

III SEMINÁRIO DO CENTRO DO ATLÂNTICO

Bashir Yusuf Jamoh, Frank Mattheis, Nuno Sardinha Monteiro, Andreas Østhagen, José Joaquim Gomes Filho, Alexander Shaheen, Kirsty McLean, Carmen Gaudêncio, Ana Santos Pinto, John Karlsrud, Licínia Simão, Patrícia Daehnhardt, Ana Paula Moreira

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Diretora

Helena Carreiras

Editor

Luís Cunha

Núcleo de Edições

António Baranita

Capa

Nuno Fonseca/nfdesign

Propriedade, Edição e Design Gráfico

Instituto da Defesa Nacional

Calçada das Necessidades, 5, 1399-017 Lisboa

Tel.: 21 392 46 00

Fax.: 21 392 46 58

E-mail: idn.publicacoes@defesa.pt

www.idn.gov.pt

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Fax: 219 202 765

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Programme of the Third Seminar of the Atlantic Centre

13h00 | Opening Ceremony

Licinia Simão, Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre
Helena Carreiras, Director of the National Defence Institute
João Gomes Cravinho, Minister of National Defence

13h30 | Keynote Address

Bashir Yusuf Jamoh, Director General/CEO NIMASA

14h45 - 16h45 | Panel I – Best practices in Atlantic multilateral cooperation

Chair: Frank Mattheis, Research Fellow, United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) / Coordinator, Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0.

Rear-Admiral Narciso Fastudo Junior, Executive Director, Interregional Coordination Center

Captain Nuno Sardinha Monteiro, Head of the Navy Staff Planning Division, Portuguese Navy

Andreas Østhagen, Senior Research Fellow, Fridtjof Nansen Institute

José Joaquim Gomes Filho, Brazilian Foreign Ministry

17h00 - 19h00 | Panel II – Informality and variable geometry in multinational cooperation

Chair: Guy Banim, Independent expert on European engagement on preventive diplomacy

Alexander Shaheen, UK Foreign Office

Kirsty McLean, Deputy Director Africa Engagements Division (N52), US Navy

Carmen Gaudêncio, Regional Government of Azores, Portugal

Ana Santos Pinto, Assistant Professor, NOVA University of Lisbon

John Karlsrud, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

19h15 | Closing Ceremony

Licinia Simão, Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre

Patrícia Daehnhardt, Co-coordinator, Reflection Group on the Atlantic, National Defence Institute

Ana Paula Moreira, Deputy Director of the General Directorate for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Concept paper for the Third Seminar of the Atlantic Centre

In the context of the incremental institutionalization of the Atlantic Centre (AC), two seminars took place on November 2019 and October 2020. The organization of a third follow-up event on October 19th, 2021, in partnership with the National Defence Institute (IDN), comes as an opportunity to deepen research lines and reinforce the conceptual grounds to further guide future activities.

This Seminar will bring together, in a hybrid format, experts and policymakers working directly on Atlantic security and defence, with the explicit goal of consolidating the relevance of the Atlantic Centre as an aggregating platform for key discussions concerning the security and stability of the whole of the Atlantic.

The overarching theme of the III AC Seminar is ‘Unpacking the multilateral security ecosystem in the Atlantic’ and aims to reflect on the existing multilateral and multinational initiatives dealing with security across this vast area. It will map established and new cooperation formats, it will identify competing dynamics of overlap, complementarity and cooperation that contribute to generate lasting solutions for common security threats.

Work proceedings will be centred on the discussion of 1) lessons learned from previous information sharing and deconfliction practices between different institutions and initiatives, as well as 2) the added value of informal settings and multinational exercises in the face of ongoing geopolitical dynamics.

In the present international context, a narrative of fragility surrounding multilateral frameworks has taken hold. Multilateralism has become more complex and diversified, warranting added concerns over its overall effectiveness and utility. However, the existing panorama in the Atlantic stands out for providing a direct counterpoint to such a perspective. Amidst a multitude of regional integration projects, codes of conduct, contact groups, informal platforms and international organisations, the preferred format in the region remains the collective in both nature and in scope. Likewise, the multiplication of Multinational Military Exercises (MMEs) is increasingly acknowledged as a valuable opportunity to increase interoperability and codify common behaviour through practice and doctrine.

This outlook presents several challenges in terms of duplication of resources, membership overlaps, and uncoordinated efforts that often compromise original mandates; but it also incites substantive questioning over how to best navigate the available options and reach an effective shared outcome. It is therefore important to make sense of this set of options and explore eventual bridges that can be created amongst one another, while pursuing innovative approaches that best incorporate previous experiences in the field.

In order to properly address this thematic, the first session will concentrate on mapping a set of good practices and lessons learned that have emerged from the intersection and overlap of multilateral entities in the Atlantic.

The second session will then centre on unpacking less visible and more informal venues that might hold considerable potential for this debate, including informal dialogue platforms and multinational exercises. Particular focus will be attributed to Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)-related initiatives.

The seminar will be structured in a round table format, where guests will be invited to briefly present (around 4 min.) their specific contribution to the debate, followed by an exchange of views among all participants under Chatham House rules. We expect contributions to address the relevance of these concerns while highlighting how the Atlantic Centre might contribute to further expand the discussion. We also expect insights on how these issues are currently perceived from distinct geographical points of view within the Atlantic itself. Participation will be possible on-site, at the National Defence Institute, as well as remotely. The Opening and Closing ceremonies will be live streamed on the digital platforms of the Portuguese MoD and the National Defence Institute.

