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The European Union Global Strategy

1st February 2016



Report, The European Union Global Strategy

International Seminar, 1st February 2016

Instituto da Defesa Nacional / National Defence Institute, Lisbon

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In June 2016 the European Council will discuss matters decisive to the international role of European Union and to the future of its foreign, security and defence policy. With that aim the National Defence Institute organized on February 1, 2016 an international seminar, with national and European experts, dedicated to reflect and debate the future EU Global Strategy (EUGS), the place of Europe in global affairs, the current state of strategic partnerships, the challenges to its foreign and security policy, the arc of crises involving Europe from Middle East to North Africa and the future of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

This report reflects the main topics presented and discussed at the seminar. The seminar was organized by the National Defence Institute with the support of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the European Security and Defence College and held in the context of the EU Global Strategy process of open outreach and consultation. The programme was composed of three topical keynotes and two thematic panels (see programme attached to the summary report).

Opening Session

Vitor Rodrigues Viana, Director of the National Defense Institute reminded that the EUGS occurs in a very different regional and international environment of that of early 2000.

The first distinctive feature pertains to the American shift to Asia-Pacific, with a likely transference of North American strategic priorities in Europe and Middle to the Asia Pacific region, due to a growing concern with Chinese ambitions in that region. Simultaneously, the US has been 'strategically withdrawing' from the international scene, a tendency illustrated well by the expression 'leading from behind'. This new situation leads to a deeper commitment of the European Union in the production of international security.

The second change, results from the EU's own internal context. The political crisis created by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, followed by the euro crisis led to a lack of urgency regarding the development of European foreign policy and to a paralysis of Common Security and Defense Policy. The general defence budgets cuts and a decrease in investments in defense research and development initiatives may, in the short run, pose limits to the deployment of Europe's capacities, affecting the credibility of the European Union in the international system.

Third, the emergence of new powers, such as China, India and Brazil turn the world into a multipolar system. This change, institutionalised under the G20 framework, generated a reactive platform to the international financial crisis, reflecting the transformation of the very basics of power generation.

All these changes, deepened by the globalization process, have implications in the security domain, anticipating substantive transformations of regional and international balances. One observes a more complex and volatile international security environment, aggravated by the arc of crises from the Arctic to the Sahel, the Ukrainian crisis, the civil war in Syria and the power void in Libya, just to mention a few examples of a deteriorating security environment. Consequently, if the European Union is to act as a relevant global actor in the international system, it is essential to clarify its foreign and security strategic guidelines.

The debate on the EUGS is an open and inclusive one, comprehending the European institutions, the Member States and European civil society. In this context, the National Defense Institute as the main hub for the production of strategic thinking, could not be absent from this debate. The Institute has organized two round tables, with the participation of national and international experts, and today's seminar. The goal is to debate the main guidelines of the new EUGS, considering the goals, the guiding lines and the means necessary to achieve it. These are essential steps to any strategy. On the base of this endeavour are sets of principles, values and common interests essential to EU Member States and to Europe's political integration.

The EUGS should address new issues, which will differentiate it from the former European Security Strategy (ESS), namely a specific concern between the internal and external dimensions of security; an effective coordination of various foreign policy instruments and a special attention given to CSDP, a fundamental pillar of the Union's ability to project and reaffirm itself in the world. These are some of the themes we will debate, in an ambitious and motivated way.

Rui Vinhas, Portugal's Representative to the European Union's Political and Security Committee reminded that in 2013, Portugal was among the many Member States that opposed to a review of the ESS. Then, Portugal considered that the risks and threats, as stated in the 2003 ESS, were relatively up to date and that the constraints in security and defense derived from five deficits and a surplus. The deficits of political, material and financial resources, the lack of definition of priorities, problems related with capacity generation, innovation, technology and with the development of European defense industries. The surplus regarded too much sovereignty bounded concerns and national interests. A new strategy would not solve instantly these constraints.

Today we share a different consensus on the matter. Under the High Representative's initiative, Member States perceived and agreed, last June 2015, that a new Strategy is needed allowing the EU to reposition itself as an international actor. This due to the fact that, in 2014 and 2015, profound changes occurred in the security environment. The arc of instability around Europe is a fact, from Tunisia to Ukraine and in the South, from North Africa to the Sahel region. These are turbulent times towards which a new EUGS became consensually necessary and crucial.

On the contents of the EUGS, there is a need to reach an outlining and a commitment on what does Europe want to define as its level of ambition. One believes that the Union should point to a level of ambition, which allows it to play as a credible international actor, in cooperation with others, so that it may decisively and substantially contribute to the resolution of crises that affect Europe's interests.

On geographical the scope of the EUGS, this is a particular delicate matter, at a time when many Member States are focus on the geographical boundaries of Europe's map, leading to a vision of a closed Europe. The EUGS will be an opportunity to open, globalize and balance those views. Europe should aim at becoming a global actor. Europe needs a global vision, global interests and a balanced approach to priorities in terms of geographical contours.

On partnerships, they are an instrument and an end in themselves, enabling multilateral cooperation. The EU partnerships web should be as vast and deepen as possible. The UN, NATO, OSCE and African Union must occupy the frontline, without forgetting Asian organizations, the African sub-regional and Latin-American institutions and the Arab League. They are all qualified to become EU's strategic partners, with a special cooperative relation towards NATO. The EUGS is an opportunity to underline potential cooperative initiatives.

