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ATLANTIC CENTRE FOR DEFENCE CAPACITY BUILDING

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ATLANTIC CENTRE

For Defence Capacity Building

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Preface

Since 2018 the Portuguese Ministry of Defence has been conceiving and developing the Atlantic Centre as a cooperative initiative bringing together all Atlantic states. Our view of the Atlantic as a shared space of opportunity and responsibility, as well as our commitment to promoting forms of concerted action that enhance peace and stability in this wide region, have led us to engage with many European, African and American partners. We are looking forward to translating the initial interest and enthusiasm we have received into new initiatives in the coming months.

An initial high point of this collaborative effort has been the first seminar of the Atlantic Centre that took place in Lisbon, last November, and whose findings and conclusions the publication of this volume aims to disseminate to a wider public. Throughout these pages you will gain insight into the vast set of ideas regarding the scope and ambition of this Centre shared by experts and policymakers across the Atlantic, as well as the Portuguese vision for the Atlantic Centre. Our proposal is for the Centre to become a forum for political discussion and dialogue of security challenges in the Atlantic, as well as a platform for analysing shared threats and opportunities, and a centre for developing cooperative ways to address them via joint defence capacity building.

It was comforting to see that there was ample agreement between the participants regarding the need for more strategic thinking, as well as for a forum promoting frank debate regarding the security and defence of the Atlantic as a whole. Building on this, Portugal has been working to bring this vision to life, intensifying its diplomatic contacts, supporting an emerging community of scholars and practitioners interested and committed to thinking about the Atlantic, as well as mobilising the means and opportunities for joint training and learning.

Although we are facing one of the most complex and demanding crisis of our age, as we deal with the new Corona virus and its human cost, as well as the social, economic and even political consequences of this pandemic, we remain committed to making the Atlantic Centre a central piece in keeping the Atlantic a region of shared peace and prosperity.

I hope and believe this publication will prove most useful in helping us move ahead with this stimulating new project by engaging more people in the debate about the security challenges in the Atlantic north to south, east to west. This volume has been made possible by the excellence of all participants in the First Seminar of the Atlantic Centre and I am very grateful for their work and commitment.

The pandemic has, of course, limited our ability to move forward with traditional meetings and training. But Covid-19 has also provided an additional and tragic example of the fact that the most important threats today are transnational and require strong regional and global cooperation, knowledge-sharing and solidarity. We are now working to make the Atlantic Centre useful in thinking about the implications of Covid-19 for the

Atlantic basin. And I hope that, even if in a different format more adapted to the times we live in, we will be able to meet in the Second Seminar of the Atlantic Centre, during 2020.

Lisbon, May 12, 2020

João Gomes Cravinho
Minister of National Defence

Programme of the Seminar

09.00 – Welcome Session

10.00 – Workshop I: 'Why' and 'what for' an Atlantic Centre?

13.30 – Workshop II: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

16h30 – Closing session

Helena Carreiras, Director of the Institude of National Defence
Nuno Lemos Pires, Interim Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre
Keynote Speaker, Robert Dussey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo
João Gomes Cravinho, Minister of National Defence of Portugal

Concept Paper for the First Seminar of the Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity Building

The Atlantic Centre for defence capacity building is being developed by the Portuguese Ministry of Defence since 2018 and aims to be a multinational centre of excellence, hosted by Portugal, and dedicated to defence capacity building in the Atlantic. Portugal is currently working simultaneously on two approaches. Firstly, defining the value-added and the specific contribution of such a centre, considering the many activities already in place contributing to security in the Atlantic; and secondly, working on presenting and discussing the idea with potential partners, to gauge their own take on what the Centre can provide.

This one-day seminar has one main objective, which is to gather the inputs from experts and policymakers working on different dimensions of security in the Atlantic, in order to provide a more solid, informed, and updated conceptual and operational basis for the future Atlantic Centre.

The seminar is therefore dedicated to thinking what the added value of such a centre would be, considering several security challenges in the Atlantic, and to thinking the particular issue of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

For the first panel, we invited experts dealing with a broad set of issues which the Centre can potentially address. We will be discussing topics dealing with:

- Sharing areas of responsibility and Maritime connectivity from North-South and East-West
- International Organisations relevant for security and defence issues in the Atlantic – How can the Atlantic Centre partner-up?
- Security and defence in the Atlantic – from the Arctic to the Antarctic. Geopolitical challenges (new transit routes and resources exploitation opportunities)
- Climate change: humanitarian response to natural disasters, migrations, refugees and forced human displacement
- Armed Conflict and violent extremism in Africa
- Exercising sovereignty at sea

We look forward to receiving contributions that address:

i. issues related to the relevance of these security concerns;
ii. the importance of having a new Centre dealing with these topics;
iii. ways in which these issues could be addressed on a conceptual and operational basis by the participating states in the Centre.

We also expect discussions to provide insights on how these issues are perceived from distinct geographical and political points of view. That is why we are bringing together experts from Europe, North Africa, North America, South Africa, South America and West Africa to this session.

For the second session, maritime security particularly in the Gulf of Guinea will be the centre of our debate. We expect this to be one of the first topics the Centre's activities will focus on, and therefore the aim of this session is to map what initiatives are on the ground, lessons learned, and what stimulus such a Centre may bring to this region. Portugal has been particularly active in this field but a multinational approach, combining perspectives from all spectrums of the Atlantic, might prove advantageous.

Having this in mind, the topics defined for the second session include:

- Existing initiatives on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea – added value for the Atlantic Centre?
- Situational awareness in the Gulf of Guinea
- Continental Shelf and Area, sovereign rights, delimitation, resources exploitation and biodiversity
- Best practices in training and capacity building in maritime security

This session gathers experts from countries in the Gulf of Guinea, international organisations engaged in the region, and experts on the topic. We value the perspectives of different stakeholders on how defence capacity building can be an effective approach to improving security in the region.

Both sessions will have a roundtable format, where all invited experts will be asked to briefly present their specific contribution to the debate, followed by an exchange of views from all the attendees. We expect this to be a frank an open discussion, under Chatham House Rules, directed at designing the best operational product to keeping the Atlantic a space of peace and prosperity in a world increasingly unstable.

Keynote Address by His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo Mr. Robert Dussay

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to express my gratitude to my friend Professor João Gomes Cravinho for inviting me to this afternoon in Lisbon. I would like to congratulate the director and all the member of the staff of the Institute of National Defence in Portugal, for hosting this event.

When I listen to your report about what you did this morning, I would like to take my time to share with you a little bit the issue about maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

You know, laying to the west of the African continent, the Gulf of Guinea is a complex maritime space, a space with multiple security challenges. This area, extending from Cameroon to Liberia is full of constantly busy lines of communication and freight transportation and is, by far, the bedrock of the vitality of our port facilities in the West African region, particularly. The huge natural resources and economic potential of this maritime area are an essential lever for the development of a blue economy in all its dimensions. This vital space for ourselves and for the rest of the world tends to become a favourite place for criminal activities of all kinds, particularly piracy, arm robbery, terrorism, trafficking drugs, illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes, etc.

In the face of recurrent attrite to maritime safety in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years, the African and international maritime community has mobilised to provide the most effective response possible. We have, as you know, two or three UN resolutions against terrorism in maritime environment and security in the Gulf of Guinea. We had, as you know, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and, of course, the Lomé Charter against maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and all African countries.

The Gulf of Guinea, as you know, is unfortunately under the control of terrorist groups, a group of pirates, and our goal must be to deter piracy. Lowering our guard would be detrimental to our economy. I set as evidence some recent data which you know as well as I do. Indeed, with an increase of nearly seventy-six percent of armed attacks against ships between 2015 and 2016, the Gulf of Guinea remains the epicentre of global piracy according to the report published by One Earth Future Foundation. The report refers 95 incidents related to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2016 against 54 in 2015. During 2016, according to the statistic release by the IMB – International Maritime Bureau –, out of 196 cases registered worldwide, 57 are recorded by the Gulf of Guinea, which is 30 percent of the world total.

West Africa alone recorded that, in nine cases, there are 68 persons of the total piracy incidents in relation of the Gulf of Guinea. The reports count 95 incidents related to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2016. Piracy attacks at sea have increased worldwide in 2018, driven by a surge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, according to the IMB, 201 attacks where occurring in 2018, compared with 180 in 2017.

From 2009 to 2018, there were more than 300 cases of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. During the same period in my country, Togo, we have tried our best and we recorded 8 cases of piracy, a proportion of nearly 3 percent of the total attacks recorded in all countries of the Gulf of Guinea.

To these statistics, we must add the recent unfortunate attacks recorded in the territorial waters of Cameroon. The first, I think it was the 15th of August this year, the last in November 2nd, we had the same attack of the Port of Cotonou, in Benin. Unfortunately for us in Togo, this November 4th, when I visited the first Portuguese warship in Togo in the same date, November 4th, we had the piracy attack in a Togolese port. So, your ship was in Togolese waters. That said, unfortunately for us but we are trying to do our best, dear João.

So, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think the reduction of this threat is primarily the result of close cooperation between the navies present in the area. In your report, dear Coronel, you said we need to share information between the navies and all the actors who are working against maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.

In this dynamic, it is plain to establish coordination zones. We have coordination zones in our region. We have the coordination of zone F and G, as well as a Maritime Operational Centre of Zone E of the ECOWAS, whose regional Centre is located in Cotonou, Benin. It included Niger, Nigeria, Benin and my country, Togo.

We have zone F, which includes the following countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Gana, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leonne; Cabo Verde, Gambia. Guinea, Guine-Bissau, Mali and Senegal will be part of zone G.

In Togo, we have a plan for the establishment of a second naval base near Lomé, the capital of Togo.

I think, to conclude my remarks, we need to have to think about a new vision, a new security vision in the Gulf of Guinea. Because now we have another problem, another security issue in our region. We have, as you know, terrorist groups inside West Africa, inside the continent. So, as can you see yourself, we have inside the continent terrorist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso. They are coming to our coasts. We have in countries like Gana, Togo and Benin. We have, of course, Boko-Haram in the northeast of Nigeria.

If we don't work together, if we don't strengthen cooperation, our military cooperation, the Gulf of Guinea will be a dangerous region for all our maritime activities.

Thank you so much, dear João, for the invitation.

Thank you, Madame Professor.

Thank you, everyone.

Address by His Excellency the Minister of National Defence of Portugal João Gomes Cravinho

Ladies and Gentlemen,

After today's intensive work and following up on the excellent keynote address from my good friend Minister Robert Dussey, my task is an easy one in just addressing a few closing words to the audience.

Two key messages for this short address from me. Firstly, I want to thank all of those who have been involved in making this seminar a success. Secondly, I wish to reiterate why it is that Portugal, through the Ministry of National Defence, is invested in bringing this Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity Building to life.

But first a few words of thanks to our hosts at the National Defence Institute. Professor Helena Carreiras, thank you for making this space available, thank you for joining our reflections on the Atlantic. This is a topic that this Institute has been following for several decades, in different guises, and of course there are several valuable partnerships across the Atlantic which this Institute cherishes, and which enhance the profile of our activities here.

The second acknowledgement is to all our invitees and to our guests, especially those who took part as presenters during today's roundtables. Your insights, your perspectives and knowledge have helped us immensely in fine-tuning our ideas about the Centre and we expect to continue working with this community of knowledge, and indeed enlarging it, in future activities of the Atlantic Centre. To everyone attending this open session, we are very pleased to share with you this initiative and your presence here today is proof of the widespread interest that the Atlantic Centre is already gathering and I can say that, in many conversations with other Defence Ministers from Atlantic countries, I have been able to witness the interest, the curiosity and the enthusiasm for this initiative.

Thank you in particular to Robert Dussey for bringing us a West African perspective to this closing moment. This is fundamental for the topics that we are engaging with. This kind of cooperative dialogue with partners from across the Atlantic – North and South, East and West – is fundamental. This is what makes sense, what gives sense to this Centre. So, we want to build on this kind of activity, absorb it, use it, and the comments from Colonel Lemos Pires summarising aspects of today´s debate, I think they have already given plenty of justification for this interactive approach as a matter of consolidating the way in which we want this Centre to operate.

A final word of appreciation is very much due to all of those in the Ministry of Defence who made this ambitious seminar a reality, in a very of short amount of time. Thank you for all your dedication over the last months, particularly to the Deputy Director for National Defence Policy, Colonel Lemos Pires, for his personal dedication to overseeing all aspects of this seminar, working in close partnership with Professor Licínia Simão from my office. Thank you to all of those who were involved.

On to the second point: Why is Portugal interested in promoting this notion, why is Portugal interest in leading efforts to bring countries together in the context of this future multinational Centre dedicated to enhancing defence capacities in the Atlantic?

The first reason is that we have actually been working for some decades with partners in different regions of the Atlantic on enhancing defence capabilities. We very much value the bilateral and multilateral relationships, which for us are sites of generating mutual commitment. They are locations that in our activities we use for sharing views and practices, which are essential for the development of joint reference frameworks that can help us address common challenges. We understand the relevance of these kinds of tools for making national sovereignty effective. It's one of the paradoxes of our times that sovereignty is best achieved and practiced through partnerships, and in fact is not achievable without partnerships. As far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are very keen to promote these partnerships, because without the exercise of State authority at sea, in different matters, none of us can benefit from the safety and security that we all need from this Atlantic ocean we share.

For us, these moments of dialogue and interaction can assume multiple forms: through our bilateral defence cooperation, through our commitment to the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, but also in our capacity as a founding member of NATO and our capacity as a member of the European Union, and our capacity as a promoter of dialogue with the African Union, with ECOWAS, with all institutions that are relevant for this region.

And Portugal of course has its own national interests in this cooperation. I firmly believe that cooperative security is an essential basis for our defence posture. We rely on the notion of cooperative security for the establishment of our defence posture. We believe, and we act on this by sending troops, we believe that our own defence is best secured sometimes thousands of kilometres away from home. We have a clear interest in looking at the Atlantic, looking in particularly at the Gulf of Guinea, at the challenges in the Sahel, we have a clear interest in fighting the extremism that feeds instability into several parts of the Atlantic region. We have a clear interest in learning with others, in sharing best practices to respond, for example, to disasters and to humanitarian emergencies, either men-made or resulting from extreme natural phenomena. The Atlantic actually has numerous vulnerabilities in this regard, and Portugal is not immune to these.

At sea, we want to protect trade routes, ours and those of others, we want to have a clear understanding of the threats that exist to our underwater communication lines. We want to make sure natural resources are managed in a sustainable and responsible manner. So, in all these areas we have a clear national interest in promoting mechanisms that can lead to the joint protection of global commons.

But the second reason for Portugal being interested in setting up this Centre is that we are deeply committed to keeping the Atlantic as an area of cooperation and of dialogue, an area of freedom of action, and of opportunities for human development. Neither Portugal, nor any other State on its own can hope to make much progress on

these goals. These goals are far too ambitious, and the Atlantic Ocean is far too vast. It is absolutely necessary, if we are to come anywhere close to achieving our objectives, that we do so in a cooperative manner. So, it is in our direct interest, and we think that it is also in the direct interest of others, to develop mechanisms and procedures for working together in order to correspond to the interests of all. This is the basis of our collective security, and it is why improving our defence capabilities together in this new Atlantic Centre is so vitally important, in our perspective.

What we are aiming for is to establish a platform for cooperative action that can enhance our knowledge of the tensions arising in the Atlantic, and that can study and develop shared solutions to common problems.

In the institutions in which we participate we are working intensively to focus the attention of partners and allies on the Atlantic. We have been doing so within the Atlantic Alliance, making sure that politically the Atlantic is kept at centre stage, but also contributing to highlighting the centrality of the Azores in this context. And I can say that we have clearly noticed a renewed strategic centrality for the Atlantic Ocean for NATO in the past year or two. Within the EU, we have been supporters of the Union's maritime strategy, and we are well aware that EU efforts to work in the Gulf of Guinea, in cooperation with African partners, are producing important results and improving the security there. The upcoming Portuguese Presidency of the EU, in 2021, is providing us with an opportunity to update the Union's maritime security strategy as well as to deepen the Union's contributions to the stabilisation of several countries in Africa, a goal to which Portugal actively contributes with its military men and women. This is the case in Mali and in the Central African Republic, but also in Somalia, on the other side of the African continent. This will be, as many of you will know, the first priority of the Portuguese presidency of the EU in 2021: the development of a closer, enhanced, and qualitatively better relation between the EU and the African continent.

We also will have upcoming in June of 2020 the UN Oceans Conference, here in Lisbon. It is another important opportunity to showcase the centrality of the Atlantic and the many challenges that we face. As we celebrate during the next three years the fifth centenary of the first circum-navigation of the world by Fernão Magalhães and Juan Sebastián Elcano, we want to highlight the interdependent nature of our political communities, which became apparent for the first time with that historic voyage. So, we see the fifth centenary celebration as an important opportunity for looking towards the next decade, not only looking to what happened in the past.

In all these and other initiatives, we see added value for the future Atlantic Centre and we are working to create synergies that can help the Centre to develop its initial activities within the framework of existing cooperation mechanisms that Portugal has.

The Atlantic Centre is a Portuguese initiative, but it does not wish to remain a Portuguese national centre. It aims to be, from the beginning, a multinational centre, as this seminar has helped to make clear. Portugal is an Atlantic country. It has its own vision for the Atlantic. But our greatest ambition regarding the Atlantic Centre is to act as a facilitator of fruitful dialogue leading to significant security cooperation and to

defence capacity building. We believe that being an active partner, working in the midst of other partners, is the best way to fulfil our responsibility as a security provider in the Atlantic.

We are well aware of the diversity of views, of the asymmetries in this vast Atlantic space, but we also believe strongly that we share an interest is making sure that our security is enhanced through sharing best practices, through making knowledge available, through cooperative platforms that facilitate common learning and action where shared interest is clear.

I very much look forward to reading – and we had a taste already of them – the conclusions of today's work and to continuing the many dialogues about the Atlantic Centre, which I have had the pleasure of working on with several partners. As we are planning to have the first training activity of the Atlantic Centre during the first semester of 2020, in the Island of Terceira, in the Azores, I would like to extend the wish that all of those present should continue to be engaged in this initiative, to nurture this young institution, and to continue contributing to its activities throughout its life. To many of you, I can say see you next year in Azores.

Thank you very much.

Workshop I

‘WHY’ AND ‘WHAT FOR’ AN ATLANTIC CENTRE?

Paulo Lopes, Rapporteur
Cabo Verde Armed Forces

Main Topics:

- Initiatives already in place regarding maritime security in Gulf of Guinea – added value to Atlantic Centre
- Situational awareness of the Gulf of Guinea
- Continental shelf, sovereign rights, delimitation of areas, exploitation of natural resources and biodiversity
- Best practices in education and in capacity building regarding maritime security.

Summary

It was unanimous that the Gulf of Guinea remains one of the most dangerous maritime regions in the world, and the threats and challenges facing the region, especially on coastal communities and countries, have been repeatedly highlighted.

In this regard, some of the causes that have contributed to the endurance of these phenomena have been listed be they political, socio-economic, legal, institutional, technical, strategic, doctrinal, human, financial or material and be they of the appropriate resource for the imposition of state authority.

To the former were added: the lack or limited maritime vision, lack of political will, difficulties in internal and external coordination and difficulties in the articulation, access, sharing and management of information and data.

It became clear that several advances have already been achieved, stemming *inter alia*, from the understandings reached, from the regional and sub-regional strategies assumed, from the architecture in the final phase of implementation, as well as from the different projects, programs, initiatives and operations supporting different partners. But it was also clear that there are still issues regarding better coordination and articulation.

It has also become clear that there is still a long way to go therefore, Atlantic Centre can, by avoiding redundancies, contribute effectively to strengthening cooperation and capacity building in the field of security and defense and, consequently, to mitigating these threats and vulnerabilities, as well as constituting a vital tool for the management of peace and security in Africa.

To this end, the Centre should initially, in Gulf of Guinea for instances, keep in mind the need for an exact definition of its area of intervention, of the different actors involved – even those who are not traditionally Atlantic –, and of the maritime border disputes and the different processes of extension of the continental shelves underway.

Moreover, focusing on the Gulf of Guinea itself, which was the case here, it should be a true aggregating element if necessary, but above all complementary and enabler.

As a complementary element, Atlantic Centre should collaborate in the clear and objective contextualization of the problems hanging over this region, addressing it as a

whole, but also addressing countries and realities that shape the Gulf of Guinea, identifying the causes that are at their origin, the gaps that empower them and assessing the needs to fight them.

It was agreed that this approach will positively influence the countries' response to maritime security issues and also their commitment at regional level.

In this regard, study and research will be step stones of the Centre, whose work should go further than policy recommendations.

On the other hand, this institution should be aware of all the initiatives and actions that have already been carried out, are in the process of being implemented or are yet to be implemented, as well as of the different local entities and partners that operate in the region, in order to know what they are already doing and to avoid redundancies, divergences and incompatibilities that do not help at all solving problems.

Thus Atlantic Centre's action should encourage the involvement of all civil society, particularly the communities concerned, of state and private entities and of local agencies, sub-regional and regional organizations and partners, based on a high degree of trust, pragmatism and efficiency, taking into account the multiplicity, discrepancies, interests and objectives of the countries and of the organizations present in the region.

Moreover, all this effort should be accompanied by the promotion of greater and better integration of military, paramilitary and civilian forces in response to the problems.

Furthermore, it was stressed that Atlantic Centre could also become a forum for discussion, where all players in the Gulf of Guinea can regularly discuss the effects of threats and of the gains achieved in combating them, in order to redefine a concerted action which could be done in close cooperation with similar centers, the academy and the intellectual capital of Africa, as well as involving communities of practice.

However, regardless the establishment of such a network, it became clear that the African narrative should be the focus, in order to ensure greater credibility and legitimacy of the African perspective, and for this reason Atlantic Centre can have greater influence on policy discussions on peace and security in Africa and facilitate the acceptance of African countries to join its activities.

In the opinion of the participants, the Centre should also develop capacities to provide experts or socialize expertise in support of the development of national strategies and doctrines, harmonization, integration, dissemination and internalization of cross-cutting documentation, and the improvement and strengthening of existing legislation and of the judicial system in the countries and regional organizations.

It was also considered that Atlantic Centre could play a concrete role in helping to materialize the objectives outlined in the existing regional and sub-regional strategies and maybe participate in their revision.

To this end it was deemed appropriate to invest in actions that promote institutional and technical capacity building wherever necessary, that provide interoperability of existing and future resources and that provide also a set of well-trained and prepared human resources.