Address by the Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre, Licínia Simão

Dear Minister of National Defence,

Dear Director of the National Defence Institute,

Dear Military Officers, Ambassadors, Distinguished Guests and Participants,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to welcome all of you, who are attending online and here at the National Defence Institute, to this Seminar.

We are very happy to be hosting the third edition of the Atlantic Centre Seminar and we are thrilled to have, once more, the National Defence Institute as our partner.

We are particularly indebted to the speakers, who have accepted our invitation to continue a reflection on the existing multilateral cooperation across the Atlantic. We hope to learn a great deal from your experiences and to identify opportunities for future collaboration.

Among all the speakers allow me special word of thanks to our keynote speaker, Dr. Bashir Jamoh, Director-general of the Nigerian Maritime Safety Agency. Sir, we are delighted to host you and your delegation in Lisbon and to hear from you on the important role NIMASA is playing in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Today's seminar is dedicated to mapping and understanding better some of the most relevant multilateral cooperation formats in the Atlantic or adjacent regions. Particularly those with an impact on security and defence. The Atlantic is a diverse region, marked by important differences in the level of institutionalisation, but with dense patterns of interaction that require our attention. The Atlantic Centre is a new initiative and will certainly benefit from the lessons learned by its partners, in its ambition to support a truly whole of Atlantic view of security.

A final word of appreciation to the team at the Ministry of Defence that made this seminar possible. You did an amazing work.

I wish you all a fruitful day of discussions.

Address by the Director of the National Defence Institute, Helena Carreiras

Prof. João Gomes Cravinho, Minister of National Defence

Dr. Bashir Yusuf Jamoh, Director General and CEO of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency

Prof. Licínia Simão, Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre

Distinguished ambassadors and guests

Good afternoon,

Let me first start by expressing my utmost joy in welcoming you all to the National Defence Institute (IDN). To be able to organize an event of this size and magnitude with a live audience is a testament to how far we have arrived since nearly a year and a half ago. At the same time, we have taken good notice of the possibilities that remote technologies allow us in these occasions, hence the reason why this opening ceremony and other parts of the event are or will be livestreamed through our YouTube channel, thus reaching an audience that otherwise we would not be able to include over the course of this afternoon.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Atlantic Centre has gathered considerable momentum over the last year and a half, with the development of new ideas and the multiplication of joint activities taking place in a parallel track. This comes as clear demonstration of the collective demand and political will to move forward with such valuable initiative, while at the same time encouraging us to press onwards, by delineating in clearer terms where the Atlantic Centre should focus its efforts and attention, and what it should eventually become from an institutional point of view.

In this context, the partnership with IDN has been met with a quick pace of its own and has generated very concrete outputs for the execution of this agenda. For instance, the annual Atlantic Centre Seminar, the third of which takes place today, has already become a regular fixture at IDN for discussions over the topics that concerns us the most as well as over the bridges that are more easily in reach, when attempting to promote new venues for dialogue and contacts across the ocean.

IDN has also assisted with the creation of the first ever online repository of publications exclusively focused on the Atlantic, while making available open access the proceedings from previous seminars. Only by pursuing further openness in the content and knowledge that we generate in our daily work can we live up to the mandate of reaching the four corners of this broad region and encompass all in equal measure. Hence why we have recently created the Atlantic Security Awards, in partnership with the Luso-American Foundation (FLAD), which will allow the Atlantic Centre and IDN to further develop its in-house capabilities, to conduct research on security-related issues and to promote policy-oriented contributions for our academic community and decision-makers alike.

But every effort towards more dialogue and reflection invariably requires a minimum of shared capacity in order to become truly effective. In that sense, last May, IDN helped to design and implement the first ever Course on Maritime Security of the Atlantic Centre, which took place in the Azores. We will be sure to repeat this experience come next Spring, with a course thematically focused on linkages between Human Security and the maritime domain and we expect to garner a similar level of engagement and interest from every participating country.

Today, however, we are called upon to explore what makes us come together, as different countries from different parts of the Atlantic, often under different banners, different formats and different varying geometries. As Prof. Licinia Simão just alluded to, the multilateral dimension stands out as a natural area for debate if the goal is set on seeking out key lessons learned that could be heeded in years ahead or incorporated in the constitutive fabric of original projects such as the Atlantic Centre itself. In that sense, this seminar could not have come in better opportunity to provide us with necessary input and clarity on the matter.

I wish you all a very productive afternoon and I look forward to accompanying the coming developments of the Atlantic Centre with great enthusiasm.

Thank you.

Address by His Excellency the Minister of National Defence of Portugal, João Gomes Cravinho

Professor Helena Carreiras, Director of the National Defence Institute,

Dr. Jamoh, CEO of NIMASA,

Professor Licínia Simão, Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre

Ambassadors, Excellencies, Illustrious Guests and Participants,

Ladies and Gentlemen, present here in the auditorium and online,

The Atlantic Centre is a very young institution, but the annual seminar is becoming the milestone event in the development of this initiative. Despite the difficulties posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, which, we are very aware, is still affecting many across the Atlantic region and elsewhere, we have been able to gather experts, partners and friends of the Atlantic Centre to discuss the relevance of reinforcing cooperative formats that bring together Atlantic states and communities.