On thematic and global issues such as : migrations, terrorism, organized crime, energy and energy security, the climate change agenda, the seas and oceans are a central part of Europe's international role and interests to be protected. The seas and oceans are priority areas to which Portugal will pay a special attention.

On CSDP, it is a structuring element of the European project, of Europe's external action and of its own security. An ambitious, substantive, robust and well defined approach to CSDP is required. There is no security without defense and no defense without capabilities. Thus, Europe must develop the required capabilities to produce and export security, but also to ensure its own security and defense. One must avoid feeding tensions, between CSDP, Europe's strategic autonomy and deterrence.

Finally, the issues of inter-institutional relationships, the resources and capabilities to implement the goals and the priorities agreed. The EUGS will be a script for the EU's external action for the next 10 years. As a privileged observer in Brussels, Ambassador Vinhas pointed out the following aspects. The first, regards ownership and the future commitment of Member States and institutions on how the EUGS will be applied in actual actions. This implies a closer involvement of Member States in its drafting process and its 'approval' at the highest level that is, by the European Council, not just 'endorsement', 'welcome' note or 'take note' remark. The second, pertains to the political-diplomatic efforts that should be set avoiding the proliferation of sub-strategies. The EUGS should reflect a consensual approach to international affairs. The third, concerns the method used to generate an all-inclusive EUGS, including matters such as: trade, development, democracy, climate change, but also the nexus internal-external security, European policies and the link between security and development.

The European Defence Action Plan, in particular in the field of defense industries, puts in evidence the need for better communication between CFSP and CSDP and those policies that fall into the Commission's competences. The same can be said regarding capacity building, where member States are looking to deepen the Commission's engagement. There is no security or defense without capabilities and their strengthening depends on a change of minds about it, that is, the understanding that committing to common mechanisms and instruments, does not mean to give away Member States independence or sovereignty.

José Alberto de Azeredo Lopes, Portuguese Minister of Defense, pointed out to the existence of a new security environment of a complex nature, with threats which are more pressing and dangerous than in earlier days. In such context, the European Union should not let to others the

duties and tasks regarding its own security and above all its defense. On what concerns the developments in our neighbourhood, Europe's enthusiasm over the Arab Spring movements led to a propensity to reactive policies, opening up large unprotected spaces in Maghreb and the Sahel region. Within Europe, other type of risks have emerged, from cyber threats to the resurrection of populist expressions, which resonate with dormant nationalisms. More than the difficulties with building a robust foreign and defense policy, the risk of fragmentation in several 'European' foreign and security policies, appears to be a far greater challenge.

Portugal has been contributing to the drafting of a European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, welcoming the fact it opens opportunities to all relevant stakeholders: Member States, institutions and civil society have, here, an opportunity to contribute to strengthen our global position and agree on a clear definition of our own strategic interests. Portugal's values the EUGS priorities: supporting democratic resilience both internally and in the neighbouring regions is the paramount goal of this exercise. The Strategy's proposal for a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to crisis management and conflict resolution, is indisputable and even long overdue. The vision it carries directed at the four quadrants of the compass is most welcome: one needs only to recall that to the East, we face the agendas of actors such as: Russia, Ukraine and Poland and that, to the South, we have an obligation to provide protection to the victims of the conflict in Syria, to defend our interests and values against Daesh and to fight poverty and hopelessness in the African continent.

These are some of the backgrounds against which Europe cannot fail to consolidate its role as a major international actor. Europe must take the lead regarding its own defense and security or otherwise it will find itself impaired both politically and in its essence.

That is why, Portugal welcomes the preparatory works to draft and adopt a European Defense Action Plan, in close articulation with the EUGS. As a matter of fact, the European Defense Action Plan should be an instrument of the European Global Strategy, by contributing to foster Europe's strategy autonomy, notably by helping us develop the internal market for dual use – civilian and military – technologies.

Current challenges transcend frontiers: on the positive side of globalisation, we can mention internet and migrations, but, on the negative side we have terrorism and cybercrime. Thus, a sound defense is a pre-condition of security, enabling us to guarantee the rights and freedoms of our citizens and the pluralist, diverse and open character of our societies.

“Defense” shall not replace “security”, but its cross- sectoral nature requires that it should play a special role in the EUGS. Every Member State should, therefore, be prepared to contribute to European defense, in a proportion way to its capacities and, in accordance with a principle of geographic equity.

A European common defense must be an essential instrument of foreign policy, placed at the service of Europe’s geopolitical and diplomatic priorities, whether one refers to the exportation of defense technologies, to maritime security, fight against proliferation of chemical weapons or by fighting the traffic of human beings.

The Minister of Defense concluded his introductory speech by stressing some of the challenges the EUGS will face, in the field of security and defense. How can the EUGS promote a common strategic culture among Member States? How will this culture translate into a common defense grammar practice? How will this culture and practice help mitigate and act preventively towards the threats that affect our citizens, protecting their rights and freedoms? How can the EUGS be recognisable by the EU’s international partners? What kind of partnerships should the Union develop with NATO, the UN and OSCE or with ECOWAS, ASEAN or the South-American Defense Council?

Europe needs to establish a foreign and security strategy that serves its civilizational premises in a globalised world, affected by tragedies such as the one in the Mediterranean Sea and by the effects of transnational threats such as terrorism.