In the session were also highlighted Portugal's successful work in the field of bilateral technical-military cooperation, particularly in capacity building of the Coast Guard of São Tomé and Príncipe (STP), were a Portuguese patrol vessel has been operating in STP's national waters and exclusive economic zone, with a mixed garrison.

In this regard, as a facilitating element, Atlantic Centre was challenged to promote the development of these same activities to a multilateral level, creating a new model of cooperation based on a strong dynamic of coordination and articulation, of rationalization of means and of institutional, technical and human resources capacity building.

Furthermore, the participants considered that strengthening defense capacity is a very important tool in the Gulf of Guinea context, noting that special attention will be needed at the level of diplomacy, investments and support operations, aiming at its long--term sustainability.

It was also considered that there should be a high level of ownership and assumption of responsibility by the receiving country, avoiding the perception of interference or neo-colonialism.

Moreover, the participants considered that defense capacity building activities should be programmed where they are well accepted and where they can add more value and ensure the best value for money.

Another demand from participants regarding Atlantic Centre was the need to create or access an inherent capacity to ensure situational maritime knowledge, early warning related to violent extremism, terrorism and organized crime, through ongoing intelligence gathering and research, information exchange and sharing, education and capacity building.

Despite all the actions that may be taken by Atlantic Centre, there was a consensus that its final purpose should be to focus on human beings and their well-being, through the development of the coastal communities or riparian countries that benefit from it.

To this end, it was advised that the Centre could also carry out activities that contribute to the regional needs regarding the conservation of marine resources and the improvement of people's quality of life, and therefore any solution that may be adopted will involve the integration of problems on land and threats and challenges at sea.

Not least, participants considered that sustained financial support will always be a challenge for Atlantic Centre so it can meet its goals, requiring funding from different sources.

The Case for an Atlantic Centre

Christopher Coker
London School of Economics

The *Geopolitical Context* Let's start with the 'why' – why an Atlantic Centre? This is where we need to take a step back and see the larger picture. The great game of the 21st century will develop around the emergence of a new Eurasia – centred world built on the fusion of Europe, Russia and China into what Bruno Macaes calls 'a new supercontinent' and its interaction with the Atlantic world that has predominated for the last three centuries under British and then American management. This interaction will not simply be about trade imbalances and economic competition but also geo-political security and ideological contests bordering on an existential struggle for both parties. The idea of Eurasia is not new. It was first articulated by Halford Mackinder in 1904. At that time 9,200 kilometres of the TransSiberian railway were being built from Moscow to Vladivostok. Describing Eurasia as "the continuous landmass of Euro-Asia" he went on to say that the real divide between East and West was to be found in the Atlantic Ocean. 115 years later Mackinder's words seem prophetic. The spine of Eurasia from China through to East and Central Europe is developing in such a way that it will, over time, rival and even surpass in power and influence an Atlantic world beset by crises and challenges. The Eurasian countries are already creating a community – think of the Eurasia Union with Russia at its centre; the Shanghai Coordination Organisation which includes Russia, China and the Central Asian republics; and the Great Belt and Road Initiative which is seen by some as a 'community of common destiny'. The Atlantic world by comparison has only the North Atlantic alliance (NATO) There is a need to build up an Atlantic Community. An Atlantic Centre could play an important role in that process.

An *Atlantic Community*: So what would such a community look like? The word 'community' is one of the most over-used words in the lexicon. Its meaning is complex and insufficient understanding of the term has led to the downfall of many well-intended community efforts.

Remember the ill-fated attempts to create an Atlantic Community in the late 1950s led by the then American Secretary of State, Christian Herter; the equally ill-fated attempts by Argentina, Brazil and Portugal to put together a South Atlantic Community in the 1980s; and the never realised hopes for a Lusophone world that would unite Portugal, Brazil and the newly independent Angola. An Atlantic Centre should tacknowledge the overlapping communities in which people live – the newly renegotiated NAFTA; Mercosur; ECOWAS, and the newly created Africa Continental Free Trade Zone. These

communities too have overlapping interests and concerns; think of them as like Russian Matryshka dolls that nest within each other. On the security front the patrols of the US Sixth Fleet off the coast of West Africa which started with the Global War on Terror show that it is possible to have overlapping interests because countries live in a common neighbourhood. But the idea of a common neighbourhood implies joint ownership which is why it would be undesirable for an Atlantic Centre to purely represent one organisation, NATO.

Atlantic Centre and risk management. Just as the growing Eurasia community is made up of many dialogues such as the China – Africa Forum; the Boao Forum which is often called an 'Asian Davos'; the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank etc, so an Atlantic Centre should encourage a series of institutional dialogues on risks that are common to all Atlantic countries. These include:

Economic Security. The Atlantic world involves Europe, Africa and Latin America. Latin America has yet to realise its economic promise but Mexico and Brazil are set to join the top 10 world economies by 2030, leaving Germany the only European country on the list. Africa may be the new growth engine, in the vanguard of tackling some of the most fundamental development challenges of our time, from lifting millions out of poverty in an increasingly fossil fuel constrained world to creating new enterprises. The Africa Continental Free trade Area which came into effect on the 30 May has created one of the world's largest free trade zones valued at over $2tr. Such growth prospects are threatened however by energy poverty (600m Africans remain off-grid), chronic disease problems et al. Sustainable economic growth is one way to tackle other challenges such as terrorism.

Climate Change: Europe is the world leader in environmental security with plans to reach near-zero greenhouse emissions within 30 years. The Atlantic however is threatened by the melting of Arctic ice that could weaken Atlantic Ocean currents; de-forestation in Brazil and West Africa. This year the Arctic has lost 40bn tons of Greenland ice sheet and seen an alarming increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather patterns, especially in the Caribbean. An Atlantic centre could help coordinate the kind of strategies we already see with INTERREG VB Atlantic Area Programme 2014-20, and the OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic. And it could help coordinate humanitarian assistance in climate emergencies.

Migration: On UN projections in the next 30 years 200m Africans may try to come to Europe. By 2050 between a fifth and a quarter of Europe's population might be African in origin.

These figures have led President Macron to talk of a perfect 'demographic time--bomb'. Many of these migrants will be coming from the Sahel, which has become a new theatre of terrorism and political extremism in the eastern Atlantic. The UN Secretary--General Ant**ó**nio Guterres describes the region as producing a toxic combination of challenges: poverty, climate change, unemployment, demographic instability, deficiencies in governance, violent extremism, migration and chronic insecurity. In the last few years the area has attracted increased military concern. The region has been called an 'African

arc of instability' and prompted some observers to describe the states in the region as the most vulnerable in the world. Chancellor Merkel has visited Niger twice in the last five years; the Italian Parliament has voted to divert a battalion from the Middle East to Niger. But another area of concern is Central America and Mexico where increasing social inequality and instability fuelled in part by transnational organised crime may see the movement of millions of people from the region to the north.

Transnational Organised Crime: ever since the G8 meeting in Birmingham in 1998 transnational organised crime has been a security issue of the highest importance. In Latin America it is the number one public policy issue, deciding elections and changing the relationship between government and the public. The death toll in the first six months of this year in Mexico exceeds the civilian death toll in Iraq at the height of the war in 2006, with drug money taking the place of religious fanaticism. In North Africa the drug trade from Morocco destabilises the Mediterranean countries as well.

Culture. In April the Council of the European Union adopted an EU strategic approach to international cultural relations. The cultural relations approach has the potential to establish spaces for global conversations between Western and non-western societies and the Atlantic remains an excellent theatre for such exchanges given the obvious cultural synergies in languages – English, French, Spanish and Portuguese; in religions – Christian and Islam; and changing demographics – the United States may be a bilingual country in 30 years' time. The great challenge for the world is to develop systems of thought that inculcate multi-level identities and extend circles of affiliation in order to promote cooperation on global challenges such as climate change. If we don't, we may soon find ourselves living in what Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group calls a G Zero World, a world with a global governance gap.

A Community of Practice: An Atlantic Centre should aim to produce a community of practice. In such communities, members are brought together by needs (economic/security/cultural) to cooperate whether cooperation is an explicit need or not and whether cooperation is a motivation for the coming together or a by-product of it.

Cooperation produces outcomes that further allow its members to identify interests they had not necessarily recognised before. The school of 'sociological institutionalism' which is rapidly gaining ground in International Relations Theory suggests that organised practices mould the preferences, identities and interests of actors in the social world. Institutions influence behaviour by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for action. It follows that institutions do not simply affect the strategic calculations of states but also their most basic preferences.

How to begin? What is the best way for a Centre to work? There is the top-down approach which goes from the general to the specific, and the bottom-up which begins at the specific and moves to the general. The top-down is certainly useful for identifying the big picture, and trying to craft what we used to call a grand strategy or a geopolitical response to global challenges. But this doesn't preclude governments that sign up to the centre from investing in sector by sector fundamentals such as sustainability and cultural dialogue.

All these are mid-to long term goals. To begin with the Centre might aim 1) to foster the exchange of military personnel, civilian agencies and NGOs; 2) to further habits of cooperation; 3) try to create an Atlantic strategic culture to foster common ownership of issues;4) promote best practice strategy making; and 5) explore the leadership skills required for collaborative strategy development. These goals however should not be restricted to hard security issues such as terrorism; human security issues are important too (disaster relief) and especially important in encouraging people to think theyvare members of the same community.

Issues of Relevance to the Security Concerns that the Centre Can Potentially Address

Moudjib Djinadou
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1. International security engagement with Africa in recent years has concentrated largely on immediate-term counter-terrorism issues, support of UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations, and efforts to strengthen the institutional capacities of the AU and the RECs. There may be an opportunity for this Centre to look at a broader range of issues of relevance, including: 1) the "transhumance" and its link to climate change, migration patterns, and security concerns in West and Central Africa; 2) the potential spread of terrorism and violent extremism to the countries of coastal West Africa; 3) the promotion of a better coordination of the actions carried out by the State actors and the regional and international organizations in order to reinforce coherence and cohesiveness.

2. "Transhumance", or the large-scale movement of nomadic groups across large sections of the continent has been a feature of the continent for centuries. It is in recent years coming to the fore as a political and security issue due to the increasing intersection of conflicts that involve negative farmer-herder dynamics, sovereignty-related tensions, and the exploitation of existing fissures by political spoilers and "entrepreneurs." Underlying all of the foregoing is the effect of climate change, which has gradually increased the movement of nomadic groups and cattle owing to the drying up of previous water and food sources, thereby resulting in deviations from long-accepted grazing areas and migration patterns and bringing herders into increased conflict with sedentary groups and central governments.

3. While the UN along with ECOWAS and ECCAS have begun to dedicate increased political attention to transhumance questions – in light of their connection to a broad range of current conflicts in Africa, from the Central African Republic through the Sahel – there is nevertheless a need for further reflection as to how exactly partners might contribute substantively. Addressing this issue concretely involves both treading into very sensitive cultural territory as well as mastering very specific details including border control measures, agricultural programs and assistance, and environmental policies in response to climate change. A growing subject of high-level political-security discussion,

transhumance issues nonetheless necessitate very technical responses along with sustained political engagement.

4. Addressing the overall security threat to the Sahel is a key element of partner engagement with African countries and institutions. Still, there is also a need for early warning and response to the possibility of this phenomenon spreading further, to coastal West – and Central – Africa. Violent extremism and other networks in the Sahel have grown their reach and operational capacity from a limited area in northern Mali to posing an enormous threat to the security of practically the entire western Sahel zone. Boko Haram, as well, started off as a Nigerian group of relatively limited reach. With so much attention on the Sahel and Boko Haram conflicts, there is space and need to look at the threat faced by countries of the coast, particularly in a broader maritime security context.

5. In that regard, a frequently forgotten aspect is the extent of the damage caused by oil exploitation, which has deteriorated the living conditions of the civilian population on the Atlantic coast, not to mention the absolute damage to the environment. It should be recalled that the African Union proclaimed the period between 2015 and 2025, the Decade of the Seas and Oceans of Africa, with the aim of improving maritime conditions and ensuring the protection and sustainable exploitation of the seas and African oceans. 'Protection and sustainable exploitation', also means the necessary consideration of the consequences on the populations of the places of exploitation.

6. Also, drug trafficking, which often travels by sea, feeds terrorist groups and destabilizes entire economies by fueling corruption. Beyond the systems and institutions, it is probably necessary to direct the debate on living conditions in the space concerned. Drug trafficking including cocaine and heroin – which accounted for 90% of poisoning cases in 2018 in the countries of North, Central and West Africa –, the havoc caused by the recklessness of oil and gas operators, which further undermine already vulnerable economic fabrics, may not be unrelated to certain societal attitudes whereby local populations end up supporting criminal networks, collaborating with terrorist groups, or taking the paths of migration in most daunting conditions.

7. While "regional integration" is a frequently advised solution to the security, political and economic challenges that Africa faces – and is the subject of an ongoing number of cooperation efforts involving UN institutions as well as bilateral partners – the headwinds faced are often underestimated. While there is little doubt that greatly enhanced cooperation between African countries is a necessity for their further economic growth, dynamism, and ability to address complex security challenges, there is also the reality that the overall success of this "project" is greatly impeded by the presence of a large number of weak states that further saps the potential of integration. For example, even in the ECOWAS zone, largely regarded as the most successful of the RECs both in terms of its political and economic institutional strength, there is nevertheless blatant

non-compliance of certain core tenets such as the free movement of persons – the ongoing closure by Nigeria of its terrestrial borders to immediate neighbors is but the latest and most highprofile example in this regard.

8. In this context, in which successful integration is acknowledged as necessary for overall political, economic, and security improvements – in particular, the economic dynamism that would be unlocked by real integration would represent an immense opportunity for all involved stakeholders – there is also the necessity to examine the role that partners should play. There is likely little to no need for further reflections or projects that aim to strengthen the institutional or operational capacities of the AU and the RECs; this space is already saturated and, moreover, the argument presented here is that the core problem at hand is not the institutions of African integration, but rather persisting dynamics that discourage individual leaders and governments from honestly pursuing and putting in place the policies and measures that will facilitate integration. The question here is how and if these dynamics can be properly addressed.

The importance of a new Centre dealing with these topics

9. Despite many commitments and initiatives to address these perennial challenges, the following remains to be tackled in a most decisive manner: promoting effective capacity building of vulnerable states; and providing populations – in our case coastal populations – with alternatives by pursuing ambitious development policies. The most important consideration is how the new Centre can contribute in a way that brings a fresh perspective and does not duplicate the many existing efforts and programs. Without doubt, concerned States need to improve their legal framework to enable effective regional and international cooperation on the ground such as mutual legal assistance and joint assessments. In that respect, the Atlantic Defence capacity-building Centre can play an innovative role elevating the ability of key state and non-state actors from all countries involved, to operate consistently in a much-needed integrated fashion on tackling issues of common interest.

Ways in which these issues could be addressed on a conceptual and operational basis

10. It would be useful if the resources and standing of the Centre could be used, principally, to inform the operational analysis, buy-in, and response of partners and donors. In this sense, the Centre might consider concentrating its work on targeted seminars and written products with a practical focus, the subjects of which would also have the clear buy-in from partners – both practitioners and policy-makers – who would have already declared in advance their interest and intention to take the respective work forward in their policy efforts.

The South Atlantic, a Space under Construction

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The debate on the South Atlantic, as it arises in Morocco, questions the geo-strategic relevance of this area. We know the North Atlantic, of course, but what about the South Atlantic, with its wide Latin American and African shores? Is this a space suitable for collective action?

The South Atlantic derives its relevance from coherence, yet in the making, between two processes: the continuous maritimization of geo-political interests of coastal states; the construction of a South Atlantic community of interest from the ground up.

I. Maritimization of geopolitical interests of coastal States

Research on the Atlantic area is generally centered solely on a continental perspective or on global analysis grids that neglect the specific characteristics of States and regions. Yet, in view of its density and the complexity of its distant and immediate history, we are called upon to be more pragmatic than theoretical in our approach to this space. Maritime and regional approaches are of particular interest: the former is all the more necessary as the maritime dimension has become a strategic stake through which States can extend their power; the latter is helpful in understanding the regional processes at work in the Atlantic area, as it considers the extent of their contribution to the emergence of a coherent South Atlantic area. The combination of these two analytical approaches offers an insight into the geo-political relevance of the South Atlantic for coastal states, based on their geo-maritime intentions. It is clearly possible to identify three general geo-economic and geo-strategic characteristics:

• A variable strategic valuation function

Spain and Portugal occupy a peripheral continental position in comparison with Germany, the center of gravity of the European space. Their footing is rather to be found in their Atlantic vocation, which endows them with valuable strategic depth, driven by the density of their relationship with South America and by strategic relay points in the Canary Islands, Madeira and the Azores. In the Maghreb, the complexity of inter-Maghreb relations fosters the sense that Morocco is located on the periphery of North Africa and that, from the depths of the Maghreb, it collides with the central Maghreb

block (Algeria, Tunisia). The Atlantic coast thus offers vital opportunities in terms of regional positioning. Morocco has every interest in projecting itself as a pivotal maritime power both to revive its economy as well as to address continental geo-political challenges[1]. For Brazil and South Africa, developing a maritime dimension is a major pillar of their evolving status as emerging powers.

These two countries, both unrivaled on their continents, are focusing their strategic priorities on the Atlantic Ocean: Brazil, for example, is building naval assets for the purpose of strategic projection and gearing its diplomacy towards the United States, Africa and Europe South Africa, referred to as the "sentinel of the Atlantic", is, to date, the only country on the African coast of the Atlantic to have a naval force including submarines, which guarantees it a unique strike and projection capability. On a geo-strategic scale, the Atlantic Ocean is an area in which the United States deploys its naval and naval air forces to secure maritime routes, defend the right of free movement of its navy, protect its maritime economic interests, fight terrorism and contribute to crisis containment. However, it seems that the US is not so much concerned with ocean domination as with sharing some aspects of these missions with their regional or sub-regional partners as part of the "multi-partnership" policy.

• A treasure trove of resources and catalyst for maritime nationalism

The maritimization of Atlantic coastal economies has increased as the coastline has increasingly become a major contributor to the production of national wealth, given maritime trade, the presence of fish and oil resources, the importance of heavy industries and the vitality of coastal cities. It in fact reflects a dependence on the sea, since 90% of world trade is carried out by sea. States are therefore compelled to design policies that are suited to these dependencies, thereby exacerbating competition and maritime disputes. Examples include: the maritime border dispute between Morocco and Spain (Canary Islands); tensions between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands. As for the Gulf of Guinea, considered as a new energy hub in Africa, the appropriation of maritime spaces is a source of rivalries between bordering countries.

Maritime legal disputes will undoubtedly grow in intensity, as most States want to extend their continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles of the EEZ, up to a maximum limit of 350 miles, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). This will lead to claims with unpredictable consequences[2].

In addition, this maritime dynamic highlights the need for maritime security and safety in response to asymmetrical threats, with high-risk areas located in the Gulf of Guinea and on the seaboard of the Sahel-Saharan region[3].

1 On this subject, see Rachid EL HOUDAIGUI, Elements of Moroccan maritime geopolitics, Revue des FAR, Rabat, edition 365, 2015.

2 States must, however, submit their applications for extension to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN), which is mandated to provide scientific advice and recommendations.

3 On January 2019, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded 201 acts of piracy, compared to 180 in 2017.

• An Afro-Atlantic maritime identity in construction

The Atlantic coast of Africa, a geo-political area in construction, combines the main assets and challenges of the African continent. Twenty-three coastal countries account for 46% of the African population, 55% of African GDP, 57% of continental trade and huge natural resources (24 billion barrels of oil from proven reserves off the Gulf of Guinea). These countries nevertheless continue to face common challenges: a human development model crisis; the settlement of territorial and maritime disputes; the rise of the asymmetrical threat (piracy, terrorism, banditry); the appropriation of maritime space, through decisive maritime policy.

The combination of these challenges with the behavior of States in the region seems to provide the first components of an "Afro-Atlantic" strategic identity, still in the making: a common vision of the challenges and institutionalization of space, through informal structures such as the Conference of African States bordering the Atlantic, held for the first time in Rabat on 4 August 2009. This initiative is of particular interest to countries because of the heightened and central importance of maritime and air dimensions in their economic development. At present, despite the establishment of some institutional structures, the initiative is in need of fresh impetus to breathe new life into it.

II. Building a community of interest from the ground up

The aforementioned elements of analysis highlight the same question: is the South Atlantic area suitable for joint actions? This question is of interest to both researchers and politicians, as this space is often seen both in terms of diversity and as a coherent system. One of the first political bodies to have sought to build a global vision on the matter is the European Parliament[4]. Its contribution reflects a new reality, where the South Atlantic discussion is gradually becoming an emerging component of the policy agenda.

It is, however, clear that the materialization of this project will depend on a convergence of views on the form and content of required cooperation. Politicians and researchers would benefit from steering away from buzzwords or from using “worldly” paradigms to structure this momentum: integration and alliance, for example, are among the paradigms that are inappropriate to the multi-centered reality of the South Atlantic. Moreover, any attempt at global action will be hampered by the density and complexity of the issues at stake in this area.Some ideas have been discussed at the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS, Morocco), as well as at its annual international conference “Atlantic Dialogues”, held in Marrakech since 2012.

This process contributes to the semantic building of a south transatlantic community of interest. In this type of forum, where the South Atlantic’ s geopolitical representations are multiple and complex, a process of socialization and adaptation is at work,

4 Resolution of 13 June 2013 on the European Union’s role in promoting an enlarged transatlantic partnership (2012/2287(INI)).

with a view to developing a common strategic identity. One of the central ideas of the forum is confidence-building as a guarantee for the coherence of the wider Atlantic project. Indeed, we believe it is advisable to lay the foundations for a partnership based on trust, with the aim of establishing terms underpinning confidencebuilding and sustainable bridges between the southern part of the North Euro-Atlantic, the Latin-Atlantic and the Afro-Atlantic shores. From a practical standpoint, such a trust-based partnership must embed cooperation within a regional framework, taking into account the characteristics of each region in key areas: the economy, security, natural resources, environmental issues and political governance. The purpose would be to define the target region(s) of specific programs and projects. The Afro-Atlantic rim and particularly West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, for example, suffer from structural and cyclical bottlenecks: endemic poverty, lack of resources and infrastructure to protect their maritime space, piracy, territorial disputes, poor exploitation of fisheries resources. From Morocco to South Africa, cooperation raises both economic and strategic issues and challenges.

In short, this trust-based partnership should be gradual and not binding. It is a long--term process which, like any cooperation process, consists of a series of phases with their share of doubts and divergences, which require prior joint reflection and adversarial debate.