The two previous editions of the Seminar were instrumental to the development of the Atlantic Centre. I recall the first seminar, in 2019, when we gathered around 30 experts, here at the Institute of National Defence, to help us shape the future Atlantic Centre to the needs of different partners, meeting the demands for more dialogue, more knowledge and more capacity-building. The Gulf of Guinea was one of the central topics that we addressed and it has since remained prominent on our agenda.

One year later, fully into the Covid-19 pandemic, we adapted through a hybrid event – much like the one we are having now – to continue this discussion. We dealt with crisis management in the Atlantic, exploring lessons learned and operational responses, with a focus on space-based technologies. More than 20 experts, policy-makers and operational experts from different sectors, civilian and military, and from different nationalities joined the very fruitful debates.

The 2021 third edition marks the closing of a cycle for this annual seminar. Much like in the previous years, we have maintained a restricted format for the more substantive panels, under Chatham House rules. Although we have a large audience in this room and following us online, we all understand the benefits of speaking freely, without attribution. This model has allowed the Atlantic Centre to benefit from frank discussions and ideas and I am certain that this will continue to be the case once more today. The natural drawback is that we lose some access in terms of the outreach to the Atlantic societies that have also come to express a growing interest in this initiative.

Our expectation is therefore that next year's event will fully benefit from a more secure global health environment, thus allowing us to gather more speakers in Lisbon, and to become fully public, turning the Atlantic Centre outwards and establishing this Seminar as a regular milestone event on Atlantic Security.

This logic is further reinforced as we enter a new stage in the Atlantic Centre. We are currently a group of 19 countries that have signed a political declaration stating our commitment to the principles guiding this initiative and to its development. We have been encouraged by the accession of new members, the most recent of which was Cameroon, and we are delighted to welcome the Cameroonian delegation to this seminar. And we are encouraged by the growing interest the Atlantic Centre is gathering, not only in the Ministries of Defence of these Atlantic partners, but also in other areas of government, namely the Foreign Ministries and across societies.

As well as the delegations, today we also have the pleasure of hosting several ambassadors, thank you for joining us. And we have recently announced the creation of two annual research awards in a partnership between the Atlantic Centre, the National Defence Institute and the Luso-American Foundation, whose sponsorship we truly appreciate. We are also advancing our collaboration with SafeSeas, from Denmark, and working to deepen our research capacity and partnerships with research centres and universities in the three Atlantic continents for the development of a report on Atlantic Security and great power competition.

We will continue our training and capacity-building activities, organizing the second edition of the Course on Maritime Security, in the Azores, next May. We look forward to the Portuguese Air Force hosting us once more at Lajes Airbase and, together with the Regional Government of Azores, receiving a new group of trainees to address the nexus between “Maritime Security and Human Security”. I am certain the good collaboration of the Joint Defence Staff of the Armed Forces will once more reinforce the practical and hands-on approach of these trainings, as well as with the Office for Equality of the Ministry of Defence, by ensuring the inclusion in this exercise of an important dimension on gender equality.

Several other training opportunities are being developed, including in the Space domain given its the importance in monitoring and securing the vast Atlantic area. But maritime governance and support for the Yaoundé Architecture remain, in our view, two main priorities for many in the Atlantic, including Portugal. This is why capacity-building initiatives will focus on this area, contributing to reinforce state sovereignty at sea, regional coordination and contributing to greater mutual knowledge of existing initiatives, complementarity and sharing of best practices. We are looking forward to deepening cooperation in this field with the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea and with regional structures and institutions. I am particularly pleased to count Rear-Admiral Narciso Fastudo Junior, Executive Director of the Interregional Coordination Center of the Yaoundé Architecture, among today’s speakers.

The development of the Atlantic Centre is a commitment of the Portuguese Government, in line with our foreign and defence policies priorities. For us, driving the establishment of a multilateral platform for dialogue and cooperation among all Atlantic nations is an ambitious but timely endeavour. This has never been done before, but the times in which we are living require us to come together in this manner.

The international context has shifted, and continues to change rapidly and dramatically. We must adapt and make the best use of the tools available to ensure

peaceful relations in our regions and areas of interest, and, through that, to contribute to global peace and security. The challenges are wide-ranging, from the sustainability of resources, to managing the human impacts of climate change, to fighting illegal and criminal activities that undermine security and the well-being of populations. And of course, we must certainly add to this list the potential negative impacts that growing geopolitical rivalry already have for the stability of the Atlantic and for its global relevance. It is of vital interest, therefore, to affirm the centrality and unique role of the Atlantic in global economics, in international relations, in the global fight against climate change and ultimately, as a region of peaceful and cooperative relations.

By pursuing an approach of small but solid steps, Portugal expects the Atlantic Centre to respond to this ambition – or rather to this need. It is our responsibility to make the best use of Portugal’s long-standing good relations with all nations across the Atlantic to foster dialogue and cooperation. Working together, in joint ownership, building common projects that respond to the security needs of all involved will take time and will be challenging. But we are here for the long-run. We are building the Atlantic Centre to last for many decades, so we have time on our side and that will certainly make a substantive difference to the quality of relations that we develop in this context.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Allow me to particularly thank to the National Defence Institute for its unwavering support to the organisation of the Seminars of the Atlantic Centre – as well as to many of its activities, as the Director Helena Carreiras has just mentioned. This partnership is a valuable illustration of how win-win solutions can be found when facing new opportunities. The Institute represents much more than a host and an experienced team available to support the Atlantic Centre. It has also been a driving force for its conceptual development and a constant partner with whom to exchange and dialogue on the challenges ahead. The Institute has made its extensive network of friends and collaborators available to meet and know the Atlantic Centre, and I know that the National Defence Institute, will continue to reinforce its research capacity and to diversify its training and outreach activities with new partners across the Atlantic.

