

## IV SEMINÁRIO DE DEFESA NACIONAL

ALBERTO MARINHEIRO, ANA BALTAZAR, BOGA RIBEIRO, BRUNO CARDOSO REIS, CHRISTIAN WOOD, COELHO GOMES, HELENA CARREIRAS, HERMÍNIO MAIO, ISABEL FERREIRA NUNES, JOSÉ LUIS CALVO ALBERO, LEMOS PIRES, MARCO CAPITÃO FERREIRA, MARCO SERRONHA, MICHAEL ZILLMER-JOHNS, PETER MARX, PIA FUHRHOP, SILVA PEREIRA

INSTITUTO DA DEFESA NACIONAL  
17 E 18 DE NOVEMBRO, 2022



# IV Seminário de Defesa Nacional

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Os Cadernos do IDN resultam do trabalho de investigação residente e não residente promovido pelo Instituto da Defesa Nacional. Os temas abordados contribuem para o enriquecimento do debate sobre questões nacionais e internacionais.

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## Programa

### Dia 17 – SESSÕES RESERVADAS

A participação das Forças Armadas em missões e operações no exterior visa garantir a defesa da independência nacional e da integridade do território, assim como a liberdade e segurança dos cidadãos nacionais, designadamente, através da satisfação dos compromissos internacionais do Estado português no âmbito militar. Perante alterações profundas no contexto securitário com impactos diretos e indiretos na projeção de Forças Nacionais Destacadas, desde a retirada das forças internacionais do Afeganistão até à invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia, importa refletir sobre lições identificadas em missões recentes, que possam ser vertidas no novo ciclo de planeamento estratégico de Portugal. As três sessões previstas, que terão lugar em formato reservado, serão centradas em: 1) debater experiências emanadas da participação nacional no Mali, Moçambique e no Índico; 2) explorar a evolução institucional da NATO e da UE enquanto condição de base para um empenhamento nacional explícito com a segurança e estabilidade internacionais; e 3) avaliar o estado da cooperação interinstitucional com vista a melhor combinar os ativos e valências da Defesa Nacional e acautelar desafios atuais e futuros com impacto para os interesses de Portugal.

#### 14h00 Sessão de boas-vindas

- Prof. Dr.<sup>a</sup> Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Diretora do Instituto da Defesa Nacional
- Prof. Dr.<sup>a</sup> Helena Carreiras, Ministra da Defesa Nacional

#### 14h15 Forças Nacionais Destacadas e Lições Identificadas de Missões Internacionais

- MGEN João Boga Ribeiro, ex-Comandante da Missão de Treino da União Europeia no Mali (2020-2021) (VTC)
- BGEN Nuno Lemos Pires, ex-Comandante da Missão de Treino da União Europeia em Moçambique (2021-2022)
- CMG João Paulo Silva Pereira, ex-Comandante da Força Naval da União Europeia – Operação Atalanta (2021-2022)

**Moderação:** Dr. Pedro Seabra, Assessor da Ministra da Defesa Nacional

#### 15h00 Pausa

#### 15h15 Forças Nacionais Destacadas e Lições Identificadas de Organizações Internacionais

- TGEN Marco Serronha, Assessor para a Cooperação com África e CPLP, Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas

- **TGEN Hermínio Maio**, ex-Diretor Adjunto da Capacidade Militar de Planeamento e Condução da União Europeia

**Moderação: Dra. Susana Audi**, Assessora da Ministra da Defesa Nacional

**16h00 Forças Nacionais Destacadas e Lições Identificadas de Planeamento Estratégico**

- **BGEN Ana Baltazar**, Subdiretora-Geral da Direção-Geral de Política da Defesa Nacional
- **CFR António Coelho Gomes**, Divisão de Planeamento Estratégico Militar, Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas

**Moderação: TCOR José Pedro Mataloto**, Assessor da Ministra da Defesa Nacional

**17h00 Sessão de encerramento**

- **Prof. Dr.<sup>a</sup> Isabel Ferreira Nunes**, Diretora do Instituto da Defesa Nacional

**Day 18 – PUBLIC SESSIONS**

Good strategic planning presupposes periodic reviews of the main guiding documents. Changes in the global distribution of power, amplified by the war in Ukraine, with important consequences for the erosion of the existing multilateral order, condition the definition of national strategies in critical domains. In addition, the rapid development and application of emerging technologies in conflict situations create opportunities, but also generate risks in the field of security and defence. The IV National Defence Seminar will therefore be organized around several working panels, with the aim of contributing for the ongoing process of revision of the Portuguese Strategic Concept of National Defence. The goal is to promote a comparison of different strategic guidelines of European countries that have already been or are currently being updated, in order to identify relevant lessons in their respective approval processes.

**09h30 Welcoming session**

- **Prof. Dr. Isabel Ferreira Nunes**, Director of the National Defence Institute
- **Prof. Dr. Helena Carreiras**, Minister of National Defence

**09h40 New challenges to European strategic concepts**

- **Prof. Dr. Bruno Cardoso Reis**, Iscte-University Institute of Lisbon



**10h10 Compared Strategic Concepts: United Kingdom and the Netherlands**

- **Christian Wood**, Assistant Head – Strategy Development, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom (VTC)
- **Lt. Col. Peter Marx**, Policy Advisor at Directorate-General for Policy, Ministry of Defence, Netherlands

**Chair: Prof. Dr. Patrícia Daehnardt**, Researcher, National Defence Institute

**11h10 Break**

**11H20 Compared Strategic Concepts: Denmark, Spain and Germany**

- **Ambassador Michael Zillmer-Johns**, Chairman of the Danish Government’s Security Analysis Group, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark (VTC)
- **Colonel José Luis Calvo Albero**, Director of the Coordination and Studies Division, Secretary General of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Spain
- **Dr. Pia Fuhrhop**, Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Germany (VTC)

**Chair: COR João Barbas**, Advisor, National Defence Institute

**12H20 Closing session**

- **Prof. Dr. Isabel Ferreira Nunes**, Director of the National Defence Institute
- **Prof. Dr. Marco Capitão Ferreira**, Secretary of State for National Defence



## **IV Seminário de Defesa Nacional – I Parte**

**Dia 17 de novembro de 2022**

Este resumo inclui as considerações mais importantes na perspectiva do objetivo para o qual a Conferência foi realizada, a Revisão do Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional, e cujo conteúdo resulta dos elementos recolhidos pelo Assessor do Instituto da Defesa Nacional, na sua qualidade de relator.

Saliente-se que o presente relatório é redigido com base em observações, boas práticas e recomendações levantadas e inferidas pelo relator a partir das apresentações dos conferencistas. No entanto, considera-se que as observações e recomendações apresentadas neste relatório carecem de uma análise posterior, para que possam ser transformadas em Lições Identificadas, de utilidade no apoio técnico à tomada de decisão.

No final deste relatório elencam-se conclusões e recomendações propostas pelo IDN.

Relator: Coronel Alberto Marinheiro, Assessor de Estudos do Instituto da Defesa Nacional.



# Relatório

## Coronel Alberto Marinheiro

*Assessor de Estudos do Instituto da Defesa Nacional*

### Sumário Executivo

Este relatório elenca as conclusões e recomendações mais importantes retiradas do Seminário. Do referido pelos diversos conferencistas, foram retiradas Observações, Lições e Boas Práticas (OLBP) que se apresentam neste sumário executivo sob a forma de conclusões e recomendações.

### Conclusões

1. A UE oferece um apoio não condicionado a contrapartidas, baseado numa perspectiva de capacitação integrada e respeitadora do direito humanitário, dos valores democráticos e do Estado de direito.
2. É necessário apoiar simultaneamente medidas imediatas, como a formação militar, e medidas mais estruturantes, como é o caso da educação e da formação de quadros.
3. No quadro das missões, a obtenção da confiança entre fornecedores e recetores de segurança implica o estabelecimento de relações pessoais baseadas na presença solidária, na franca partilha de informação e na compreensão das necessidades e possibilidades das entidades a apoiar.
4. O tempo é uma condição significativa no espaço africano, diretamente relacionado com a possibilidade de estabelecimento de relações de confiança institucional e operacional. A EUTM Mali é a única missão cujas lideranças e assessoria mudam de seis em seis meses, correspondendo assim aquela condição de temporalidade útil.
5. É essencial identificar as necessidades e apoiar soluções localmente desenhadas.
6. Apesar de existir uma perspectiva de ação integrada no desenho das missões, a área da educação e a precariedade no domínio da saúde têm impacto na adequada gestão dos aspetos humanitários das missões.

### Missão de ajuda às vítimas do terramoto no Paquistão (2005)

7. A importância da ação civil-militar é fundamental neste tipo de missões e operações.
8. A sensibilidade cultural e a cooperação com as autoridades locais são essenciais.
9. A morosidade das decisões por consenso, tal como se processam na NATO, tem sido um desafio para uma missão de caráter humanitário como esta.

### **Missão de apoio da NATO no Darfur/Sudão (2006)**

10. É benéfico para a missão que as organizações no terreno falem a uma só voz, nomeadamente entre a ONU e a União Africana (UA).
11. É relevante o apoio da NATO através do treino, aprontamento e projeção das forças da UA que atuam no terreno.
12. Em termos operacionais, é importante o alcance de um nível de coordenação adequado, e tão cedo quanto possível, entre a componente diplomática e a militar.

### **Missão da ISAF no Afeganistão (2009-2010)**

13. Estabelecer laços de confiança leva tempo, por vezes alguns anos, e é igualmente importante definir um claro *end state* para as missões.
14. O apoio no domínio da segurança, do desenvolvimento e da ajuda humanitária não foi equilibrado, no Afeganistão, privilegiando-se os aspetos securitários, em detrimento do apoio ao desenvolvimento e da ajuda humanitária.
15. Não se apostou nas condições dadas aos militares locais e descurou-se a importância do empenhamento das lideranças na melhoria daquelas condições.

### **Missão de Treino da União Europeia em Moçambique (2021-2022)**

16. As tarefas inerentes à missão foram feitas em estreita coordenação e participação com os moçambicanos, a todos os níveis de decisão.
17. É importante aplicar o conceito “ombro a ombro – estamos juntos” (orador) entre os elementos da missão de treino e as forças e autoridades locais, em todas as fases de execução das missões e operações no terreno.
18. A implementação de um método de abordagem integrada (*integrated approach*) foi uma realidade na missão em Moçambique, embora menos operacionalizada em Bruxelas.
19. O conceito de *Quick Reaction Force* (QRF), como exemplo de uma tipologia de forças desenvolvida por Portugal no Afeganistão e República Centro Africana (RCA), confere um enorme sucesso operacional às operações.
20. Verificou-se a importância de se garantir objetivos de longo prazo na assunção de compromissos estáveis.
21. Não considerar a cultura e hábitos locais pode prejudicar o alcance dos objetivos definidos para a missão.
22. O empoderamento das mulheres nas instituições locais e a participação crescente das mesmas neste tipo de missões é fundamental para o seu sucesso.
23. A ausência de coordenação entre as Forças Armadas (FA) e as Forças e Serviços de Segurança (FSS) nas missões prejudica o sucesso da missão.
24. A pirataria está contida, mas não está erradicada, pois verifica-se um aumento das atividades ilícitas no Oceano Índico, sendo necessário manter e reforçar a participação nacional.

25. As missões militares internacionais têm um formato muito centrado na sua organização militar e no seu papel de fornecedores de segurança, não incorporando outras valências do Estado.
26. O processo de decisão nacional é complexo e demorado face à indefinição do ambiente estratégico internacional.
27. A situação de incerteza e imprevisibilidade de evolução do cenário internacional conjugado com os novos desafios geopolíticos implica preparação para atuar noutras geografias (Indo-Pacífico) e fazer face a outros fenómenos, como o da guerra híbrida.
28. As expectativas sobre a criação do *Military Planning and Conduct Capability* (MPCC) da União Europeia não foram alcançadas em várias áreas por falta de recursos adequados.
29. Faltam recursos cruciais no apoio médico e na evacuação médica estratégica para cumprir integralmente os procedimentos padrão da UE, salvaguardando o princípio da *golden hour*.
30. É notória a dificuldade em obter os resultados necessários no apoio ao desenvolvimento, apesar do empenho total das tropas no terreno.
31. Dificuldade em implementar e gerir as expectativas necessárias à implementação de ações de abordagem integrada da UE.
32. A implementação do Mecanismo Europeu de Apoio à Paz (MEAP) pode ser melhorada.
33. A mudança em curso na arquitetura de segurança europeia vai influenciar o papel de Portugal na Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, com impacto nas estruturas militares e missões da UE.
34. Apesar de Portugal se ter tornado relevante e reconhecido no contexto do contributo dos Estados-membros para a PCSD, este facto não reflete a respetiva participação nacional nas estruturas permanentes da UE.
35. As Forças Nacionais Destacadas (FND) contribuem decisivamente como instrumento de política externa de Portugal, sendo que, ao nível estratégico, a sua relevância pode ser enquadrada em 4 dimensões: político-diplomática, económica, sociocultural e militar, fomentando uma melhor interoperabilidade.

## Recomendações

1. A UE deve adotar uma postura mais atrativa, combinando a formação com outros vetores de desenvolvimento de capacidades, nomeadamente o pilar do equipamento. O Mecanismo Europeu de Apoio à Paz deve ser empregue neste tipo de missões, fortalecendo assim a credibilidade da missão.
2. A ação da UE no terreno deverá ter em consideração objetivos de curto prazo, sem descuidar a consecução de objetivos de longo prazo, de natureza mais estruturante.
3. Deve ser construída uma condição de confiança junto das autoridades locais.

4. A assessoria da EUTM no Mali deve ser alargada no tempo, aconselhando-se um período temporal de um ano.
5. Devem ser desenvolvidas soluções locais (*ownership*) com apoio externo contínuo e partilha de um esforço cooperativo, que fomente uma aceitação local imediata.
6. A missão deve preconizar o desenvolvimento e apoio de outras funções do Estado, nomeadamente na educação e saúde.

#### **Missão de ajuda às vítimas do terramoto no Paquistão (2005)**

7. O planeamento e execução integrada desde o início da missão deve contemplar a importância da cooperação civil-militar.
8. A consciência e respeito cultural, assim como a cooperação com as autoridades locais a todos os níveis, deve ser uma constante durante a missão.
9. Deve ser implementado um processo de decisão mais rápido e flexível na NATO, que permita projetar forças o mais rápido possível.