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1. Speaking Points

- In the early 10ths of the 21st century, the European Union started to think – or at least to rethink – about their strategic view on the sea: The perspective, Europe did choose, was mainly the one of the sea as the connector to the world and as a source of prosperity.

- For the EU, its maritime interests are fundamentally linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of its citizens and communities. Some 90% of the EU's external trade and 40% of its internal trade is transported by sea. 50% of the EU population and GDP are in maritime regions. The EU is the third largest importer and the fifth global producer of fisheries and aquaculture. There are more than 80.000 EU fishing vessels worldwide. More than 400 million passengers pass through EU ports and harbours each year.

- The EU depends on open, safe seas and oceans for free trade, transport, tourism, ecological diversity, and for economic development. In this vane, security and defence have become an integral part of the European project.

- Key to the European view on maritime security still is the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EU MSS) adopted in 2014. It describes maritime security as a 'state of affairs' marked by law enforcement, freedom of navigation and protection of sea-related assets and resources.

- Also under the EU MSS umbrella, the EU is cooperating with relevant partner countries and other international and regional organizations, in particular the United Nations (UN) system, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU).

- The revised EU MSS Action Plan, adopted in June 2018, fully take in on board this approach and features different actions related to the type of cooperation just mentioned.

- It brings together both internal and external aspects of the Union's maritime security. The actions foreseen contribute to the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, the renewed EU Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020, the Council Conclusions on Global Maritime Security, and the Joint Communication on International Ocean Governance.

- For example, it builds upon the success story of the Crime Information Cell where EUNAVFORMED Op. Sophia cooperates with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, with EUROPOL and NATO.

- The revised EU MSS action plan also promotes the enhancement of cooperation within the framework of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. EU and NATO are working together to enhance a common maritime security understanding and to share maritime security knowledge and expertise.

- The Action Plan is clustered in 5 key areas, dedicated to crosscutting issues and a regional part, where the EU seeks to address global challenges through regional responses to key maritime hotspots both at home – at European sea basins, like the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltic, and internationally – the Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa-Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, South-East Asian seas, and also including the Arctic.

- Building on all our experience, the EU is ready to explore possible new initiatives, looking at all dimensions of maritime security. EEAS proposed the Concept of Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP).

- The basic principle of this concept is that Member States would transmit information to an EU coordination cell with the aim of enhancing situational awareness. In addition, the Member States concerned vessels would carry out, on a voluntary basis, some representative activities that would help showcase EU security interest in a specific maritime area. Vessels would remain at all times under national chains of command.

- Through the CMP, the EU could enhance its presence and political influence in key areas of maritime security interest, as well as develop a greater common understanding on maritime awareness. Implementing the CMP concept requires the following decisions: 1) Identification by the Council of a specific maritime area as 'Maritime Area of Interest' (MAI) for the EU; 2) Creation of an "EU Maritime Areas of Interest Coordination Cell" (MAICC)

- The implementation plan for a pilot case of the CMP concept in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is under development.

A centre focusing on defence capacity-building in the Atlantic should take into account all the above factors and come into contact with all relevant stakeholders, in order to contribute to the security in the region.

The Atlantic as a Multidimensional Space of Diversity, Unity and Uniqueness

José Arnaut Moreira
Portuguese Army

Introduction

The birth of an organization that seeks to coordinate international efforts to promote a common good is certainly a cause for satisfaction and celebration. Indeed, at a time when international identity-affirmation movements resurface, with nations aspiring to states and states seeking to regain national values, the emergence of an effort that seeks not differences and dissent but the purpose of a unity of action is certainly a remarkable fact that should be stressed.

This first seminar will certainly show that on the broad subject of defence and security in the Atlantic area salutarily diverse and even discordant opinions exist. The analysis I share here today only holds me personally responsible and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the many institutions and organizations I have worked with in the last forty years.

I must start by confessing that the designation of the Atlantic Defence Center has never made me comfortable because of the difficulty of applying the concept of Defence to a very complex multidimensional space, such as the Atlantic. I will detail.

At a time when Ministries of War have become Ministries of Defence, wars are called conflicts, and the great contemporary strategic clashes are dubbed trade disputes it is obvious that the concept of Defence is getting closer to the Security concept. We well know that the concept of Defence had to adapt to the demise of the institutional enemy at the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new actors with terrifying capabilities such as at the 9/11 or the realities of shared sovereignty as in the process of European construction. Nevertheless, I understand that the use of the word Defence is only justified when we intend to preserve a set of significant areas associated with a set of values.

In the case of the Atlantic can we clearly identify this set of values to preserve in such vast space?

To help us answer this central question, it is important to apply some geopolitical analysis on this multidimensional space we call the Atlantic.

The Atlantic

The Atlantic is not just a navigable maritime space. It is a pool of common seafloor, promising continental shelf platforms, submarine cables that guarantee our permanent

access to cyberspace, a huge column of water, islands and archipelagos, exclusive territorial seas and economic zones, plastics and pollution, erodable coast lines and floodable areas and an airspace used for transcontinental connections, but, above all, it is a very diverse set of coastal states each with its own particularities and interests. This rather exhaustive characterization is intended to alert us to the complexity of this multidimensional space that is at the same time used by multiple actors: institutional, private or criminal.

A geopolitical and geostrategic analysis of the Atlantic, necessarily succinct in this short summary, sought to frame the different factors of analysis into three groups: Diversity Factors, Unity Factors, and Uniqueness Factors.

The first of the factors of diversity has to do with the high number of coastal states (more than 50) that the Atlantic has, with different self-interests, different forms of regime and different geopolitical and geostrategic alignments. The second factor of diversity has to do with the fact that these states are spread over three different continents, which also provides alignment with different regional political and economic blocs. The third factor of diversity has to do with the existence of asymmetries of economic development which lead to significant imbalances in their trade balance.

Regarding the factors of unity, let me mention four that seem relevant to me: on the one hand, there is an old historical relationship that translates into the existence of a multiplicity of relations of an economic, cultural or political nature that clearly do not exist on the perimeter of the other oceans. This is something that must be preserved. Secondly, I refer to the existence of continental-scale political and economic organizations that facilitate intercontinental and transatlantic institutional dialogue, regulating trade between blocs and establishing special multi-domain cooperation partnerships, and also more diverse organizations like the Ibero-American Conference since 1991 or the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) since 1996 that clearly contribute to this transatlantic dialogue. A third factor, which is not insignificant, is the dependence of coastal states on a secure Atlantic, both to ensure sovereignty over the resources of their territorial seas and to ensure their process of internationalization and economic diversification. Safe navigation is certainly one of the major contributions to promote the active participation of coastal countries in the globalization process.

There is also a special uniqueness in the Atlantic that should be noted: The Atlantic Alliance (NATO) politically and militarily unites the two shores of the North Atlantic, ensures the security of a vast sea, air and land space and, despite the current turbulence, continues to exist as the most powerful political-military force in the contemporary world. Any new organization seeking to institutionalize dialogue in this area cannot ignore this perfect uniqueness unparalleled on two shores of any other ocean.

Risks and threats in the Atlantic area

The classic strategic confrontation, centered on the ability to employ nuclear and conventional weapons on a global scale, is now quite diluted. Especially in the Atlantic. However, the strategic confrontation has not disappeared: it has only refocused its scope

on the use of instruments of economic power. This is a subject that certainly divides us and whose discussion in this forum seems to me neither adequate nor essential.

At a lower level, on the level of risks, there are three phenomena that generate common concern and where we can certainly find broad bases for consensus. I refer to piracy that seems to be a resurgent phenomenon on a global scale and cannot become chronic in the Atlantic, to human trafficking, where the weakest are exposed to often fatal risks and are exploited economically by criminal organizations with transcontinental ramifications and, thirdly, the drug trafficking that generates such massive amounts of revenue that these cartels are capable of corrupting officials, infiltrating institutions, confronting police and military forces, and thus jeopardizing the democratic regimes. I think these are three concerns that can unite us and on which we will find common ground for collaborative answers.

Naturally the birth of any organization generates immense voluntarism and optimism but what one should be looking for are reasoned answers. I identify four areas where a sound reasoning should be conducted:

Firstly, any reasoned solution must prevent militarization of the South Atlantic, which seems to be costly in the face of available defence budgets and disastrous from the point of view of strengthening trust between North and South; our focus should be on local or regional capacity building, with all external forces on temporary missions.

Secondly, we should not think that the solution is exclusively maritime because the actors involved in piracy, trafficking in human beings or drugs always act at sea from terrestrial bases and territories and it is on land that their profits will be managed. Any solution must involve local political structures, the regional level and transnational institutional collaboration and not just navies.

Thirdly, we must refrain from defining non-sustainable levels of ambition or establishing too broad objectives or we will face the risk of lacking the skills to create a true Center of Excellence. It is important to revisit the generic Mission, to mark the areas of consensus and to evaluate the competences that can be combined.

Fourth, no effort will succeed with just great voluntarism. We need to be able to establish sound cooperation with the web of organizations and institutions that promote transatlantic dialogue in search of safer, leaner and more reasoned solutions.

In short, the Atlantic is a multidimensional space where natural differences between sovereign states prevail, but where there are elements of unity strong enough to generate consensus around common problems. I believe that we should be cautious in using the term Defence in the designation of this Atlantic Center and suggest that we delimit the initial Generic Mission in order to adjust it to the necessary consensus and the skills we can together generate.

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My contribution for the discussion on why a Centre focused on defence capacity building for the Atlantic is important and what it could contribute to, focuses mainly on issues related with humanitarian crises and emergencies resulting from both natural/environmental and man-made disasters in the broader Atlantic region. The aim is to shed some light on how an Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity could provide an important platform for more consolidated and effective responses to emergencies and the challenges these may pose, thus contributing to the broader security and stability in the region.

As mentioned in the Centre's original creation document, security challenges and threats in the Atlantic are multiple, complex and of various different natures and sources. These range from the need to reinforce the presence of naval means in the North Atlantic, to addressing the many challenges related to combating drug trafficking routes and groups from Central and Southern America and Western Africa to Europe. All these challenges and threats require a broader and more integrated approach, including mechanisms and strategies at sea, land air and even cyberspace (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 66/2018).

In the past few decades, it has become consensual that humanitarian catastrophes and crises pose particularly important security challenges worldwide and the Atlantic region is not an exception. From natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis or wildfires to man-made disasters resulting from civil war and violence, all have particularly complex consequences that must be urgently addressed requiring an integrated and holistic response which has increasingly come to include the involvement of military and defence forces. In fact, more and more the so-called 'complex emergencies', i.e., humanitarian crises of a broader, multi-causal nature involving a higher degree of political, economic and socio-cultural breakdown and disruption, directly or indirectly related to violent conflict, which directly affects populations' lives (Duffield, 2001)

The role of armed forces in the context of such complex emergencies has, in the past few decades, given place to a particularly intense debate both within the academic and policy-making realm. In fact, although the support of military forces in humanitarian action has traditionally been a relatively common phenomenon, mostly in terms of protection and support to humanitarian NGOs or building of infrastructure, this debate has become much more active and explicit ever since the mid-1990s, as a complement of an increasingly political and military approach to responses to humanitarian crises. As a consequence, international armed forces started assuming, more or less legitimately, various degrees of humanitarian roles in large-scale operations and emergencies, as in Kosovo, Timor Leste, Afghanistan or even Iraq. Examples of these broader mandates include providing food or health assistance to populations in need, or even education infrastructures for children in refugee of displaced camps.

This new trend of military involvement into what is traditionally considered 'humanitarian space' raises a few principle issues and problems, as well as important operational

questions from the point of view of its impact on the work of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The fact that military forces are characterized by, and act within, a particularly hierarchical and structure and in line with specific military objectives has contributed to some degree of scepticism when it comes to having military forces involved in humanitarian crises scenarios and, more specifically, performing humanitarian tasks and activities, traditionally associated with humanitarian agencies and NGOs.

Furthermore, whereas classical humanitarianism is associated to specific operational and substantive principles, such as independence, neutrality, impartiality and humanitarian imperative, military action tends to be associated with a military culture that often includes taking part of the violent conflict which is causing a particular humanitarian crisis, or even contributing directly or indirectly to the aggravation of such crisis. But still it is important to refer that in the past few decades, both the academic debate and practice in the field have come to show how the presence and action of armed forces may be of significant importance in responding to many emergency crises and challenges, especially if based on increased coordination and integration between the different actors and activities involved in order to achieve more effective responses. In such complex circumstances, it becomes crucial to rethink the role and place of armed forces in the framework of complex emergencies since these may well perform a very useful and important role in the immediate assistance and restoration of vital infrastructures, of the security conditions, especially in contexts where the capacity of aid channels is limited.

This is even more important in a context where various types of actors – human rights advocates, humanitarian workers, development agencies and military forces – often literally stumble into each other while performing their mandates, which often overlap. Furthermore, evolution at the level of increasingly integrated missions has rendered evident the way through which the military and defence dimensions can be decisive to effective and successful outcomes. Experiences like the ones we have seen in conflict/emergency and post-conflict/emergency settings such as in Timor Leste or Haiti in the beginning of 2000s or more recently in Mali or CAR are interesting examples.

In the specific context of the Atlantic, this debate is also pertinent as there are increasing security threats and challenges which are multi-causal and that also require comprehensive, integrated and coordinated responses and where the military dimension can play a crucial role. In particular, threats and challenges related to crises resulting from natural and environmental disasters which are increasingly common: hurricanes, storms, wildfires and floods, among other harsh events, that require immediate responses and to which military forces may be better equipped to provide and deal with-access to victims, rebuilding urgent infrastructure or even providing medical and food assistance to areas of difficult access by other actors.

But also challenges and crises related to forced displacement. Increasingly, armed forces (both military and police forces) are called upon to respond to situations of forced displacement – as, for example, in the Mediterranean where national teams assure missions and patrols to save and rescue thousands of migrants and refugees. A third area of relevance for a more active involvement of military and defence forces in the Atlantic

region is related to combating various forms of trafficking – arms, human beings or drugs. Drug and human trafficking, in particular, have become a particularly important reality affecting the broad Atlantic region, as a consequence of harsh and restrictive policies and measures in relation to migrants, refugees and drugs in the American continent and/or of illegal flows of both people, drugs or weapons controlled by criminal networks in the African continent, resulting in the need to find new routes to sustain trafficking, for both people in flee and criminal networks. The creation of a Centre for Defence of the Atlantic is thus of much relevance as it has the potential to work as a privileged platform for the promotion of both expert analysis, planning, coordination and joint response strategies and mechanisms to the above identified threats in the region.

On this matter it is also relevant to mention the potential in terms of coordination and articulation between the Atlantic Defence capacity building Centre and the recently established European Intervention Initiative (EI2) proposed by the French President Emmanuel Macron and to which around a dozen European States have been invited and are now part (including Portugal and the UK). According to this Initiative, participant countries will "share information, intelligence, and lessons learned based on their experiences in these regions and identify potential areas for cooperation" (Zandee and Kruijver, 2019, p. 5). Rather than creating a new standby force, this EI2 is mostly aimed at providing joint action and capacities based on a common strategic culture – i.e, strategic foresight and intelligence; scenario development and planning; support for operations; lessons learned and doctrine – between these European countries to better prepare for future crises (Zandee and Kruijver, 2019, p. 4). At this level, EI2 contributes to the development of an operational doctrine so that participant countries can more easily and rapidly deal with and respond to save and rescue missions of people in areas outside of Europe who are in emergency situations. In fact, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is one of the already proposed areas of action and intervention (through Dutch recommendation), particularly, though not exclusively, in the Caribbean.

To some extent, these objectives are very much in line with the ones aimed by the Atlantic Defence capacity building Centre, so the reference to a more integrated approach is of much relevance here. In this sense, some of the crucial questions to be discussed and developed at this level are the ones related with how to assure the required capabilities to actually enhance this ability to respond to future crises and threats in the Atlantic region. In our view, this has to be based on joint efforts in terms of developing and/or consolidating early warning mechanisms based on the already existing structures, but also in terms of planning and information sharing and intelligence. Of significant relevance here, as mentioned previously, is also the question of coherence of instruments, mechanisms and policies as well as coordination of efforts between civilian and military actors involved in humanitarian/emergency or stability operations in a more comprehensive and multidimensional approach in order to better and most effectively respond to increasingly complex and often unexpected and sudden crises.

Finally, there is also the question of what role can Portugal play in these capacity building efforts. Given its very significant historical, cultural and institutional ties with all

countries in the Atlantic region, as well as its acknowledged role in the main international organizations acting in these areas: the UN, CPLP, NATO and the EU, Portugal is definitely well positioned to assume a leading and privileged role within the Centre and related activities. Of particular relevance here is the role that may be played by the Portuguese military and police forces based on their already extensive experience in the field and in the context of integrated missions which include a humanitarian and immediate relief component. Here again we can refer specifically to the recent rescuing missions in the Mediterranean, were Portuguese military and police have coordinated and led efforts to successfully save and provide safe havens for hundreds of migrants wanting to reach Europe through sea, while at the same time combating criminal groups and networks involved in human trafficking.

This capacity, duly articulated with other mechanisms and actors, and based on good practices already being implemented, may be further developed and consolidated to be applied with increased effectiveness and success in the Atlantic region. This could thus contribute to some of the Centre's objectives, namely reducing some of the still existing gaps and shortcomings in defence capacities or addressing discrepancies in terms of operational capabilities.

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Most if not all generations are convinced that their timeline is a particular conflict--prone age, feeding a self-fulfilled sense of angst which becomes a focus for their constant concern.

Currently, we can't escape that paradigm. We actually spread the idea that we are living in a particular insecure world as never before. Is that correct? Suppose we would ask a Byzantine on the eve of Constantinople's capture by the Turks, or a French aristocrat in 1789 or even a British craftsman at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution how they were feeling and I'm sure all of them would have answered that their set of beliefs and values, sustaining their own identity, had collapsed in the face of a threatening or even lethal environment.

This historical detour is not attempting to relativize the complexity of what needs to be done to ensure the security of states and citizens against external or internal threats. The only objective is to show that mankind has been able to provide answers to a number of challenges in its past, and rather successfully by the way. There is no reason why we can't emulate our forebears. Or, if you prefer, I'm trying to underline here a message of cautious optimism about our ability to fight adversity.

I'm not ignoring that globalization made it even more essential the capacity to respond collectively to those challenges. If we go back to the examples from the past I mentioned previously, one can say that here is hardly any link between the fall of Byzantium and the development of the Amerindian civilization, the French revolution and the life of the peasantry in the Sahel region or the Industrial Revolution and a shepherd's activity in Patagonia. Now, when notions of time and space are shortened – information across the globe being exchanged digitally in real time about any event taking place anywhere –, these new circumstances demand a new framework to protect the citizenry of each country wherever they are and whenever is needed.

Therefore, being able to provide security to the people is not circumscribed anymore to the territorial borders of a nation-state. It implies that authorities should be able to act, irrespective of moment and place, and bearing in mind that economic and social life also happens today more and more in the virtual and digital realms.

Citizens have now the ability to move from one place to another in all corners of the globe in a nick of time. This situation pleads for a diversified toolbox and for a smart use of multilateral fora by the countries that are supposed to ensure the protection of their nationals. In my view, the Atlantic Centre easily corresponds to this logic. The question is: how to better use the several skills it can enhance? And an additional one: how can it get a highlevel ranking within the international toolbox just mentioned?

Before I try to answer those two questions, I dare to put a one more and self-centred one by all means. Why am I emphasizing the particular aspect of citizen's protection? Simply because I believe the divorce between institutional authorities and the citizenry is

growing in many of our countries. Undoubtedly, misinformation, purposely slaving for specific undercover agendas, certainly plays a role in feeding suspicion and disenchantment if not anger. At the same time, those who are governed have now a much higher degree of expectation concerning the ability and integrity of those who govern and a much stronger chance to scrutinise their behaviour through the progress of the digital society. The relationship between the two groups became unfiltered, exposing every act of governance to all sorts of criticism in basically real time and with the possibility of spreading faster than a contagious disease.

In a much more discombobulated narrative without a specific pattern like in the past or, rather, a kaleidoscope of narratives that are all different and unverified but valid in itself, either legitimate or not, it is necessary to develop new ways of communicate that will show that public administrations – those in charge of the State – are actually concerned about the well-being of those under they are serving.

Atlantic Centre can be part of that strategy. What should be its main goal? Creating and developing capacities surely is a sensible choice. Defending Europe against threats like terrorism, piracy or all kinds of traffics is a doubleedged winner in the sense that whatever we can do to empower locally those who are on the frontline fighting these scourges has an immediate effect in keeping local populations safe and simultaneously prevents them to lately affect our continent.

The fragility of some Atlantic countries, or their closest neighbours, implies that it won't be easy to solve the challenges in front of them without some help from external contributors. That support is usually well received, which has a positive effect in reinforcing defence capacities against the threats just underlined – and others, natural ones or man-made. However, for capacity-building or training actions to be successful there is a need for continuity, for monitoring and even for mentoring.

Otherwise, there are clear risks. Indeed, if we do not accompany closely the people who have been trained, we might not be in a position to prevent them to actually feed the ranks of those they were supposed to fight. It is not difficult to envisage that in countries where finding a sustainable job opportunity is not obvious, the sweet siren chants of a lucrative alternative will not prevail even if it means following the lure of unlawful activities. Albeit accidentally, we might, thus, be increasing the capacities of the enemy, a perverse consequence of our well-intended contribution. Mentoring and monitoring will not totally exclude this possibility but could be instrumental to reduce it considerably.

On the other hand, when the European defence identity is being discussed at Union level, there is an opportunity to sharpen the role of Atlantic Centre in solidifying coherence and complementarity that we think is essential to safeguard the relationship between our current and future activities in this framework with our engagement as a NATO ally.

The geographic location of the Center seems to be an invitation to precisely take advantage of being half-way between two continents. It has the potential to connect different strands and deepen the relationship with non-EU NATO members like the USA, for sure, but also Canada, Iceland or Norway that all share a strong interest in the Atlantic.

Working on streamlining procedures, ensure interoperability between forces coming from different environments, creating synergies while avoiding overlaps are all targets that could (and should) steer the work of the Center when pursuing its specific objectives.

In case someone would doubt the diplomatic impact of promoting a Center of Excellence, he or she could be directed to Finland and check how the Helsinki Center of Excellence on Hybrid Threats is contributing to the Finnish security agenda and to forge consensus around its main concerns in that sector – Germany is basically emulating the concept on the civilian crisis management area with a proposal of a dedicated center.