Keynote address - The New Global Strategy of the European Union

Nathalie Tocci, Special Adviser to High Representative Federica Mogherini introduced the main topics and recent developments of the coming EU Global Strategy (EUGS). She started by outlining the reasons why a new strategy was needed, referring to the process through which this strategy is being developed and in which stage is the drafting of the EUGS.

Why do Europe needs a new strategy? The international context is changing fast and a new way of looking the world is needed, through a strategic exercise that may lead us to a common narrative on security and foreign policy. There is a tendency to highlight fragmentation rather than cohesion, whether one refers to Brexit, Grexit, Russia or the refugee crisis. Foreign policy can be the domain where attempts to reconcile may be tried and despite internal divisions,

Europeans realise that unity is needed. The sense of global urgency, present today, can be capitalised by the EUGS by pressing for a common narrative. This common narrative regards the political meaning about why we engaging in a strategic review. A second reason pertains to moving from a common narrative, to doing more for common actions, for which a common vision is required.

How is it being done? The first phase took the form of a strategic assessment presented by the High Representative (HR) in June 2015, when a mandate was given to produce a EUGS on the base of an actionable document. This will be a HR document, meaning that it will not be drafted on a committee drafting mode, nonetheless it involves consultations with Member States. How are these consultations taking place? A group of national contact points was created, with which meetings are set almost once a month, together with other processes of consultation with the Political and Security Committee, with the COREPER, with political, security, defence directors, with military representatives and during the Gymnich informal meeting of foreign ministers, which signifies that work has been conducted with Member States in different formats. This exercise is a drafting exercise, incrementally adding content and substance to the document. Another main partner in the drafting process has been the European Commission (EC) and various representatives of all the Directorates-General from Trade to Development, considering that HR Mogherini is a double hatted entity in the EU. A third level of engagement consists of open outreach and consultations with think tanks and research centres in Europe, America and Asia, seeking contact with experts and with the general public.

What is the global content of the EUGS and why was it chosen to name it a 'strategy'? It is global due to the Union's global presence in trade and development and the fact it is the first economical global actor in the international system. Despite the fact deeper challenges are close to Europe's home, Europe has to share a broader view towards global affairs from food sustainability to climate change. The EUGS is not only geographically broad, with a regional focus to the East and South, but also thematically global, comprising thematic concerns from security, trade, development, climate change, development, migrations to cyber policies.

On what regards the baseline of the EUGS strategy, the EU interests have been identified reflecting the struggle between the internal-external divide, with three internal interests with foreign implications and a fourth one, exclusively external. The first is an interest on its people and territory, which leads to a specific concern with peace and stability in the surrounding regions. Second, the EU has an interest in its own prosperity, consequently sustainable

development in an open economic world-wide system does matters. Third, it wishes to safeguard values that underpin our democratic system, meaning that the way we conduct our foreign policy has to be wed to those democratic values, in the wide range of foreign policy problems. Fourth, it sustains a rules global based order.

Engagement, responsibility and partnership are reflected on the EUGS and these dimensions are familiar to the security and defence constituencies, but less acquainted to, for instance, internal security agencies. In a more *contested* world, Europe has to engage in long term and cooperative solutions for conflicts and looking for the root causes through preventive measures and actions. Being the world more *complex*, because power is diffused, one has to think better on how do we partner within and with others. Perhaps a distinction should be made between those with whom we can always be partners with (e.g. UN, NATO, OSCE and the US) and those with whom an occasional partnership is needed to solve specific problems.

The EUGS sets five main priorities. First, the European Union is a *security community* and this starts at home. The EUGS reacts to a growing impression that the EU is the 'soft belly' of the European security, which is crucial to the credibility of the document, in terms of defence. For many, NATO will remain a reference point for collective security. This means the EU Member States have to take better care of their security and defence, whether at NATO or EU framework. What can the EU do to avoid becoming an alibi for Member States not doing more? We need to strengthen capability development, encourage cooperation and develop the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Collective security is more than collective defence covering counter-terrorism, intelligence share and cooperation, cyber capabilities, energy security, strategic communication and the dangers of hybrid risks. Migration policy and migration crisis are the most recent challenge towards which Europe needs an internal common asylum system, a better border management policy and better external security cooperation by working with countries of origin.

The second priority is *peace and stability* in the surrounding regions, beyond the neighbourhood policy region, from Afghanistan to the Republic Democratic of Congo. Different problems require different instruments and we have to leverage them accordingly. For the Balkans and Turkey, a special accession tool applies, but although we need to improve the EU accession process, there are investments to be made where states and societies resilience is on demand. What can we do to improve it? This situation includes countries within the neighbourhood policy and those beyond it and with no interest in taking part in it. To *improve resilience*, it is not only states,

institutions and structures we must be concerned with. We must target, justice, security and defence arenas as levels of primary concern to the EU, but we also have to go beyond that. This implies a broader look into inclusive governance, social and economic development, energy and climate, climate adaptation, cyber-resilience and the protection of critical structures accordingly to different states and societies' different interpretations of resilience.