#### **Missão de apoio da NATO no Darfur/Sudão (2006)**

10. A coordenação da NATO (JCL)-ELE com a UA e a ONU foi muito importante para que se falasse a uma só voz com a ONU e com a União Africana (UA).
11. O apoio da NATO através do treino, aprontamento e projeção das forças da UA no terreno complementou de forma eficaz as necessidades destes operacionais.
12. A coordenação e manobra de instalação da missão deverá ser feita em conjunto entre a componente diplomática e a militar no terreno.

#### **Missão da ISAF no Afeganistão (2009-2010)**

13. Deve ser estabelecido um claro e inequívoco *end state* da missão aliado à sua permanência, desejavelmente de um ano.
14. Deve ser dada atenção ao equilíbrio no apoio à segurança, desenvolvimento e ajuda humanitária.
15. Deve ser dada atenção às condições proporcionadas aos soldados locais e providenciada formação e treino das lideranças nos diferentes escalões de comando.

#### **Missão de Treino da União Europeia em Moçambique (2021-2022)**

16. Deve ser incentivada uma estreita coordenação e participação com entidades locais, a todos os níveis de decisão, incluindo o treino, garantindo o necessário nível de apropriação.
17. Deve ser implementado o conceito de parceria entre os elementos da missão de treino, as forças e autoridades.
18. Deve ser totalmente implementado um método de abordagem integrada do nível político-estratégico ao tático.
19. Deve ser implementado e desenvolvido pelas forças locais o conceito de forças de resposta rápida.



20. Deve ser dada especial atenção ao tempo de permanência das missões no terreno e que o *handover takeover* garanta uma linha de atuação consistente e contínua no tempo.
21. Deve ser fomentada uma postura de sensibilidade cultural nas missões e operações, contemplando exaustivamente esta componente na formação e treino da FND e garantindo a sua implementação no terreno.
22. Incrementar as dinâmicas da agenda “Mulheres, Paz e Segurança” conjugada com programas de proteção de crianças.
23. Deve ser assegurada uma efetiva coordenação entre as FA e as FSS, desde o início do planeamento das missões e operações.
24. Devem ser consideradas as seguintes recomendações: apoiar a proposta de extensão do mandato da Operação ATALANTA até 2024; fomentar a cooperação entre a Operação ATALANTA a EUTM Somália e a EUCAP Somália; alargar a cooperação com a Operação AGENOR, componente militar da iniciativa *European Maritime Awareness in The Strait of Hormuz* (EMASOH); apoiar a transformação da Operação ATALANTA numa Operação de Segurança Marítima; criar sinergias entre os diversos atores intervenientes na iniciativa da UE “Presença Marítima coordenada no Noroeste do Oceano Índico” (*Coordinated Maritime Presence in the North Western Indian Ocean [CMPNWIO]*); manter ou reforçar a participação nacional na Operação ATALANTA.
25. Deve ser considerada uma abordagem mais holística às missões, numa perspectiva de retorno de investimento, maior coordenação interagências e uma melhor preparação para explorar oportunidades de investimento nos países que recebem as missões.
26. Deve ser implementado um processo de decisão mais rápido e uma abordagem de planeamento simultâneo entre todos os atores envolvidos, em detrimento do clássico planeamento sequencial.
27. Deve ser considerada a possibilidade/hipótese de Portugal atuar militarmente em novos espaços geográficos.
28. A UE deve alocar os recursos necessários para a operacionalização de um Comando de última geração, com pessoal qualificado em funções específicas, principalmente no âmbito do aconselhamento estratégico, da proteção de infraestruturas e no emprego de tecnologias digitais.
29. As missões devem ser dotadas de apoio e evacuação médica estratégica.
30. Deve ser equacionada uma nova forma de promover a estabilidade e resiliência político-estratégica.
31. Deve existir uma estreita coordenação entre os intervenientes na implementação do princípio da unidade de comando.
32. O MPCC, enquanto entidade responsável pelo treino, deve ser integrado no planeamento das medidas a financiar (exemplo de Moçambique).
33. A UE deve preparar-se para uma grande mudança na sua arquitetura de segurança, através do levantamento das estruturas de comando e de apoio às mis-

sões e operações, sem duplicações com a NATO, utilizando ainda os recursos elencados na Bússola Estratégica.

34. É necessário manter, ou eventualmente aumentar, a participação nacional nas estruturas permanentes da UE, assim como nas missões e operações.
35. Deverá ser acautelada a obrigatoriedade de garantir a manutenção da interoperabilidade com os nossos aliados e parceiros assente na: modernização tecnológica e na inovação; no alcance de equilíbrio orçamental; na sustentação das operações; no aumento do recrutamento e da retenção dos recursos disponíveis entre os compromissos internacionais e a resposta das forças armadas às emergências civis.

# Painel 1 – Forças Nacionais Destacadas e Lições Identificadas de Missões Internacionais

## Observações e Recomendações

### Major-General Boga Ribeiro

*Antigo Comandante da Missão de Treino da União Europeia no Mali (2020-2021)*

O orador partilhou a sua experiência na missão EUTM Mali, tendo sugerido o que os assessores do IDN identificaram como observações, lições e boas práticas.

A relevância da presença da missão EUTM – Mali, independentemente das dúvidas sobre a sua eficácia e sobretudo no contexto de competição estratégica, pode ser comprovada nos seguintes aspetos:

**Observação 1** – A UE oferece um apoio sem contrapartidas, baseado numa perspectiva de capacitação integrada e respeitadora do direito internacional humanitário, dos valores democráticos e do Estado de direito, enquanto outras organizações presentes no terreno pautam a sua conduta a troco de contrapartidas pecuniárias ou de recursos pela conhecida abordagem 3M (mercenários, minério e *media*), oferecendo apenas uma intervenção militar de apoio imediato, orientada para a segurança do regime vigente e não uma capacitação militar duradoura.

**Recomendação 1** – A UE deve adotar uma postura mais apelativa, combinando a formação com outros vetores de desenvolvimento de capacidades, nomeadamente os pilares treino e equipamento, sem esquecer o apoio a outras áreas, como a da assistência. A disponibilidade do Mecanismo Europeu de Apoio à Paz será um recurso importante neste tipo de missões, fortalecendo assim a credibilidade da missão;

**Observação 2** – É necessário apoiar o presente e preparar o futuro através de ações que simultaneamente contribuam para as medidas mais urgentes, como a formação militar, e para questões mais estruturantes, como é o caso da educação e da formação de quadros;

**Recomendação 2** – A ação da UE no terreno deverá ter em consideração objetivos de curto prazo, não descurando a consecução de objetivos de longo prazo.

**Observação 3** – A obtenção de confiança implica o estabelecimento de relações pessoais baseadas na presença solidária, na franca partilha de informação e na compreensão das necessidades e possibilidades locais. A sincronização é crucial para o resultado sinérgico da ação dos diferentes atores, em que o aproveitamento da especialização de cada entidade se assume como um aspeto central.

**Recomendação 3** – Deve ser procurado um envolvimento e empenhamento com base na participação ativa das autoridades locais, aliadas a uma sincronização e especialização mais centrada na articulação das intervenções externas e entre os vários intervenientes.

**Observação 4** – O tempo é uma condição significativa no espaço africano, diretamente relacionado com a possibilidade de estabelecimento de relações de confiança. A EUTM Mali é a única missão cujas lideranças e assessoria mudam de seis em seis meses, facto que deve ser objeto de correção. Para esta confiança concorre igualmente a continuidade da presença militar na partilha do esforço e da vontade para identificar e aplicar as soluções possíveis. A perseverança é também relevante para aceitar os reveses conjunturais, mantendo o foco nos objetivos traçados para a missão. Resultados necessitam de tempo, continuidade e permanência.

**Recomendação 4** – A assessoria da EUTM deve ser ampliada no tempo, aconselhando-se um período de um ano.

**Observação 5** – Considera-se essencial procurar identificar as necessidades e apoiar soluções localmente desenhadas, em detrimento da apresentação e aplicação de soluções externas, cuja aceitação local se tem revelado sucessivamente mais complexa;

**Recomendação 5** – Devem ser desenvolvidas soluções locais (*ownership* ou apropriação) com apoio externo continuado e partilha do esforço, com ganhos no que respeita a uma aceitação local imediata.

**Observação 6** – Apesar de existir uma perspetiva integrada na cooperação multilateral, a área da educação está a ser seriamente afetada, seja pela destruição das capacidades existentes ao nível dos recursos humanos e das infraestruturas, seja pela substituição dos processos educativos por outros, com uma forte carga ideológica ou religiosa. Este aspeto tem que ser encarado como uma prioridade, em virtude dos efeitos de médio e longo prazo que, aliados ao crescimento populacional, se irão traduzir em ameaças ao continente africano e europeu. Também a precariedade na saúde local assume prioridade, uma vez que influi em questões relacionadas com a vulnerabilidade e complexidade dos aspetos humanitários, económicos e sociais.

**Recomendação 6** – A missão deve preconizar o desenvolvimento e apoio à implementação das outras funções do Estado, nomeadamente na educação e saúde.

## Major-General Lemos Pires

*Antigo Comandante da Missão de Treino da União Europeia em Moçambique (2021-2022)*

O conferencista abordou a sua participação em quatro missões internacionais, a saber: Missão de ajuda/auxílio às vítimas do terramoto no Paquistão (2005); Missão de apoio da NATO no Darfur/Sudão (2006); Missão da ISAF no Afeganistão (2009-2010); e Missão de Treino da União Europeia em Moçambique (2021-2022). Neste âmbito, foram levantadas as observações, lições e boas práticas abaixo elencadas.

### **Missão de ajuda/auxílio às vítimas do terramoto no Paquistão (2005)**

**Boa Prática 1 – Importância da ação civil-militar.** O planeamento e execução integrada desde o início das operações foram elementos fundamentais, com uns *clusters* liderados por civis e outros por militares, que decorreram de forma agilizada e eficaz, contribuindo para alcançar o estado final pretendido.

**Boa Prática 2 – Consciência cultural (*cultural awareness*) e a cooperação com as autoridades locais.** Nada se pode fazer sem o apoio e o respeito pela cultura local e pela organização regional. A missão foi sempre realizada em estreita coordenação com as autoridades locais, desde os mais altos níveis de coordenação até aos responsáveis locais (chefes de aldeias), recetores últimos da ajuda prestada.

**Observação 7 –** No quadro NATO, as decisões por consenso revelaram-se um desafio para uma missão de carácter humanitário como esta. Ao contrário da Decisão Política Nacional, que foi relativamente célere, e dos apoios nacionais bilaterais diretos (que chegaram quase imediatamente ao local), o processo de decisão da NATO (NAC) afigurou-se algo mais demorado, arrastando-se por mais de 10 dias de discussão (no NAC-NATO) e imprimindo um certo *delay* no *timing* de chegada (percebido como urgente) dos militares da NATO ao terreno.

**Recomendação 7 –** Deve ser implementado um processo de decisão mais rápido e flexível na NATO, que permita projetar forças o mais rapidamente possível.

### **Missão de apoio da NATO no Darfur/Sudão (2006)**

**Boa Prática 3 – Coordenação NATO (JCL)-EU com UA e ONU.** Para além da estreita coordenação entre a NATO e a UE, o facto de as duas organizações falarem a uma só voz com a ONU e com a União Africana (UA) revelou-se um contributo decisivo para a eficácia e divisão de tarefas.

**Boa Prática 4 – Apoiar quem vai complementar.** O apoio dado pela NATO às forças da UA que iam para o terreno – através do treino, do aprontamento e da projecção dessas forças – foi muito importante, entre outros aspetos, por ter permitido complementar de forma muito eficaz as necessidades destes operacionais.

**Boa Prática 5 – Atuação em conjunto.** O facto da coordenação e da manobra de instalação da missão ter sido realizada, desde o primeiro minuto, em conjunto, pela compo-

nente diplomática e pela componente militar no terreno, com a organização antecipada do que ia ser negociado, e sempre em conformidade com as orientações que ambos recebiam de Bruxelas, revelou-se outro contributo importante para o sucesso da missão.

### **Missão da ISAF no Afeganistão (2009-2010)**

**Observação 8** – Revelou-se importante definir um *end state* claro para que a missão no terreno possa ser planeada em função dos objetivos superiormente definidos.

**Recomendação 8** – Deve ser estabelecido um claro e inequívoco fim da missão aliado à permanência de, desejavelmente, um ano de missão.

**Observação 9** – O apoio ao denominado triplo nexa, no domínio da segurança, do desenvolvimento e da ajuda humanitária, não foi equilibrado, no caso do Afeganistão, tendo-se investido/gasto muitíssimo mais na parte securitária face aos outros dois domínios.

**Recomendação 9** – Deve ser dada atenção ao equilíbrio do apoio ao triplo nexa (segurança, desenvolvimento e ajuda humanitária).

**Observação 10** – Não se apostou nas condições dadas aos militares locais e descuroou-se a importância do empenhamento das lideranças neste aspeto.

**Recomendação 10** – Deve ser dada atenção às condições proporcionadas aos militares locais e providenciada formação e treino em liderança aos decisores dos diferentes escalões de comando.

### **Missão de Treino da União Europeia em Moçambique (2021-2022)**

**Boa Prática 6** – *As tarefas inerentes à missão foram realizadas em estreita coordenação e participação com os moçambicanos, a todos os níveis de decisão.* Inclui-se ainda aqui o treino, uma vez que os formadores da UE foram sempre acompanhados por formadores moçambicanos que, no final do ciclo, ficaram aptos a conduzir, de forma autónoma, o mesmo tipo de treino, garantido assim a almejada adequação.

**Boa Prática 7** – *Conceito “ombro a ombro – estamos juntos”.* Revelou-se extremamente importante, para o sucesso da missão, aplicar o supradito conceito entre os elementos da missão de treino e as forças e autoridades locais, em todas as fases de execução e em todas as operações no terreno.

**Observação 12** – A implementação de uma abordagem integrada (*integrated approach*) – mais evidente no terreno do que em Bruxelas (nível superior) – permitiu confirmar a sua maior valia para a prossecução de um claro e bem-sucedido *end state* de estabilidade e progresso local.

**Recomendação 12** – Deve ser totalmente implementada uma abordagem integrada (*integrated approach*) desde os patamares de decisão em Bruxelas até aos elementos no terreno.