The Atlantic and in particular the Southern Atlantic are traditional areas of our foreign policy. Therefore, Atlantic Centre has a considerable potential to strengthen our ability to be full-fledged actors in the region. Future projects will need ownership of all partners involved, which should not be an issue since it fits rather well with our traditional matrix of dialogue, openness and transparency.

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Partex

1. Backgound and framework: a geopolitical challenge

Nowadays Portugal and Europe are facing a volatile geopolitical landscape, plenty of risks and uncertainties stemming from the weakening of the Transatlantic Relationship; the shift of United States policy – more focused today in domestic issues and promoted by the "American First" attitude; the disregard by the great American nation of their traditional allies and the multilateral organizations built after the second World War and inspired in the America vision for the international system, that still prevails. However, the "old" order is under erosion and is changing as expressed by the growing trade war promoted by the US not only against China but also Europe and the growing level of uncertainty and chaos that is emerging in some regions across the globe and especially in the Middle East. All these changes imply deep consequences for Europe, its stability and security. The growing role of Russia and Turkey to fill the void left by the US decision to withdraw from Syria and the empowerment of both countries in defining new rules for the Middle East, is also a matter of concern. As we have witnessed before, the destabilization of the Middle East soon propagates to the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, affecting strongly the European Union. On top of that the role of Russia and China as revisionist powers trying to fill the gaps left by American mistakes and incoherent policies may contribute for a harsh political environment that risks undermining the international order in the XXI Century.

In this complex geopolitical situation, the idea to create an Atlantic Defense Centre is a response to the growing volatility of the international order and is crucial to minimize the risks faced by Portugal and other Atlantic Nations. In spite of the announcement made many times by many analysists stating the "death" of the Atlantic Ocean and the emergency of a so-called "Pacific Century", the reality has shown a different trend.

It is undeniable that the Pacific nations are in a trajectory of growth both in terms of economic and political power, but this will not lead to a total hegemony of the Pacific and a "replacement" of the Atlantic axis, in the world affairs. The outcome will be a co-existence of Atlantic and Pacific axis, around a Hybrid International order. The role, influence and the strength of the Atlantic axis will be dictated as well by the will of the Atlantic Nations to valorise the Atlantic geography, resources, infrastructures and the trade and energy networks. To build a Centre for the Atlantic Defense able to convey the contribution of Northern and Southern Atlantic Nations in a platform that must encompass multidimensional components is a geopolitical response to reinforce the Atlantic axis in the international order of the XXI Century.

This platform must deal with the defense of the Atlantic countries and the ocean routes for trade and energy flows; with the fight against the piracy attacks, that are increasing in Guinea Gulf (West Africa) and terrorist actions; with the defense of the Economic Exclusive Zones and the ability of Atlantic Nations to exploit the ocean resources in a

sustainable way; with building a platform of cooperation among the Atlantic Nations to discuss, design and exchange policies for the protection of the ocean including the ocean pollution, acidification and the effects on eco-systems and biodiversity; with the fight against the climate threat including the minimization of risks and accidents, the protection against storms and hurricanes, the effects of sea rise or the impact of growing desertification; with the development of sustainable models for the protection of the marine life and the eco-systems but ensuring the sustainable utilization of the resources; with the definition of a new vision for the protection and use of the ocean in the XXI Century with the best use of Knowledge, Science and Technology, launching initiatives among the Atlantic Nations like the "Digitalization" of the ocean to build a digital data base focused in the smart use of sensors that will allow the Atlantic Nations not only to study and understand the ocean but also use their resources in a smart and sustainable way.

The Atlantic Ocean is re-emerging as a key driver for the world trade. In the XXI Century 90% of the world trade is made by sea and the Atlantic Ocean plays a key role on that. The Atlantic Ocean is also re-emerging in the XXI Century as a key asset in terms of energy resources both renewables (wind offshore, ocean waves, solar) and non--renewables (oil and gas). The Atlantic Ocean displays also a huge potential in terms of strategic mineral resources (like cobalt and rare-earth minerals that are essential for the energy transition and for the response to the climatic threat). Atlantic trade networks are also a key component of the international trade system as reflected in the growing trend of maritime traffic. Finally, the Atlantic displays some of the best places in the world, like the Azores Islands, to undertake oceanic and climatic research that is crucial to tackle the climatic threat, because a deep understanding of the oceans behaviour is essential given that they play a key role in the stabilization of the climatic system of the Earth.

In this regard we defend a broad concept for an Atlantic Defense Centre that goes beyond the traditional "defense" concept and involves the following key dimensions, which are crucial to respond to the XXI Century challenges:

- Gather the Atlantic Nations in a platform that is focused in the defense of the Atlantic both in the geopolitical and geoeconomical dimensions.
- This platform must not be confined to the Northern Atlantic Nations, as it was the case in the past; the platform may foster the convergence of Northern and Southern Atlantic Nations around common interests and challenges like the protection of the ocean, the security of trade and energy routes and flows, the minimization of risks like climatic change or piracy attacks, the scientific research projects to understand the role of the ocean in the climatic system of the Earth, the exchange of policies to minimize pollution and environmental risks.
- A "defense" component is essential meaning to assemble the Atlantic Nations in a strong partnership to address common challenges and build common policies to prevent and minimize risks and threats, fight piracy and terrorism and ensure stability.
- The "geoeconomical" dimension is also essential in the sense that many Atlantic Nations have important Economic Exclusive Zones and the role of the Atlantic

resources discovered in the last decade in terms of conventional energy resources – oil and gas –, non-conventional – renewables that display a huge potential ranging from wind and ocean waves and tides to the solar energy –, mineral strategic resources and other, is vital for the future. The building of reliable models to ensure the sustainable development and exploration of these resources and, at the same time, guarantee the protection of the eco-systems, is crucial for the wellbeing of Atlantic Nations and for the future.

- The Technological, Scientific and Research component is also vital within this broad concept of the Atlantic Defense Centre because we are today, in the XXI Century, in a very peculiar situation. We understand very little of the ocean – not more than 5% – but new data provided by the sensors and new treatment of massive data provided by technologies like Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, are helping to build a new understanding of the oceans. There is a revolution underway in the research related to the Oceanography and Climatology and it is possible today to build a more healthy and productive relationship with the ocean and use the new knowledge to tackle the climate change. Finally, the Centre for Atlantic Defense may provide also a forum and a framework to fight ocean pollution, to improve the security of offshore operations, to regulate possible maritime disputes and to map and prevent major risks and threats.

2. Why an atlantic defense centre?

An Atlantic Defense Centre is required today for the following reasons:

- To respond to the global geopolitical uncertainty and to empower the Atlantic Nations with an effective tool to strength their role in the international order, improve the stability and security of the Atlantic, protect the Atlantic trade and energy routes, build an effective framework to prevent and deal with crisis and fight piracy and terrorism and, in a broad sense, maximize the role of the Atlantic as a main platform of the world trade networks and affairs.
- To build and reinforce a system of security in the Atlantic; contrary to the Pacific where several conflicts arise and have potential to disrupt the international order like the disputes of China with neighbour countries – Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia and others –, the Atlantic Ocean is stable, there are no major conflicts – except, in the near past, in the Falklands or the Western Sahara. It is very important in the XXI Century to preserve this stability and a Centre of Defense for the Atlantic may provide a platform to reinforce this trend and to prevent and solve any issues that may arise.
- In order to achieve that is essential that the Centre for the Atlantic Defense is a broad forum for dialogue and partnership not only of Northern Atlantic Nations but also Southern Atlantic Nations. In this regard the role of Portugal here is very important to ensure a smooth bridge between Northern and Southern Atlantic. Due to its role in the history, Portugal is today a nation with a multidimensional diplomatic approach, that encompasses different geographies and Nations and can

play very well, as it happened in the last decades in diverse multilateral organizations, the role of facilitator of consensus, a broker for development of common approaches and policies and a genuine platform to promote the convergence of different Nation wills.

- To build a "geoeconomical" cooperation among the Atlantic Nations that need to develop their Economic Exclusive Zones with sustainable policies and sustainable resource management. The development of the energy and mineral resources to create new engines for a sustainable economic growth and for the well being of the Atlantic Nations, is a common goal of the Atlantic and this involves a combination of development, diplomacy, security, resource management and protection of the eco-systems, that has a huge potential to transform the Atlantic and ensure peace and prosperity.
- Finally to protect the Atlantic Ocean, to reduce the pollution, to ensure a healthy environment, to protect ocean life and, for that, the Atlantic Defense Centre is essential in order to build cooperation programmes at scientific and technological levels, launching multi-national projects to research the behaviour of the oceans and to map its resources and produce a new understanding of their role in the climatic system of the Earth. From the knowledge gathered new advanced scientific policies may emerge not only to protect the ocean but also to ensure a sustainable way for the management and development of the resources.

3. What for an atlantic defense centre?

The Atlantic Defense Centre must be based in a multidimensional concept of defense including the "military" component to protect the Atlantic Nations and the Atlantic Ocean from piracy and terrorist attacks – like the ones that are occurring with more frequency in West Africa and Nigeria Gulf –, to ensure the security of the trade and energy routes but also to ensure the environmental security of the Atlantic Ocean and the sustainability of the ocean resources management and development.

This means that the Atlantic Centre for Defense may be designed to work out solutions, policies and a framework of cooperation, around four major drivers:

3.1. A Center for Military Defense of the Atlantic ranging from infrastructures, energy and trade routes to ports, in order to ensure free access to markets, fight and prevent piracy and terrorism attacks, monitor the traffic and detect and prevent threats. A combination of diplomacy and security is also essential for the Centre to address and manage migration, minimize risks and build policies to promote the cooperation for the economic growth of the Atlantic Nations. This is crucial to tackle migration crisis. Also the security of offshore operations both above and below sea level, building policies to prevent accidents and mitigate risks, exchange emergency plans and environmental protection systems, is essential to ensure the stability and security of the Atlantic. Also, a framework to prevent and tackle Maritime disputes is a key for a peaceful future.

3.2. A Center for Geopolitical and Diplomatic Action and Concertation promoting a dialogue among Northern and Southern Atlantic Nations, defining a framework to manage and solve crisis, building trust and cooperation for joint actions to protect the Atlantic Ocean, to ensure stability and prosperity, to build convergence of the will of different nations in order to foster the cooperation at all levels ranging from military and defense to economic cooperation and scientific and research cooperation.

3.3. A Center for Geoeconomical Cooperation not only to protect the trade among Atlantic Nations but also addressing the need of sustainable policies for the development of the resources of the Economic Exclusive Zones ensuring new engines for a sustainable economic development of the Atlantic Nations but also protecting the ecosystems. In the last seven years 35% of new oil and gas resources were discovered in the Atlantic Ocean. On top of that the potential of the Atlantic in terms of renewable energy resources is huge ranging from wind offshore, ocean waves and tides to solar energy. Joint cooperation projects among Atlantic Nations may provide an avenue for the future. The Atlantic has also mineral strategic resources that are crucial for the energy transition like cobalt and rare-earth minerals. A joint platform to promote the development of these resources in a sustainable way may be crucial for the future.

3.4. A Center for the Environment Defense of the Ocean and for the Climatic risk mitigation meaning that today with the power of sensors and the new technologies like Artificial Intelligence and MachineLearning, we are at the edge of building a new knowledge about the oceans. A revolution in Oceanography and Climatology is under way and with this knowledge the human intervention in the ocean will be more consistent and productive. In this regard a platform of cooperation among Atlantic Nations involving research and scientific projects may open the way to a better understanding of the role of the oceans, to build a solid data base about all key variables that affect the life in the oceans – pressure, temperature, level of oxygen, level of CO_2, level of acidification, occurrence of biological resources, occurrence of energy and mineral resources etc. All this knowledge will allow to define a sustainable way to intervene in the oceans, to defend the ecosystems and to develop and produce the resources.

On top of that these studies are essential not only to design sustainable resource management policies for the oceans but also to develop and reinforce partnerships to address common challenges like the climatic change and risk mitigation. The Atlantic, in special the islands like Azores, are one of the best locations in the planet to study the ocean and the climatic system providing key advantages for the research and this is something that can be promoted and valorized under a project like the Atlantic Defense Centre. Issues like the ocean pollution, the response to sea rise or to storms and hurricanes, the fight to desertification and other common challenges of the Atlantic Nations may be tacked through this Defense Platform.

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At the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the maritime international security presents two main trends: the increasing economic and military importance of the oceans and, in some regions, the increasing tensions arising from the process of demarcation of maritime borders. These two trends are set out in the strategic frame of a major shift in international security: the return of competition between the great powers, officially announced in the 2017 US National Security Strategy.

The return of the power politics and the competition between the great powers increases the military importance of the oceans in the international security, thus decreasing the relevance that terrorism had gained in international security after the attacks on the World Trade Center. This conflictive environment is being developed in the framework of an economic globalization that depends on the global maritime trading system and data transmission. Therefore, conflict and cooperation are present on the international arena in which the oceans play an important role. It is in this scenario that we can analyze the "why" and "what for" the creation of the Atlantic Defense Center (Atlantic Centre).

On the conflictive dimension, the return of the competition between the great owers generates tensions in the oceans, especially in the Pacific and in the North Atlantic, with possible impacts in other maritime spaces. According to the Resolution that created the Atlantic Centre, it seems that the Center aims to become part of this conflictive dimension as the document points out "the increasing reinforcement of the presence of naval assets in the North Atlantic" and establishes that the Center has to contribute to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) collective defense mission. This dimension may affect the South Atlantic Ocean, similarly to what occurred during the Cold War, when, in 1986, the States bordering this ocean created the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone – ZOPACAS, Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul –, in an attempt to prevent extra-regional conflicts and nuclear weapons from contaminating peace and security in the region.

On the cooperative dimension, the globalized maritime system needs national and multinational initiatives to help ensure maritime security, defined here as the prevention and the combat of threats such as piracy, transnational crime, illegal fishing, terrorism, aggression to the marine environment and communications through submarine cables. As stated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in the Review on Maritime Transport 2015, "Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade and the global economy. Around 80 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent of global trade by value are carried by the sea and handled by ports worldwide." Similarly, submarine cables are the backbone of world communication, representing almost 90 per cent of transoceanic communications. Therefore, initiatives that contribute to protect this global system are of paramount importance.

It is in this context of cooperative dimension related to maritime security that the creation of Atlantic Centre generates greater possibilities on building partnerships with international organizations and countries that borders the South Atlantic Ocean. The Resolution creating the Center highlights this cooperative dimension, emphasizing the possibility of establishing partnerships with international institutions, such as the UN, multilateral mechanisms, such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries – CPLP, Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa –, and also with countries that borders the Atlantic coastline, establishing networks with other similar institutions.

On this cooperative dimension, the Atlantic Centre's founding document establishes that the Center should initially focus on the Gulf of Guinea. This is quite appropriated as there is an important maritime security problem in the region, comprising a full range of threats: piracy, oil theft, illicit drugs, arms and human trafficking, illegal fishing, armed robbery at sea and environmental pollution, affecting the globalized maritime system and, in particular, the European Union and the countries bordering the South Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantic Centre contribution to alleviate this problem will demand a considerable effort to coordinate its actions with the various regional organizations and multilateral mechanisms involved in the region.

Then, why and what for is the Center being developed? To become another initiative that contributes to enhancing NATO's defense capability in the conflictive dimension of the competition between the great powers? Or to become a multinational cooperative initiative that contributes to maritime security in the North and South Atlantic? Naturally, the alternatives are not exclusive and they can also be combined, as the Resolution points out. However, for the South Atlantic countries members of the ZOPACAS the first alternative is not desirable because they share the common interest, reiterated in the 2013 Montevideo Declaration, "in reinforcing the South Atlantic as the Zone of Peace and Cooperation, free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."

On the other hand, the second alternative may generate a wide range of bilateral or multilateral cooperative possibilities, inclusive with Brazil, one of the most active members of ZOPACAS, to enhance the region maritime security. Brazil and Portugal are traditional partners and are already involved in helping African countries to improve their maritime security capacity. Moreover, as members of the CPLP, last year in the Declaration on the Seas and Oceans they have committed themselves to "promote the development of maritime safety and security strategies".

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Chatham House and Institute Marquês de Valle Flôr

Introduction

Across the EU and NATO there has been in recent years increased focus on maritime security (from environmental crime to human and people trafficking and piracy and armed robbery at sea). Portugal's history and size of its EEZ give it agency and an important voice on maritime issues, but for any strategy to be successful, it will need to be targeted and complimentary. There remains a danger of duplication. This concept paper maps out current engagement and assesses what are the Portuguese comparative advantages for an Atlantic Centre in Lisbon.

EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan

In 2018, the European Council adopted an updated EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan, designed to tighten and improve its approach to maritime security including the introduction of regional approaches to hotspots as the Gulf of Guinea. With 70% of the EU's outer border being coastline, there is key strategic value in ensuring that Europe's seas and oceans are adequately protected. Looking beyond European waters, the EU has a vested interest in ensuring its goods are able to be transhipped securely around the globe.

This EU Maritime Security Strategy is underpinned by four key principles:

1. A regional approach to a global challenge

The EU recognises that its own economic development and position in the global market requires focus on maritime security beyond its own territorial waters. Destabilized zones in the Horn of Africa or the Gulf of Guinea are of particular concern. The EU as part of its global reach supports the African Union's integrated Maritime Strategy and Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime.

2. Protection of critical maritime infrastructure

This global approach is evident within this second principle. EU NAVFOR Operation Atlanta (started in 2008 and extended to December 2020) has a focus on the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme, monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and generally strengthening maritime security in the region. The EU has also a heightened sense of risk around cyber threats and has encouraged further integration of security measures to provide it with the most robust practices to counteract threats to its maritime infrastructure.

Due to Brexit, the EU Council also relocated the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Operational Headquarters from Northwood (UK) to Rota (Spain) and to Brest (France) for the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) as of 29 March 2019.

3. Stronger collaboration between civilian and military

The EU's comprehensive approach encourages pooling of resources across both military and civilian operations. Collaboration between agencies is crucial in executing the EU's strategy, such as the Common Information-Sharing Environment (CISE) and European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Challenges such as the "migrant crisis" from North Africa have necessitated greater levels of cooperation between EU member state agencies to address maritime security issues.

4. Innovative and holistic

The EU defines maritime security as multi-faceted challenge, going beyond piracy and armed robbery at sea and includes cyber, hybrid, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

The EU's Operation Sophia – whose core mission is to fight human trafficking and smuggling networks operating in the Mediterranean – is focussed on the EU's wider goal of restoring security to the Libyan waters – and was extended for six months in September but without vessels. Similarly, the CISE aims to give EU member states an integrated platform where authorities across the EU will share surveillance data needed for missions carried out by sea.

Building Upon the Gulf of Guinea Strategy

This EU Maritime Strategy built upon the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and was adopted by the Council in March 2014. This strategy highlights the various regional threats, including IUUF, illicit dumping of waste, piracy and armed robbery at sea, human and people trafficking, narcotics, arms and counterfeit goods, smuggling of migrants, as well as oil theft. The EU committed to: "identify geographic and thematic priority zones to focus the EU response, including in cooperation with other international actors" and to help "states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law and effective governance across the region, including improvements in maritime administration and law enforcement through multiagency cooperation by police, navy, military, coast-guard, customs and immigration services". In 2013, the EU launched the Critical Maritime Routes programme (CRIMGO).

Armed attacks in Gulf of Guinea waters surged in 2018, making them the world's most dangerous regarding piracy and armed robbery. In 2019, violent attacks continue to rise – although the overall figures have dropped slightly – and the latest figures show that the majority of the incidents worldwide take place in Gulf of Guinea.

Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are concentrated in waters ofNigeria. Since 2016, the EU has announced more than $60 million for maritime security. France and the US have also played important roles – such as the Africa Partnership Station and annual exercise – Obangame Express.

The EU is considering a "new coordinated maritime presence" in the Gulf of Guinea but each asset from EU would be deployed on a voluntary basis and not under any EU joint command.

A Spanish naval vessel during a patrol mission in April [2019], as part of its support to Maritime Security and Surveillance in Gulf of Guinea, assisted Equatorial Guinea and freed the crew of a Nigerian flagged merchant ship, which had been highjacked for four days. Pushed by industry, current EU 28 thinking is that more patrols by EU member state naval assets are necessary in response to the number of increased violent attacks – especially in the Bight of Benin.

Atlantic Maritime Strategy and Action Plan

The EU Commission adopted an Atlantic maritime strategy in 2011, in response to repeated calls from stakeholders for more ambitious, open and effective cooperation in the Atlantic Ocean area. The strategy identified the challenges and opportunities facing the region, grouping them under five thematic headings: implementing the ecosystem approach; reducing Europe's carbon footprint; sustainable exploration of the natural resources on the sea floor; responding to threats and emergencies and socially inclusive growth.

Out of this evolved an Atlantic action plan (adopted in 2013) in order to support the 'blue economy' of the EU Member States in the Atlantic Ocean area. The action plan identified four priority areas to help generate sustainable growth in coastal regions and drive forward the blue economy, while preserving the environmental and ecological stability of the Atlantic. The mid-term review in 2018 of the action plan was based on an independent study and stakeholder consultation and took stock of progress to date in its implementation. It highlights the main achievements and weaknesses, and points out potential avenues for improving the action plan in future.

The EU in July 2017 boosted its research and innovation cooperation with its strategic partners Brazil and South Africa to better understand marine ecosystems and climate, by launching a South Atlantic Research and Innovation Flagship Initiative.

NATO

EU-NATO cooperation in the maritime domain represents a key element of the two organisations' endeavour. The long-standing cooperation between EU and NATO was reinforced with the 2016 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The EU revised the Action Plan implementing the EU Maritime Security Strategy in June 2018 and called for stepping up EU and NATO cooperation and joint activities through seven actions. The revised Action Plan refers to NATO as a natural partner for cooperation in a number of maritime security-related activities. The Plan also contributes to the implementation of the EU Global Strategy and to the role of the EU as a global maritime security provider. Examples of operational cooperation between the EU and NATO include: the joint effort to fight piracy in the Indian Ocean; cooperation at tactical and operational level in the Mediterranean Sea; the joint organisation of a seminar on lessons learned on the fight against piracy, and the EU cooperation with NATO regarding accredited maritime Centres of Excellence and Training Centres

CPLP

At the 11th conference of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP in July 2018 in Cape Verde, the economic importance of oceans for CPLP members was highlighted in the Declaration of Santa Maria.

The Declaration also highlighted the importance of sustainable ocean management for the SDGs and the need for better maritime security to combat national and transnational maritime crime.