Conflicts are the third priority of the EUGS by stretching the meaning of comprehensive approach into a wider approach, especially in societies where the centre of government and governance has collapsed. This means that we need to look into conflicts in a multidimensional way (security, defence, development and humanitarian). This approach has also to be multi-temporal with a special interest on prevention, which is what the EU does best. The necessity to remain in theatre in a sustainable way is another temporal dimension, we need to pay attention to. But if the centre of government or governance has collapse, what can we do? To work at the centre is not always enough, so a local dimension of sustainability is required, for instance by promoting cease fires with local actors, because it may be more efficient to do so. A true multilateral dimension means that cooperation has to be promoted with international and local actors on the ground.

The fourth priority goes to *broader regional security and cooperation*, which closes in different stories of success. If we think about cooperation with the North on issues like the Arctic, climate change, research, science and innovation, this leads to a necessary concern on cooperation with Russia and other regional partners. Improvement of relations with regional organizations, according to the security topic under observation, means for instance to improve and capitalise the NATO-EU relation by working in theatre on hybrid threats. Regarding Russia, there is broad consensus that better cooperation means respect by Moscow for international law and for European security. Despite disagreements, Europe needs to compartmentalize common interests with Russia, whether is the Middle East, terrorism, critical infrastructure, the Arctic or climate policies. Regarding Asia, relations with China have to do with infrastructure, with Chinese connectivity drives and how can we cooperate within them. Security dimension should be reassessed by focusing on the practical provision of security in Asia. How can we provide better security in Indian Ocean? How to help South Korea regarding the nuclear issue with its northerner neighbour? On what concerns relations with Southern partners, like the Arab League or the African Union, they have unfortunately reflected more the existing divides, than potential commonalities. The EUSG will offer platforms for better regional diplomacy that may mitigate

those divides. The success with the negotiations with Iran, may raise hopes for better cooperation with this regional actor. The problems pertaining to Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions lead to think these regions with a different mental geography, due to their potential to contaminate local stability and affect whole regions.

Global governance is the last priority in the EUGS. In 2003 multilateralism meant to preserve the system, but today the situation is different, so how to reform institutions and create new governance mechanisms, not necessarily highly institutionalized? How to create governance mechanisms at the frontier of global affairs, like terrorism, cyber or energy? How to think global governance from a bottom-up approach? How can bilateral and pluri-lateral agreements help fair trade and protect resources? These questions will certainly be looked at.

Finally, the future implications of the EUGS will require better coherence between the EU and other regional and international institution and better ways of working together. Flexibility will be an important word and perhaps the best way to deal with current uncertainty.

Panel 1 “EU’s Strategic Partnerships”

On the global approach to partnerships addressed by Cristina Barrios important points of reflection were suggested. It was recognised that in drafting of the EUGS there is a close connection between themes and geographies. The weight of geography translates into a better relation between the East and the West and a need to better engage with partners, despite the temptation to be less inclusive. With whom should the EU engage? With the big players or with the lesser powers, with whom it can make a difference? What are the priorities at the multilateral level and how can this be compatible with the global dimension?

The EUGS is also about how others see us, not only how we see the world. The idea of a necessary focus on the East and South is welcomed among Member States and among regional actors. Turkey, for instance, is a strong EU candidate and a NATO member, with a pivotal role on the refugee crisis. How to engage it? There is an expectation that the EU can be a match for the US, Russia, India, China, but some are not interested about the EU. The EU has more leverage than other international actors, supporting political transition, democratisation and by ensuring peaceful elections. Therefore, we need to move interests towards effective policies and actions with stronger international and regional partners.

Multilateralism and regional architectures are also relevant for the EUGS. There has been a lot of support for regional organisations, because we can draw from our own experience, our

democracy led to progress and peace. But on the other hand, there is a lot of competition among organizations. How to deal with these multilateral and regional structures as stronger systems of global governance?

And last how do we use strategic partners? We would need a mix of approaches: security and economics or by promoting arenas of common values. There are still power houses in each of these regions, so we should look for the partners with specific regional weight and work with them regionally.

On the EU-NATO partnership, Isabel Ferreira Nunes defined the scope of partnership as a EU foreign policy instrument in three dimensions: political consultation, capability development and crisis management. This partnership contains some limitations derived from the fact there is a prevailing notion that strategic partners are only possible among equals, sharing a grand strategy, integrated approaches to foreign, security and defence policy, both at the conceptual and doctrinal level and very precise definitions on why, where and how to act. This may not always work between the EU and NATO. A more contested, connected and complex world, as the EUGS suggests, requires strategic approaches to security partnerships, which can meet diversity, which are tailored made, flexible and adaptable to emergent security and defence risks leading to better European coordination and external cooperation with the Alliance. For the moment, CSDP and development cooperation should focus on what they do best concerning non exclusively military emergency missions and operations. While NATO should focus on military dissuasive and reactive action, towards high intensity military contingencies, without meaning that Europe, in the medium term, should not be able to act at the high end of the military operational spectrum. The EUGS should also contribute to help reassessing perceptions of organizational efficiency between CSDP and NATO, underlining their complementary strategic functions and their specific added value to regional and international security. This is a difficult task, considering that the NATO and the EU comprise states with distinct strategic cultures and outlooks, which affect the comprehensiveness of security agendas, the very concept of strategic partnership and the choice of preferred strategic partners, whether one refers to the EU/CSDP or NATO.