**Observação 13** – O conceito de *Quick Reaction Force* (QRF) ou Força de Reação Imediata (FRI), na nomenclatura portuguesa – como exemplo de uma tipologia de forças

desenvolvidas por Portugal no Afeganistão e na RCA –, confere sucesso operacional às operações/missões, tendo sido adaptado à realidade de Moçambique (nas duas vertentes de forças de fuzileiros e de comandos, com a indispensável presença de equipas de *Tactical Air Control Party* [TACP] da Força Aérea).

**Recomendação 13** – Deve ser implementado e desenvolvido o conceito de QRF nas forças locais.

**Observação 14** – É importante garantir objetivos de longo prazo, assumindo compromissos estáveis, para os quais o fator tempo e a permanência de uma continuidade de linha de ação são fundamentais.

**Recomendação 14** – Deve ser dada especial atenção ao tempo de permanência das missões no terreno e ao facto do *handover takeover* garantir uma linha de atuação consistente e contínua no tempo.

**Observação 15** – A boa prossecução dos objetivos definidos para a missão pode ser prejudicada pelo facto de não serem tidos em consideração a cultura e os hábitos locais. Neste âmbito, potenciar uma postura de sensibilidade cultural junto dos elementos que irão integrar uma missão, afigura-se como um fator deveras facilitador e potenciador do sucesso da missão. Uma capacidade – saber entender, saber aprender, saber ouvir e saber estabelecer pontes entre variadas culturas, geografias e línguas – pela qual Portugal é amplamente reconhecido pelos seus parceiros, sejam eles organizações internacionais, sejam os próprios atores integrados nos teatros de operações.

**Recomendação 15** – Deve ser potenciada a postura de sensibilidade cultural nas missões e operações, através, por exemplo, da exaustiva abordagem desta componente na formação e no treino das FND (com aplicação a todos os níveis da linha hierárquica), e da conseqüente monitorização da sua implementação no terreno. Deve, igualmente, ser potenciado o fator humano e a competência.

**Observação 16** – É amplamente reconhecido que o empoderamento das mulheres nas instituições locais e a sua participação crescente neste tipo de missões tem trazido melhorias significativas no desempenho e no sucesso nas mesmas.

**Recomendação 16** – Incrementar as ações previstas na Agenda “Mulheres, Paz e Segurança”, aliadas a programas de proteção de crianças.

**Observação 17** – No terreno, verifica-se que o apoio prestado pelas Forças Armadas (FA) e as Forças e Serviços de Segurança (FSS) englobam diferentes tarefas que exigem uma estreita coordenação, a fim de serem evitadas redundâncias e aumentada a eficácia. Para o sucesso das missões é fundamental que entre as FA e FSS presentes no terreno exista coordenação, e que esta seja desenvolvida num registo permanente – antes, durante e depois da missão – e entre os que formam (formadores) e os que são formados (formandos).

**Recomendação 17** – Deve ser garantida uma efetiva coordenação entre as FA e as FSS, desde o início do planeamento da missão/operações até à sua realização e ao momento posterior ao seu término.

## Capitão de Mar e Guerra Silva Pereira

*Antigo Comandante da Força Naval da União Europeia – Operação ATALANTA (2021-2022)*

**Observação 18** – A pirataria está contida, mas não está erradicada, pois verifica-se um aumento das atividades ilícitas no Oceano Índico, como o tráfico de estupefacientes e pessoas e pesca ilegal, não regulada ou declarada. A Somália, ao contrário do que se afirmava, não tem capacidade para exercer a autoridade nos espaços marítimos sob a sua soberania ou jurisdição. A presença militar no Índico é um dos vetores fundamentais para manter a pirataria contida e a entrada nas águas territoriais da Somália é um imperativo para a realização bem-sucedida das missões atribuídas à Operação ATALANTA.

**Recomendação 18** – Apoiar a proposta de extensão do mandato da Operação ATALANTA até 2024;

Fomentar a cooperação entre a Operação ATALANTA, a EUTM Somália e a EUCAP Somália;

Alargar a cooperação com a Operação AGENOR, componente militar da iniciativa *European Maritime Awareness in The Strait of Hormuz* (EMASOH);

Apoiar a transformação da Operação ATALANTA numa Operação de Segurança Marítima;

Criar sinergias entre os diversos atores intervenientes na iniciativa da UE “Presença Marítima coordenada no Noroeste do Oceano Índico”;

Manter ou reforçar a participação nacional na Operação ATALANTA.



## Painel 2 – Forças Nacionais Destacadas e Lições Identificadas de Organizações Internacionais

### Observações e Recomendações

#### Tenente-General Marco Serronha

*Assessor para a Cooperação com África e CPLP, Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas*

**Observação 19** – As missões militares internacionais têm um formato muito centrado na sua organização militar, não incorporando, mesmo quando há razão para tal, outras valências do Estado, descurando uma abordagem mais holística. As missões militares internacionais, nas suas diversas configurações, têm sido uma mais-valia para as políticas de segurança e defesa de Portugal, incluindo no capítulo da política externa, nos últimos 30 anos.

**Recomendação 19** – Torna-se necessária, no futuro, uma abordagem mais holística às missões, equacionando o retorno de investimento económico, por exemplo através da participação na reconstrução de infraestruturas, da produção de produtos de defesa, da própria incorporação de aspetos culturais e da língua e de uma maior coordenação interagências.

**Observação 20** – O processo de decisão nacional é complexo e demorado face à indefinição do ambiente estratégico internacional. A rapidez com que os meios têm de ser colocados no terreno não se compadece com esta situação. As ações tomadas pelos diversos atores e sectores implicados numa projeção de forças nacional têm de ser simultâneas e não sequenciais.

**Recomendação 20** – Deve ser estudada a hipótese de ser criado um processo de decisão mais rápido e uma abordagem de planeamento simultâneo entre todos os atores envolvidos, em detrimento do clássico planeamento sequencial.

**Observação 21** – Perante a situação de incerteza e imprevisibilidade no cenário internacional, em conjugação com os novos desafios geopolíticos, é necessário estar-se preparado para atuar noutras geografias (Indo-Pacífico) para fazer face a novos fenómenos, nomeadamente no contexto de guerra híbrida.

**Recomendação 21** – Deve ser considerada a possibilidade/hipótese de Portugal atuar em novos espaços geográficos de atuação militar.

## Tenente-General Hermínio Maio

*Antigo Diretor Adjunto da Capacidade Militar de Planeamento e Condução da União Europeia*

**Observação 22** – As expectativas sobre a criação do *Military Planning and Conduct Capability* (MPCC) da União Europeia não foram alcançadas em várias áreas por falta de recursos adequados. O MPCC da União Europeia representa hoje um elemento-chave na construção de uma cultura estratégica comum e uma base essencial para a PCSD. Tornou-se uma estrutura militar necessária e credível, no entanto importa refletir sobre o que é indispensável para o MPCC cumprir a missão. Como o MPCC é claramente uma estrutura necessária para planear e conduzir missões militares, e em breve operações, espera-se que a UE aloque os recursos necessários (pessoal, infraestruturas, tecnologia) para a operacionalização de um comando de última geração. Reconhecendo que o efetivo das missões sempre esteve abaixo do acordado nos SOR, apesar das sucessivas Conferências de Geração de Força, a falta de pessoal qualificado em algumas funções é recorrente, principalmente no âmbito do aconselhamento estratégico.

**Recomendação 22** – A UE deve alocar os recursos necessários para a operacionalização de um Comando de última geração, com pessoal qualificado em algumas funções específicas, principalmente no âmbito do aconselhamento estratégico, das infraestruturas e das tecnologias.

**Observação 23** – Faltam recursos cruciais no apoio médico e na evacuação médica estratégica (*Strategic Air Medical Evacuation*) para cumprir integralmente os procedimentos padrão da UE, salvaguardando o princípio da *golden hour*. Foram, por exemplo, verificadas situações críticas exigindo evacuação médica estratégica (casos Covid), sem que fosse possível acionar, de imediato, meios aéreos de estruturas existentes na Europa, como o *European Air Transport Command* (EATC).

**Recomendação 23** – As missões devem ser dotadas de apoio e evacuação médica estratégica.

**Observação 24** – Há uma notória dificuldade em obter os resultados desejados, apesar do empenho total das tropas no terreno; neste contexto, o exemplo da RCA é elucidativo. Um país pequeno e frágil no coração de África, lutando com um longo processo de estabilização e onde a UE desempenhou, e desempenha, um papel muito importante. O facto é que, independentemente do substancial investimento, a população continua numa grave situação humanitária e securitária. Quando o ambiente é hostil, a missão não se pode retirar simplesmente, deixando espaço para que outros ajam de forma arbitrária, sem que a sua conduta se pautar por valores morais e éticos.

**Recomendação 24** – Deve ser pensado um novo paradigma e consideradas formas inovadoras de apoiar o país, particularmente as comunidades mais vulneráveis, assim como promovidas a estabilidade e resiliência político-estratégica, primordiais para não capitular diante das dificuldades impostas por ambientes voláteis e de elevado risco.

**Observação 25** – Há dificuldade em implementar e gerir as expectativas sobre o método de abordagem integrada da UE. É um facto que a União dispõe de um vasto leque de políticas e instrumentos para responder a diferentes desafios, incluindo a defesa. A abordagem integrada é excelente como método de atuação, pelo que são depositadas nela grandes expectativas como quadro para um envolvimento mais coerente e holístico da União Europeia em conflitos e crises externas. No entanto, há tantos atores interessados em Bruxelas que é quase impossível aplicar o qualificativo “integrado”.

**Recomendação 25** – Deve existir uma estreita coordenação entre os atores interessados e a necessidade de implementar o princípio da unidade de comando, facilitando a implementação da abordagem integrada da UE.

**Observação 26** – O Mecanismo Europeu de Apoio à Paz (MEAP) pode ser desenvolvido. Este instrumento responde à necessidade, há muito identificada pelos militares, de garantir o nexu treino e equipamento, essencial para o sucesso da reforma do setor da defesa nos países onde a UE opera.

**Recomendação 26** – O MPCC, enquanto entidade responsável pelo treino, deve ser integrado na planificação das medidas a financiar (caso de Moçambique).

**Observação 27** – Torna-se evidente uma grande mudança em curso na arquitetura de segurança europeia, fruto, entre outros aspetos, da crise Covid-19 e da guerra na Ucrânia, que vai influenciar o papel de Portugal na Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, com impacto nas estruturas militares e missões da UE.

**Recomendação 27** – A UE deve preparar-se para uma mudança na sua arquitetura de segurança, através do levantamento das estruturas de comando e de apoio às missões e operações, sem duplicações com a NATO, complementando a sua ação e contribuindo ativamente para a sua adaptação. A Bússola Estratégica é uma tímida aproximação e deve ser explorada.

**Observação 28** – Nos últimos anos, Portugal tornou-se muito relevante no contexto do contributo dos Estados-membros para a Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, principalmente pela participação nas Missões Militares da União Europeia, assumindo o Comando em várias ocasiões difíceis, mas também nas estruturas de Comando e Estado-Maior, como o MPCC e o EUMS. A participação de Portugal é reconhecida como uma das mais importantes e credíveis, prestigiando e credibilizando as nossas Forças Armadas pela preparação das tropas e qualidade dos comandantes empenhados. A voz de Portugal é escutada com atenção no Comité Político e de Segurança (COPS) e no Comité Militar. Partindo desta posição privilegiada, Portugal pode influenciar positivamente a evolução da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, beneficiando a segurança da União Europeia e dos Estados que nos acolhem nas diferentes missões, particularmente em África.

**Recomendação 28** – É necessário manter, porventura aumentar, a nossa participação nas estruturas permanentes da UE, assim como nas missões e operações.

## Painel 3 – Forças Nacionais Destacadas e Lições Identificadas de Planeamento Estratégico

### Observações e Recomendações

#### Brigadeiro-General Ana Baltazar

*Subdiretora-Geral da Direção-Geral de Política de Defesa Nacional*

A oradora referiu:

O Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional constitui uma referência para o ciclo de planeamento estratégico de defesa nacional, no que diz respeito ao conceito estratégico militar, às missões das Forças Armadas, ao sistema de forças nacional e ao dispositivo de forças.

É um documento estruturante e integrante da política de defesa nacional, que define as orientações estratégicas e respostas mais relevantes para uma visão de conjunto de uma estratégia nacional, tendo em vista o apoio à decisão e à definição de um quadro de planeamento de médio e longo prazo.

Visa identificar as prioridades do Estado em matéria de segurança e defesa, de acordo com os interesses nacionais, consubstanciados nos objetivos permanentes e não permanentes no quadro da política de defesa nacional, e define os aspetos fundamentais da estratégia global a adotar pelo Estado para a consecução dos objetivos da política de segurança e defesa nacional.

Sendo o Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional uma referência para o ciclo de planeamento estratégico de defesa, então o planeamento estratégico tem de conseguir interpretar alterações ao contexto e adotar respostas rápidas, com elevado pragmatismo e atendendo aos recursos materiais e humanos disponíveis.

Sendo o ambiente estratégico caracterizado pela Volatilidade, Incerteza, Complexidade e Ambiguidade, coloca enormes desafios ao planeamento estratégico.

A oradora sugere alguns exemplos em termos de lições identificadas:

- De que forma é que reagimos em termos de planeamento de FND em situações como a da Ucrânia (consequentemente forças na Roménia)? Que implicações tem nas FND na RCA e no Mali?
- O que é que no próximo planeamento podemos fazer diferente com base no quadro abaixo? Qual o impacto disto no planeamento de defesa?

Situações	Implicações
Renovada centralidade de conflitos	Novas missões (rearranjo)
Competição entre Estados	Calibração/Adaptação
Alteração nas Organizações Internacionais	Reorganização
Diferentes alianças	Calibração
EDT e espaço	Desenvolvimento de capacidades
Contrainformação/ataques cibeméticos	Estratégia de comunicação Desenvolvimento de capacidades Estratégias de ciberdefesa
Dinâmicas Civil/militar	Intergovernamentalidade Integração instrumentos CIV/MIL (reconhecimento público)

O próprio CPDM materializa a implementação das opções políticas inscritas no Programa do Governo e nas Grandes Opções do Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional (CEDN), documentos estruturantes no planeamento estratégico de defesa nacional.

O CPDM deve estar harmonizado e sincronizado com o planeamento de defesa da NATO (NDPP) e a União Europeia, nomeadamente, o *Headline Goal Process* (HLG), o *Capability Development Plan* (CDP) e, mais recentemente, desde 2018, o *Coordinated Annual Review on Defense* (CARD).