G7++FOGG

The G7 Friends of the Gulf of Guinea group (G7++FOGG) includes Portugal – it gathers Germany, Canada, the United States, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Brazil (observer), South Korea, Denmark, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the European Union, UNODC and INTERPOL.

Originally focused on anti-piracy issues in the Gulf of Guinea when it was created in 2013 (during the UK presidency), the G7++ FoGG has since extended its scope to all illegal activities at sea, such as illegal fishing or different types of trafficking including of human beings, drugs, weapons, animals and natural resources.

Multiple Initiatives – Portuguese added value?

Portugal's history is deeply focused on the Atlantic and on Gulf of Guinea. Lisbon is also seeking an extension of the Portuguese Continental Shelf and submitted a claim to extend its jurisdiction over additional 2.15 million square kilometres of the neighbouring continental shelf in May 2009 resulting in a marine territory of more than 3,877,408 km^2. Portugal already has the fifth largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within Europe, the 4th largest of the EU and the 20th largest EEZ in the world, at 1,727,408 km.

There are EU agencies such as the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, and the European Maritime Safety Agency; the Secretariat of the CPLP and NATO Communications and Information Agency in Portugal whose interests overlap any Atlantic Centre initiative.

The Gulf of Guinea in particular has seen active Portuguese diplomacy over the last decade through the CPLP and EU and as a member of the G7++FOGG. Portugal also in 2018 chaired the Maritime Working Group on the use of private military and security companies in maritime security – of the Montreux Document Forum Maritime Working Group. This process led to the approval by the Portuguese Council of Ministers in January 2019, of a law that allows Portuguese flagged vessels navigating in areas of high piracy risk, such as the Gulf of Guinea, to have armed guards on board. The law also allows hiringsecurity contractors headquartered within the EU or EEA to protect Portuguese vessels.

Academic bodies in Portugal also have conducted research on maritime security. For example, Instituto Universitário Militar launched a research project on maritime security in 2016 (through the Department of Post-graduated Studies – Navy Studies)

The Portuguese Atlantic Centre Initiative could also play a role in capacity building, through increasing preventive capacity (in land and at sea) as well as maritime security capacity of African countries navies.

Observations

- Portugal's history and size of EEZ give it agency and an important voice on maritime issues;
- The importance of fisheries to the Portuguese economy and culinary culture provide an important driver for thought leadership on fisheries stock management, conservation and combating IUU;
- EU and NATO, including their agencies in Portugal provide opportunities for niche collaboration;
- EU initiatives such as Gulf of Guinea Strategy; Atlantic Maritime Strategy and the overarching EU Maritime Security Strategy, provide opportunity for Portuguese influence;
- CPLP – should especially allow for dialogue of Atlantic partners – São Tomé and Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau and Angola and Brazil;
- G7++FOGG has benefitted from Portuguese diplomacy and this might be an entry point for post-Brexit triangulation with the UK (which includes the Atlantic).
- Spain and France and USA – important bilateral partners to co-ordinate with, given their increased focus on Gulf of Guinea and on other maritime domains.

Final remarks

To have an in-depth knowledge of the historical background of how and why the situation in the Gulf of Guinea has evolved along the years should be a starting point. A solid knowledge, as well as a constant update, of the actors and of the interests at stake (oil, trade routes, etc.) is needed to define an effective response strategy.

Deep knowledge of major players agenda in the region, notably the interests of the USA, as it is one the main actors, in economic and military terms, in the Gulf of Guinea, is of crucial importance.

A pre-emptive, preventive and effective fight against piracy in the area can only be defined based on solid knowledge as stated above.

There are currently several hundred Portuguese flagged ships worldwide, a very significant number crossing the Gulf of Guinea, and consequently there is a clear interest in ensuring a safe passage in this area.

For Portugal, there is a clear economic and strategic interest in deepening cooperation with countries in the Gulf of Guinea and to look for well-targeted and complementary action, with partners and countries, in the region.

Workshop II

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Concept Note on EMSA's Support to Member States' Activities in the Gulf of Guinea

Leendert Bal
EMSA, European Maritime Security Agency

Background

Europe and the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) have a long lasting and fruitful partnership in what concerns trade, investment and development in the region. To this effect piracy and other organized crime activities at sea constitute a threat to freedom of navigation and the safe and legal use of maritime resources, which is a concern to European public and private partners. These concerns are linked with the increase of attacks against seafarers, armed robbery, illegal trafficking organised or transiting the region, but also related with the fact that security is a key prerequisite for investment, which subsequently leads to growth, and has a strong positive impact in both sea and coastal communities in the region.

For the past years, EMSA has been supporting Member States and International organizations in a wide range of operational activities taking place in the Gulf of Guinea. These include:

- Information services in support of maritime security (including anti-piracy)
- Information and alert services in support of law enforcement authorities
- Information and alert services in combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing
- Capacity building of third countries' authorities in charge of Coast Guard functions

EU authorities currently using EMSA services when operating in the GoG include a wide range of European Navies (Spain, Portugal, France…), European organizations working in law enforcement (such as MAOC-N), the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

State of Play

EMSA operates and manages a suite of systems, which receive, process, and distribute maritime related information – information on vessels, their cargoes, their voyage, their position and behaviour at sea. The support provided by the Agency to its users operating in the GoG includes the provision of an integrated maritime picture combining available sources of vessel reporting information, including:

• Automatic Identification System (AIS) acquired from space (Satellite AIS).
• Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) as shared by the "EU flags";
• Vessel Monitoring System (VMS – used for monitoring of fishing vessels).

Via EMSA's Integrated Maritime Services (IMS) this aggregated vessel information is delivered to the users according to their data access rights and provides enhanced maritime situation picture over the area of operations. The Agency is also offering a suit of algorithms to detect automatically "abnormal" behaviour of vessels, so-called ABM (Automated Behaviour Monitoring).

EMSA also provides dedicated support to on-going operations using a wide range of earth observation satellites, both radar and optical, in support of a broad range of activities. These spacebased sensors enable the detection, identification, tracking and characterization of non-cooperative targets. Satellite monitoring can be used to detect non-reporting vessels over wide areas, to monitor fisheries activities, to detect and identify specific vessels – i.e., for instance in case of hijacking – and overall contribute to extend the maritime picture beyond the standard reporting information provided by vessels.

These capabilities include the fusion with vessel positioning information contributing to the surveillance of sensitive zones, rapid mapping and analysis over ports and coasts. In addition, vessels of interest can be detected over a given period.



Figure 1 – Overview of satellite monitoring acquisitions in the Gulf of Guinea area of operations. From 2017 to 2019 more than 1200 satellite acquisitions were delivered to Member States and international organizations such as the UNODC, covering an area of over 100 million km^2.

EMSA has worked with European Navies and the UNODC in support of capacity building missions of GoG States. This support usually includes provision of Earth Observation information in the scope of maritime operations exercises with the aim of bolstering GoG Sates maritime security capabilities.

Therefore, EMSA's can support Member States users in the region by:

- Enabling the monitoring of large ocean areas in a cost-efficient way, which will amongst other things optimize surveillance efforts and deployment of on-scene assets;
- Flagging of a suspicious vessel based on anomalous behaviour;
- Activity based intelligence and patterns of life analyses (before mission and/or in operation preparation phase);
- Support to exercises and capacity building activities to improve GoG States capabilities in terms of maritime security.

Prospects

In the future EMSA could expand the services provided to European actors in the region. More involvement could include:

- An improved maritime picture by integrating existing terrestrial AIS information from GoG States;
- Further analysis in terms of maritime security sensitive areas and plotting of piracy attacks, and
- expanding automated behaviour algorithms to identify anomalies and suspected behaviour.

Moreover, new technologies such as radiofrequency detection from space, which enables the detection of a broad range of equipment – e.g., marine radios, AIS emitters, GSM and satellite phones, maritime radars, etc. –, could potentially enrich the maritime picture of this area.

As stated in this document, EMSA has the technical expertise to collect and distribute wide ranging integrated maritime information of the Gulf of Guinea, in support to maritime security activities of EU Member States. Nevertheless, it is important to note that governance considerations – i.e., identification of a single recognized organization in the region that takes the lead in terms of coordination – as well as establishment of the right policy frameworks – i.e., support provided to a dedicated EU mission or as part of an EU programme for the region – would enable the Agency to provide more services and a more sustainable and long term contribution to maritime security activities in the region.



Figura 2 – Example of information available at EMSA
(screenshot of the maritime picture)

Aldino Campos
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

Objective of the Note

Provide a general scope on maritime boundaries and seabed activities across the Atlantic as a contribution to the discussion for the implementation of the Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity-building (ACDCb).

Some major challenges in the medium and long-term will be presented. The whole area corresponding to the Atlantic Ocean will be generically addressed and a special focus, as required, will be considered to the region of the Gulf of Guinea.

Background and rationale

Setting the Scene (The metrics): The Atlantic Ocean spans for area of 85,133,000 square kilometres making it the second largest ocean in the world. This area corresponds to roughly 23.5% of the Earth's total surface area. The ocean has an average depth of 3,650 meters and has a volume 310,410,900 cubic kilometres, which is about 23.3% of the Earth's total water. As spatially defined by the International Hydrographic Organization (Special Publication 23), the Atlantic is divided into two parts, the North and South Atlantic Ocean (Figure 1). The northern part of the Atlantic (approximately at 60ºN) merges into the Arctic Ocean, whereas the southern part (at 60ºS) connects to the Antarctic Ocean. Note: The spatial domain of the ACDCb is a challenge by itself.

Setting the Scene (The actors): a total of 66 sovereign States share their coastlines with the Atlantic Ocean. This includes the two main basins of North and South Atlantic as well as all seas as defined the International Hydrographic Organization – Caribbean Sea, Labrador Sea, Irish Sea, Gulf of Mexico, Gulf of St. Lawrence, Bay of Biscay, Celtic Sea, North Sea, Gulf of Guinea, Bay of Fundy, Bristol Channel, St. George's Channel, English Channel and Skagerrak. The total coastline length of these 66 States is approximately 112,000 kilometres. Note: The actors involved in the ACDCb's context are also a challenge (by location and by social culture).

Setting the Scene (The maritime spaces):

All 66 coastal States exercise sovereignty over theirs Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ). This is a considerable share of the total area of the Atlantic Ocean (Figure 1 in light blue).

So far, 37 coastal States have submitted their Extended Continental Shelf Claims (beyond the 200 Nautical Miles) to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Figure 1 in dark blue). From those, only 15 have been issued recommendations. Presently four submissions, in the Atalntic, are under consideration by the CLCS (Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Portugal and Spain).



Figure 1 – Atlantic Ocean's spatial domain as conceived by the International Hydrographic Organisation. In light blue is represented the EEZ of the Atlantic coastal States. Dark blue represents the limits of the extended continental shelves, as submitted to the CLCS.

The Challenges for the ADDCb

Medium-term

Since ever, boundaries disputes are a source of tension and instability. In the Atlantic, several neighbouring States are still undergoing their negotiations to set the bilateral boundaries in the Territorial Sea and EEZ. Some others are not even engaged, at all, in that process. With the continuing progress in deep-sea mining, the pressure by the industry might destabilize the present unsolved position related to this matter. Also, as

a medium-term challenge, we can point out the disabling process regarding the consideration of submission by some coastal states. The deposit of notes verbales that prevent the CLCS to consider some submissions (for allegedly disputing territories) delays the ongoing delimitation process that allows to define the extended continental shelf of coastal States, but also to allows defining ultimately the limits of the Area (the common heritage of humankind).

Long-term

In a long-term perspective, we can foresee some more issues regarding maritime delimitations.

We can split those in three major issues:

(1) Beside those that are still ongoing (for Territorial Sea and EEZ) we can also add the overlapping areas resulted of neighbouring States that share the same continental margin.

Obviously, depending on the richness related to seabed mineral in these areas, the appetite to control such areas will be higher. Note that from the higher latitudes in the North Atlantic (Hatton Rockall Area) to the southern limit of the Ocean (Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich) we can point out some disputing developments that are on hold by the CLCS.

(2) The future challenge of exploring beyond areas of national sovereign. At this point in time, three significant areas to explore the Atlantic have been granted from the International

Seabed Authority. Those were assigned to Poland, France and Russian Federation. Since is a new geopolitical paradigm to have non-traditional actors in some of the regions, a special attention should be considered in the activities of such areas. Note that in figure 2 (right down panel), some of the granted areas are very close to other states limits for the extended continental shelf.

(3) A third challenge in the long term would be the decarbonisation process of the economy.

Since the new energy paradigm relies on powerful batteries, this will not only emphasize the competition for control the seabed, and their minerals, between countries (bilateral boundaries disputes) but also will increase the race for the minerals in the Area.



Figure 2 – The present activity in the Area (Atlantic)

The Challenges for the Gulf of Guinea

This region represents a major challenge in the context of the Atlantic security process. As shown in Figure 3 (top panel), nine States share this area. From those, six submitted to the CLCS their claim to extend the continental shelf (Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Togo together with Benin (joint submission).

As of today, only one State has recommendations from the CLCS – Ghana (5 September 2014), two are under consideration by the commission (Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire) and the remainders still waiting for the constitution of their Subcommission. The other three States, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé e Príncipe and Cameroon, although not having presented a formal submission to the CLCS, they submitted a preliminary information with the intention to do so in the future. Note: the configuration of the coast in this region and the location of the existent islands are major challenges to accommodate the desires of such countries.

A concerning issue in this region is the combination of the regional population growth (one of the largest in the world) and the global decarbonization process. The predicted values in reducing globally the oil consumption will have a significant impact in the economy of several States in this region (highly dependent on oil exportation). This combination might be seen as the local perfect storm that might spread to the "Extended Gulf of Guinea Region" countries (Figure 3, bottom panel) contributing to increase the migration fluxes and stimulate some illegal and threatening activities in the Gulf of Guinea.



Figure 3 – Gulf of Guinea Region (top panel) and Extended Gulf Region (bottom panel).

Securing the Maritime Domain in the Gulf of Guinea: The Case for Greater Military-Civilian Cooperation

Agnes Ebo'o
ENACT Africa

Pitch-Summary: this concept note argues that initiatives to fight maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea need to shift their focus from an all-security intervention to a more human security-oriented approach. Specifically, actors in the region need to rethink military-civilian relations at both coastal and the wider national levels.

Coastal communities in the Gulf of Guinea are the primary victims of insecurity in the region. But they are also the principal perpetrators of some of the violent acts observed in the region, as well as non-violent criminal activities. At the same time, they are the actors most likely to collaborate with either criminals or security and defence forces, depending on the group that is able to gain their trust. As intelligence and information are key in addressing criminality in the region, Gulf of Guinea governments and their allies should be able to achieve this by persuading coastal communities and citizens at the national level that they stand to benefit the most from safe and sustainable seas.

Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea region, adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean, is a vast area that spans a coastline of over 6 000 km, with territories in 19 coastal states (out of 38 in Africa as a whole) and 6 landlocked countries that depend on the latter for their access to the sea. With a total surface of 2.35 million km², the Gulf of Guinea touches West, Central and Southern Africa[5].

The strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea has been extensively documented. The region has abundant natural resources including oil, gas, timber and minerals. Nearly half of the countries in the region produce and export oil; with Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria topping the list in Africa. The Gulf of Guinea also has a wealth of

5 Countries with a coastline in the Gulf of Guinea include (1) members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of the Gambian, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo; and (2) members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS): Angola, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome e Principe

living marine resources such as fisheries, and the region is sought after by fishing companies worldwide for its migratory species such as tuna, shark (controversially fins), and billfish. Demersal species (including prawns and octopi) and small migratory pelagic species (such as sardines and mackerel) are also common. Most significantly, the Gulf of Guinea is also a key maritime trade route linking Africa to Europe and Asia. It has for instance been identified as one of the European Union's critical maritime routes[6] to be supported to improve maritime security worldwide.

A region with multiple challenges

– An unstable socio-political and economic context

The Gulf of Guinea faces multiple challenges that are political, economic and strategic, in addition to insecurity in the maritime domain specifically. At the economic level, the countries of the region are still impacted by the consequences of the decline in commodity prices[7], particularly as most lack diversified economies and are naturalresources dependent. At the political level, the region is prone to poor governance and accountability, leading to contest of leaders in place and unrest in several countries. Several countries of the region also face internal conflict; and others are affected by insurgency in the Sahel. Defence and security forces in across the region are increasingly overstretched, due to these multiple challenges.

As a result, and in a context of already very low level of maritime domain awareness and state engagement at sea – the sea to citizens and government investment in many countries of the Gulf of Guinea only means offshore exploitation of hydrocarbons or shipping – the defence and security sectors are concentrated on land, to the detriment of security at sea.

– Maritime threats and challenges

The security threats and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea's maritime domain have been widely reported. The main focus has so far been on piracy and armed robbery at sea. Others include oil theft, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; and the use of the sea as a conduit for other illegal or criminal activities, principally smuggling and trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons, and contraband goods. In addition, pollution from the exploitation of hydrocarbons and other sea-based and land-based activities also constitutes serious threat to the local fisheries sectors.

– Uncoordinated regional response-framework

In 2003, militancy in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria shifted in strategy and modus operandi, moving from political claims to violent action. The violence peaked

6 See: Critical Maritime Routes Programme website at: https://criticalmaritimeroutes.eu/mission/

7 Kingsley Ighobor, Commodity prices crash hits Africa, Africa Renewal Magazine, December 2016-March 2017, available online at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/commodity-prices-crash-hits-africa

around 2006 and by 2007, there were as many as 100 attacks against vessels recorded off Nigeria.

As this primarily Nigerian problem threatened regional maritime security – particularly in the face of weak navies unprepared and unequipped to address such concerns at the time –, countries of the Gulf of Guinea supported by international partners such as the International Maritime Organisation, set up the so-called Yaoundé architecture in 2013.

Following a Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Cameroon in June 2013, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct on the prevention and repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illegal maritime crime in Central and West Africa was adopted. It subsequently led to the creation of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC), the institution in charge of the implementation of the Code of Conduct.

Alongside the ICC, other institutional mechanisms seek to address criminal activities and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. They were created before or after the ICC, or as part of the Yaoundé architecture. They include:

– The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC), set up in 1999.
– The CRESMAC (2012) and CRESMAO (2014), the two regional centres for maritime security under the ECCAS and the ECOWAS respectively, supported by zonal (multinational and regional) centres for maritime coordination and information sharing.
– The African Union's 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy.
– The African Centre Charter on Maritime Security and Safety in Africa (Lomé Charter, 2016), which provides a broad framework for addressing maritime security at continental level and applies to the Gulf of Guinea Due to their similarities in missions and objectives however, these initiatives appear to be competing against, rather than complementing, each other. Particularly as they rely on financial support from external sources. This has resulted in a response-framework that is uncoordinated and incoherent to address the region's pressing maritime security threats and challenges.

A needed shift in focus and strategy The Yaoundé architecture and other regional mechanisms were based on the reported resurgence of piracy and armed robbery at sea off Nigerian coasts or in Nigerian internal waters. Yet, despite some reduction around 2009-2015, when the Nigerian government granted amnesty to armed militants in the Niger Delta, piracy and armed robbery at sea attacks have reportedly increased in the Gulf of Guinea. In most cases, they are still tied to Nigeria or its immediate neighbouring countries – Benin, Cameroon, and Togo for example. Overall sea criminality in the region has also increased rather than reduced.

This might be the consequence a lack of coordination and capacities of the actors operating in the region. But it could also be due to the fact that the regional and international focus on piracy and armed robbery at sea has undermined other illegal or criminal activities, yet equally if not more harmful.

One such overlooked illegal activity is IUU fishing. Unlike piracy and armed robbery at sea, which remain largely concentrated around Nigeria, IUU fishing is a concern for all

the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Primarily addressed as an environmental and stock management issue under the Food and Agricultural Organisation, IUU fishing has evolved to become a security threat due to its association with other criminal activities. Particularly, it is increasingly connected to economic crimes such as money laundering, bribery, corruption, tax avoidance and other unethical practices to avoid regulation in countries' fisheries sector. The UN and other actors[8] now recognise the interconnectedness between IUU fishing and transnational organised crime for instance. IUU fishing also represents a major source of conflict between foreign fishers and local – artisanal – fishers across the Gulf of Guinea.

The focus on piracy and armed robbery at sea as the prevailing criminal threat to maritime peace and security in the Gulf of Guinea is based on questionable data collection and incident monitoring methodology[9]. It is also primarily founded on the impact that these activities have on international trade and the global maritime economy. However, when examined from the perspective of coastal communities and citizens in the Gulf of Guinea, they have different implications.

Countries of the Gulf of Guinea generate most of their sea-based revenue from the exploitation and exportation of hydrocarbons offshore, maritime transportation and fisheries. The fisheries sector particularly, relies on agreements between Gulf of Guinea countries and rich fishing nations. But this tends to perpetuate a windfall economy. In economic terms, this translates into losses rather than gains for local economies. Specifically:

– Fisheries crimes committed by distant-water fishers take advantage of already weak governance systems or exacerbate them;
– Harm to small-scale fishers in that they affect their yields and livelihoods;
– Impact on food security of coastal countries.

Fishers interviewed in Nigeria also indicated that they are falsely accused of being pirates on a regular basis by foreign fishers – when international trawlers are caught trespassing the limits of their allocated fishing areas.

In security terms, these are increasing sources of frustration and potential sources of conflict. Local fishers are already turning to criminal activities such as smuggling and trafficking of drugs, weapons, contraband goods and persons to supplement or replace their income. In the absence of intervention from governments and their allies to address these issues, fishers have expressed self-redress as the next step of action. This could include open conflicts with sea criminals, but also with foreign fishers.

Recommendations for the Atlantic Centre

An effective strategy to address maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea should focus on threats and challenges that local – coastal and national – populations recognise

8 In October 2018, ministers from Large Oceans Nations adopted the Copenhagen Declaration on Transnational Organised Crime in the global fishing industry. See: https://bluejustice.org/copenhagen-declaration/

9 Agnes Ebo'o and Dapo Olorunyomi, Data Conundrum in the Gulf of Guinea, ENACT Africa, 25 July 2019, available online at: https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/data-conundrum-in-the-gulf-of-guinea

as priorities and identify with. Pirates and other sea bandits are sometimes perceived as Robin Hoods to local communities, who take from rich foreigners what is stolen from them. Yet, this perception also suffers cracks as criminals turn against local communities.