How to improve it? The defence dimension of EUGS should pave the way to solve the problem of access to NATO's command, control and planning capabilities, by CSDP operations, under the Berlin Plus agreement. This could be done, whether by introducing an 'opt-out clause' option, for those NATO allies and European Member States that often block the use of this mechanism,

therefore abstaining, without impairing access to those capabilities by the EU, as a part or a whole. A clearer position of the US administration on European defence would also be welcomed. This would facilitate the building of coalitions of willing, under a NATO-EU partnership flag and the development of commitments regarding Permanent Structure Cooperation among like-minded and strategically capable partners, without unnecessary capabilities overstretch and undesirable institutional tensions. On capabilities, EDA has identified deficits, which a better cooperation with NATO and the US could help overcoming, on what concerns strategic air lift, air-to-air refuelling, surveillance, reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defences.

A strong partnership demands that bilateral political and security initiatives of Member States and allies strengthen a comprehensive transatlantic security agenda. This means that information and knowledge on strategic affairs must be shared; that cooperation among those who can and will take the lead results in added value to prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution and that coordination and cooperation occurs among those that can offer the best and most sustainable solutions to local, regional and international security problems.

On the EU-Africa partnership, José Costa Pereira stressed the importance of including the sub-Saharan Africa in the EUGS for five reasons. First, they are close neighbours, so geographical proximity matters. Second, there are many threats sourced in the region from illegal migration, trafficking of people and goods, pandemics, to terrorism and the demographic challenge. By 2050 African population will have double. Third, partnerships are important because soft powers need friends to spread values and interests, for which Europe should bind with likeminded partners. Fourth, due to common economic interests and the presence of substantial raw materials, being Africa a significant trade partner. Fifth, people's connectivity: many Africans live in Europe and many Europeans live in Africa, which is crucial to bind both continents.

There are several types of framework agreement between the EU and Africa, being the Cotonou Agreement one of them. Though the political partnership was strengthened in the road from Lomé to Cotonou it is still very much anchored in a donor-receiver relationship sourced in the European Development Fund. Cotonou is reaching its end and this poses questions on how do we wish to shape future relations with Africa, which of course will impact on the EUGS drafting. Then we have diverse bilateral partnerships with many different African countries, with whom special relations have been built. Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are important EU partners. The Joint EU

Partnership with Africa agreed in 2007 is not a European strategy vis-à-vis Africa, but a strategy that underlines common values, ownership, common responsibility, peace, security, prosperity, interdependence and joint responsibility. The aim in 2007, as today's, called for concerns regarding clean environment, terrorism, pandemics and climate change. Ten years later, a new summit will reflect whether or not we should review the strategy with Africa. The relations with the Gulf region and the troubles in the Sahel will certainly introduce new security themes in the partnership agenda and a better attention should be paid to other strategic partners in the African continent: China, the USA or Brazil, for instance. New opportunities like those posed by trust funds, blending economic partnership agreements claim a more inclusive approach in response to current challenges. Terrorism is one of these challenges, so empowering Africans regarding the fight on terrorism is crucial and it is now perceived as a real threat by governments and societies. A close reflection on the root causes of terrorism is a requisite to security, whether they lay on fragility, absence of governance and rule of law or poverty. Countries of the region should help fighting these challenges. Climate change also received a positive welcome from Africans and so has the reassessment of the European Development Fund hoping that, one day, it may be totally replaced by investment and trade. Wealth distribution is also a challenge and so is demography and increasing poverty around urban areas, where sometimes radicalization finds its grassroots.

The EUGS, the revision of the Cotonou Agreement and the next EU-Africa summit should mutually reinforce the position of Europe and of Africa in the world.

Keynote address - On the EU's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges António Vitorino, noted that the separation line between internal and external security is now thinner. Consequently, when referring to defence, one has to keep in mind the specific nature of it and question whether one refers to the military apparatus or rather a much broader perspective. In times of transition, there is a conceptual confusion between internal and external security. The failure of the 2004 Neighbourhood Policy opened space to a growing regional instability and to this, one must add the inability of the European Union to anticipate the crisis, to assess the future of the Arab Spring movements and its consequences to Europe's security, notably with the refugee crisis.

If we look to what has been done in foreign and security in Europe, since the Solana document was adopted, the role of Europe in enhancing security in low key crises has been positive, but limited by budgetary constraints on who pays. There is a need for a revision of missions financing

method in order to enhance sustainability of these missions. The EU links, in a unique way, the military, police and civilian dimensions within its missions and operations, winning a substantial comparative advantage. We need a comprehensive view and a global strategy, but there is a difference between having a global strategy and the belief that the EU can do the whole spectrum of crisis management. Consequently, Europe should select and prioritize in order to be able to deal with the fact it gathers 28 Members States.

A second idea regards capabilities. There is a need to develop common military and police capabilities, despite the serious budget cuts, which impaired the possibility to turn the financial crisis that hit Europe, into an opportunity, affecting its ability to act internationally. We should focus on what capabilities we are lacking most. Pooling and Sharing will not solve all Europe's problems in terms of capabilities, but if we wish to have a joint initiative on capabilities, one should blend various sources of financing by Members States, CSDP and the Commission. A good assessment of the capabilities, equipment and training needed, is a requisite.

There are parallel developments that should be taken into account, namely the revision of NATO strategic perspective, in July 2016. Another parallel development has to do with how France and Germany will position themselves vis-à-vis CSDP, due to United Kingdom's possibility to exit the EU. This will undoubtedly affect how the EUGS will be drafted and its future credibility.