O CARD procura identificar as lacunas existentes, para orientação do esforço de edificação das mesmas, essencialmente através de projetos colaborativos da PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation).

## Capitão de Fragata Coelho Gomes

*Divisão de Planeamento Estratégico Militar, Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas*

**Observação 29** – As Forças Nacionais Destacadas são um instrumento da política externa portuguesa. No quadro de emprego das Forças Nacionais Destacadas salienta-se: o amplo espectro de emprego destas forças, desde a capacitação de parceiros até à defesa coletiva, passando pela gestão de crises em missões de estabilização e dissuasão. Dessa abrangência decorre, sustentado nas orientações políticas, o seu emprego nos diferentes âmbitos (NATO, UE, ONU e multi/bilateral), verificando-se um acréscimo do número de missões. Ao nível estratégico a sua relevância pode ser enquadrada em quatro dimensões:

- Uma dimensão político-diplomática, que contribui para a afirmação de Portugal no mundo como um contribuinte ativo, responsável e fiável na promoção do multilateralismo e da paz;
- Uma dimensão económica, considerando que um empenhamento mais frequente das FND requer mais meios, podendo proporcionar o desenvolvimento e internacionalização da indústria de defesa nacional;
- Uma dimensão sociocultural, sendo um forte contributo para uma inequívoca promoção da lusofonia e um permanente reforço dos laços de amizade e cooperação com aliados e parceiros;
- Uma dimensão militar, através da manutenção da interoperabilidade com as outras forças nos diversos teatros de operações e a atualização de capacidades.

**Recomendação 29** – Deverá ser acautelada a obrigatoriedade de garantir a manutenção da interoperabilidade com os nossos aliados e parceiros, assente na modernização tecnológica, na inovação e na necessidade de alcançar uma situação de equilíbrio orçamental, de forma a reforçar a operação, a manutenção e a premência de adequar os efetivos militares aumentando o recrutamento e a retenção, como forma de corresponder ao nível de ambição na competição pelos recursos disponíveis entre os compromissos internacionais e a resposta das Forças Armadas às emergências civis.

## Conclusões e Recomendações do IDN

Identificaram-se as seguintes observações comuns por parte da generalidade dos oradores:

**Observação 1** – A importância que este tipo de missões tem no contexto da política externa portuguesa justifica uma participação alargada de Portugal, nomeadamente através das FND. As FA portuguesas beneficiam de várias vantagens comparativas:

- a) Boa receção pelas populações e autoridades locais, sendo que esse grau de aceitação contribui substancialmente para o sucesso das missões e operações que integra;
- b) Investimento incremental do Estado português em equipamento e treino das FA nacionais, nomeadamente das FND;
- c) Usufruto da experiência acumulada, no plano internacional, em missões e operações da ONU, da NATO e da UE.

**Recomendações:** a) manter, ou mesmo aumentar, a participação nacional no quadro dos compromissos internacionais de Portugal; b) assegurar um adequado nível de interoperabilidade no plano da cooperação multinacional, no quadro das alianças; c) garantir o necessário investimento em matéria de defesa, que permita assegurar um desempenho operacional eficiente das FA, nomeadamente recorrendo a projetos colaborativos multinacionais.

**Observação 2** – Nos mandatos das missões e operações substantivos que contemplem uma dimensão de ação integrada de políticas e recursos, é necessário incorporar uma dimensão temporal orientada pela execução de objetivos claramente definidos e de execução faseada. No atual ambiente de competição estratégica entre atores estatais e não estatais, aquelas missões abrem espaço à presença de outros atores, eventualmente com objetivos que comprometem a implementação efetiva do princípio da soberania e da governação democrática e determinam a diferença entre o sucesso ou o insucesso das missões.

**Recomendações:** Portugal deve potenciar o capital cooperativo e de confiança com autoridades e comunidades locais, que possibilite o sucesso da missão, contribuindo para evitar saídas prematuras das missões.

**Observação 3** – A experiência também tem demonstrado que a adoção de uma metodologia de abordagem integrada concretiza melhor o objetivo, não apenas de fornecimento de segurança, mas também de desenvolvimento local. Esta abordagem mais holística concretiza a perspectiva de fornecer um maior apoio às comunidades locais, mas também de poder obter, ou mesmo otimizar, algum retorno do elevado investimento efetuado com estas missões.

**Recomendação:** Portugal deve fazer uso das suas vantagens comparativas, por exemplo, capital de confiança local, sensibilidade cultural, empenhamento operacional

sem *caveats* e acessibilidade direta às autoridades locais, através dos chefes de missão ou comandantes da força, para simultaneamente identificar e levantar oportunidades de investimento.

**Observação 4** – A crescente complexidade das missões e operações, nomeadamente através da inclusão de novos domínios operacionais como o ciber e híbrido, requer uma maior especialização, preparação e treino, com reflexos óbvios no orçamento das missões. A criação de modelos de financiamento comum possibilita que mais atores contribuam para estes fundos, sem necessariamente terem de contribuir para os fundos comuns da NATO ou para o orçamento da UE.

**Recomendação:** A resposta eficaz a este desafio pressupõe o reforço da dotação de meios financeiros no apoio à formação e preparação das FA e FSS, e o recurso a instrumentos europeus vocacionados para a capacitação de países terceiros através do Mecanismo Europeu de Apoio à Paz.

**Observação 5** – A complexidade, extensão e morosidade do processo de decisão das instituições, nomeadamente as nacionais, da NATO e da UE, e os respetivos mecanismos de consensualização de posições entre aliados são frequentemente motivo do atraso e mesmo do insucesso das missões. A eficiência da resposta e qualidade do impacto das missões e das operações internacionais requererá, no plano nacional, uma simplificação do processo de tomada de decisão, a adoção de uma prática colaborativa nacional integrada, de natureza interministerial, e a introdução de financiamentos dedicados à execução de ações externas de natureza integrada. No plano internacional, a indefinição do ambiente estratégico internacional e a frequente volatilidade dos contextos de crise e conflito geram situações de grande exigência humanitária, que requerem uma resposta imediata, em que a projeção de forças militares deve ser acompanhada, em simultâneo, com outros recursos e capacidades e não necessariamente de uma forma sequencial.

**Recomendação:** as fases de treino e de aprontamento da força, de relações públicas, de financiamento, entre outras, devem ser mobilizadas paralelamente no sentido de reduzir o máximo possível o tempo necessário para projetar a força.



## **IV Seminário de Defesa Nacional – II Parte**

**Dia 18 de novembro de 2022**



# Welcoming Session

## Prof. Dr. Isabel Ferreira Nunes

*Director of the National Defence Institute*

Madam Minister of Defence,  
Madam Counsellor of State,  
Secretary General of the Portuguese Republic Information System,  
Vice-Admiral Head of the Military House of His Excellency the President of the Portuguese Republic,  
Ambassadors,  
Representatives of the Armed Forces and of the Ministry of National Defence,  
Speakers and Moderators,  
Distinguished civilian and military authorities,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

Strategic concepts are part of international actors' strategic cultures as an instrument to assess, address and solve military and non-military challenges and opportunities. Today, we will discuss compared experiences on how strategic documents are developed and what's their substance about.

Strategic guidance documents must be exactly that: strategic.

A strategic guidance document should translate how a country positions itself internationally in the longer term, and how defence organisations should develop, in order to achieve that goal. It should formulate a desired end state and the strategic objectives which may lead to that end. Strategic guidance documents should focus on the 'what', not necessarily on the 'how'. That's why strategic guidance documents will often be followed-up by implementation plans; to clarify in which way the agreed strategic objectives can be met, based on priorities, timelines, required resources and which responsibilities should be allocated to meet those aims. Strategic objectives should be formulated in accordance with parameters for a successful formulation and action. They should be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound. This approach will make it easier to evaluate if and to which extent the objectives have been met.

The current nature of threats and challenges presses to introduce new understandings regarding the protection and resilience of states and people, where defence is an essential part of a complex constellation of resources, from technology to energy security, from security of supply to health and social stability; to defence economy, industrial and technological development or innovation.

In the current strategic context, cooperation is not an option, but a necessity that will structure collaborative practices in different ways. Whether by pooling and sharing defence resources; or by being more willing and capable and strive for a more integrated approach with the help of the Permanent Structure Cooperation Projects, of the Euro-

pean Defence Fund and of the European Peace Facility or with the support of NATO's Committee of National Armaments and NATO's Innovation Fund; or by simply better embedding and integrating defence planning, between the European Union Coordinated Annual Review Defence and NATO Defence Planning.

The growing competition among powers, the progress of war in Ukraine and the approval and implementation of the EU Strategic Compass and the new NATO's Strategic Concept suggest the importance of introducing adjustments in European countries' defence stand, with impact on countries' strategic posture and centrality.

Today we will dedicate the second day of this seminar to compare different experiences of European countries (Germany, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), with respect to the process of development and the review of their own national defence guidelines. We have asked speakers to share with us the strategic context in which these documents are being revised, their substance, the process and the stakeholders involved.

Different strategic documents have distinctive outlines and purposes. National defence concepts, white papers, strategic defence reviews or international security strategies translate different levels of ambition and implementation tempos for defence policies.

On the one hand, defence white papers translate a more short-term governmental project oriented by electoral cycles and by government's political perspectives on defence affairs.

On the other hand, strategic defence reviews pertain to a medium-term document, which often translates a process of re-evaluation of policies and practices, an assessment of the state of play in defence affairs, in both the political and operational dimensions, translating sometimes a paradigm shift, in the way defence affairs are conducted and security and defence culture is changing.

National Defence Concepts should offer a structural state view, with a whole-of-government approach to defence, and thus reflect a more integrated approach between defence administrations and stakeholders: military, civilians, actors from the industrial and technological sectors, as well as public and private actors. National defence concepts comprehend threat assessments; they identify and prioritize strategic objectives, define a timeline for implementation and include allocation of required resources, on the base of courses of action.

The current geopolitical rivalry and the invasion of Ukraine has been having many unintended consequences, claiming for the elaboration of new or review of defence guidelines. This occurs against an international background that redefined the centrality of defence, as a public policy and an existential domain for the sovereign independence of states and societies. The conflict in Ukraine has united some of the stronger and more prosperous strategic actors in the world, from Europe and the United States, to Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

It strongly and successfully reconnected a post-Brexit United Kingdom in the European strategic context, with a strong military and solidary response to the war effort in

Ukraine with its European allies, with NATO and the European Union. Germany decided to spend more 100 billion euros on defence and pledged to increase its defence contributions to the 2% threshold. It provided the incentive to what can be perceived as a paradigm shift in the case of the Netherlands' defence strategy, with a greater focus on European defence initiatives and collaborative projects. Denmark, despite recognizing NATO's centrality and leading role as a central strategic partner, it acknowledges Europe's significance in global security, its relevance as a de-securitisation agency, within a single political community, with a key role in hybrid warfare and in cyber diplomacy. Spain, in its National Security Strategy, supports a choice for a combination of deterrence and dialogue within NATO and a balanced participation in missions and operations in the EU, NATO, and UN.

At the political and strategic level all these documents tell us something about how threats are perceived, which strategic goals must be pursued nationally, and which should or must be achieved collectively; they tell us which and why priorities are set, how alliance systems and preferred strategic partners are prioritised and how these choices impact the defence institutional architecture and defence cooperation with allies and partners.

By thinking more commonly and in a more integrated manner, we can act more collectively in the defence of the values and the way of life generations before ours fought for, guaranteeing that democracy and multilateralism prevail.

With this I will conclude, thanking the presence of the Minister of Defence, which proves the importance attached to the themes that brings us together, here today.

I would like also to express my appreciation to all the speakers in presence and through videoconference, and to the moderators for your participation in our seminar at a time of change, which in itself is demanding for yourselves and for the services and institutions you represent.

I wish you all an excellent presentation and a very fruitful debate.

Thank you.

## **Prof. Dr. Helena Carreiras**

*Minister of National Defence*

Dear Director of the National Defence Institute,  
Madam Counsellor of State,  
Secretary General of the Portuguese Republic Information System,  
Vice-Admiral Head of the Military House of His Excellency the President of the Portuguese Republic,  
Ambassadors,  
Representatives of the Armed Forces and of the Ministry of National Defence,  
Speakers and Moderators,  
Distinguished civilian and military authorities,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great satisfaction to open today the fourth edition of the National Defence Seminar. This yearly event serves the purpose of fostering the debate within the Portuguese defence community while helping to establish new bridges with society. Since it was first created, in 2019, it has brought together the main actors in national defence policy with the aim of providing space for internal reflection. Since then, we have widened our approach to include both a restricted work session, that took place yesterday, and an open debate with the participation of the general public.

Our reasoning is clear: without steady linkages to knowledge production and public debate, it is not possible to make sound political decisions. It is vital that we keep promoting a productive dialogue between decision-makers, researchers and practitioners, to better develop national strategic thinking and better contribute to ongoing international debates. This seminar is a direct and important contribution to such a goal.

To all the speakers and moderators, thank you for your presence and for the important contributions that I am sure you will provide us through the day.

I thank the National Defence Institute as well for helping to organize this event, in close collaboration with my Cabinet and the Secretary-General of the Ministry of National Defence. As usual, the proceedings of the Seminar will be published under one of the IDN's publication series, thus ensuring that the rich content of our discussions will endure beyond the event itself.

I would also like to thank the participants here at IDN and all those following us through livestreaming this morning. This is an important way to expand the public impact of the National Defence Seminar and contribute to bringing the Portuguese society closer to national defence, as we make these complex issues more understandable and within reach to a wider audience.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Over the years, the National Defence Seminar has brought together different perspectives and experiences on how to deal with common security and defence challenges.

Previous editions have tackled a combination of internal priorities and global geopolitics, seeking to understand how new trends and developments could affect both national defence and international security. Today, we hold this fourth edition in a context that is marked by one defining international event and by one ongoing national process: the war in Ukraine, and the revision of the National Defence Strategic Concept.

Allow me to begin with a few words on the war itself, as it continues to reach new heights of violence and destruction, evidenced by the latest attacks on Kyiv and other parts of the Ukraine this week. As we witness the escalation on the ground, with no easy end in sight, we are reminded that our collective security cannot be taken for granted. We are also reminded that acts of deliberate aggression and open disregard for a rules-based international order, such as those carried out by Russia on Ukraine, demand an appropriate response.