On 2 November 2019, a vessel and its crew of nine sailors were seized off the coast of Benin in West Africa. A few days later, on 5 November, four crewmembers were abducted from a Greek oil tanker while anchored at the Port of Lomé in neighbouring Togo[10]. Ironically, these attacks took place during the week of the Grand African NEMO, a live multinational exercise organised by the French Navy to build the capacities of Gulf of Guinea countries to fight maritime crimes. In concrete terms, more than 14 Gulf of Guinea coastal countries and several of their allies – Portugal was an invited participant to the 2019 edition – did not detect and intercept such attacks, or could not even deter criminals from hijacking vessels. This raises serious questions about the efficiency of exclusively military responses to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.

Even with a focus on piracy and armed robbery at sea, military successes to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea are seldom recorded. The military approach to maritime security in the region relies on high technology used on vessels, but which is not necessarily indispensable to local sea bandits who often use small flyboats equipped with speed engines. What gives criminals an advantage over more sophisticated defence and security mechanisms is an exceptional knowledge of the terrain and trust or fear of communities.

Currently, several institutions are undertaking research on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea: as well as capacity building and support operations to regional and national bodies.

The Atlantic Centre needs to bring innovation and added value to existing initiatives to be worth it. Specifically, it should target the following:

Strategic activities

– Research
  Groundbreaking and innovative research that extends beyond policy-recommendations.
– Capacity-building and training
  Holistically engage institutional and non-state actors, including coastal communities and citizens.

Areas of focus

– *Civilian-military relations and improving maritime domain awareness*
  To build trust with coastal communities and citizens at the national level.
– *Incident monitoring and data collection and analysis*
  In collaboration with key actors in the region, such as the ICC, set up a network of agents responsible for incident-monitoring (not limited to piracy and armed robbery at sea), data collection and analysis.

10 Ed Reed, Crew members snatched off Benin and Togo, Energy Voice, 5/11/2019, available online at: https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/africa/211322/kidnappings-target-anchored-vessels-off-benin-and-togo/

– Fisheries: the interconnectedness between fisheries, fisheries crimes and security
  In collaboration with national and regional fisheries organisations (CSRP based in Dakar and COREP based in Libreville) and small-scale fishers.
– *Special focus on Portuguese-speaking countries*
  Improve the participation and visibility of Portuguese speaking countries on maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea – Angola, Cabo Verbe, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe.

Concept Note

Pedro Ferreira
Portuguese Air Force

Africa is a land of sensations. In fact, as much as it is told or tried to be described, I find it practically impossible to understand any problem of the local nations on this wonderful land, without being there or even living there.

Before trying to understand a particular region, I think it is necessary to understand its surroundings, from macro analysis to micro analysis. So, the whole conjuncture of both exclusively inland and coastal countries is generally considered to be unstable or with a strong possibility of becoming unstable.

Even so, over the years and with most of the people I have worked with, there is a strong willpower and positive energy that drives them to incredible results.

Some Key words to have in consideration: Safety and security; Maritime Domain Awareness; Threats; Agreements; Cooperation and Interoperability; Operations and Exercises.

WHAT: Atlantic Defense Center (ADC).
WHO: Gulf of Guinea and West African nations.
WHERE: Lisboa, Portugal.
WHEN: 2020
WHY: To increase safety and security in Atlantic Ocean.
HOW: Increasing the interoperability and proficiency of Gulf of Guinea and West African nations to counter illicit activities and enhance safety and security in the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), improving the Maritime Domain Awareness.

However, concerning the Gulf of Guinea, I will therefore focus my conceptual note on some guidelines, which are:

– The ADC should be capable to improve a comprehensive maritime safety, security, stability, cooperation, and economic prosperity throughout the Gulf of Guinea and West African nations. Based on the Keyline for all the interference done in the vicinity of any nation, perhaps is the closest direct interference that can be done with or without their permission.
– Implementation of an annual forum where representatives from nations and organizations can discuss all the threats affecting the region or impacting Europe. With this, a start "deconfliction" and coordination of Maritime Security Operations

(MSO) by sharing situational awareness, assessment of the evolution of trends and best practices can be achieved.

– By joint combined exercises (Ex.: Obangame) and operations (Ex.: Junction Rain or national), there is a direct possibility to improve law enforcement capacity and capability in this region. Guinea Gulf and West African nations is a huge geographical area that reminds us of the importance of greater cooperation, integration and interoperability between all the nation respective sensors and systems.
  All the possible combined operations to counter illicit maritime activity employing an interregional, regional, and national whole-of-government approach in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa nations, operating under civilian authority and respecting maritime law enforcement capabilities to increase all the Maritime Situation Awareness (MSA).
– Keep fighting for the implementation of Yaoundé Code of Conduct or any other existing or creating new arrangements and agreements to share resources (assets, intelligence and information exchange), in accordance with the identified potential deficiencies, that allow to increase all the cooperation and coordination mostly between neighbour nations. Is needed it to continue to break down the barriers to relevant, timely information sharing in accordance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
– Identification of the transnational threats, in accordance with the geographical region, as well as support on identification of the process to disrupting or neutralizing Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). Most of the Gulf of Guinea and West African nations threats are related with: energy security, piracy, illicit trafficking (people or goods), illegal fishing, or any other threats on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
– The ADC must work to establish national support maritime strategies, enabling the political authorities and organizations to take effective action complemented by the establishment of appropriate legal frameworks. Bottom line is need it to continue our efforts through the various players to perform law enforcement activities which protect trade, and reduce the threat of transnational criminal and terrorist organizations.
– The ADC must be prepared to work together with military or law enforcement European, NATO or national (US AFRICOM) organizations, military or non-military, on the same propose with the similar objectives.
  Bottom line, in March 2018, Portuguese Air Force aircraft participating on Obangame Exercise, prevented real acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. On 22th and 27th March, on Obangame exercise, the Portuguese crew employed aircraft sensors to confirm an ongoing piracy act and directed the appropriate means of intervention to the area. This action in coordination with the national authorities ended in the release of the kidnapped people.

Hervé Hamelin
DGRIS, Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, French Ministry of Defence

The maritime areas of the Gulf of Guinea countries face many threats that jeopardize their stability and economic development. In this context, in 2013 in Yaoundé and 2016 in Lomé, the African riparian countries adopted tools laying the foundations for a maritime security architecture and the foundations for a rational exploitation of the sea's resources. In order to support these decisions, France has long been developing a policy aimed at ensuring that the riparian countries take ownership of their maritime security challenges through capacity building actions. This policy is also based on greater coherence in the initiatives of all international partners, particularly through the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, which France and Ghana co-chaired in 2019.

In the framework of the one-day seminar organized by Portuguese Ministry of Defence, the aim of this concept paper is to provide an updated conceptual and operational analysis from the French point of view regarding the issues and challenges about the Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.

French analysis thus encompasses the threats, the risks but also the opportunities to consider in the field of Maritime Security in this region, giving a highlight on the initiatives implemented on the ground and their lessons learned by French Armed Forces, consequently contributing to the future structure of the Atlantic Centre.

1. Security Context

The Gulf of Guinea is now the area most affected by piracy and robbery in the world. In 2018, six hijackings of ships, 13 others hit by gunfire and 130 crew members were kidnapped for ransom, the average price for negotiation being estimated between 500 000 and 1 million dollars. The trend in 2019 untill the beginning of November remains a high level of incidents: 90 incidents were recorded as well as 91 kidnappings. While the figures seem to remain steady, criminals no longer seem to be engaging in "bunkering" activities, or the theft of hydrocarbons, the attackers' modus operandi now being turned towards more brutal actions, with the search for hostages, particularly Europeans, becoming the primary objective. Actually, attackers now orchestrate quick and brutal strikes in order to target crews and precious goods and they systematically use firearms before even attempting to board a ship.

While the epicenter is still around the Niger Delta, attacks are now spreading to other areas, with incidents reported more than 600 nautical miles off the Nigerian coast. Although the majority of attacks occur off the coast of Nigeria, the threat of piracy in the other areas of the Gulf of Guinea remains significant. The use of "mother ships" – vessels that serve as a logistics and command platform – have enabled Nigerian pirates to conduct attacks as far as Ivory Coast. Piracy and robbery incidents have also been reported in the mooring areas of Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo), Conakry (Guinea), and Freetown (Sierra Leone).

Moreover, piracy has huge consequences regarding investments for African countries minoring the economic growth potential of coastal States.

Maritime insecurity is not limited to piracy: many traffics pass through the Gulf of Guinea. The Atlantic Ocean is for example a drug smuggling transit area between Latin America and Africa and then irrigate Sahelian flows to Europe or the Levant. Just for cocaine, and according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the production increased 31% since 2017 in Latin America, that is to say more than 1 410 tons per year, mainly in Colombia. As a consequence, between 60 to 80 tons of cocaine land on the shores of West Africa every year (mainly coming from Brazil), as much as the volumes seized by the Federal Police in Brazil (80 tons a year). And it is assessed that these figures represent only 5 to 10 % of the quantities smuggled. With an average price about 60 dollars per gram, the annual business revenue for the smugglers is an average of 8,5 billion dollars.

The plundering of fisheries resources and maritime pollution risk destabilising coastal regions by contributing to the impoverishment of their population and thus fuelling migratory flows.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is the most observed form of illegal maritime activity at sea, and its effects impact all riparian states of the Gulf of Guinea. IUU fishing represents a lose of 23 billion dollars per year – 15% to 20% of world fisheries. The social, economic, and human externalities of illegal fishing further undermine this fragile region. As a result of their migration patterns, fish stocks are a shared transnational resource, unbound by the limitations of Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ). Many of the vessels engaging in illegal fishing activities intentionally hop between different maritime borders in order to exploit loopholes in the regional surveillance and enforcement architectures.

In western and central Africa, the overexploitation of these fish stocks reduces the potential for economic development and threatens the livelihoods of artisanal fishermen. Indeed, fish represents more than 60% of human animal protein intake in Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. The socioeconomic consequences of illegal fishing have profound regional political and security implications, as demonstrated through the 2007 Somali piracy crisis.

Finally, more than addressing each of these threats separately, the main issue for the following years is to prevent a vast movement of hybridization between them. It is feared for instance that drug trafficking bolsters and finances regional criminal organizations in Africa and contributes to the development of terrorism throughout the Sahel region.

The terrorist threat on land however, especially towards Western interests in riparian states, remains high. This growing threat can be correlated with the steady increase of radical Islam in certain states. Foreign nationals and interests, as well as African countries supporting the fight against regional terrorist groups, have become the main targets. Oil, gas, and port facilities have become the preferred high-value targets for terrorist groups, which can hit any nationals whose companies are involved in trade with the countries attacked.

All these scourges weaken a region that is of strategic interest to Europe because of its economic importance – more than 20% of French oil imports, 50% for Portugal, 6.5% at European level, etc. – but also because of its proximity to the Sahel-Saharan strip.

2. Building a maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea

On 24 and 25 June 2013, all West and Central African States met in Yaoundé to develop a common strategy for securing their maritime space, known as the Yaoundé process or architecture. In particular, States and international organizations in the subregion have committed themselves to consolidating and harmonizing their legal and criminal measures to combat piracy, and have developed an interregional maritime security architecture.

On 10-15 October 2016, the African Union Summit on Maritime Security and Safety and Economic Development was held in Lomé. The objective of this event was to find common approaches among Africans to better address the challenges of maritime insecurity, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the preservation of the marine environment. It resulted in the adoption by some 30 African

States of a charter on maritime safety and security and economic development in Africa in order to better coordinate their efforts in these areas.

Finally, the 834th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) on 21 March 2019, devoted to the link between maritime safety and security and sustainable development, while recalling the AU Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM 2050), the related Action Plan and the 2016 Lomé Charter, expressed its concern about threats to maritime safety and security. It highlighted the efforts of ECCAS and ECOWAS within the framework of Yaoundé's maritime security architecture and the importance of building capacity and support to Member States. Finally, the PSC concluded by the need to create a specific AU budget for the development of the blue economy.

3. France strategy in the Gulf of Guinea

Securing maritime areas in the Gulf of Guinea is the guideline of our policy in western and central Africa in support for the implementation of a maritime security architecture resulting from the 2013 Yaoundé Process. France developed a strategy in this region ruled by the main principle of capacity building actions in order to facilitate ownership by our African partner's navies.

To that end, French forces implement permanent deployments and cooperation missions in the Gulf of Guinea. CORYMBE naval operation is the major French naval investment in the GoG area in order to protect French interests from regional threats and to provide a large array of training exercises for our African partner's navies. To that end, France also relies on land positions in Ivory Coast (900 soldiers), also with cooperation teams based in Senegal (350 soldiers) and Gabon (350 soldiers).

France detached also maritime security experts from the Ministry of Armed Forces or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

– at the Institut Supérieur Martime Interrégional (ISMI), located in Abidjan which delivers theoretical training and education for our African partners on maritime security and safety topics; and
– with the concept of national schools with a regional vocation, for instance the Naval Academy in Tica in Equatorial Guinea with a regional scope and run with the support of embedded French navy cooperation representatives;
– in Embassies with defence attachés in almost each of the 19 countries of the region;
– with Naval support stations in Senegal and Ivory Coast.

France has also developed a large network of 17 cooperants in 11 countries of West and Central Africa: Benin, Cameroun, Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Conakry, Equatorial Guinea (3), Mauritania (2), Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire (4), Sénégal and Togo who are "embedded" in local navies with a focus on global maritime security topics.

All these actions are regularly strengthened with expertise missions coming from France on demand by our African partners.

The French cooperation milestones are built in order to reach one common goal: reinforce maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, as a global player but in close partnership with international community and the various stakeholders involved in the region.

Along with our main objective that aims the ownership by the African partners, France developed for many years a strong policy in support of our African partners based on the following guiding principles:

– Global and inter-departments approach ("security and development" continuum).
– Multilateral framework by seeking complementarity between programs developed by the EU or the UN and the support for regional maritime strategies.

Nonetheless, multilateral cooperation is key to reinforce the maritime security structure:

– That is why France supports the Yaoundé Architecture centers, and the strategic role played by the Interregional Coordination Center on top of it;
– France seeks also to work in coherence with all other nations involved in the fight against maritime insecurity in the region, promoting comprehensive training in the whole maritime domain.

France thus promotes the actions undertaken under the umbrella of the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea. Created in 2013 from an UK initiative, the G7++ gathers all members of the G7 and various countries involved in maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea: Brazil, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, South Korea, Norway, Belgium, Denmark or Switzerland and International organizations (EU, ONUDC, and Interpol).

France and Ghana co-chaired the 2019 Forum with the aim to tackle the main difficulties faced by the Yaoundé architecture since its creation in 2013. For that purpose, France and Ghana first defined an ambitious roadmap tackling all the main issues regarding illegal activities at sea, this roadmap being supported by an action plan, based on the

conclusions and recommendations of five virtual working groups launched the 2nd of July 2019, during the first conference of the G7++ FoGG that took place in Brussels.

At the end of this year of presidency, the first assessment is largely positive. The roadmap is intended to be sustained, as well as the working groups that demonstrated their value at the G7++ FoGG plenary conference in Accra on November 5. Beyond these successes, the most positive point will probably remain the strong mobilization of the countries of this forum, as well as African countries symbolized by the large number of participants (more than 200). This has given a new political impetus to the Yaoundé process and concrete solutions have been put forward, mobilizing all partners.

Training is key in order to provide a capacity building service to our African partners. The Milestones France identified for a successful training are:

– International coherence: requires work in direct link with other navies and actors in the area such as:
– EU programs like Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network (GoGIN) and Support for West Africa Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS);
– US exercise Obangame Express;
– Coordination with Spanish and Portuguese deployments in the region;
– Regularity associated with flexibility
– Regularity: 4 to 5 exercises per year including one major event, the Grand African Nemo exercise;
– The purpose of the local events is to adapt to each Navy's needs, promoting a tailormade service, from the training for the benefit of boarding teams or Special Forces, to the analysis and the use of satellite pictures to plan actions at sea;
– The main event aims at bringing together all African Partners, in order to make them work and exercise in a joint and combined fashion. As an example, the Grand African Nemo Exercise gathered international partners – USA, Brazil, Spain, Portugal and Belgium in 2019 –, involving all the 19 states of the region and covering all the aspects about maritime security: illegal fishing, SAR, piracy, drug trafficking or pollution;
– Finally, Maritime Security faces also another challenge in the Gulf of Guinea: the difficulty to obtain a clear picture of what is happening at sea and to achieve a real Maritime Domain Awareness. The creation of the Yaoundé Architecture was a first step to promote maritime information sharing between African Countries and the four different layers of the structure.

Information sharing is key to ensure a swift response when incidents occur. In order to better articulate the need for information sharing and the necessary degree of confidentiality with the maritime Industry, France and UK have developed since 2016 an original mechanism, the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG).

The MDAT-GOG is in fact a virtual reporting mechanism rather than a centre. It is a phone number and an email address that goes to a 20 years old-existing French Marine Nationale maritime information centre available 24 hours a day and 365 days of the year.

Since the beginning, and in accordance with what was presented during the G7++ FoGG on the 8th of June 2016 in Lisbon, the MDAT-GOG is a mechanism designed to sit in support of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and in full support of the efforts of regional states. It regularly works with the Yaoundé centres. Very simplistically, the MDAT-GOG operating model is a virtual "see and avoid" service that carries out the fundamental functions of monitoring the merchant vessels willing to cooperate and to provide them with a warning and alert system granting a swift response.

The MDAT-GoG monitors 300 ships a day and gathers more than 800 customers. But it represents only 38% of all merchant vessels traffic in the area, which proves that progress should be made, still.

Putting an end to illegal activities in the Gulf of Guinea is paramount; any incident that occurs is unbearable for the African States, for the maritime Industry and even more for the families of the seafarers attacked or kidnapped in the region. Our African partners primarily want the international partners to share their operational knowledge, and seek to perform together real operations in their maritime domain. Since, this requires training and developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) prior to joint operations. Therefore, time and patience are key. Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is a long-term investment that takes time before getting results: it took 30 years in France to achieve its model of Law enforcement at Sea; it took also 30 years for the JIATF-South, which can be considered as a great success in the fight against drug trafficking, to become efficient. A coherent multinational response is needed and all stakeholders need to be persistent. Success will come with the strong involvement of all stakeholders in the region. To that regard, the Atlantic Center can thus give a string contribution to this process.

Bridging the Gap between Regional and Continental Architectures: Opportunities to Support the Gulf of Guinea

Daniel Hampton
Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Gulf of Guinea has experienced a rapid and extensive build-up in maritime security architecture over the last decade. With a cascading set of instruments and institutions, the 26 states of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct are grouped into five maritime zones and supported by two regional coordination centers. Additionally, there has been a marked increase in the number of maritime-focused security strategies within the region. However, few goes as far as laying out an integrated maritime strategy or maritime domain strategy that brings together the full spectrum of activities in a framework that includes security, governance and the blue economy.

The proliferation of strategies, codes of conduct, declarations, charters, and other instruments is only matched by the similarly extensive propagation of institutions focused on maritime safety and security in Africa. There is still much work to be done to harmonize, coordinate and deconflict maritime security architecture across the continent. Most efforts to date have arisen from a bottom-up approach within sub-regions and regions without a coherent continent-wide framework of integration. Accordingly, the time is ripe to advance implementation of the African Union's 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) and connect lines of effort along the continuum.

There is a continued and productive role for external actors and international organizations to play in assisting African partners' efforts to advance both national and collective maritime security. Entities such as the Atlantic Centre can provide advice and guidance to the Gulf of Guinea states and organizations to help bridge the gap between regional and continental instruments and institutions.

While the plethora of strategies, instruments and institutions across the continent have arisen out of the desire to advance Africa's maritime security, they have not all been developed in a fashion that leads to coherency. Too often, there are gaps, duplications, overlaps, and contradictions between the different instruments and institutions, and at this point, not all of them are fully operational. They do not fit together in a framework, and this patchwork is actually hindering the process of creating security in the African maritime domain. Non-functional institutions are a drain on limited resources, and even well-resourced institutions may be working at cross purposes.

Part of this process also includes clarifying the roles of the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Both the AU and the RECs must recognize that they are strategic and political-level institutions, so their role in maritime security is fundamentally different than operational centers. To address this problem, experts from around the continent must come together to both clarify the picture as it stands today, and decide how an Africa wide framework should be implemented. Based on this analysis, recommendations must be posed to political leaders in order that they may strengthen the functional institutions, and make the hard decisions to jettison those that are not working.

Marshalling political will behind maritime security is often problematic. While a maritime security strategy is important as an integral part of a National Security Strategy, maritime security alone may not provide sufficient incentive for political investment. Frequently, a National Maritime Security Strategy is organized around just one pillar: security. This basic strategy can be developed and implemented by maritime security agencies such as the navy, coast guard and/or marine police. By contrast, a strategy that also includes Maritime Safety and State Action at Sea has two pillars: security and governance. Therefore, it involves both the security and the governance agencies including the maritime administration, fisheries ministry and port authority. Finally, an Integrated Maritime Strategy or Maritime Domain Strategy brings together the full spectrum of activities in the maritime space and has three pillars: Security, governance and the maritime/blue economy.

This third form of strategy, integration of the maritime domain, is the most ambitious as it requires interwoven lines of effort between many different agencies and necessitates a whole of-government implementation process. However, it is the best approach to garner political will as it links security, governance and economic interests. Consequently, African states should strongly consider developing integrated maritime strategies with three pillars: security, governance, and the blue economy. This approach provides in one document the necessary steps to provide maritime security and generate a return on the investment of state resources resulting from the growth of the blue economy.

Finally, considered thinking must be applied to how AIMS 2050 can assist rather than encumber the work that is already being doing at all levels around the continent. National actors should look to see how their efforts can simultaneously augment the maritime security capacity and capability of their country, zone, region and continent at the same time. The relationship between AIMS 2050 and the inter-regional, regional, zonal and national initiatives must be melded into a functional interplay.

In conclusion, the Atlantic Centre for defence capacity building, in working with the Gulf of Guinea states and organizations, can help realize the AIMS 2050 goal of "providing a common template for the AU, the RECs/RMs, and relevant Organizations; and Member States, to guide maritime review, budgetary planning and effective allocation of resources, in order to enhance maritime viability for an integrated and prosperous Africa". The AIMS 2050 ambitiously calls for "a business plan that specifies milestones, capacity building targets and implementation requirements including technical and financial support from within Africa and also from development partners". Working with Gulf of Guinea states to implement integrated maritime domain strategies will assist in bridging the gap between regional and continental to better address Africa's maritime challenges for sustainable development and competitiveness.