Which priorities should be addressed. First the jihadist threat and second the relationship with Russia, in the near boarder and in the Middle East. Between 2005 and 2015, we had no major successful terrorist attacks in Europe. But the recent attacks in France and the spread of new terrorist actors pose new challenges to the European security. In Eurobarometer record, for the past 20 years, the position of Europeans in favour of CSDP is very high. However, Europeans consider migration one of the top threats to European security, which poses a trap by confusing migrations with terrorist threats, without a proper distinction of migrants, refugees and terrorists. Ten years without successful terrorist attacks means that European coordination, exchange of information and intelligence has been effective. The new Counter Terrorist Centre in Europol needs to be attached to a new strategy on terrorism and Europe needs better cooperation and better levels of mutual trust.

On what concerns Russia, Europe needs to be firm regarding Ukraine and strengthen sanctions towards it. Russia is needed to solve the Syrian problem, regardless firmness on Ukraine. This will not work easily in the short term. One needs to be firm simultaneously towards Ukraine, but at the same time to open channels to dialogue with Moscow.

It appears that, the European public opinion has a more advanced view on the need of a CFSP, than European politicians. This will require a re-legitimization of the European Union at the eyes of its citizens. Europe needs to be focus to be able to deliver positive outcomes.

Three main priorities for the EUGS were suggested. The first regards, fight against ISIS. France valued CSDP by invoking the Solidarity Clause, last November, although the wording of 'war on terrorism' should have not been used. Various positive consequences resulted from this: the British overcame the opposition of the Parliament and joined the air strikes against ISIS positions in Syria. The Germans became more engaged with the international coalition on Syria and more committed to CSDP, supplying the coalition, together with Belgium and Sweden, with material and personnel. The Syrian crisis requires a political solution and this should be a European priority.

Second, regards migrations, refugee's crisis and external border control. We need to bear in mind we have a common responsibility towards the external borders of Europe and avoid the collapse of Schengen. Members states are responsible for border control, but they share very different standards and a weak approach may compromise the whole European territory. Cooperation with Turkey is essential in controlling the fluxes of refugees and mitigate illegal trafficking of people. The Dublin Agreement should be revised and a new asylum regulation is required, because the majority of the asylum status is not conceded in the countries where refugees arrive.

Third, regards the exchange of information and intelligence dealing with terrorist networks. A lot of improvements have been achieved, but there is not a culture of open exchange among intelligence communities in Europe, given they are too focus on trade-offs. The latest attacks in Paris prove this lack of exchange culture within Europe, with the US, with Morocco, with Algeria and with Russia. The Commission should also change its approach on how it can help fighting terrorist threats, by placing aid development at the service of stability of countries, where migrants come from, because these countries are also interested about discussing fluxes of migrants. Financial aid, economical aid and trade are key tools to stabilise countries of provenience of migrants and they should be integrated in our foreign and security views. A kind of 'National Security Council' could be instituted to bring together different perceptions on foreign policy. Member states have different outlooks, from world powers to countries with specific interests in certain parts of the globe, where more valuable relations can be developed.

This could contribute to enhance a common culture on how to assess and evaluate threats, helping politicians setting priorities.

Panel 2 “The Middle East and North African Arc of Crises”

Florence Gaub pointed out that the main security problem concerns insurgencies that are efficient, flexible, motivated, all what the Arab armies are not. Insurgencies go beyond the so called Islamic State. There are insurgents with the same goals and tactics that have nothing to do with Islamist orientation and they just take advantage of political voids in power. Local military forces and police forces are our partners in the fight against terrorism, but with limitations. They are modern forces fighting post-modern phenomenon. They lack the capacity for surgical attacks, for instance one must note how the Lebanese army in 2007, flattened a Palestinian camp, while looking for a group of fighters that had infiltrated there. Egypt is not able to mitigate attacks in the Sinai region and since 2010 these have increased significantly.

Youth unemployment, growing demographical tendencies and the impact of climate change on development will have consequences on these challenges and risks. Europe and the countries in the region are interested about different perspectives of the problem in fighting insurgency. While Europe looks for a political solution, countries in the region are looking for a security answer. Insurgencies are a politically phenomenon with a security dimension, so both dimensions should be taken into account.

Our security is related with regional security, but the European expression of foreign fighter is a European borne problem, so we cannot look for a solution outside Europe, when it resides in it. 20 to 25% of the jihadists are converts, coming from secular families. This means that reducing the problem to a cultural dimension, misses what leads these people to insurgency. Where radicalisation hits harder, is where the percentage of unemployed people is greater, reaching as far as 30% or more of youth unemployed. Two regions meet this numbers: the Middle East and Europe. It is not perceived as a security problem, but it results in a very toxic combination.

Where states have already broken down like in Syria, Libya or parts of Iraq the Europeans are concerned with political solutions, which is an illusion. In Libya, for instance, we are trying to make small steps towards stabilisation, but disarming militias is a wider challenge and makes part of a larger process. Europeans are resilient in engaging in security solutions, but this will not solve the security problems in the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria, during the negotiation process, there should be an explicit international commitment to a security force,

which would supervise the agreement. The local conditions are not making it easier for Europeans and non-European to engage directly with armed forces, but this commitment could help re-establishing trust among local armed groups.

On partners, training and capacity, partners need time, more than equipment and training. The Lebanese military, after 2006, received long term support from Europe and the United States, which enable them to become more resilient to security threats.