As it is well known, we have steadfastly delivered on that response since February 24th onwards. We have pledged continuous support to Ukraine, either by sending much-needed military equipment, by coordinating with our partners in the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, or by taking in over 57.000 refugees. We have joined the chorus of generalized condemnation of Russia's brutal aggression in every multilateral fora. We have followed through with joint efforts adopted within NATO and the European Union to reinforce transatlantic cohesion and to increase our collective deterrence posture accordingly.

However, we also need to ensure that the overall reaction to such aggressions is holistic. First, our response needs not just be a reaction to the more immediate events and surroundings. It should also take upon a more all-encompassing view of the impact that this conflict carries for our existence as part of a community of shared values and principles.

On Monday, the EU approved the launch of the new Assistance Mission to train Ukrainian military personnel on European soil, in which Portugal will actively participate. Yet, we will be sure to match this contribution with our ongoing obligations and expectations in other areas of national interest, such as in Africa, the Atlantic or the Mediterranean – a testament of our intent to truly adopt a 360 degrees approach to security in the present world order.

Second, our response to developments in Eastern Europe should not be restricted by the consequences of the war alone – a conflict that, while far-reaching in its global impact, does not exhaust the predicaments that the international community faces in other important domains.

We are aware of the scale of new threats that can emerge from fast-changing scenarios, such as those emanating from the cyber domain, from the geopolitical competition in space, from the need to protect critical infrastructures, or from the wide-ranging consequences of climate change. We must remain vigilant across the board and be ready to fully incorporate these issues and its different implications in our respective planning.

In other words, our overall response as a state needs to be strategic at its core, in terms of how to select goals, tools and outcomes for the next few years. That requires

having the capability to identify what we lack, the willingness to go beyond short-term gains, and the vision to carve out the future that we aim to achieve.

It is for this reason that this year's edition of the National Defence Seminar takes place in the context of the ongoing revision of our own National Defence Strategic Concept. Since September, a Revision Committee has been working with the goal of submitting a draft proposal by next January. In parallel, and as mentioned by Prof. Isabel Nunes, a cycle of thematic events coordinated by IDN has been taking place throughout the country, to collect contributions and input, which, hopefully, will also be included in the revision process.

Amidst these efforts, we wanted to reach out and explore similar experiences undertaken by our fellow allies and partners. That is why the different sessions over the course of this morning will focus on the processes underpinning other strategic orientations, ongoing or recently concluded.

All countries here represented have collectively worked towards the approval of key collective documents in recent months, such as the new NATO Strategic Concept, approved last June. All have also retained the need to express their security and defence interests in codified orientations of their own. As we consider pathways for future commitments, we believe there is great value in comparing how other attempts of this kind have been able to incorporate surrounding dynamics, without losing focus of national priorities.

In sum, the context we live in requires major changes in our strategies and policies, in our investments and capabilities, and in our understanding of the new strategic environment. I am certain that the debates here today will help to ensure that our future strategies are well-crafted and, more importantly, that they can be soon followed by effective results.

Thank you once again for your presence. I wish you all a very productive and fruitful morning of work.



# New Challenges to European Strategic Concepts

**Prof. Dr. Bruno Cardoso Reis**

Iscte – University Institute of Lisbon

It is always a pleasure for me to be here at the National Defence Institute, it is also partly my house and especially in this very distinguished company and very important initiative, the National Defence Seminar. And all the more so to discuss such a fascinating topic as the new challenges for strategy in Europe today. General George Marshall, who knew a few things about strategic planning – he was the Chief of Staff of the US Army during the Second World War, and then was appointed Secretary of State, he was put in charge of US diplomacy just after 1945 –, created the State Department Office of Policy Planning and in his short instruction to this new institution, he made his famous recommendation: avoid trivia. This is of course much easier said than done, both in terms of strategic planning, strategic documents, and talks like this one, but I will try my best.

In recent months, both NATO and the EU, as Dr. Isabel Nunes has already mentioned, have issued relevant strategic documents, and many countries in Europe have either issued their own national strategies or are in the process of doing so, as is the case of Portugal. We will have distinguished speakers addressing some of these strategies during this morning, so I will not go into detail, but I will occasionally reference the EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept.

Let me also just briefly preface the presentation by saying that as an advisor to the Portuguese Minister of Defence, I was involved to some degree in the Portuguese contribution to both the Strategic Compass and the process of revision of the NATO Strategic Concept. This means that alongside my own experience in national documents here in Portugal, I am well aware of how difficult it is for the drafters of these strategic documents to balance different constituencies, have a holistic enough approach to security, while keeping focus, a clear vision, and a realistic level of ambition in a relatively short document. In fact, all these documents tend to be criticized either for being too ambitious, if they are holistic, or too narrow, if they are perhaps more realistic or more modest.

To go straight to the point, I have divided my speech in two main sections or parts. Part one will cover generic comments on the nature of these documents and key global trends with implications for strategy at the European level. Part two will cover specific comments linked to more specific debates and controversies.

In terms of more generic comments, the first one is: What can we realistically expect from this type of strategic document, and is it at all useful? Some claim that this is just another piece of paper that states, especially the EU, but also NATO, produce too many of, and are primarily of interest to academics like me involved in strategic studies. I confess that this is true, this type of document is of interest to academics, and it is useful for

someone who teaches classes in grand strategy. But I also believe that strategic doctrine guidelines are important in providing guidance and setting priorities for very complex structures. They are also very important as instruments of public scrutiny and accountability, allowing debates like the ones we are having today. In the past, these aspects were largely absent, and therefore, grand strategy was largely done informally and secretly. The setting of priorities and the implementation of these priorities was in the hands of the sovereign, an actual person, and a small group of elite advisors who were always in close intimate contact. This started to change from the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards and has changed even more in recent decades.

Strategic documents are also important as an instrument of public diplomacy, signalling intent to both allies and enemies. They are especially important, even indispensable, when we talk about a confederal, maybe partially federal, Union of 27 Member States, the EU, or a political military organization, not simply an alliance in the conventional sense, like NATO, with 30, and hopefully soon to be 32, Member States. This, of course, also means that the Strategic Compass of the EU and the Strategic Concept of NATO are not national strategies of a single state; we should take that into account. We cannot expect the same kind of document that we have at the national level, like the just recently issued National Security Strategy of the US. They are basically a bridging exercise between national strategies of 27 or 30 Member States. This means that a key test of these documents in terms of implementation is how they are implemented at the national level. While national strategies should have national priorities and signal a commitment to these crucial alliances, for Member States it is interesting to see how much of the larger documents – the EU Strategic Compass and NATO Strategic Concept – is reflected in the national strategies of the different Member States.

Second generic comment: Is a fixed strategy useful in this very fast changing world? A couple of years ago, there was a hot debate in the pages of Foreign Affairs among academics about whether we should have grand strategy, whether we should have strategic documents in the context of a fast-changing world. As an historian, I am always sceptical about this idea that this is entirely new. The world was always changing and, in the past, our ancestors also thought that it was changing fast, but I can accept that this is true to a certain degree. The answer is no, we should never have a fixed strategy. Any good strategic guidelines or document should not be seen as a dogma to be blindly implemented regardless of a changing reality.

For it to be useful, it should provide pointers to key dynamics, threats, and risks that must be watched, and help identify key capability gaps that must be addressed, and set key priorities in terms of defending core interests, which will remain despite a fast-changing world. This makes revision and adaptation much more important, and should be signalled in these documents. To quote another American, General Eisenhower, planning is even more important than plans. This also highlights the importance of intelligence, which is always important, but even more so in a fast-changing world.

On that note, one useful aspect of the EU Strategic Compass is that it is the first strategic document specifically for the Common Security and Defence Policy, but also

that it was based on the first joint threat analysis coordinated by the EU INTCEN (EU Intelligence and Situation Centre) in coordination with the National Intelligence Services of the 27. The document also sets up regular exercises of this type – threat assessment – by the intelligence services, with a timetable that is left open. It would be useful to make it clear that these exercises should be conducted annually, as it is the right approach. The problem with some strategic cultures, such as the Portuguese, is to create plans and then ignore them, do no strategic planning and just rely on improvisation, which is called “desenrasca” in Portuguese. While improvisation can be useful, it cannot be the only answer.

The last generic comment: What are the main trends that we should consider, and are they taken into account in these documents? I think that, generically, yes, they are taken into account in these documents. However, problems arise when we look at more specific points. We are living in a world where the distribution of power is changing. This is actually a pattern in human history, but this does not make it any less dangerous. But we are also living in a world where the biosphere, which we always needed to survive, have tended to see as relatively and safely changing, is in fact also changing in dramatic ways. We all know about the climate crisis. The technosphere that we increasingly also need to survive and to thrive economically is also changing even faster than was the case in the past. And of course, this has major implications in vital areas for our security and defence.

In terms of this specific transition of power, as I said, it is a pattern in human history, but what makes it especially dangerous, especially from the point of view of Europe, is that it means the end of American unipolarity. Of course, American unipolarity was not risk free or even tension free, but it was, if we want to be frank, very comfortable and very safe for Western Europe. Now we are looking, if we are lucky, at the likely second Cold War. This means no direct clash between great powers, all of which are now nuclear powers. However, a dangerously declining power like Russia may pose an imminent and very close threat to our freedom and security in Europe, and an emerging or re-emerging China is also becoming increasingly relevant in military and maritime terms. The Chinese Navy surpassed the US Navy in the number of ships last year, and they are getting closer to being able to project power globally. They recently launched their third aircraft carrier and established their first overseas military base in Djibouti since 2017. Additionally, we have the growing relevance of cyber and space.

All of these aspects, I think, are for the most part mentioned in these new strategic documents. The problem, as I mentioned, has to do with the specifics. So, first, is this a real strategy or just a list or roadmap? In the case of the EU Strategic Compass, it can be said that this is mostly a roadmap because the EU Global Strategy is the main strategy and this is a subsidiary strategy. This is not necessarily a bad thing, and the Strategic Compass does contain a key strategic insight: that we need to spend more jointly on defence. The issue in Europe is not that we do not spend enough on defence, as European countries as a whole spend roughly as much on defence as China and significantly more than Russia. They are only clearly surpassed by the US. The problem is that we are not spending together or in a coordinated way, which is perfectly legitimate, but it is

obvious that we should do much better in terms of spending jointly and especially in a coordinated way. Therefore, this is a crucial insight, and I believe it is a major contribution of the Strategic Compass.

Regarding the NATO Strategic Concept, it clearly reaffirms the so-called three core tasks while also rebalancing them. For a long time, the focus has been on so-called crisis management, particularly in the model of counterinsurgency or military counterterrorism. Now, the focus will be on territorial defence with cooperative security or capacity building remaining as the third task. However, it is important to emphasize that territorial defence should not be understood as business as usual or a simple return to very conventional-minded first Cold War military defense. There are many references to hybrid threats, to resilience in the NATO Strategic Compass. And it is made clear that there will be a huge impact of so-called EDTs (emerging disruptive technologies), which is a recurrent topic in both strategic documents, and goes back to these dramatic changes in the so-called technosphere. It is made clear that this will have an impact across the board, including in territorial defence.

Also, a very positive aspect in these two documents is the emphasis given to maritime strategy. Portugal can claim to have been active in promoting this in a very effective way. It is important to explain why this is important to everyone, even countries without a coastline. Two numbers alone are enough to support this argument: 90% of global trade is done via maritime routes, as it was 500 years ago, and 60% of intra-European trade is done via maritime routes. The consequences of this were seen in the war in Ukraine in terms of energy and food security. Additionally, 90% of the data needed for our digital economy growth goes through underwater cables, and the underwater infrastructure is vulnerable, as seen in the crisis in Ukraine.

A second aspect to highlight is the civilian dimension, which is more present in the EU Strategic Compass than in NATO. Resilience is a key word in the EU document, but less so in NATO's. I think it is important to highlight that for the EU to be taken seriously as a security actor, the frequently stated EU's claim that it is uniquely equipped for crisis management due to its civilian tools for development and prevention, as well as military tools, is not entirely true. The EU budget shows that aid to development is 10 times greater than the item for defence – the European Defence Fund –, which is a positive indication of its seriousness. However, it is 10 times less than the development budget, and the EU has yet to engage in any real operational combat missions. We are far from a militarized European Union, which my colleagues in development studies fear.

What is the connection between the two? The two documents point to each other as key, indispensable partners. NATO regards the EU as such, and the EU regards NATO as such. This is a necessary condition for the approval of the Strategic Compass. If there were any doubt that the EU would not replace NATO as the primary security provider for collective defence in Europe, then the Strategic Compass would not be approved. NATO is the real security provider for Europe, and it is key for deterrence and defense. This was evident during the invasion of Ukraine; we cannot improve an alliance, much less a political military organization, during a time of war.

However, this does not mean that the EU should have no real military capabilities. Should strategic autonomy be a taboo? Clearly, the answer is no. There is no good alternative to NATO, but that does not mean that we should not think about it, even though it is difficult. We live in a fast-changing world, and the greatest threat to NATO and the EU is internal cohesion or hyperpolarization caused by divisive domestic politics. This has already partially impacted the cohesion of those alliances, with examples like Trump and Erdogan. It directly impacts how much NATO and the EU can cooperate at the political level, although they are very effective at staff or senior official levels. This represents a problem.

The good news is that an engaged EU in terms of defence and security can solve these problems, especially by starting with joint or coordinated capabilities development to address the recurrent capability gaps that we all know about. This will be indispensable if the EU is to be taken seriously as an actor in these areas. It will also be crucial for scaling up and showing effective burden sharing at the NATO level, which of course is crucial to avoid the fundamental risk for NATO, which is the rise of isolationism in the US.

The most recent midterms gave us some good news, not because Republicans lost or not gained as much as expected, but because many Trump Republicans and isolationist Republicans lost. J.D. Vance in Ohio was very clear in saying that he does not want any more aid to Ukraine, that is up to Europeans and the Europeans have paid nothing. Of course, we know that is not true, but that shows how important it is that we are able to say that this is not true.

To conclude, regarding the war in Ukraine. For me, one thing that is not actually very clear in these documents, they keep saying there is a return of war to Europe, this is not actually the problem. Wars have happened in Europe in the past decades, like in the former Yugoslavia. The real problem here is, not just are interstate wars very rare since 1945, so the invasion of Ukraine is rare already because of that, but it is in fact a unique challenge because it is the return of wars of conquest, it is the return of wars of imperial aggression and annexation. We have not seen that since 1945. This is a challenge, not just for Europe, it is a challenge for the world.