I invite all of you to engage with this initiative, to learn more about Atlantic security and to find ways to engage your organisations with the Atlantic Centre. Professor Licínia Simão is the new coordinator, following on the footsteps of BGEN Nuno Lemos Pires, who was deployed to Mozambique as commander of the EU Training Mission. She has been mandated to make the best use of these vast partnerships and to harness the potential of our joint work to push this agenda of regional peace and security forward.

I wish you all a fruitful day of work and look forward to hearing about the conclusions reached today.

Thank you.

Address by the Director-General/CEO of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Bashir Yusuf Jamoh

His Excellency, the Minister of National Defence, João Gomes Cravinho,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is indeed a great honour and privilege for me to be invited to deliver a keynote speech to this distinguished, highly informed and esteemed audience.

Hilaire Belloc once said that “If there is one portion of Europe which was made by the sea more than another, Portugal is that slice, that portion, that belt. Portugal was made by the Atlantic.” No wonder we are here at the Atlantic Centre. So, let me congratulate you all for being here.

The Atlantic Ocean is a vast body of water, the second largest in the world after the Pacific. The Atlantic extends to five continents of North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Antarctica. It is, therefore, very important to ensure its safety and security for the sustenance of international trade and other highly invaluable benefits derived from the Atlantic seas.

Ownership: Then who’s Responsible for Ocean Governance and Maritime Safety in this Context?

At the national level, every coastal state has an obligation to ensure the safety of navigation in its territorial seas up to 12 nautical miles, by ensuring proper and effective enforcement of its flag state implementation and part state control responsibilities. It should enforce all the important safety, marine pollution prevention, and control conventions and protocols it had ratified. Coastal states also assert economic rights over the resources of their seas extending 200 nautical miles and sometimes beyond.

Internationally, the United Nations General Assembly is obviously the recognized body on ocean governance, as clearly demonstrated by the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. This comprehensive treaty of 320 articles and 9 annexes, deals with safety, security, rights, and obligations including other various aspects of economic and social use of the oceans. The UN has also adopted a number of protocols and resolutions on sustainable use of the resources of the oceans.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the other hand, sets technical and safety standards and has adopted many international legal instruments on the safety of navigation including marine pollution prevention and control.

Maritime security

Criminality and insecurity at sea caused by acts of piracy, armed robbery, and other dangerous activities aren't new phenomena. Pirates and piratical attacks have happened for more than 2,000 years which arguably, may never be completely eradicated. However, with the advancement in technology resulting in faster, bigger, and more sophisticated vessels that have increasingly and seamlessly facilitated international commerce, faster connectivity of the global supply chain has enhanced the growth of the world economy, through marine transportation of high valued cargoes across the world oceans and seas, piracy and other criminalities also grew in scale and intensity.

The water volume of the Atlantic is 310,410,900 cubic km and about 25% of the global oceans. Therefore, no single country or body can adequately and consistently police or patrol to ensure security. Maintaining safety, and security against piracy, armed robbery, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU), trafficking of drugs and other psychotropic substances, etc., within the Atlantic's massive body of water requires multiple approaches which include:

- Legal and regulatory enforcement;
- Effective naval force for patrol and surveillance;
- Technology for a maritime domain awareness infrastructure;
- Intelligence and information sharing and transparency;
- Multinational and multilateral cooperation and collaboration;

Nigeria realizes the importance of security on its seas and oceans to the international trade, economic progress, and well-being of the country and has taken a pragmatic approach to security within its sphere of the Atlantic Ocean. In 2018, Nigeria executed a contract with a firm for an integrated national maritime surveillance and security infrastructure, i.e. the Deep Blue project as a robust tool to combat piracy, armed robbery, and other maritime crimes within Nigeria's territorial waters and by extension the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). The Deep Blue Project consists of sea, air, and land assets including a Command, Control, Computer, Communication, and Information Centre (C4i). The deployment of these assets was flagged off by President Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR, on the 10th of June 2021 with a goodwill message from the IMO Secretary-General, Mr. Kitack Lim.

To further bolster Nigeria's effort in fighting crimes at sea, the government signed into law the Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Act (SPOMO) 2019. This piece of legislation gave effect in Nigeria to the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 on piracy and the International Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Navigation (SUA), 1998 and its protocol. Since the law came into effect, convictions of at least 20 pirates have been secured under the Act with offenders currently serving various jail terms.

At the regional level, following the United Nations Security Council resolutions of 2011 and 2012 calling on the countries in the ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the GoG to work together on a strategy to fight piracy, armed robbery, and other illegal activities at sea in

the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria joined other heads of States and governments to sign the Yaoundé Declaration on the 25th of June 2013 to collaborate in the fight against piracy and other crimes in their Atlantic oceans. This declaration known as the ‘Yaoundé declaration’ led to the establishment of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC Yaoundé).