Claire Spencer observed that our perception of the region, from Mauritania to Pakistan, should be oriented to the differences and look for solutions at the individual level with different countries and governments. When one thinks in terms of crisis, and this is a European and US fixation on ISIS and terrorism, it comes attached to migrants and our inability to deal with the numbers arriving and to find common solutions for it. In the region, 99,9% of the people eligible to join ISIS are not joining it. We should look into the needs and expectations of local younger generations, especially by changing our views on the demographic problem, because in the region the birth rate is declining, including in Egypt, due to better education and health care. Cooperation between Europe and North Africa should target also areas that are already generating solutions, such as energy and electric power sustainability.

We should evaluate our perceptions on the region and on its pressing problems, looking at jihadism as a symptom, rather than the cause. Otherwise we will look at outcomes, rather than structural issues.

The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, with its funding approach, did not address the consequences of problems in the region and departed from the principle that everything can be done in an intergovernmental manner, with willing governments. Agreements can be reached at this level, but it does not mean that we have to implement them in that very same manner. We have to integrate problems we are facing in Southern Europe, with those experienced in Northern Europe.

On new partnerships, the Mediterranean Growth Initiative (MGI) added a new vision to development, rather than looking at EU economies versus non EU economies. It has amalgamated trade, investment and movements in the Mediterranean region, seeking to create a common hub, linking both rims of the Mediterranean. The MGI concluded that in the Mediterranean region it occurs 10% of the global trade, which may turn it attractive to investors, in particularly with the EU element present.

We cannot have mixed models of development, let's say in Libya, if we do not know where countries are heading. Europeans could divide support to militias, in a way direct funding would leveraged to some conditionality from their side in supporting the new government. During transition periods, the state's role is important in ensuring some kind of stability by providing employment opportunities, but it is not a sustainable model, especially if tinted by corruption.

A European long term vision should be anchored to structural changes in the region, to developing the local private sector and connecting it to the European one, providing the incentive to development and employment, helping to stabilise younger populations and making their countries appealing to them, rather than promoting migration. Younger generations in the region are interested about educational reform, unemployment and a voice in their future, not about radical ideologies.

Ana Santos Pinto analysed the connection between the Mediterranean region and the EUGS document at three levels: the institutional, the political and the regional security level. At the institutional level the moment is the right one to assess if the Lisbon Treaty, as a common political umbrella, had a workable impact and how the 28 Member States perceive it and wish to proceed in the future. At the political level, the financial crisis aggravated cleavages between north and south and deepen different perspectives on the refugee crisis and the internal crisis ahead, with the UK position regarding the EU, which will pose challenges in achieving a common voice. At the regional security level, one may refer to the arc of crisis, but within Europe the crisis rises in the Arctic, moves to Ukraine and ends the Middle East and Sahel.

The internal, external and regional environment of crisis compromised the 2003 notion of a prosperous, free and safe Europe. The new crises are multiple, linked, parallel and lasting. These connects to the social-economical dimension of solutions and with our security perceptions of the region.

This calls for a strategy, but what kind of strategy? What are Members States able and willing to do in the Middle East. The way is to focus on what we do best and that is support for socio-economical change, civil society and new generations. Do we have partners? The Neighbourhood Policy offers a platform for partnership very different from the Gulf region partners, that integrate the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The region is characterised by many interlinked problems starting with the Iraq war, the Arab Spring, the NATO military intervention in Libya and the power vacuum that followed, the rise of

ISIS, the development of the Iranian nuclear programme, the structural problems pertaining to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the situation in Lebanon and the Kurdish issue. To this one must add the return of identity politics, based on an identity narrative that is opposed to the other. In the Middle East, identity politics is strong and cannot be solved by traditional instruments of crisis management and conflict resolution. Identity conflicts are framed by instability, violence, power struggle, failed states and extremism and these are not solved in a short term period. In North Africa, Tunisia is taking its path through political transition, but in a difficult security situation. Libya faces a power vacuum, without capacity to control the territory, affected by power struggles. Algeria is fighting extremism, flows of people and arms with a potential to contaminate other geographies.

The EUGS puts interests first. Secondly, sets priorities and goals, seeking for resilience in supporting stability and democratic reform, investment in regional security architectures and mechanisms. But will all this apply to a region as North Africa and Middle East? Can we fulfil local expectations? Can we promise results, we are unsure to attain?

But an even bigger problem regards the capabilities to implement the EUGS. An effective and combined approach to foreign policy is needed, but can we talk at one voice, when European actors have their own interests to safeguard? In order to engage in crisis management, we need the right civilian and military capabilities to do so. Current crises are not going away anytime soon. The EU can work to implement a EUGS or to let 'the ring of fire' in the southern rim to burn. The way ahead seems to fit in the middle.

Keynote address - Common Security and Defense Policy – The Way Ahead

Thierry Tardy identified five aspects when looking at CSDP, in the context of EUGS. First, defence will have to be central. The EU is not a military alliance, but yet the 'D' in CSDP cannot be ignored. The use of military force is one of the tools at the EU disposal to face security challenges. This would be the worst moment to ignore it, due to the multifaceted characteristics of the current security environment and threats, which require a military dimension, also given the pivotal shift of the US to Asia. Europe should not give up on one of the key elements of any relevant security actor.