To end, I think that probably we should thank actually Putin. I know that this is a challenging proposition, but there is this idea that maybe we should include Stalin as one of the founding fathers of European integration – alongside De Gasperi, Spaak, Schuman, Adenauer –, because he really made clear that Europeans had to hang together or they would hang separately. They would really have to change their ways if they wanted to resist this massive threat of Stalin's Soviet Union. And I think that Putin maybe forced us to rethink some of the priorities and made it very clear how absolutely vital NATO is to Europeans and to the Americans and Canadians, and also how important it is that Europeans do show up in terms of defence and security and do not fall into this trap that they can remain this kind of civilian power, normative power in a world that is increasingly dangerous.

Thank you very much.

# Compared Strategic Concepts: United Kingdom and the Netherlands

## Christian Wood

*Assistant Head – Strategy Development, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom*

First of all, thank you. It is a pleasure to be here this morning and thank you very much for inviting myself and Ministry of Defence.

You touched on a few points in your introduction, but I thought it would be useful to first set out the Integrated Review and then how that actually transcends into how defence does strategy. We view this as a pyramid. The Integrated Review is the government's overarching vision for the UK over the next 10 years. It takes into account our national interest and tries to promote UK's interests, project UK's influence, and, most importantly, protect the nation. However, it is a strategy that encompasses the whole of government, not just the Ministry of Defence. So, it takes into account our economic strategy, our diplomatic strategy, our cultural strategy, our trade, our information, as well as the military. As you correctly pointed out, it was published last year.

We believe that the UK was slightly ahead of the game in recognizing the unprecedented challenges and geopolitical shifts that we are witnessing in the world have led to a deteriorating global security environment. We also recognized the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, which is critical to ensuring global prosperity and security, while recognizing the intensifying competition between states and the widening range of security threats. Unfortunately, it is not as if you looked at our Integrated Review in 2010 and 2015, which focused mainly on non-state actors and counter-terrorism; it is not that those threats have diminished, but other threats have increased. Finally, we recognize in the Integrated Review that we have found ourselves at a time of rapid technological change, and it is crucial for the UK to be a leader in that and get ahead of the game.

From that, the Integrated Review set out four overarching objectives up to 2025, which I will just briefly touch on: 1) sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology; 2) shaping the open international order of the future; 3) strengthening security at home and overseas; and 4) building resilience at home and overseas. The last objective is particularly interesting because it was amended due to the impact of COVID. The Integrated Review is usually published every five years, but ours was delayed by a year to take into account lessons learned from the pandemic and our domestic resilience, that had grown following the impact and the pressures we had seen on our domestic services following the pandemic.

This was underpinned by a Defence Command Paper, which is what my team was responsible for. The Integrated Review is written by the Cabinet Office, but all parties across government contribute to it. It is a central document that is publicly owned by the Prime Minister, so we, in Defence, do not ride the pen on that. Following the Integrated

Review, defence was given a comprehensive settlement for the next four years in 2020, with an additional investment of over 20 billion, which, at the time, was the largest investment since the end of the Cold War. Recognizing that this investment gave us an opportunity to reform and renew our Armed Forces to prepare and deliver on the ambition set out in the Integrated Review, our Defence Secretary requested that the Defence also publish a Defence Command Paper.

The Defence Command Paper had three particular points that I want to touch on. Firstly, it outlined how defence must prepare for persistent global engagement and campaigning, outlining how we would be on the forefront and shaping the open international order of the future, how we would move from just defending our nation to ensuring that we are strengthening our deterrence and are becoming an increasingly adaptable and integrated ally to our partners, not just in Europe and NATO, but around the world. This led to a change in our Concept so that we can intervene and fight more rapidly and decisively, becoming more agile, leaner and more lethal.

Secondly, the paper doubled down on our commitment to science and technology and research and development, allocating 6.6 billion to accelerate research and development for strategic advantage. We chose to sunset certain capabilities and enhance our sub-threshold threats, our cyber capabilities, ensuring we have a decisive edge as a global science power.

Lastly, the paper underpinned our commitments to our allies and partnerships, reaffirming NATO as the cornerstone of Europe's and the UK's security. It also signalled a willingness to expand our collaboration and cooperation through industrial partnerships with like-minded partners and allies worldwide. We recognize that the malign threats we face are not just close to home but across the world, and it is our duty to be a responsible power and uphold the international order in multiple domains.

Finally, following the Defence Command Paper, we also have an internal strategy which is classified and direct. This is almost the third layer in the pyramid, the Defence Strategy. This Defence Strategy, which was published last year, takes the Defence Command Paper and the Integrated Review, recognizes their vision and gives specific outcomes and objectives that direct the rest of the department. That was a significant change, we have moved away from measuring outputs, such as the number of operations or tanks built, and focus on outcomes. We want to measure and understand the changes we want to see in the world and our organization. Having an overarching strategy that focuses on these outcomes allowed us to identify key areas to focus on, such as deterrence, modernization and transformation, and integration, to change the way our department functions. That brings together all of our frontline commands in order to be able to work more closely under one integrated operating concept, and to make sure that everything that they are doing and everything that teams in defence are doing are all working to this overarching vision.

In having this Defence Strategy, which is normally published every four years, and sets out our vision for the next eight years, we have done something quite different this year. We have chosen to adopt something called an adaptive strategy. Within my team,

Strategy Development and the Ministry of Defence's Strategic Hub – recently set up following the creation of the Defence Strategy –, we are seeking to constantly evaluate and interpret the difference we are making in the world, and what is the threat and how it is changing. So our constant aim in our strategy is always to be threat-led, and that gives us the opportunity to amend and change and give a new direction to our seniors and to the rest of the Defence each year. We do this through what we are calling a strategic cycle, to monitor and evaluate progress, seeking to understand lessons learned from conflicts such as Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, and the success of deployments such as Carrier Strike 21 in the Indo-Pacific. Our aim is to move away from a strategy as just a big public document left on a shelf to collect dust, but a live document that is constantly informing defence. And by that we are finding that as strategists, we are able to work much more closely with our operational teams, with our policy experts who have this subject matter expertise and the relationship with particular issues. We are constantly ensuring that we are not just led by the financial implications and the capabilities in the operational requested time, but always strategically driven.

We recognized in the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper that the world was deteriorating and competition was intensifying. However, as the previous speaker said, the world is deteriorating at a faster pace than anticipated, which was not foreseen by the Integrated Review or our allies and partners. Therefore, in her short tenure, former Prime Minister Elizabeth Truss commissioned an update to the Integrated Review, announced at the UN General Assembly. Currently, my team is working with Number 10 and an academic professor to write an update to the Integrated Review, which we will be publishing hopefully by the end of the year. This updated public document which could almost be seen as a second chapter, which recognizes that, broadly, the Integrated Review remains at extant. The vision set out under those four pillars remains the UK's driving ambition for the next 10 years, but we recognize that we must have a sharpening of the focus towards certain threats, most predominantly recognizing that we have a very aggressive and volatile Russia, which is directly causing war in Europe. Therefore, we must be more resilient and we must be more ready to deter these threats and double down on our commitments to our allies and partners.

In addition to the updated Integrated Review, our Defence Secretary has also commissioned an update to our Defence Command Paper, which our team is writing. We published our Defence Command Paper last year and will be publishing another update to it in the spring, following a spending review that will align with the financial settlement that defence receives in the new year. This aligns with the Defence's recognition that, due to the threats, it is important that we increase our defence budgets.

This aligns with the Defence Secretary's commitments to seek to receive 2.5%, to ensure that the 2% NATO GDP target is the floor, not the ceiling. This will, therefore, also update and ensure that our Armed Forces are not just ready to fight today's threats, but that they are also, with a modernized force, ready to fight the threats in 2030. More importantly, it will address the hollowing out that the Defence Command Paper almost signalled and roll back on that in 2026, to have armed forces ready to deter all threats, not just in Europe, but potentially in other parts of the world, if aggression ensues.



## Lt. Col. Peter Marx

*Ministry of Defence, Netherlands*

Thank you for inviting me today. The Seminar and your distinguished presence underline the need we all feel for more cooperation, which normally starts or is at least helped by strategy. I am honoured to be a small part of that today.

Today, I will tell you not about the process or the contents of the Dutch strategy, but mainly explain why we felt the need to design a more political military strategy. That will help you understand why it is aimed at not only military problems, but also at worldwide and societal issues, such as climate change and the military's role within it. It will also help you understand why it is aimed, not only at capacity building, but also at how the military relates to the Dutch public and our partners, and the dilemmas that come with it.

In the next twenty minutes, I will explain why we felt the urgency to invest in strategy and political and social support, what we did within the Ministry to address the urgency we felt, and how it translates into the recently published strategy, as well as the one from two years ago. As a side note, it is important to understand that the Netherlands is based within Europe, but the Ministry of Defence has a responsibility for the whole Kingdom of the Netherlands, including a Caribbean part. So, besides our partners within NATO, within the EU and our neighbours – Germany, the UK, Belgium –, we have to take into account neighbouring countries like France in the Caribbean, and problems within the Caribbean, such as those with Venezuela. These are also the responsibility of the Dutch MoD, and we must consider them when making choices.

Firstly, the urgency. Therefore, I go back to the period directly after 2014; as defence strategists and planners, we all recognized the shift in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. We addressed that in our strategic papers as a game changer, but we did not see that translated into public opinion or the political debate. To demonstrate the problem, this graph shows a 2017 survey of Dutch public investment priorities. In 2017, there were a lot of worldwide problems and climate change already, and a lot of instability around and in Europe, such as Crimea. However, defence, as circled on the slide, was very low on the list of priorities of the Dutch public, while healthcare, integration, and education were high. These are important issues in the Netherlands, but defence is also important. This translated into a decline in defence budgets from approximately 1990 to 2014-16.

So we experienced, on the one hand, a world which is deteriorating – we published quite a lot of good papers on it – but we saw that did not translate into a feeling of urgency within the public. We had trouble reaching the public and the public opinion, and also the political opinion. Now I analyse what was the problem with that. First of all, there was a political perception that investing in defence is a black hole. That was not because the urgency was not felt, or that there were no issues with safety or security, but it was mainly because we as a MoD did not succeed in showing, for instance, the impact investment has on our capacities, or the link between investment and readiness. That made it very hard for Dutch politicians to really invest heavily in defence, because it is

hard to translate how public money relates to readiness or deployability – that was a real problem. Also, the societal perception. There was a lot of support for the military, Dutch operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, for instance, translated into a lot of respect for soldiers in the Dutch public opinion, but that did not translate into a feeling of urgency for Dutch security problems or for the need to invest in the defence organisation.

Therefore, we decided we had to invest in a more political security/defence military strategy, which better addresses the public and the politicians and underlines the need for a strong defence for the Dutch security problems, but also for the economic position of the Netherlands and Europe. So, we had to invest in several aspects. Invest in dialogue, between the Ministry/military and society, but also businesses, politicians and partners within the Netherlands, the Caribbean, the EU and NATO. Invest in dependability that the euros that are spent in the MoD are well-spent euros. Invest in the visibility of the armed forces in the Netherlands, people have to see more of the military since that shows what we do with public money. Invest in a strong brand in dependability, but also that the military is not only for missions abroad, but for national security, and it is an essential component in Europe and for the security of European people and, therefore, the Dutch people.

Therefore, like my colleague from the UK, we designed a strategic cycle, which is linked to our parliamentary cycle, which is normally four years. What is important is that it is a cycle, so we are constantly thinking about strategy; and that we have two main moments in that strategic cycle. One is the Defence Vision, we published that two years ago, and normally it's published around halfway down the parliamentary cycle. That's an opportunity we take to assess the world around us, assess the situation within the Dutch Armed Forces, decide what is needed within the next fifteen to twenty years to address all the current and future problems, and how we can get there. The document is not funded, it is merely strategic and it helps us engage in our public dialogue, but also in a dialogue with Dutch politics, about what is, from an expert opinion, needed for the development of the defence organisation. After that, elections happen and a new cabinet takes place; they design a coalition agreement, and we translate that coalition agreement into a Defence White Paper, and that is funded. So there is the planning for the defence forces for the next four years at least, how we will spend our budget and how we will handle the direction we got in the coalition agreement. That was the document we published last year.

So in a timeline, first of all, we published the Defence Vision in October 2020, called Defence Vision 2035 because that was the scope of the vision. Also, a side note, all the Ministers sign the Defence Vision and the Defence White Paper, it is designed by the Ministry of Defence, but it is a document published on behalf of all our Cabinets. On the Defence Vision 2035, we stated three things. First is that, at that moment, the Dutch Defence was not adequately equipped to address all the security problems and all the government demands, also within our obligations in the law. That, of course, was quite a statement, but it is true. There were a lot of budget cuts in the last twenty years and the demands are growing, so there was no balance anymore between, on the one

hand, the budget and, on the other hand, the demands. So it was true, but the statement was very important also within the societal discussion. We concluded that to respond to all the demands we needed an extra 13 to 17 billion euros. That was more than double the Dutch defence budget, which was 11 to 12 billion at that moment. And of course, we knew, and we also put it in the document, that we did not get that amount of money, and we cannot process that amount of money in a short time as well. What we said in the document was that if you increase investment on defence to higher levels than now, but not to the 30 to 70 billion, we have to start a dialogue at the political level about what risks you are about to accept or mitigate in another way with the military. That is a discussion within society, within the public, which we put in our Defence Vision, and we need long-term political commitment on budget, but also on policy.

After that, the real discussion in society and also within our politics began. With the MoD, but also within society. This was facilitated, of course, by the heavy security problems developing in Europe, but even before the war on Ukraine happened, in our coalition agreement our government decided to invest 3 billion more in the Dutch defence organisation because there was a need felt within our government to invest more in defence, but mainly to invest more in European security cooperation, and the need for the Dutch military and Dutch government to step up within that responsibility. After Ukraine happened, an additional 2 billion was invested. So now we are working towards a defence budget of about 80 billion, which is 40% more than two years ago. That is a huge assignment for the Dutch Defence Forces, but it is highly needed.