Further to this, Nigeria together with the ICC Yaoundé is engaged with the major international shipping industry and commodities groups (INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, ICS, OCIMF, BIMCO) to develop a framework known as the Gulf of Guinea, Maritime Collaboration Forum on Shared Awareness and Deconfliction i.e. GoG-MCF/SHADE. The framework is a multilateral initiative involving industry stakeholders and member countries in West and Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea on Information sharing and incident reporting, Cooperation at Sea, and Air De-confliction. The G7++ FOGG is another multinational collaboration with regional countries on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Whilst multilateral and multinational collaboration and cooperation are desirable for maintaining safety and security of not only the Atlantic but the entire oceans and seas of the planet Earth, however, such must be done within the complex web of international relations and diplomacy so as not to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country, big or small. Therefore, while appreciating the principle of ‘Mare Liberum’, a unilateral declaration by private entities to deploy warships to the waters contiguous to the Atlantic seas of West Africa is not amenable to good international relations. Likewise, the idea of Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) scheme, used by some countries to deploy frigates to the Atlantic oceans of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea should be with the consent and agreement of the countries within the sub-continent in line with international laws and as a mark of respect for the dignity of their people and the sovereignty of their nations.

At the continental level, Nigeria is a party to the Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa signed in September 2016 in Lomé, Togo (Lomé Charter). One of the objectives of the charter is to prevent and suppress national and transnational crime, including terrorism, piracy, armed robbery against ships, drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons, and all other kinds of trafficking through the sea and IUU fishing.

Nigeria’s effort in deploying huge resources to maintain maritime security is gradually crystallizing going by the latest encouraging January – September 2021 IMB report on Nigeria.

It is my hope, therefore, that this seminar will come up with recommendations and suggestions, for strengthened and collectively beneficial multinational and multilateral strategic initiatives for stronger and effective *communication, cooperation, collaboration and coordination* in ensuring the security of the Atlantic which constitutes about 25% of the world oceans described as the “common heritage of mankind.”

Before I leave, permit me to use this auspicious moment to make just two related appeals:

1. To the international maritime business community to recognize the improvement in security in Nigerian waters and reciprocate by removing the war risk insurance

premium charged on cargoes bound for Nigeria. The 3 quarters of consistent decline as reported by no less an institution than the IMB cannot be considered a fluke.

2. My second appeal is to our nation friends to the IMO, it is also time to return Nigeria to the membership of the Category C in the forthcoming IMO Council Elections in the next few weeks. We ask for your vote and count on your continued confidence in the efforts of Nigeria to work in partnership with other nation states in the Gulf of Guinea to continue keeping our corridor of the Atlantic Ocean a safe passage for seafarers, their vessels and the vital supplies they transport for our common sustenance.

Your Excellency, distinguished guests, I thank you very much indeed for your attention.

Long live Lisbon. Obrigado.

Working Session 1

Best practices in Atlantic multilateral cooperation

Frank Mattheis

Research Fellow, United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) / Coordinator, Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0.

Challenges for multilateral cooperation in the Atlantic space

Although the Indo-Pacific draws much international attention in terms of maritime security concerns, the Atlantic remains home to a dense network of multilateral cooperation. A vast number of regional organisations engage in security governance in the Atlantic space, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to the Gulf of Guinea Commission to the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic, to name just a few. This institutional density indicates that despite unilateralist leanings in some riparian states, multilateralism still benefits from a tailwind in the Atlantic space. However, the institutional density has also created a set of challenges which will be highlighted in the remainder of this note.

1) Contrasting delineations

For regional organisations, the delineation of the maritime space is not merely a question of hydrographic survey but a political decision about how to territorialise the sea. Organisations explicitly or implicitly follow a mental map that informs who may or should be a member of the organisation. This mental map can be based on numerous foundations. Some organisations, such as the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) or the European Union (EU), are like-minded organisations, where the willingness to cooperate or certain societal or political criteria are more important than geographic cohesion. Other organisations delineate the maritime space according to specific interests and objective, be they scientific exploration, security threats, geopolitical rivalry or the blue economy. This often follows a functionalist problem-solving approach, which requires a clear identification of the problem to be solved as well as an anticipation regarding what should happen after a mission is accomplished. The existence of multiple security challenges in the Atlantic space leads to the question which delineation is most fitting to solve a specific problem: sub-regions of the Atlantic (e.g. North vs. South), the pan-Atlantic or even the global scale of the United Nations? The more delineations are proposed by different regional organisations, the more difficult a consensus is to achieve.

2) Exclusion and inclusion

The proliferation of regional organisations in the Atlantic provides numerous interpretations of exclusion and inclusion. It belongs to the organisation to define who is a full member, who is an outsider, and who might hold an intermediate status. In the field of maritime security in the Atlantic, such decisions specifically entail questions about the overseas territories of European countries, in particular the United Kingdom and France, but also Norway, Portugal and Spain. These overseas territories do not only represent vested

material but are often integral parts of a country's identity, most visibly demonstrated by the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. Regional organisations concerned with the Atlantic thus need to deal with overseas territories and foreign military bases, especially if they are composed of former colonies. Do they seek to reclaim the ocean from imperial control, do they include the metropolises as members or do they scrupulously try to avoid engaging with contentious issues? Vice-versa, countries with overseas territories may use them to legitimise claims of membership and involvement in regional security governance. To give an example from another maritime space: France is a full member of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and together with the European Union has used this membership as an entry point for involvement in the Madagascar crisis. The question of delineation also applies to global powers. The USA's hegemonic security position in the Atlantic can justify either its exclusion or its inclusion, depending on the *raison d'être* of the regional organisation. In this regard, NATO is the elephant in the room – it constitutes a safeguard but also an obstacle for equitable governance of the wider Atlantic. Regional security organisations may wish harness NATO's experience and resources but there might be a trade-off in terms of asserting their own authority over a maritime space. And lastly, while China is geographically located at the antipode of the South Atlantic, its ever-expanding Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has both economic and security ramifications which require regional organisations in the Atlantic to position themselves towards the country's growing presence. The more regional organisations in the Atlantic differ with respect to who to consider internal and external, the more difficult collaboration becomes.