Second, European defense is a problem, in the sense that it is controversial and contentious. More than 20 years after Maastricht and 17 years after Saint Malo, one is still not sure about the meaning of the 'D' in CSDP. Article 42, paragraph 7, regards the 'defence clause', which

indicates a possible role for the EU in exercising defence in case a Member State is object of an attack, but misses the EU as the framework for it, by rather stressing the role of Member States, contrary to the Solidarity Clause. Even when France invoked this clause, it was taken in a more bilateral context, between France and the Member States. There are divergent strategic cultures among Member States, as referred earlier, some are comfortable with the use of coercive and military force under a EU frame, but others are less at ease with it. NATO still plays a central role in collective defense, both in conceptual and operational terms. The UK has placed a red line regarding defence, in the context of the EUGS drafting. This poses the problem of whether Member States that are reluctant about European defense would in the end endorse a document that makes defence one of its central themes. Therefore one challenge is for the HR to calibrate correctly the place defence will have in the document, so that all Member States find their own views reflected.

Third, CSDP is much more than defence; it also incorporates security and here two issues arise. First, CSDP is about civilian missions and military operations. If the EU wishes to take a stand on the international scene, it will have to do more, both in civilian and military dimensions, better connecting missions and operations with broader policy goals and strategic objectives in theatre. These missions and operations also need to be better supported, notably in terms of force generation and better financed. The EU will not play a military role in CSDP, if financing problems are not solved and the current rule of 'costs lie where they fall' is not changed. Second, are these missions and operations adapted to the current security challenges and threats like terrorism, cyber, migrations, hybrid threats or internal-external security nexus? One judges the relevance of a tool by its propensity to adapt to the needs. CSDP operations such as EUNAVFOR MED or EUCAP Sahel Niger and Mali were deployed to address parts of these problems. But on a topic such as hybrid threats, one argument is that the first line of defence lies in the Commission rather than with CSDP operations.

The fourth issue regards partnerships and how much partnerships are intertwined with CSDP missions and operations. On EU-NATO, if we look at threats and challenges, one sees how much politicised and little institutionalised this relation is. The time has come to overcome political difficulties and the EU HR and NATO SG should review the fundamentals of the Berlin Plus agreement and build a true strategic partnership given that priorities from both sides are so similar. The EU-UN relationship is far more institutionalised than the EU-NATO and it has been a rather successful story, both at the headquarters and field levels. Cooperation between both

organizations is drawn on the basis of what they do best. Also, while in the past 15 years, most of the troop contributors to UN operations would come from non-EU UN members, one now sees that countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and eventually the UK are coming back to UN operations. As for the EU-African Union relation, if in the initial phase of it, resided the idea of overcoming the traditional donor-recipient logic, ten years after that top-down characteristic is still present. The relation is still of an asymmetrical nature and about capacity building of one institution by the other.

The fifth and last point has to do with the wording in the EUGS. One must move beyond wishful thinking to engage in a true operational approach to foreign and security policy so as to guarantee the credibility of the document. More robust wording will be necessary to commit further Member States and institutions and draw them to implementation. Three issues would need to be present. One being the employment of the notions of 'strategic autonomy' that appeared in the December's Council Conclusions of 2013, implying that the EU should be able to undertake operations autonomously of external actors, like the US or NATO. The second word, despite the fact that 'collective defence' will not appear, is 'solidarity' in the defence field. 'Deterrence' and 'reassurance' are valuable words for countries of Eastern Europe, which need to be reassured on the sense of solidarity by other Member States. Finally, 'Shared strategic culture' is a necessary term to any credible defence. It assumes that the EU develops the notion of homogenous political and strategic identity and shared conceptions on the use of force, meaning that the EU would act as a whole and not only Member States acting accordingly to very different strategic cultures. This should be perceived as a necessary political objective leading to deeper integration.

The European Union Global Strategy

International Seminar

Instituto da Defesa Nacional / National Defence Institute

1st February 2016

10h00 – Welcome and opening remarks

Vitor Viana, Director, *National Defence Institute (IDN)*

Rui Vinhas, *Portugal's Representative to the Political and Security Committee*

José Alberto de Azeredo Lopes, *Portuguese Minister of Defence*

Morning session

10h30 – The New Global Strategy of the European Union

Keynote: Nathalie Tocci, *Special Adviser to HR/VP Federica Mogherini, Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)*

Moderator – Isabel Ferreira Nunes

11h45 – Panel “EU’s Strategic Partnerships”

Cristina Barrios, *Policy Advisor, Strategic Planning, European External Action Service*

Isabel Ferreira Nunes, *Head of the Research Department, National Defence Institute*

José Costa Pereira, *Adviser, Africa Department, European External Action Service (EEAS)*

Moderator – Ana Santos Pinto

Afternoon Session

14h30 – EU’s Foreign and Security Policy Challenges

Keynote: António Vitorino, *Former EU Commissioner, President, Notre Europe*

Moderator – José Costa Pereira

15h30 – Panel “The Middle East and North African Arc of Crises”

Claire Spencer, *Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House*

Ana Santos Pinto, *Researcher, National Defence Institute*

Florence Gaub, *Senior Adviser, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*

Moderator – Bruno Cardoso Reis

16h35 – Common Security and Defense Policy – The Way Ahead

Keynote: Thierry Tardy, *Senior Researcher, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*

Moderator – Isabel Ferreira Nunes