Now, some fundamental choices. For us, the need to step up as the Netherlands, but also as Europe, for taking responsibility for our own security issues was priority one in designing our strategy. It was also in the coalition agreement, therefore it was our guiding principle in designing the Dutch Defence Strategy. That is very fundamental. When you read our strategic papers, you see that the red line is that we have to invest in cooperation to make Europe stronger, the EU stronger, and also, by doing that, NATO stronger. But we also had some fundamental dilemmas in designing our strategy. First of all, is the urge to grow versus investing in fundamental basis. We had a lot of gaps in our organization, due to budget cuts, due to choices made, and there was a strong need to repair that, but also the security situation demands the growth of some capabilities, new capabilities, but also old capabilities. So there was quite a dilemma. Secondly, tooth versus tail. Are you going to invest heavily in combat forces or in the support of combat forces? Because, of course, again, lot of needs are with the combat units, but if you do not have adequate support for the combat units, they become less effective. So there's also a strong need to address the tail. And a dilemma, which is also kind of a side note, is the target audience for the White Paper, because we had to address a lot of stakeholders. First of all, society, politics, to show them what we believe to be the best way to develop the Armed Forces, our partners, internationally and nationally, but also, of course, our Armed Forces themselves, because it is the guideline for them in the next few years to develop their own part of the organisation. That is quite a difficult target audience because all audiences need different things for their understanding, but it is all addressed within one document.

So the choices we made overall and I think, in the opening speech, that was addressed also strongly, is that the overarching goal for us is to step up as Netherlands, develop our Armed Forces, repair a lot of readiness and deployability issues we have, and therefore be a better partner within Europe, within the EU and within NATO. There's also a big red line, which focused on cooperation with our partners, close partners like Germany, the UK, Belgium, Norway, the United States, but also within the EU and within NATO, because we really believe that cooperation – and I'm really happy that this is addressed almost by every speaker today –, we really think that the only possibility to address all the security issues Europe is going to face in the future, is facing now, but is going to face in the future, is by working far more closely together, on capacity building, on integrating our forces, than we do right now.

So our security strategy is based on stepping up as Netherlands by improving our readiness and deployability, strongly investing in the support of Dutch Forces, so support units but also supplies and stocks. Therefore, in strengthening all units, we targeted to improve a few units' combat power, which we think are some missing links within Europe, like rockets and air defence units, and we invest heavily in agility by putting a lot of money in our intel chain, but also our command chain and information manoeuvre units.

That, in short, concludes my briefing, not only about the choices we made, but hopefully this helps you understand the choices we made, but also the urge we felt to cross the bridge between the military and military analysis, and the public debate within the Netherlands, but within Europe. And we really think that it is necessary because we have to address the future security problems, not only as a military, but as a society.

# Compared Strategic Concepts: Denmark, Spain and Germany

## Ambassador Michael Zilmer-Johns

*Chairman of the Danish Government's Security Analysis Group, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark*

It is a great pleasure to participate in this meeting with Portuguese decision-makers and colleagues. Through my long career in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I have found that despite the geographical distance and cultural differences, Denmark and Portugal, along with the Netherlands, almost always seem to be aligned in worldview and on issues both economic and politically. Probably because we are all former empires that now realize we are quite small countries, but still have a global outlook as great seafaring nations with interests and responsibilities far beyond Europe.

In Denmark, our defence budgets and structure are decided by a very broad majority in Parliament, through five-year spending cycles. The big advantage of this is that the defence budget is ring-fenced, which means it is protected from other cuts in economic crises. That also means that, even if there are changes of government, the overall strategy and plans for defence will stay intact. This time around, due to the need to really plan ahead, we are expecting a 10-year agreement. We have just had elections in Denmark; after a new government is formed we expect political parties to embark on negotiations on a new defence spending agreement, which will begin by 2024 and run through 2033. This also coincides with a decision made by a large majority in Parliament to move to the 2% target of defence spending as a proportion of GDP, in that time perspective.

My role has been to chair a working group that has prepared this report. We have just prepared a White Paper, which is not a strategy or government policy paper, but an analysis of the world as it is and as we expect it to evolve over the next 15 years. Although the group I chair was composed of the Chief of Staff of Danish Defence, representatives of ministries and of the Faroe Islands and Greenland governments, it mainly reflects the inputs we received from numerous Danish experts and research institutes. We are also, of course, inspired by what other countries are doing. Particularly, we have found a lot of inspiration in the Integrated Review, although we are spending more time and focus on the EU than the Integrated Review does.

As Professor Reis said this morning, we are at a major turning point in global history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Of course, the most visible and dramatic expression of this new era is the ongoing war in Ukraine, but probably the most important thing we will witness, as Professor Reis said, is the end of the unipolar world with the US as the one superpower. We are going to witness a major shift in the balance of power from the West to the rest, and

in particular from the US to China. This also means that the liberal rule-based world order that we have known for so many years is going to be transformed, probably into a much more fluid world order with many more strong actors striving for influence and competing.

We are expecting this new world order to be much more brutal and difficult to navigate for Europe and European countries like Denmark. What we also see is that the age of globalization is probably over; as we are moving away from free trade, sophisticated supply chain and outsourcing are being substituted by home sourcing, and friend sourcing substituting them. Everybody is looking at their strategic autonomy and how they can safeguard this. We are going to see tough competition on technologies, as previous speakers have mentioned. This has been one of the surprising things for us to look into. The impact of the militarization of technologies like quantum computing or artificial intelligence might lead to some to think that we will have a New Cold War. That is not what we are expecting because in spite of stronger competition with China, there will also be a need to keep open trade and cooperation going on issues like climate change. We saw that unfold at the recent G20 meeting.

In contrast, in Europe, we are going to see a total decoupling of Russia from the rest of Europe, almost a breakdown in economic and human ties, and in almost any interaction from just the bare minimum of diplomacy. This also has to do with the fact that, although we, of course, want Ukraine to prevail very soon, we fear that the most likely scenario for Ukraine will be another frozen conflict in Europe, which will stay with us for decades.

One important impact of the rise of China is that it has changed the US threat perception. Now, the US, in their policy papers, say that they see China as the major threat and as the only country with both the intent and the increasing economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to reshape the international order. China is also therefore the most comprehensive and serious threat to US national security. This means that the much talked about US pivot to Asia is really going to happen in the years also in defence and security.

This will mean that European countries will have to take upon themselves a much stronger part of the defence and deterrence against Russia. We do not expect the US to give up on Article 5 or the nuclear guarantee, but in many of the contributions that the US has made historically, strategic enablers in space-based information gathering and communications, strategic airlift, the follow-on forces and so on, will have to be reduced. This is simply the logical and inevitable consequence of the challenge from China to the US. Even if Russia had not attacked Ukraine, European countries would have had to spend much more on defence. Fortunately, we are seeing that all of the countries are now moving in that direction. Germany has made a major decision, and we are expecting that this will transform the German military, which we really need, because we will see in the future Germany being the centerpiece of the land-based deterrence of Russia in Eastern and Central Europe. We have the biggest imbalance with the Russian forces in this area. Even though Russia has been very weakened by the Ukraine war, we expect

that as soon as they are able to regroup, they will concentrate again on the northern flank, here in our area in the Baltic Sea, and in the Arctic.

One thing that has not been mentioned is the big difference that Sweden and Finland joining NATO will make to our security. This will change the whole security geography in the Baltic Sea, transforming it into a NATO *Mare Nostrum* with Russia only controlling the small coast outside St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. However, Russia remains the biggest and most dangerous threat in our part of the world, both on land and as a continued threat to the Baltic states.

For Danish defense, this means shifting from the intervention force that the Danish military used to design to go to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Mali, with major forces deployed, to now focusing on territorial defence in the Baltic Sea, especially forward defence in the Baltic countries and the Arctic region. We expect to be able to renew and develop our cooperation with other Nordic countries, but also Germany. In the future, we foresee a new division of labor between NATO and the EU. Denmark, fortunately, has been able to now join fully the military cooperation in the EU by lifting the opt-out on Defence Cooperation. This is very fortunate, because the EU will have a strong role in defence against hybrid warfare, the resilience agenda and dealing with the threats from the Global South.

One of the difficult challenges for us in the future is that while we see a resurgence of the threat from Russia, the threats from the Global South, including migration and terrorism, reinforced by climate change, will not subside. Therefore, the Danish military will have a lot of new tasks, but the old ones will not go away. They will have to be dealt with differently than the major military interventions seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. But we will have to retain a certain capability to engage with our partners militarily in protecting Europe's borders and in projecting European military power into Africa and the Middle East to safeguard our security.

The only way the Danish military can do this with a manpower that cannot be expanded – due to democracy and the labor market – is by investing heavily in high-tech equipment. We will focus on technology in the future, which also means changing the recruiting pattern and system. We will need fewer lorry drivers and people with experience in basic machinery and more high-tech experts who expect different salaries and working conditions. Thank you for listening.

## Colonel José Luis Calvo Albero

*Director of the Coordination and Studies Division, Secretary General of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Spain*

First of all, thank you for your introduction. Thank you to the National Defence Institute for this invitation to discuss strategy and the production of strategic documents in these difficult times in Europe. This is an opportunity to learn from each other and share experiences. Listening to the previous speakers, I realized that in fact we are facing very similar problems, which is logical since we are all European countries and we have the same threats, risks and scenarios.

I will speak about the Spanish case and the National Defence Directive issued in 2020, two and a half years ago. It has been a short period of time since then, but in this time a lot of things have happened. In fact, I remember that this document was drafted at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic; as such, the document cannot reflect recent events such as the invasion of Ukraine and the consequences of the pandemic. This is one of the problems of this type of document; you write it and issue it in a given moment and then, a few months later, or one year or two years later, a very important international event takes place that changes the situation. So now we are feeling the necessity to draft a new one, but since this is a politically linked document, we will have to wait for a new government. This National Defence Directive document is produced by every government when they assume the office for a term of four years, so usually, unless there is something exceptional happening, to draft a new one requires a new government.

Moving on to the schedule, I will discuss the context and purpose of the National Defence Directive, the structure of the document, its contents and key concepts. In Spain, we have different strategic documents. Until 2011, the National Defence Directive was the main strategic document and the highest-level strategic document produced in Spain. In 2011, the concept of national security was introduced into our strategic body and the first National Security Strategy was issued. Despite the introduction of the National Security Strategy in 2011, the decision was made to keep the National Defence Directive at the government level due to the importance of national defence as a key function of the state. So now we have two documents at this level. The National Security Strategy, which is broader, covering all aspects of national security such as defence, internal security, environmental security, foreign affairs, and cyber security; and the National Defence Directive, which is drafted mainly by the Ministry of Defence, approved by the whole government and signed by the Prime Minister.

The document at the Ministry of Defence level is the Defence Planning Directive, which is issued a few months after the National Defence Directive. The National Defence Directive is the political document, while the Defence Planning Directive is more operational and executive. The National Security Strategy and the National Defence are public documents with no security classification, but the Defence Planning Directive is usually confidential security classified. However, the latest one was issued during the



pandemic and was made public as a show of transparency in defence. These are the three main documents regarding strategic concepts and strategic development in Spain.

The National Defence Directive is produced when a new government takes office, usually within the first year. It is drafted by the Ministry of Defence, but approved by the government as a whole and signed by the Prime Minister. It is theoretically subordinate to the National Security Strategy since the latter includes defence as one of the parts of national security, and the former develops defence. However, I said theoretically, since sometimes it is difficult to adjust the times and the order of the documents due to complicated political cycles. For example, we now have a National Security Strategy drafted in 2021 and a National Defence Directive drafted in 2020, but since both of them were approved by the same government, they are coherent.

So, the National Defence Directive has three main purposes. The first is to inform the citizens about what is going on regarding defence and the government's plans for the next four years. It has to be a clear and easily readable document. It is a political document and, obviously, it provides political guidance. Usually, this document develops the political program of the ruling party, in which there is a small part dedicated to defence. Once in office, the government develops its political program through the National Defence Directive. Finally, this document is a planning document and serves as the starting point for a planning cycle. In Spain, we have a planning cycle of two years followed by another two-year cycle for review, making a total of four years. This can be a challenge because the document needs to be understandable to common citizens while also serving as the starting point for defence planning, capability planning, and military planning. It needs to be significant enough to give clear guidance, but also general and clear.

The structure of our document is traditional and typically has four points. The first point presents the international situation and its influence on Spanish interests and security. The second point defines threats, risks and challenges, which is difficult and sensitive, as it requires a political decision on that. We do not clearly define an enemy, since in Spain there is no enemy as such, but rather present a very general definition of threats and risks, as it is a public document. Prioritizing threats, risks and challenges is important for planning, but it is not easy to make such a decision in a public document. Sometimes there are opportunities to make decisions through classified documents other than the National Defence Directive. However, it is often difficult to put something in writing because it creates a commitment. For instance, if the Prime Minister states that their first priority is instability in Northern Africa, but then a conflict arises in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine, they cannot prioritize the other side of Europe in writing. Politicians are often uncomfortable with this definition, but it is something that they must attempt to do.

The third point, which is defining objectives and goals, is probably the most important because it is essential for planning. In this case, it is crucial that the government defines its intentions for defence and security in the next four years in order to have a proper planning process. The fourth part of the document is guidance. While in the third part, the goals and objectives are established, the guidance part presents the meth-

ods to achieve those objectives. This includes the instructions, concepts, actions and projects necessary to accomplish the goals.

So this is the structure of the document. The document should be short and to the point. In the past, National Defence Directives have been as long as 25 pages, but in this case, the goal was to keep it concise. Even with a 10 or 11-page document, there were criticisms from the Army and the Navy that it was too long. However, it is important to keep in mind that these documents are not only for the government, but also for citizens. Therefore, it may be necessary to elaborate on some points. Regardless, the documents must be clear and concise.

It is important to identify in these documents the key points, issues or projects that the government wants to develop during this term of four years. In the case of Spain, the four points included in this National Defence Directive: 1) multilateralism in international relations; 2) development of an integrated National Security System; 3) use of military force based on a combination of strength and disposition to dialogue/negotiation/respect for other cultures. On the first one, multilateralism in international relations, Spain is convinced that it is impossible for a country in isolation to deal with all the challenges, risks, and threats of this globalized world. Therefore, it is necessary to manage this security environment together with other countries in the framework of international organizations, NATO and the European Union, through bilateral relations and coalitions.