3) Resources and institutionalisation

The multiplication of fora and formats often puts a strain on the national and local governments that need to ensure their operation. This is especially true for the many small countries that have limited resources at their disposal. Likewise, the inclusion of civil society is hampered if a large number of initiatives exist. As a result, most organisations dealing with security in the Atlantic lack the adequate resources to fulfil their purpose. They are understaffed and underfunded, while the regularity of meetings is undermined. Existing organisations are rarely dismantled entirely but risk falling into a standby mode, where they still retain a mandate but do not perform activities. Rather than consolidating, there is rather a trend of creating more organisations that serve to coordinate action between the already existing ones. Another challenge relating to institutionalisation is the choice of the appropriate and effective level for multilateral cooperation. Multiple formats exist, including summits or meetings between presidents, ministers, navies, national administrations, staff of regional organisations or civil society organisations. Depending on the aims of the cooperation, the involved levels yield different results and thus require a deliberate decision. The more organisations exist, the more difficult it becomes to ensure that all relevant parties can be adequately involved.

4) Identity

Not all Atlantic countries perceive themselves as Atlantic countries in the way Portugal does. Sea-blindness or terra-centrism is prevalent in many countries, both at the level of government and of the population. Even countries with large coastlines or bi-oceanic ones like South Africa, may prioritise looking inwards. This is not only due to a lack of resources but also a question of identity. These poses a significant challenge for organisations in the Atlantic, as they have to decide between working on convincing them or going ahead without them. The question whether there is or can be an Atlantic identity is crucial for organisations that seek to be sustained over time and rooted in the population. The North Atlantic can rely such an identity, which is often roughly subsumed as “the West” entailing a particular political, economic and societal model as well as a distinction from the ‘outside world’. The notion of a South Atlantic identity is more diffuse, although certain norms, such as nuclear non-proliferation and anti-imperialism are usually invoked and continue to be unresolved issues for maritime spaces in general and the South Atlantic in particular. South and North Atlantic identities can thus be difficult to reconcile and regional organisations struggle to engage with how to define elements of a common identity for the pan-Atlantic. Even regional perspectives on the Atlantic (e.g. an African or South American or Caribbean perspective) are not well-defined and might in any case not correspond to those countries that conceive their identity as transcending regional boundaries across the Atlantic.

5) Mapping institutional complexity

In order to effectively cooperate and coordinate between the multiple regional organisations in the Atlantic, it is crucial for policy-makers, civil society and scholars to have access to reliable and complete information. This is particularly important when a new security challenge emerges or when a new organisation or forum is being created. The existing institutional complexity needs to be comprehensively mapped, ranging from organisations primarily dedicated to maritime security, such as part of the Yaoundé Process, to organisations that inter alia develop strategies and capacities to address security issues in the Atlantic, such as the European Union. However, such knowledge still needs to be consolidated and systematised. The Atlantic Centre is already playing a pivotal role in taking stock of the existing cooperation mechanisms through detailed studies and the promotion of information sharing. In order to facilitate comparisons, a platform such as the Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS) by United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), which already contains data about most security-related organisations, could be expanded to cover all initiatives that are relevant for the Atlantic.

Nuno Sardinha Monteiro

Head of the Navy Staff Planning Division, Portuguese Navy

The purpose of this panel is to reflect on the existing multilateral and multinational initiatives dealing with security across the whole of the Atlantic, highlighting good practices and lessons learned. With this purpose, I was asked to address an organization, which, since its creation in 1949, has been central to security and stability in the Atlantic: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO.

In this context, it is important to remember that, in 2010, during the Lisbon Summit, NATO approved the current Strategic Concept, entitled *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, which identified three essential core tasks:

- Collective defence;
- Crisis management;
- and Cooperative security.

Shortly after, NATO disclosed the Alliance Maritime Strategy, which added a fourth core task for maritime forces: *maritime security*, identifying that NATO naval forces should contribute to the maintenance of a secure and safe maritime environment, given their unique capabilities and routine blue water activities.

This was also a recognition of the exceptional role of the NATO Standing Naval Forces in addressing security threats in the maritime environment. These forces were created in 1967, after a thorough review of NATO's strategic concept that introduced the doctrine of flexible response. Two forces were then created: the *Standing Naval Force Atlantic* (STANAVFORLANT), in 1967, and the *Naval On Call Force in the Mediterranean* (NAVOCFORMED), in 1969.

STANAVFORLANT was activated for the first time on January 1968 and Portugal joined the force the following year, with the integration of the frigate *Almirante Pereira da Silva*, on May 1969. Since then, Portugal and the Portuguese Navy have participated uninterruptedly in NATO's Standing Naval Forces, with the integration of at least one naval asset every year, generally for periods of 4 to 6 months per year.

Best Practice 1: The utility of naval forces at sea

The experience gained with those Standing Naval Forces leads to the first best practice, which is the utility of naval forces at sea, to deter maritime threats and to respond immediately to scenarios of instability or insecurity at sea.

Currently, NATO's Standing Naval Forces consist of four groups: two Standing NATO Maritime Groups and two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups, which are the maritime component of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. They are flexible and versatile naval forces, continuously available to perform a broad spectrum of tasks. These naval forces can remain on station for quite some

time, providing a sustained presence when needed, and can function according to the operational needs of the Alliance, with optimal flexibility.