Dakuku Peterside
NIMASA, Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency

Background

The Gulf of Guinea is a strategic maritime region in the world, having geographical contiguity to Europe and the Americas. It is a veritable source of global energy needs, food stock supply as well as raw materials for industries. Also, a vital transportation route and relevant as a "flow" and manoeuvre space for military operations. Thus, security in the region especially the maritime domain has been a focus of great consideration amongst countries within and beyond the region, international organisations and partners.

Maritime security is one amongst the few critical factors required to develop the blue economy, identified as the new frontier for socio-economic, scientific and technological advancement. Maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea manifests in forms such as piracy, illegal and unregulated fishing, sea robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, crude oil theft, drug trafficking and non-compliance with safety and environmental regulations. These hinder greatly efforts to use ocean resources sustainably, create jobs, improve livelihood, food security and engender economic growth in the region.

It should be noted however that in the past decade, the Gulf of Guinea countries have initiated some strategic responses such as the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lome Charter), ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS), ECCAS Maritime Security Plan (SECMAR) and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which is borne out of the cooperation between ECOWAS and ECCAS. This has manifested in the development of the zonal maritime security operation and coordination mechanism. Accordingly, the region has two main maritime security coordination centres. They are the Maritime Security Regional Centre of Central Africa (CRESMAC) covering Zones A and D based in Pointe Noire and the Regional Maritime Security Centre of West Africa (CRESMAO) covering Zones E, F, and G located in Abidjan. At the apex of both Centres is the InterRegional Coordination Centre (ICC) based in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The zonal centres are in Douala, Cotonou, Accra and Praia. The centres are envisaged to share credible information and coordinate combined maritime security operations and exercises.

As observed, the effects of the various initiatives so far are yet to be felt substantially, i.e., complete elimination if not drastic reduction in incidents of maritime insecurity and crimes in the region. For instance, the Regional Coordination Centres in Cotonou and Douala have been activated but they are all operating currently at low capacity in their information sharing and operation coordinating roles.

Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

Maritime security by nature and scope is a highly complex policy area involving crosscutting issues such as territorial defence and state sovereignty, legal jurisdiction, maritime safety including search and rescue, disaster response or port security, protection

of the marine environment and improving socioeconomic livelihood. These issues equally can pose as challenges to maritime security since its threats are trans-national, trans-border and increasingly dynamic as well as sophisticated. This is further complicated in the absence of dedicated policies and strategies capable of integrating and prioritizing responses to the issues and the required coordination of the diverse agencies responsible (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017).

In the Gulf of Guinea region, maritime security governance is greatly affected by issues such as legal/regulatory deficiencies, inadequate law enforcement capacity and capabilities (manpower, assets and logistics), low maritime domain awareness, lack of inter-operability as well as effective coordination and the absence of domesticated or developed maritime security strategy document in most Gulf of Guinea countries.

Relevance and Contributions of the Atlantic Centre to Maritime Security in Gulf of Guinea

Problems are meant to be solved. And a solid understanding of the problem and context is vital. Thus, in contributing to solve maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, the proposed Atlantic Defence Capacity Building Centre (ADCBC) needs to identify specific pressing concern of each Gulf of Guinea country, because what may be a pressing concern for one country might not be for another. This underlying tends to influence countries' responses to issues of maritime security and engagements at regional level. Grounded in problem analysis would not only help to identify the issues and prioritise them but would also help in devising the best approach to address them. Suffice to say that effective maritime security governance requires a solid understanding of the problem, as it determines areas of priority or focus, the strategy to be adapted and the management of resources. The Atlantic Centre can contribute to improve maritime security in Gulf of Guinea in the following areas and ways:

a) Assisting countries drafting their maritime security strategy document. It is one effective way to ensure maritime security as it provides the means of analysing and outlining problems, existing capacities and needs, as well as specify roles and responsibilities of the different entities involved in maritime security.
b) Facilitating the upgrade of maritime domain awareness capabilities and facilities within and across the region to enhance inter-operability, profile shipping and coastal activities across Gulf of Guinea with a view to achieving preventive capability and timely identification of vessels and persons of interest.
c) Capacity building of personnel at the region's maritime domain awareness centres, especially in data mining, integration, analysis and timely information dissemination.
d) Development of common doctrine on information sharing within the Gulf of Guinea maritime security architecture and with other wider Atlantic stakeholders.
e) Assist in research and development of action plan on maritime information integration and exchange – between Agencies, ships and users – in a way that there will be no compromise.

f) Acquisition, efficient and preventive deployment of surface and maritime air patrol assets around hot spots in the Gulf of Gulf.
g) Training, exchange programmes and peer reviews.
i) Assisting to improve an effective and altruistic coordination system in the region. As the saying goes "united we stand, divided we fall". If there is a better time to be united in the region to end maritime insecurity it is now.

Concept note

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UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The Gulf of Guinea is currently one of the most dangerous maritime areas on the planet. The frequency and extent of maritime crime in the region during the last decade, as well as its impact on international maritime trade, remain one of the biggest challenges for the international society. In addition, in recent years, West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea have become an increasingly hotspot for international drug trafficking and organized crime. From this scenario, several questions naturally arise such as how the international society should address these issues, and why is it important to have a new Centre dealing specifically with water security operation trainings, such as VBSS, in the Atlantic Ocean?

Overview of security trends and drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea

Although insecurity along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea may be an old phenomenon, challenges and complexity of crimes are constantly evolving. Today, the criminal sphere to which this area belongs covers West and Central Afdrican States, both on land and at sea. Further, some West African States are facing different and more complex problems in terms of drug trafficking. While some countries are merely placed on trafficking routes, others are facing financial and security problems which drug trafficking can cause.

To illustrate this alarming scenario, in which drug trafficking became a real scourge for the Gulf of Guinea, several important seizures have been known this year (data on the public domain, not UNODC source):

– In Cabo Verde tons of cocaine were seized in January 2019 (it remains the largest ever seizure of cocaine in West Africa) and 2 tons also of cocaine in August 2019;
– In Guinea-Bissau 789 kg of cocaine were seized in March 2019 and 1947 kg in September 2019;
– In Senegal approximately 1 ton of cocaine was seized in July 2019 and 1 ton in October;
– In Gambia 45 kg of cocaine in July;
– In Liberia two seizures were notified of 23 kg and 264 kg of heroin in October 2019;
– In Benin 59 tons of tramadol;
– As well as a number of seizures done in South America and destined to West Africa.

All these recent seizures show the scope of drug trafficking, highlight the problem of improving capacities in the Gulf of Guinea and therefore reinforce the idea that a multilateral center focused on water security operation trainings and supported by the Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity Building could gather all the necessary elements to play an important role in fighting this phenomenon. Indeed, UNODC would envisage a VBSS dedicated multinational Centre for the Atlantic Ocean, which could be a crucial step for capacity building purposes whether focused either on regular water security operations trainings or on the embedment of an expert who should ensure the maintenance of maritime capacity interdiction of drug trafficking at sea.

Why is it important to have a new Centre dealing with VBSS in the Atlantic Ocean?

Assuming that UNODC GMCP's experience on maritime crime could be valuable for the activities developed by the Atlantic Centre for Defence capacity building, then it should be considered that, to date, VBSS has been a core element of UNODC GMCP capacity building curriculum. In fact, the Global Maritime Crime Programme of UNODC is supporting VBSS trainings across the seas in order to help States increasing criminal responses through capacity building and, since 2015, is supporting States of the Gulf of Guinea in raising operational capacities for patrolling and controlling their maritime zones and so detecting and addressing potential criminal activities, including drug trafficking, through maritime domain awareness.

The VBSS trainings typically run for two to four weeks and to date have been conducted in either Sri Lanka and Seychelles, as in both locations GMCP had access to captured drug dhows that are used as training platforms to conduct simulated exercises and underway boarding[11].

GMCP's VBSS trainings generally include theoretical sessions on drug trafficking and smuggling trends in the Indian Ocean region, which are delivered by expert officers from countries of best practice. The strength of the VBSS training is attributable to the extensive practical exercises that are conducted to supplement the theory, and which include exercises on aspects of maritime law enforcement including boarding procedures, ladder climbing techniques, use of rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs), body searching techniques, drug testing techniques and onboard tactical combat critical care[12].

The purposes of this Centre would take into account not only the weakened capacities of many Atlantic States to act against organized crime at sea but also the fact that maritime insecurity, has become increasingly prevalent in the Gulf of Guinea. In order to overcome the numerous challenges presented by the large amounts of illegal drugs trafficked and seized in the West Africa, it becomes essential to strengthen maritime law enforcement capacities in the region, and this through regular training sessions. Further-

11 For a more practical view of the exercise conducted in Sri Lanka, please visite the following web page: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=--7jfGsB3Do

12 For more information about VBSS trainings, please visit the GMCP annual report: https://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/MCP/GMCP_Annual_Report_2018.pdf

more, given that all security strategies in the Gulf of Guinea is based on the premise that security threats are transnational, then coordination and cooperation are essential to overcome capacity gaps identified in the national levels. Such a VBSS Centre should, if implemented, support the reverse of negative trends and establish common standards for tackling drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea.

Moreover, since GMCP is implementing a series of projects in West and Central Africa, it is possible to confirm that embedding mentors/advisors with public authorities in order to improve capacities in maritime law enforcement is an effective method to enhance criminal responses at sea.

The objectives of this Centre would thus be focused on promoting cooperation in order to enable law enforcement agencies duly mandated by the States Parties or by regional authorities to conduct national and regional water security operations in accordance with international law, as well as on developing individual and collective capacities of States Parties through mutual assistance.

Given the various improvements on capacity building that could be ultimately achieved through the Centre, the coordination of its activities by the Atlantic Centre for defence capacity building would be in line with the maritime security strategy defined in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as well as with the ECOWAS Maritime Security Strategy (EIMS) which intends to enhance security standards in the Gulf of Guinea.

In order to better implement the activities of the Atlantic Centre for defence capacity building, this one could potentially rely either on the Gulf of Guinea States as their counterparts and on their key international and regional partners, such as UNODC, Interpol, ECOWAS and ECCAS. For the venue, Atlantic islands that are key drug transit areas and, therefore, strategic zones for a multilateral action against drug trafficking should be taken into account.

The expected results are:

a. Improved capacity of maritime law enforcement operators with regards to implementation of legal instruments against drug trafficking in the Atlantic waters, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea.
b. Practical understanding of the operations conducted at sea achieved in order to effectively tackle drug trafficking activities.
c. VBSS training center developed and based in one of the strategic islands for ensuring security against drug trafficking at sea.
d. Embedded maritime mentors to develop capacities for the maintenance of assets to be used to interdict drug trafficking at sea.

Defense Capacity Building in the Gulf of Guinea: A Strategic View

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Defense Capacity Building Today

Defense Capacity Building (DCB) is part of a wider concept named Cooperative Security whose function is to establish cooperation and confidence-building mechanisms with other nations in order to enhance common security. More specifically DCB activities aim at providing support, advice and training to other nations in the development of their own security.

There is a recent and very remarkable example in the campaign against ISIS in Iraq where the Iraqi Security Forces have been able to retake their territory from a terrible enemy, thanks to the support and training provided by the forces of the Global Coalition. Obviously, the credit of this success does not rest on DCB activities alone, as they are embedded in a wider military and diplomatic effort.

It is important to note that DCB does normally take place in a context of marginal or complete lack of governance by the receiving state. Sometimes, it will even be necessary to create a safe and secured environment (SASE) before DCB can actually take place.

In general terms and even though DCB plays an important role in the current global security context, it requires a safe and secure environment, a high degree of appropriation by the beneficiary state and even under the best possible conditions, DCB it is only part of the solution.

The role of DCB in the context of Maritime Security

All said fully applies to DCB activities in the maritime domain although some additional prerequisites exist. Indeed, in order to support a nation in providing for its own maritime security it is necessary to create safe and secure environment inland, which in turn demands additional military operations and DCB activities on the terrain.

The threat of piracy in the horn of Africa is probably a good case in point. When operation "Atalanta" started in 2008, Somalia was a failing state and the only possibility to defend the merchant traffic was through a UNSC Resolution to allow international operations into Somali Territorial Waters.

A few years later, the EU launched two DCB missions inland: EUTM Somalia (2010) and EUCAP Nestor (2012) that later on (2016) became EUCAP Somalia. The mission

of EUCAP Somalia is to contribute to the establishment and capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia.

It´s been almost ten years and yet conditions are not met for Somalia to provide for its own maritime security forcing the international community to remain in the area to avoid the re-emergence of the attacks.

When a riparian state can´t provide for its own maritime security that is to a greater or lesser extent due to the lack of national governance. Under exceptional conditions, it may translate in the need for the United Nations resolutions, extra DCB efforts on the territory and a great deal of strategic patience to achieve tangible results.

The particular case of the Gulf of Guinea

We have seen that DCB is an excellent tool to help one state create its own security capabilities yet it is but part of a wider effort that is normally accompanied by many long-term difficulties, especially in the maritime domain.

In this regard, it is difficult to find an area more complex than the Gulf of Guinea in terms of maritime security. The Gulf of Guinea is formed of 19 riparian states of a varying degree of self-governance that share a weak security situation on the territory and as a result, at sea. Furthermore, the situation in the Gulf of Guinea is to some extent connected to that of the Sahel, one the most complicated regions in the world in terms of security.

As a result, the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is increasingly weak as the increased number of arm robbery and piracy related events over the years show. Yet the governance in these countries albeit inefficient, weak and in many cases corrupted is far from being that of a failed state. This reality makes local appropriation a must. In fact, every effort has to be made to avoid international presence being perceived as a new form of colonialism. In this context, strategic patience plays a very important role and no one can expect problems can be resolved in the short term.

The good news is that African authorities, particularly those in the Gulf of Guinea are aware of the situation and have developed different political initiatives to cope with it. The African Union presented in 2014 the so-called "2050 Africa´s Integrated Maritime Strategy" (2050 AIM Strategy) while the Gulf of Guinea riparian states have come up with the "Yaoundé Architecture", which at least in theory tries to set the foundations of a comprehensive and professional solution for maritime security in the region.

These countries are not alone in their attempts as these initiatives enjoy the support from behind of different nations and international organizations. The European Union launched in 2014 its Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea and has invested over 150 M€ during the last few years in cross-sectorial efforts. The G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea concentrates the work of a number of nations that are especially committed in support of maritime security in the region, as well. Individual nations like France or the United States invest a great deal of human and material resources also, especially in the field of DCB by means of exercises like the "African Nemo" and the "Obangame Express" series, respectively.

Denmark, Portugal and Spain are other important actors in the Gulf of Guinea.

Regardless of all this important effort, incidents at sea continue to increase and the efficiency of the whole maritime security structure in the region has clear room for improvement. Most of the attacks happen within territorial waters of the riparian states limiting international action to an eventual support to the local authorities based on demand and appropriation principles. Here is where DCB has an important role to play.

DCB in the Gulf of Guinea

As we have seen already, DCB is an important tool in the current strategic context and it is definitely so in the Gulf of Guinea. At the same time, it requires a great deal of patience and diplomatic skills to avoid misperceptions from the local authorities.

But how can maritime DCB be organized in such a large area shared by 19 riparian states along 6.000 km of coast? How can we fit DCB in the complex structure of international efforts in the region? How can we develop an efficient maritime security system while respecting the local appropriation by the riparian states?

May be the first part of the answer is clear enough: "not overnight".

Achieving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is a long-term mission that will take years of continuous efforts in the fields of diplomacy, investment and support operations.

The only thing we can do to be more efficient and less time consuming is to increase our capacity to work together. Indeed, as we have seen already there is a myriad of international actors in the region and their efforts need to be harmonized.

The objective of improving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and eliminate the threat to normal and licit activities is a difficult one and no efforts should be spared to harmonize the different interests of the parties involved and to coordinate DCB activities to achieve the maximum possible output. Avoiding the current dispersion of initiatives is paramount at this stage.

This will also take a while. Every nation and international organization is in the Gulf of Guinea to defend their own interests in the region but competition is not an option. At the same time, we must concentrate our individual efforts there where they are mostly needed and at the same time more efficient.

DCB activities must be programmed where they are likely to be more welcomed by local authorities and where they can provide more added value. The levels of national commitment, corruption, availability of naval assets and the maritime security situation in each of the candidate riparian states should be carefully weighted before committing into DCB activities, in order to assure the best cost-benefit.

While doing so, it is highly desirable to reduce the dispersion of international efforts trying to merge them into unified ventures. The recent Coordinated Maritime Presences concept within the European Union offers a possibility in this regard.

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Cote D'Ivoire Navy

Côte D'Ivoire has host the Regional Maritime Security Center of West Africa (CRESMAO) since May 19th, 2015. This regional structure is integral part of the implementation of the Yaounde Architecture, which come from different solutions offered by the States in June 2013 in Yaounde to address the increase of illegal activities committed in Gulf of Guinea's maritime area. Nowadays, those activities represent around 40% of all maritime incidents reported in the world during 2018 according to the international Maritime Bureau.

The implementation of all these complex mechanisms adopted in the Yaounde Process, two regional centers (CRESMAO and CRESMAC) and several Maritime Zone Centers – CMMCs zones A, D, E, F et G – is lasting longer than expected both at the operational level and the logistic level, despite the support of international partners (France, USA, EU, etc.).

This support given on some phases of the engagement spectrum and decisional process is characterized by the reinforcement of national capabilities through trainings and exercises (Obangame, Nemo), the creation of regional centers (VTMS UK-Accra) and the support to national maritime coordination and operations centers. In this environment, with a balance between the consolidation of the architecture's achievements and the implementation of new initiatives, what could be the positive input of another center focused on the reinforcement of defense capabilities in Atlantic?

This Atlantic Center for the reinforcement of capabilities can play a major role in the prior-decision step both at the strategic and tactic level. So, it will be an efficient awareness and analysis tool for national maritime operations, and at maturity of the interoperability of Yaounde maritime security architecture, be a Gulf of Guinea's maritime domain awareness and anticipation tool.

A deep analysis of security threats, affixed to the challenges faced by the actors in the region in maritime operations' continuum, is fundamental to better understand the positioning of the Atlantic Center as an integral part of the solutions to enhance the security in the region.

I. Security challenges

The cartography of security problems in the Gulf of Guinea could only be elaborated by a threats' synthetic analysis affixed to the essential challenges related to its maritime area.

1. The threats

In general, Gulf of Guinea faces several maritime security threats. The most occurrent is the scourge of piracy and armed robbery. This scourge which causes the regional and international' reaction on maritime security costed more than 818 million dollars to

West Africa in 2017 only, estimated Oceans Beyond Piracy. For example, in November 2019 during NEMO exercise, two piracy attacks occurred respectively off the coast of Cotonou (Benin) and Lomé (Togo), with a total of 13 crewmembers kidnapped.

Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported fishing (IUU fishing) is another major issue off the west coast of Africa. A report published in 2014 by Africa Progress Panel estimates that West Africa could lose up to 1,3 billion USD per year due to IUU fishing. Particularly in Cote D'Ivoire, this threat represents more than 80% of the Navy's operations with up to two hundred and fifty (250) arrested vessels in five years.

Added to this is the problematic called "fishing related crimes". Indeed, the region is known to be a key zone for drug trafficking, illegal bunkering and human trafficking. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) noticed that many Gulf of Guinea's countries are key points of passage for cocaine trade between Latin America and Europe.

However, in the research of solutions to address these threats, regional actors face many major challenges.

2. Current constraints

In the implementation mechanisms, the challenges faced by the regional actors are inherent to the maritime operations continuum.

First, in the preparation phase the states suffer from the weakness of the institutional framework, characterized by the plurality of maritime stakeholders and the absence of national strategies. This situation worsens by the lack of information gathering and coordination capabilities.

At the operational level, in the intervention phase the navies are facing a lack of assets, mostly offshore intervention capabilities.

Then, in the follow-up operations' legal continuity, the states both individually and together, show weaknesses in the legal framework and lack harmonized legal standards and practices. The lack of harmonization or legal compatibilities going from one state to another and also the slowness in the relevant international convention's integration in national laws, are an impediment to the management of transnational criminality in the region.

Moreover, disputes related to maritime borders in West Africa are numerous and have a negative impact on interstaterelationship. Those disputes are often obstacles to Memorandum of Understanding's signature, bilaterally or multilaterally, mostly in the implementation of hot pursuit.

Finally, another weakness of the regional security's plan is the absence of a center dedicated to analysis and prospective which could help anticipate threats and challenges inherent to the region in a proactive manner. Very often, local navies are rather reactive than preventive when addressing the threats.

II. Proposed solutions

1. The support of partners to the adopted solutions

The maritime security architecture of Gulf of Guinea is comparable to a chain formed by links which are not all hardened. In fact, in the engagement spectrum, some phases are addressed and taken into account by either the states or the international partners, regarding the capabilities of different actors of the architecture.

Therefore, in the first link of the chain during the preparation phase, the coordination and mission control of maritime operations are addressed by the creation of national and multinational maritime operations centers. The capacity building of these centers (equipment and training) is effective for some states through a partners' support. In this same phase, the problematic of training is taken into account with the deployment of experts and the organization of major naval exercises like OBANGAME and NEMO. Finally, the procurement of naval assets is often made of cessions or donations by foreign partners.

The second link, related to intervention and maritime law enforcement, is made by joint operations like Operation Junction Rain, organized with the participation of Gulf of Guinea region's states and an air surveillance support at sea.

Finally, the last link, which is legal, is also enhanced by the training of legal actors with the help of UNODC.

Contrariwise, three maritime domain's aspects are not supported by partners and represent emergencies in the consolidation of all the chain's links. In fact, the anticipation in maritime situation awareness, the threat analysis and the availability of statistics for research are ways to explore for the Atlantic Center focused on the enhancement of defense capabilities.

2. The positioning of the Atlantic Center

Gulf of Guinea's states should give priority to maritime domain awareness in their national security policies. For this purpose, the NGAS Portugal offers a huge support to Abidjan MOC through maritime information sharing.

Contrariwise, a cooperation in research is paramount to enhance maritime security in the region. The real impact is, on the first hand to anticipate probable security developments in the Gulf of Guinea in the upcoming five to ten years in order to implement efficient tactic counter measures. And on the other hand, to conduct a prospective threat analysis in order to find convergence or divergence points in the policy and the implementation of states' national strategies. Finally, the provision of statistics on the availability and the management of marine resources could be an advantage for fund raising like the fishing agreement with the EU.

In any case, this center will lead to strategic restructuration and intensive equipment policy for navies. It could help identifying some future challenges like finance shortage, border disputes and also lack of training and technologies in order to make proactive measures. As soon as West Africa will anticipate those aspects, they will be in a way better position to tackle the threats and the challenges above mentioned.