For example, one of the ideas of the government is that NATO and the European Union are both important for security. There is no competition between them, and NATO is already the pillar of our collective defence. However, the European Union also has interesting security capabilities, diplomatic capabilities and economic capabilities, and regarding defence, it is something to be built, but always in complementarity with NATO. Even if one day we develop our European defence capabilities completely, it does not mean that we are going to compete with NATO. Therefore, it is normal that we collaborate, and there is no competition, but rather collaboration and complementarity. This was one of the key concepts included in the document.

The second one was the comprehensive approach or whole-of-government approach to security problems. Integration of all the available instruments in the management of internal crisis means that all the instruments working on security and defence must work together, not only the armed forces, but also the security forces, civil protection, the health system infrastructures, and more. All of this falls within the concept of national security. We are developing a national security structure where all the tools related to security and defense can work together. So the key word in the document is integration, both at the international level within the European Union, NATO and the United Nations, and at the national level within the national security system.

The third point is model of military intervention model, based on a combination of soft and hard power. It is essential to demonstrate strength while also being open to dialogue, negotiation and respect for other cultures. This is a critical point that the government and the Minister emphasize when deploying forces abroad. We are always

respectful towards other cultures. We try to not offend the local populations. We try to collaborate with them.

Finally, the fourth point is related to all the social aspects of defence. The government's political program includes improving living conditions and facilities of the military, particularly those in lower ranks, and addressing issues such as gender equality in the Army forces.

Now on to some final remarks, it is important to take into account that the National Defence Directive is a political document that expresses the intent of the government during its term of four years. The document must be concise and straightforward, while providing a starting point for military and capability planning. It should be built around a few key concepts that the government considers essential for defence.

And finally, some concluding remarks. We need to take into account that the National Defence Directive is a political document expressing the intent of a government in defence for a four-year term; it is not a long-term document. Other documents, produced by the National Security Department or other institutions, analyse the long-term situation. Our capability planning is organized in short, medium and long term, but the National Defence Directive is a political document of a government that will remain in office for at least four years. The document must be short, clear and explicit, combining the possibility of explaining the defence situation to citizens in clear language while serving as the starting point for military planning, capability planning and the organization of Army forces. It should be built around three to five key concepts that the government intends to develop for defence over the next four years.

That concludes my briefing. Thank you.

## Dr. Pia Fuhrhop

*Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)*

Thank you very much for the kind invitation from the National Defence Institute. Before I start my remarks, I would like to make two caveats. Firstly, I speak to you as a think tanker, not a member of the German government, so I do not speak for the German government. Secondly, although I had the privilege of being a scientific advisor to the early stages of drafting the National Security Strategy, I cannot provide any information on the National Security Strategy currently being drafted as it is still in the final stages of development. However, I would like to make four points about Germany's strategic revision, the complex strategic landscape we will face in Germany in the next two to three years, the process of drafting the National Security Strategy, and what I see as the three challenges ahead when it is published.

As for the context, Germany is coming of age in terms of security policy. Anyone who has children or remembers their own teenage years knows that coming of age means questioning some of the fundamental hypotheses of the place you call home. Questioning these hypotheses also comes with some growing pains. So, what are the main hypotheses under review? In the broader German security policy landscape, as I see it, the first is that no one doubts the American commitment to Article 5. The current administration is very helpful in reinforcing transatlantic relations. However, the Trump years have left a deep mark on German security policy, and there is a deeper understanding that Europe has to be able to care for its own security, also in military terms. This is something where Germany will take center stage. The hypothesis that the US is going to come and save us has gone.

The second hypothesis is that for a long time it was widely shared in the German security policy community that European security meant security with Russia. Now, there is quite a firm consensus that security for Europe for the foreseeable future will not be security with Russia, but safety from Russia. That's a quite tectonic shift.

The third hypothesis, which probably a more implicit one and is under review now, is that whatever is good for a deeply internationally integrated German economy is also good for German security. Our dependence on Russian gas has shown that economic interdependencies are only good for German security under very specific circumstances. If these interdependencies are asymmetric or held with countries willing to use them as a geopolitical tool, they create vulnerabilities for Germany that must be reduced as fast as possible. And why is that? Why do these insights come with growing pains? I think it is important to remember that this traffic light government that came into power in late 2021 started on a very strong domestic transformation agenda and is now increasingly bound by managing the fallout of the war. In my view, the second growing pain is that redirecting German security policy comes with immense real domestic and financial costs, such as the hundred billion for the special funds of the military or the increasing prices of energy. As a politician, you can no

longer keep foreign policy away from the voter beyond the water's edge. That is my first point.

My second point is about the strategic landscape that is evolving in Germany these days. As we compare different European strategic documents today, it is important to situate where these documents sit in a multinational and a national context. It is important to underline how crucial the European Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept are for German security policy, which is multilateral in its DNA. The German government could only underline what previous speakers have just said about complementarity. However, nationally, the picture gets more complex. I have looked into the coalition agreement and counted 64 strategies, 10 to 15 of which have a heavy leaning on security and foreign policy, depending on how narrowly or widely one defines security. All of these papers are going to come out soon, which will make for an interesting picture.

The National Security Strategy is the first of its kind in German history. It replaces the first part of what used to be the white book for the *Bundeswehr*. It's supposed to be an umbrella document that gives general policy guidelines, identifies main interests, priorities, and spells out what is a value-based foreign policy, something that this coalition has always campaigned on. The Foreign Minister, when she started the process of drafting the National Security Strategy, said that she thinks of it in terms of classic matters of defence, but also securing our freedom and the protection of our democracy and, last but not least, climate security. We'll see a broad umbrella document, followed by a plethora of not-so-minor strategies that are falling into place. For example, over the next months and years, there will be a new China strategy, guiding principles on feminist foreign policy, climate forum policy, and elaboration of the government's existing cyber strategy. The government has also pledged to have new strategies on supply chains, securing national resources, tackling disinformation, and technological sovereignty and research, including military R&D. These are just a few of the many documents that will make for a complex picture of Germany's strategic position.

Moving on to my third point, I would like to discuss the process of drafting a National Security Strategy. As a researcher, it is fascinating to follow a bureaucracy doing something for the first time. The Foreign Minister and the government as a whole emphasized the need for inclusivity and a 360-degree approach. They emphasized that this should not be an elite deliberation taking place behind closed doors. They held consultations and workshops on a variety of topics, including climate change, cyber dynamics, arms control, tech trends and crisis management, with a diverse set of stakeholders such as think tankers, academics, different ministries, officials from federal states, cities, parliamentarians, businesses, and NGOs. This approach produced a rich picture of Germany's situation and what people feel the problems are and what should be the solutions. Lastly, the Foreign Minister conducted a successful experiment with a structured and intense exchange with citizens, holding seven town halls throughout Germany to discuss what should be in the National Security Strategy. What should be main priorities were dilemmas. I think over 350 citizens participated, some in scenario workshops within the

Ministry. The reason I stress this is because it is important to serve the political communication function of this document, which will be public. The government needs to explain what priorities are and how they will affect the everyday life of citizens. It is also important for bureaucrats to understand how much good common sense the average German citizen actually has. It was a fruitful two-way street.

To conclude, I want to name three tasks ahead. Once colleagues in the ministries have managed to produce this first-time National Security Strategy, the first task is to realize that good strategy making needs to be more than a one-time effort. We are placing a lot of burden on citizens as the world is changing fast. Keeping the public engaged and ensuring public support for what the government has defined as its national interest and priorities is a key task.

The second challenge is to produce more than just a lot of papers, as I have said, at least 10 to 15. Ensuring a coherent message across all of these papers will be quite a challenge for the government because different constituencies will read different papers, but they should all add up to something where you can still say, “This is where Germany is going, and these are the main priorities.” I believe that will be quite a task.

Last but not least, we should discuss what the National Security Strategy will mean for defence and planning. Currently, we are spending around a hundred billion based on the 2018 Conception of the *Bundeswehr*, which I think is sufficient. This document already made clear the necessary steps for Germany to be the conventional land force in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, a big reshuffling may not be necessary. Recently, there was a leak that the Chief of Defence had internally published its own strategy paper, called the operative guidance for the *Bundeswehr*. I will not comment on this since it is not yet officially published by the government, but it shows there is room to figure out how to translate it into defence planning.

Thank you for your attention.

## Closing Session

### **Prof. Dr. Isabel Ferreira Nunes**

*Director of the National Defence Institute*

Madam Minister of Defence,  
Secretary of State for Defence,

We would like to thank to all our guest speakers for their valuable insights on the current and future development of the strategic guidance documents of Denmark, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and United Kingdom in the context of the IV National Defence Seminar, co-organized by the Ministry of Defence and the National Defence Institute.

For introducing us to different contexts that shape their own national and international strategic environment, the substance of their strategic choices, the method used to draft these documents and the stakeholders involved.

To all, we wish you the best of success in the conclusion of their respective strategic reviews. The success of these processes for each of our countries, it will make the difference for peace and stability of Europe and the safeguard of the values and principles we commonly cherish most.

To the moderators, I would like to thank you for conducting the debate in such committed way.

To the National Defence Institute's teams and services and to Madam Defence Minister's Cabinet and Secretary General's team my appreciation for the support to organization of this two days event.

To our guest participants, here at the auditorium and all the guests attending through live streaming, thank you for your interest in this initiative. Your presence makes our defence community larger and stronger.

Thank you.

## **Prof. Dr. Marco Capitão Ferreira**

*Secretary of State for National Defence*

Your Excellency, Minister of National Defence,  
Director of the National Defence Institute,  
Madam Counsellor of State,  
Vice Admiral, Head of the Military House Office, of His Excellency, the President  
of the Portuguese Republic,  
Ambassadors,  
Representatives of the Armed Forces and of the Ministry of National Defence,  
Speakers and moderators  
Other distinguished civilian and military authorities,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to first underline the excellent work undertaken by the National Defence Institute (IDN). Under its core mission, IDN has accustomed us in making a critical and invaluable contribution to thinking about the security and defence of our country and has been consistently instrumental in increasing dissemination and stimulating dialogue as a key platform for debate.

I therefore want to value the continuity of this work, reflected here in the organization of this fourth National Defence Seminar that was, today, open to the public, in pursuit of one of the priority axes of the work of National Defence: to foster an even closer approach to society.

These are great opportunities to think about major national and international issues with an impact on security and defence. At the same time, they allow for the dissemination of the missions that our Armed Forces carry out on a daily basis and to instill a greater national awareness over security and defence matters.

I would like to express the appreciation that was just referred to the teams, the speakers, the moderators and everyone that was a part of the work these days. I personally believe that the objective of thinking critically about the best way for the country to respond to its challenges has been fully met. I would also like to thank everyone who, on the teams, made this possible.

We had the pleasure of bringing together at IDN national and international researchers, leaders and decision-makers in the field of security and defence.

We gave particular emphasis to the comparative analysis of different strategic orientations of European countries, in order to contribute to the ongoing national reflection regarding our own National Defence Strategic Concept – a topic of the utmost relevance and which will require considerable attention over the next few months.

Each country has its own traditions and realities, and we do not propose that Portugal should randomly adopt models that were developed for other contexts. Instead, the goal was and is to promote a comparative view of the different strategic orientations of



European countries that have already been, or are in the process of being updated, seeking to identify relevant lessons in the respective drafting and approval procedures.

The new National Defence Strategic Concept that Portugal will adopt in 2023 will inevitably contain elements of continuity but its revision process also stands as a moment of reassessment of our country's external and security agendas. At the same time, it signals priorities and concerns, triggering the necessary steps for the corresponding allocation of means and resources, as a way of achieving the objectives that we choose to set.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We live in unprecedented times. The current moment is extremely challenging and demanding.

The world is still reeling from a dramatic global pandemic, with vast human, social and economic effects. We continue to adapt to the impacts of climate change, seeking to build more resilient and sustainable societies and to develop more human and effective responses to catastrophes.

As a consequence of the war in Ukraine, we are also witnessing important global geopolitical shifts, with a significant toll on the transatlantic community. Meanwhile, we are also deep diving into the vast ocean of technological development, with exponential discoveries in fields only matched by their disruptive potential. We need to figure out what to do with this.

In an era of major geopolitical transformations, and in a world that is increasingly connected and interdependent, but also more disputed and conflicted, there is a pressing need for us to adopt a more proactive attitude to deal with uncertainty.

The way we respond to challenges today will determine our ability to continue to shape our destinies and safeguard our interests and values. Naturally, the instrument of defence is only part of the answer, but it is not a minor part.

In this era, we must be prepared to deepen a reflection on the armed forces of the future, their missions, their organization and their competences, so that they have the necessary flexibility to respond to these new needs and the ones that will be arising.

By nature, the defence area contributes decisively to the resilience of our institutions and our society. When everything else fails, National Defence ensures the continuity of the state and its community.

The reasons why societies' structures may fail vary considerably. This means that the mission of ensuring the well-functioning of the state cannot rest alone on the shoulders of the defence structures. Our work is faced outwards to prevent, to mitigate and to respond to external threats.

Today's world, however, has made the distinctions between internal and external threats less clear. Critical threats may emerge not only in the form of a military attack in the traditional sense, but also through the use of civilian means to cause havoc and disrupt services with potentially devastating human, economic, societal, political, and environmental impacts.

This requires a whole-of-government approach – in fact, it requires a whole-of-society approach – to security, establishing clear priorities and mobilizing the necessary

resources to sustain them, be that military or civilian, public or private, national or international.

In that sense, we need to develop further skills on technologies and learn how to take advantage of the best that our industry, government, and academia have to offer. Cooperative approaches and interoperability will be key to achieve success.

This investment in military capabilities and in their modernization will serve our national defence well, but it will also allow to leverage the development of a true European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

Therefore, in 2023, in line with the new National Defence Strategic Concept, the Development Strategy for the Portuguese Defence Technological and Industrial Base will be reviewed. Indeed, it is crucial that we engage more thoroughly with the defence industry sector and seek out common political and strategic priorities, as well as increase our efforts aimed at internationalizing the defence economy sector.

Bearing in mind the lightning speed of technological evolution that has taken place over the last decade, we will make sure to align this strategy with the dispositions already found in the EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept. This way, we will seek to reduce external dependencies in areas of strategic interest and contribute to the modernization of our Armed Forces, while fully supporting them in their missions.

I conclude by restating that the objectives defined for this seminar were entirely met. We shared ideas and debated different positions. We hope that, with this forum, we can continue to do so and contribute to deepen our strategic thinking.

I am personally humbled by the quality of the work done here in the past two days. There is a lot to take home and consider and settle our mind around.

Thank you very much.

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