In the 21st century, the Standing NATO Maritime Groups have been the first responders to some insecurity situations that developed in the maritime environment, namely in 2001, protecting sea lines of communications against transnational terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea, and in 2008, fighting pirates off the shores of Somalia.

It is worth noting that the EU also felt the need to have a continuous naval presence in Maritime Areas of Interest and therefore developed the concept of Coordinated Maritime Presences. This initiative aims to optimize the coordination and cooperation of member states' naval assets, which remain under national chains of command, by sharing maritime security information and thus enhancing maritime situational awareness. Under this initiative, member states' naval assets also undertake activities (including exercises) in partnership with local navies and develop diplomacy and naval presence actions, aligned with EU interests in the region. The first pilot project of the Coordinated Maritime Presences has been established in the Gulf of Guinea, since January 2021, aiming to show the utility of the concept for other Maritime Areas of Interest.

Best Practice 2: The importance of cooperation, namely between NATO and the EU

The second best practice I would like to point out is the importance of cooperation, not only in broad terms, but, in the case of NATO, particularly with the EU, because both organizations share common values, strategic interests and a majority of member nations. Over the last years, the two organizations have developed closer cooperation, focused on concrete results and improved security for European citizens. This cooperation ranges from crisis management, in response to terrorism, hybrid threats and maritime insecurity, to cooperation on strengthening resilience and building up the capacities of partners beyond European borders.

In this context, the three main drivers for NATO-EU cooperation, in times of limited budgets and increasing new security and defence challenges, are coherence, complementarity and interoperability.

A good example of NATO-EU cooperation at the operational level was developed in the Horn of Africa to counter maritime piracy. In fact, NATO and EU coordinated their actions and exchanged best practices with one another, while naval forces from both organizations fought piracy together, between 2009 and 2016.

Another example of operational cooperation between NATO and the EU in the maritime domain occurs in the Mediterranean Sea, where, to tackle the humanitarian crisis, the EU established, in 2015, a maritime security operation called SOPHIA, while NATO is conducting operation SEA GUARDIAN, since 2016. Operation SEA GUARDIAN has been supporting and complementing operation SOPHIA (replaced, in 2020, by operation IRINI), by sharing maritime situational awareness and giving logistic support.

Best Practice 3: The relevance of Centres of Excellence

Finally, the third best practice I would like to identify is the relevance of Centres of Excellence in supporting maritime capacity building, through doctrine development, identification of lessons learned, concept development & experimentation and education & training. In fact, since the establishment of the concept of the NATO Centres of Excellence, in 2003, the Alliance has already accredited 28 centres – including the first one in Portugal, the Maritime Geospatial, Meteorological & Oceanographic Centre of Excellence, which was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council in August this year.

NATO COEs are multinational entities that provide their expertise and experience to NATO, in support of transformation, helping the Alliance to expand interoperability, increase capabilities, aid the development of doctrine and standards, evaluate lessons learned and conduct experimentation in order to test and verify concepts. COEs work alongside the Alliance even though NATO does not directly fund them and they are not part of the NATO Command Structure. Nonetheless, they are part of a supporting network, encouraging internal and external information exchange to the benefit of the Alliance.

The success of the concept of NATO-accredited COEs shows a clear role for this kind of multinational centres, dedicated to specific areas of expertise, to contribute to stability and security. That is exactly the philosophy of the Atlantic Centre, which aims at fostering the participation of military and civilian entities to promote maritime security and defence capacity building in the Atlantic.

Final Remarks

In the future, the importance of the global maritime domain, as the conveyor belt of goods, components, raw materials and energy supplies, will certainly continue to grow. Therefore, it is essential to ensure coordinated action by the various political, diplomatic, scientific, military and law-enforcement actors, as well as to foster cooperative activities that contribute to maritime security.

In this context, the Atlantic Alliance offers several good practices based on a 72-year experience of safeguarding freedom and stability, namely in the maritime spaces. Of those good practices, three are particularly useful for maritime security in the Atlantic Ocean, namely:

- The utility of naval forces at sea;
- The importance of cooperation, namely between NATO and the EU; and
- The relevance of Centres of Excellence.

These are best practices that will certainly be helpful in shaping the role and the activities of the Atlantic Centres in its goal of contributing to maritime security and promoting capacity building in the Atlantic Ocean.

Thank you!

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Three Levels of Arctic Geopolitics

The notion of geopolitical conflict in the Arctic continues to make media headlines. A decade ago, as climate change was altering the geography of the region, the resource potential of the North grabbed attention, and states (and companies) saw the chance to turn a profit. Today, this focus has shifted to concerns about the strategic positioning of, and increased tension between, NATO countries and Russia, with a dash of Chinese interests on top. Ideas of the Arctic as an arena for political competition and rivalry are often juxtaposed with the view of the Arctic as a region of harmony and shared interests. Such regional approaches have led to Arctic security debates being dominated by ideas of “exceptionalism” – the notion that the Arctic is unique and separate from the (geo) political rivalries elsewhere in the world.¹

This paper unpacks the notion of Arctic geopolitics by exploring the different, at times contradictory, political dynamics at play in the North. It explores three levels² of inter-state relations: the regional (Arctic) level, the international system, and the level of bilateral relations. Labelling these levels as “good,” “bad” and “ugly” – borrowing from Sergio Leone’s epic 1966 film – helps shed light on the distinctiveness of each and on how they interact.