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University of South Africa

Background

According to the Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, some countries in Africa enjoy a high or medium 'state of peace'. However, most countries in Africa suffer from a low or very low state of peace. Countries around the Gulf of Guinea are considered as 'high' or 'medium' but Nigeria is considered as 'very low', Cameroon, and the Republic of the Congo as 'low'. According to the latest Stable Seas Maritime Security Index the Gulf of Guinea is probably the worlds 'most severe maritime security challenge because of the abundance of natural resources, proximity to violent onshore non-state actors, and limited maritime law enforcement capabilities that leaves countries vulnerable to trans-national violent crimes.

Violent extremism poses a growing threat to countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea, mostly originating in remote parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo and the Sahel countries, contributing to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Collaboration of early warning institutions is important to exchange knowledge on how to prevent the spread of violent extremism in the region[13] in the interest of 'positive peace', meaning 'the presence of the attitudes, institutions, and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.[14]'

Purpose of the presentation

Against this background, the purpose of the presentation is to share my perspective on how a ATLANTIC CENTRE can contribute to the security of Gulf of Guinea countries with specific reference to early warning and situational awareness related to violent extremism.

Scope of the presentation

The brief presentation will address the following:

- The threat of violent extremism in countries of the Gulf of Guinea
- The functioning of a 'Peace Centre'
- Forming collaborative partnerships
- Conclusions and recommendations for practical implementation and conceptualization.

13 Institute for Security Studies. Avalaible at https://issafrica.org/events/preventing-violent-extremism-in-west-africasconseil-de-lentente-states

14 Institute for Economics & Peace. Positive Peace Report, 2017.

The threat of violent extremism in countries of the Gulf of Guinea

People as actors in the socio-economic arena, tend to compete for access to political and cultural power as well as economic resources that can escalate into violent conflicts. Furthermore, there is a current trend in the world (not only Africa) of uprisings against states by groups with specific identities that can escalate into civil-wars, violent interracial, interethnic, inter-clan, inter-religious, or inter-occupational conflict.

According to the 2015 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, we need interventions to address the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, which include reaction to socioeconomic deprivation; unfair discrimination and marginalization; poor governance; human rights violations; a culture of violent conflict; collective grievances; and other psychological factors that became an ideology. Violent extremism became an internationalised peace and security challenge because of its interconnectedness across national borders and natural boundaries affecting all walks of society, governance, cultures, technology, and legal systems. Preventing violent extremism is the ideal end state, but to have early warning is very important towards managing it when it happens.

The 'Peace Centre' concept

An ideal peace centre (it can be renamed something else if deemed appropriate) forms part of a broader peace infrastructure across society, with complementary and within existing government structures. In Africa, it becomes increasingly important to for a Centre to engage with civil society complementary to just government structures.

A sophisticated early warning and situational awareness function is vital in the specific case of where a centre serves a specific security challenge, such as ATLANTIC CENTRE. The principle here is that security solutions are knowledge driven not pre-prescribed. That requires a coherent body of knowledge about the dynamics of peace and security in Africa.

A small but dynamic international relations capability that can take action and respond beyond statist government-to-government diplomacy to participate in peace negotiations and to mediate in specific conflicts can ensure early warning and stem the escalation of violent conflict.

Educational interventions in fragile and post-conflict states by a Centre to reduce the participation of especially young people in violent extremism is essential for long-term peace. Such interventions departs from in-depth research to ensure the desired impact.

The unique body of knowledge that accumulates in the centre will be ideal to drive defence capacity-building programs of not only the Gulf of Guinea countries, but also the defence forces and security services of other participating countries.

A collaborative network aimed at peace and security in Africa will ideally include an alert facility and early warning capacity, teaching and learning (including public education), research, and intervention capabilities such as a mediation network to implement solutions to violent conflict involving African dispute resolution specialists.

Forming Collaborative Partnerships

The Centre should maintain national, Africa-continental and global connections. Collaborating with the African Peace and Security Architecture is essential for actionable outcomes. Formal connection on one collaborative platform with especially the early warning capacities of regional initiatives is important: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS);the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC); the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon; the Regional Centre for Maritime Security of West Africa (CRESMAO) in Abidjan, Ivory Coast; and the Regional Centre for Maritime Security of Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe Noire, Congo. For situational awareness, collaboration with relevant think tanks and academic institutions is required.

It is important to recognise the limitations of these partners, especially dependence on external funding, limited implantation capacity, absence of political will, challenges of relationships between states, and participating governments who perpetuates violent extremism as part of undemocratic governance.

In this way, ATLANTIC CENTRE can also contribute to the renewal of peace architecture for Africa to violent conflict – and not just provide for 'resolutions'. Civil society in collaboration with global knowledge holders such as ATLANTIC CENTRE can play a vital role for developing such an architecture together with strategic partners in Africa and the rest of the world, including in terms of capacity building through education, training and human development.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The main argument of this presentation is that a centre such as ATLANTIC CENTRE is a vital instrument for the management of peace and security in Africa. Through a collaborative network of participating partners and an inherent capacity to ensure situational awareness and through ongoing intelligence gathering and research for early warning, teaching and capacity building training and engagement with societies in conflict, ATLANTIC CENTRE can play an important role in the combatting of violent extremism in Africa.

The ATLANTIC CENTRE initiative should aim at the mustering of the intellectual capital of Africa, focus on lessons learned from lived experiences and not only what is visible but systematically investigate into what hides in the 'forest' of the security landscape. It enables the involvement of communities-of-practice as cornerstones of peace and security in Africa. This requires a long-term commitment to end violence in Africa not just time-bound projects and programs that are not sustainable.

From a conceptual perspective, it is recommended that ATLANTIC CENTRE pursue a tailor-made design to address the specific challenge and not slavishly follow existing models that does not always function well in all circumstances. However, ATLANTIC CENTRE must ensure that it can seamlessly link to other centres, academic institutions and even the court system in different countries, in locations with different technological and human capacities.

Sustained financial support will always be a challenge, which requires an integration of funding from different sources, complementing funding from sources such as the EU. In this regard, the 'African narrative' should be clearly visible to ensure credibility and legitimacy from an African perspective. In this way, ATLANTIC CENTRE may become influential in policy debates on peace and security in Africa and make it easier for national leaderships in African countries to buy into the activities of the Centre.

From a practical implementation perspective, I see that this centre will develop doctrine that is appropriate to the situation in GoG. While it is important to tap into the lessons learned in other contexts, every context has its own unique challenges. Moreover, SEDA should collaborate with academic scholars to strengthen rigorous evidence-based scholarship on how to deal with violent extremism in Africa.

Richard Young
European External Action Service (EEAS)

Introduction

This note has as its main purpose to outline the main challenges with maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and the EU's strategic response. It then outlines some elements that could be taken forward in responding to the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.

The Issues – challenges and opportunities

There are many ways of looking at the challenges and opportunities that exist in the area of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The main challenges cover piracy and armed robbery at sea; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; pollution and dumping of waste at sea; and smuggling and trafficking in all its kinds such as people, arms, and drugs. Against these challenges are the opportunities of what is the "Blue Economy", where there is much potential for developing the different marine-based and marine--related activities.

If we focus on the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea, the evolution of the actual and attempted incidents (see Annex 1) presents a picture of some concern. The figures are much disputed, because of the widespread sentiment that there is large under-reporting. But if we focus on the numbers prepared by the International Maritime Bureau, based on reports by the shipping industry the overall trends are clear. The number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea has fluctuated between 2014 and 2017, and then in 2018 there was a sharp rise in incidents, of around 80% in one year. If current trends continue there should not be much change over 2019 compared to 2018. This rise in numbers can also be seen in the percentages, with the Gulf of Guinea accounting for over 90% of all incidents in African and between 40-45% of incidents in the world-wide. At the same time kidnap cases in the Gulf of Guinea increased by nearly 30% from 65 cases in 2017 to 83 cases in 2019.

If we look at IUU fishing the picture is less clear. There are estimates by the FAO that IUU fishing amounts to 11-26 tonnes for fish each year, worth around USD 10-23 billion. The Gulf of Guinea has rich and abundant fishing grounds, and overfishing is said to be posing a serious threat to fish stocks and risk of collapse of the fishing industry. Annual fish production is estimated to be about 3.2 million tonnes, of which 70-80% comes from small scale fisheries. There are also a number of important ports in West Africa (Tema, Abidjan and Dakar), where EU vessels land fish, and from which fisheries products are exported directly to the EU, and these states also process and export their own products, leading the EU to exercise vigilance in issuing catch certificates.

Information on pollution and dumping of waste is less widely available, but the concerns especially related to oil pollution are widespread. The UNODC reports that trafficking and smuggling (drugs, humans, arms), with related money-laundering, also

continues to grow across porous land and sea borders, taking advantage of continuing insecurity notably in the Sahel, and in other countries. Sophisticated and highly adaptable criminal networks are firmly entrenched across the region. In addition, in the background is the general instability that currently exists across the Sahel region for which there is a risk they could spread to the coastal states.

How to respond – the Yaoundé Architecture

For the countries of the Gulf of Guinea the strategic response is reflected in a number of key documents, most noticeably: The 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy – so called 2050 AIM Strategy; the African Union's Lomé Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development; and ECOWAS's Integrated Maritime Strategy. But perhaps the most important document is the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and its architecture agreed by twenty four (24) Gulf of Guinea States, June 2013.

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct foresees and Architecture of four levels consisting of (i) an Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC); (ii) two regional organisations – CRESMAO and CRESMAC; (iii) five Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCC); and (iv) country-level Maritime Operations Centres (MOC) (see Annex 2). This Architecture has both long-term and short-term objectives, and in support the international community has put in place the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++FOGG), which meets at least once a year to deliberate on the work that is on-going.

At a strategic level the European Union's response is governed by The Global Strategy[15] and the Integrated Approach[16]. These documents provide some guiding principles for addressing security issues, with an emphasis on ensuring that all aspects are addressed in a multi-dimensional manner (political, economic, development, security); multi-phased (different stages of a conflict cycle, for example); multi-level (addressing different levels or spheres of government, from central, regional, to local); and multi-lateral (addressing the issues in cooperation with others). In the application of these principle, the EU has its EU Maritime Security Strategy, and the EU's Gulf of Guinea Strategy, and its accompanying Action Plan.

The Gulf of Guinea Strategy and its action plan[17] aims at promoting the sustainable development of West and Central African coastal states economies by promoting a well-governed safe and secure maritime sector. To meet this overall objective, four objectives, fourteen expected results, and sixtyseven actions are identified. The four objectives cover: (i) an improved common understanding of the scole of the threat and the need to address it among the countries of the region; (ii) reinforced multi-agency institutions at the regional and national levels; (iii) more prosperous and resilient economies and coastal communities; and (iv) strengthened cooperation structures with the region and amongst EU Member States and international partners.

15 A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, 16 June 2016
16 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, 22 January 2018
17 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, 22 January 2018

Practical support from the EU to the Gulf of Guinea Strategy and Action Plan is organised around a number of programmes, most noticeably through six main on-going projects: (i) SWAIMS: Support to West Africa Gulf of Guinea Integrated Maritime Security of €29m with its focus on legal aspects and operational capacities; (ii) PASSMAR: Programme d'Appui a la Strategie de Surete et Securite Maritimes en Afrique Centrale of €10 with its focus on legal aspects and governance; (iii) GOGIN: Gulf of Guinea Inter-regional Network), €7.5m with its focus on information systems and information sharing; (iv) SEACOP: Seaport Cooperation Project of €6m, with its focus on fighting illicit trafficking and associated criminal networks; (v) WeCAPS: Western and Central Africa Port Security of €8.5m aimed at increasing port security and meeting international standards; and (vi) PESCAO: Fight against illicit, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) of €15.5m, to improve regional fisheries governance through better coordination of national fisheries projects. In addition, support is provided through the Copernicus programme which provides satellite imagery for some training operations.

In addition, the EU has established a cooperation mechanism with third countries to fight illegal fishing. The objective of such cooperation is to ascertain that countries have in place national arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of the applicable laws, regulations and conservation and management measures; to ensure that all abide to their international obligations and therefore establish a level playing field. In line with EU regulations[18] the EU has a process from pre-identification (yellow card), to identification (red card), to listing, and then delisting, to address the issues of third countries having problems fulfilling international rules.

Elements of a way forward

There is much discussion about whether the Yaoundé Architecture, the associated strategies respond effectively to the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. On the one hand there are critiques (most frequently from the shipping industry) that the Yaoundé Architecture does not respond to their pressing operational needs of security for shipping and their crews. On the other hand, there are critiques that more needs to be done to address issues such as legal harmonisation; and ending impunity for maritime crimes through capacity building for investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. One way of interpreting the different messages is that they focus on different objectives and different interests. The shipping industry focuses on short-term interests; those interested in the Blue Economy are focused on the long-term. The challenge is to develop an approach that addresses these different objectives and interests in a coherent manner.

Given the divergent views, at the recent G7++ FOGG meeting, in early November 2019, it was proposed that a review of the Yaoundé Architecture should be carried out with the aim of more clearly identifying the different responsibilities of the different organisations in the Architecture. In this way the personnel, resource requirements, and

18 EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, March 2014; EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020, March 2015 4 Council Regulation No 1005/2008, 29 September 2008

training needs might be more easily identified. It is expected that these matters might be taken forward by the next chair of the G7++FOGG.

On the specific concerns of the shipping industry, matters are being addressed by the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GOG) system, set up in June 2016, which is designed to play its part in ensuring coherent maritime situational awareness, thereby contributing to safety and security of the mariner in the regional maritime domain. Hand in hand with this information system, the EU at its Informal Meeting of EU Defence Ministers, Helsinki, August 2019, discussed the "Coordinated Maritime Presences" concept [19] as "an instrument to better coordinate Member States' naval presence in a certain specific area." It has been suggested that this could start from the Gulf of Guinea. But it is still relatively early days, since discussions are still on-going on how this concept might be applied in practice.

One key aspect of the work on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea will be the development of training and capacity-building. Much of the training in the Gulf of Guinea to address the objectives of the security strategy appears to take place through EU financed projects. In addition, training is conducted through naval exercises, such as the Grand African NEMO organised by the French Navy. There may be scope for working with EU institutions in carrying out training work, and in this respect the work of the EU's European Security and Defence College (ESDC) could be instructive. The ESDC is of particular interest since it works through a network of around 140 different European institutions to provide training courses, and has developed a distinctive methodology for identifying training needs, the training gap, design of courses, and the delivery of course, followed by evaluation. Certainly, the Atlantic Defence Capacity Building Centre could explore its approach to training with the ESDC.

Conclusion

The Gulf of Guinea presents particular challenges in terms of maritime security in the widest sense. The key response is organised around the Yaoundé Architecture. But to make this work effectively it is suggested that it is timely to carry out a review; complement with additional information systems along with exploring the role of EU coordinated maritime presences, as well as initiating cooperation with EU institutions working on training and capacity building.

19 Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the Informal Meeting of EU Defence Ministers, 29th August 2019

ANNEX 1

Actual and Attempted Incidents by location, 2014-2019

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Jun-19
Angola	1		2	1		
Benin			1		5	1
Cameroon	1	1			7	1
DRC	1	3	2		1	1
Eq Guinea						2
ST&P	1			1		3
Gabon	1					
Ghana	4	2	3	1	10	
Guinea		3	3	2	3	1
Cote D'Ivoire	3	1	1	1	1	1
Liberia	1	2				1
Nigeria	18	14	36	33	48	21
Sengal				1		
Sierra Leone	1			4		
Congo	7	5	6	1	6	
Togo	2		1		1	3
TOTAL	**41**	**31**	**55**	**45**	**82**	**35**
Gulf of Aden	4		1	3	1	
Kenya		2	2	1		
Mozambique	1	1	1	2	2	1
Red Sea	4			1		
Somalia	3		1	5	2	
South Africa			1			
Tanzania	1					
TOTAL	13	3	6	12	5	1
GRAND TOTAL AFRICA	**54**	**34**	**61**	**57**	**87**	**36**
REST OF WORLD	**191**	**212**	**130**	**123**	**114**	**42**
TOTAL END YEAR (ex 2019)	**245**	**246**	**191**	**180**	**201**	**78**
GoG share of Africa	75.9%	91.2%	90.2%	78.9%	94.3%	97.2%
GoG share of World	16.7%	12.6%	28.8%	25.0%	40.8%	44.9%
GoG year on year change		-24.4%	77.4%	-18.2%	82.2%	na

Source: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, International Maritime Bureau (various reports)

ANNEX 2
The Yaounde Architecture

Conclusions

The excellent quality of the speakers in both workshops of this one-day seminar dedicated to thinking the future Atlantic Centre triggered a dynamic, open discussion among all participants, decisively contributing to the fulfilment of its goals, and to getting this "Centre of ours" on the verge of success.

The objectives of this seminar were fully achieved: enhance the common understanding of challenges across the Atlantic; consolidate the conceptual basis of the Centre, by gathering inputs from experts and policy makers from a wide range of Atlantic countries, universities and organizations with mandates related to security and defence; and identify the first initiatives that could contribute to ehancing regional secueity in the Atlantic.

One of the core ideas put forward by the organisers and fully endorsed by all participants was that there is only one Atlantic. This is our common ocean and experts revealed a wide consensus on an Atlantic, from the Sea of Labrador to Cape Town and from the Strait of Magellan to the Sea of Norway, which the Atlantic for the Centre could work on. However, the specificities of the South Atlantic were also referred to, and some participants suggested that an Artic dimension may be needed if an encompassing view of Atlantic security is to be developed. Although this would enlarge the areas of action of the Centre, pontentially diluting its purpose, there seemed to be some consensus on the need to discuss these and other matters openly and frankly, and the importance of identifying some areas of shared concern and positive cooperation.

Having this balance in mind, for the Centre's future success, it is imperative to avoid unnecessary duplication with existing entities from the UN, NATO, EU, AU, ZOPACAS and CPLP among others. Some degree of overlap is inevitable, but it is important to identify niches were the Atlantic Centre can bring specific added value.

Among the activities that were identified as potentially contributing to the consolidation of the Centre's contribution to Atlantic security, reference was made to research and political dialogue. The Centre could benefit from the commitment by research fellows, designated and funded by participant States each year, as well as a regular, yearly Atlantic Security Fora, in order to help identify new shared concerns and areas of future cooperation, and help to test the willingness of Atlantic states to actively contribute to their envolvement in the Atlantic Centre.

The pressing common challenges identified that unite this Atlantic community are:

- Climate change;
- Technological change;
- Natural resources, living, mineral and energy resources;
- Terrorism and piracy
- Transnational criminality and illegal trafficking;
- Migrations.

A balance between the identified and potential threats in this broad area, on the one hand, and the opportunities it presents, on the other, were highlighted by participants. The Centre should address both ends of this spectrum. The threat of Climate Change, the increasing number of natural disasters together with the sustainability of natural resources pose major threats to communities across the Atlantic, mainly in coastal areas, requiring that we pay special attention to human security challenges. Any response by the Centre will need to have an echo in community lives across the Atlantic for the Centre to be successful.

But the Atlantic should also be perceived as an engine of growth, an open ocean, with the Centre promoting activities that foster engagement with states, communities, and private actors invested in this goal.

The Azores were identified as an excellent location. It stands on a unique place for Atmospheric and Oceanic research. It is also a unique place to build bridges from North to South, East to West.

Our goal for this Atlantic community is to create a system that allows to survey the Atlantic, collect data, and share information that could help communities and societies to better cope with threats and potentiate its resources and capabilities in a sustainable and fair way. Thinking and building long term strategies for the benefit, development, and security of all Atlantic coastal states should therefore be integrated into the Centre's main goals.

Doing so will change our relationship with the ocean.

The Centre, which several participants suggested could be renamed as the Atlantic Centre, due to the concerns raised by the word "Defence", is to be a trusted entity for all partners, dedicated to capacity building sustained in three tears:

- A research unit, focusing on knowledge production, strategy development, and policy definition;
- A platform or forum for a wider, more inclusive regular political discussion of the security challenges in the Atlantic;
- A facility for capacity-building on education and mentoring.

The Atlantic Centre needs to think holistically about defence, security, safety and development. It must take into consideration both civil and military cooperation, the public and private sectors, bringing into the equation the relevant international organizations and NGOs.

The Atlantic Centre is a Portuguese initiative, but it does not wish to remain a Portuguese national centre. It aims to be, from the very beginning, a multinational centre. Portugal is an Atlantic country and it has its own vision for the Atlantic. But our greatest ambition regarding the Atlantic Centre is to act as a facilitator of fruitful dialogue leading to significant security cooperation and defence capacity building. We believe that being an active partner, working amid other partners, is the best way to fulfil our responsibility as a security provider in the Atlantic.

An initial area of interest will be the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) to debut the Atlantic Centre's activities, focusing on some of the following ideas:

- An early warning, situational awareness, and information exchange system that tackles violent extremism, terrorism, and criminality;
- Engagement of civil society, local, and regional organizations, taking into consideration the complexity of all the organizations present in the GoG;
- Promote inter-agency deconflict and convergence;
- Centred in the maritime security in a land sea continuous;
- Address the regional needs of living resources conservation, enhancing the fight against illegal, unreported fisheries;
- Capability edification, resources interoperability and a pool of well-trained resources.
- Harmonizing doctrines

Defence Capacity Building is very important, but special attention must be given to long-term sustainability, ownership and self-responsibility of sovereign states. A relevant example of success is the capacitation of the São Tomé e Príncipe Coast Guard, through the long-lasting deployment of a Portuguese patrol boat, operating in its territorial waters and EEZ with mixt garrison. It should be looked as a new model of cooperation.

The seminar established the first community of interest of the Atlantic Centre and it is important to sustain and further enlarge it in the following months, leading up to first training event in Azores, which will take place in the first semester of 2020.[20]

At the end of the day, our only purpose is to contribute to keeping the Atlantic a space of peace, freedom and prosperity in an increasingly unstable world.

20 Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the training session has been postponed.

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A publicação deste IDN Cadernos, dedicado ao 1.º Seminário do *Atlantic Centre for Defence Capacity Building*, visa tornar públicos os valiosos contributos recolhidos durante este evento que reuniu, em Lisboa, cerca de três dezenas de peritos em questões atlânticas. Coloca também no debate público a visão do governo português, e do Ministério da Defesa Nacional em particular, sobre a génese deste futuro Centro Atlântico, cuja principal vocação é promover o diálogo entre todos os países ribeirinhos do Atlântico e aprofundar a cooperação em matéria da Defesa, contribuindo assim para garantir que o Atlântico permanece um espaço de paz e cooperação por muitos anos.

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