The Good: Regional Relations and Cooperation

Let us start with the good in the Arctic – the regional relations among Arctic states: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. The Arctic region was thrown onto the international agenda in the early 2000s due to the increasingly apparent effects of climate change. Arctic ice sheets were disappearing at an accelerated pace, which coincided with new prospects for offshore oil and gas exploration, as well as the opening of shipping lanes through sensitive areas such as the Northwest Passage.³

1 Elana Wilson Rowe. 2020. Analyzing Frenemies: An Arctic Repertoire of Cooperation and Rivalry. *Political Geography* 76, DOI:10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102072.

2 See, e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press; J. D. Singer. 1961. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics* 14(1): 77-92; Fakhreddin Soltani. 2014. Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4(4): 166-171.

3 The Economist. 2015. *Not so Cool*. The Economist, 14 February. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21641240-hypeover-arctic-recedes-along-summer-ice-not-so-cool>; Andreas Østhagen. 2013. *Arctic Oil and Gas: Hype or Reality?*. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 9 April. Available at: <http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/04/09/osthagen/>.

In the wake of this, environmental organizations and politicians outside the region led an outcry about the “lack of governance” in the Arctic.⁴ In response, top-level political representatives of the five Arctic coastal states (excluding Finland, Iceland and Sweden) met in Ilulissat, Greenland, in 2008, where they publicly declared the Arctic to be a “region of cooperation.”⁵ They also affirmed their intention to work within established international arrangements and agreements, in particular, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international agreement binding states in shared pursuit of order, cooperation and stability at sea.⁶ Since then, the Arctic states have repeated the mantra of cooperation, articulating the same sentiment in relatively streamlined Arctic policy and strategy documents. The deterioration in relations between Russia and its Arctic neighbours since 2014 – a result of Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula – did not change this,⁷ although security and military concerns now occupy more space in Arctic discussions than ever.

Some also argue that low-level forms of regional interaction help ensure low tension in the North, despite not dealing with security matters.⁸ The emergence of the Arctic Council as the primary forum for regional affairs in the Arctic plays into this setting.⁹ The council, founded in Ottawa in 1996, serves as a platform from which its member states can portray themselves as working harmoniously toward common goals.¹⁰ Adding to its legitimacy, since the late 1990s an increasing number of actors have applied for and gained observer status on the council: initially France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom; and, more recently, China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland.¹¹

The Bad: Global Power Politics

What happens in the Arctic, however, is not the same as international global politics over the Arctic. During the Cold War, the Arctic held a prominent place in the political and military standoffs between the two superpowers. It was important not because of

4 See Greenpeace’s Save the Arctic Campaign, available at: <https://www.peoplesoil.org/en/savethearctic/>. For an analysis, see Alf Håkon Hoel. 2009. Do We Need a New Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean?. *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 24(2): 443-456.

5 Heather Exner-Pirot. 2012. *New Directions for Governance in the Arctic Region*. Arctic Yearbook, 224-246. Available at: https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2012/Scholarly_Papers/12.Exner_Pirot.pdf

6 Available at: http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.

7 See Byers, ‘Crises and International Cooperation,’ op. cit.

8 Kathrin Keil and Sebastian Knecht. 2016. *Governing Arctic Change: Global Perspectives, Governing Arctic Change: Global Perspectives*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

9 Svein Vigeland Rottem. 2017. The Arctic Council: Challenges and Recommendations. In *Arctic Governance: Law and Politics*, vol 1, Svein Vigeland Rottem and Ida Folkestad Soltvedt (eds.), 231-251. London: I. B. Tauris.

10 Heather Exner-Pirot. 2015. *Arctic Council: The Evolving Role of Regions in Arctic Governance*. Alaska Dispatch. Available at: <http://www.adn.com/article/20150109/arctic-council-evolving-role-regions-arctic-governance>.

11 Rottem, “The Arctic Council: Challenges and Recommendations.” op. cit.

interactions in the Arctic itself (although cat-and-mouse submarine games took place there), but because of its wider strategic role in the systemic competition between the United States and the USSR. The Arctic formed the buffer zone between these two superpower rivals, its airspace comprising the shortest distance for long-range bombers to reach one another's shores. Following the easing of Cold War tensions, from the mid-2000s onwards, the Arctic regained strategic geopolitical importance. A repeat of Cold War dynamics saw Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, strengthen its military (and nuclear) prowess in order to reassert Russia's position at the top table of world politics. Given the country's geography and recent history, its obvious focus would be its Arctic lands and seas. In this terrain, Russia could pursue its policy of rebuilding its forces and expanding its defence and deterrence capabilities in an unobstructed manner.¹² This build-up has happened not primarily because of changing political circumstances in the Arctic, but because of Russia's naturally (i.e., geographically) dominant position in the North and its long history of a strong naval presence, the Northern Fleet, on the Kola Peninsula.¹³ This is where Russia's strategic submarines are based, which are essential to the country's status as a major global nuclear power.¹⁴ Melting of the sea ice and increased resource extraction on the coast along the Northern Sea Route are only some elements that have spurred Russia's military emphasis in its Arctic development efforts: Russia's north matters for the Kremlin's more general strategic plans and ambitions in world politics. Within these shifting geo-economic and geo-strategic dynamics, China has also emerged as a new Arctic actor, proclaiming itself as a "near-Arctic state."¹⁵ With Beijing's continuous efforts to assert influence, the Arctic has emerged as the latest arena where China's presence and interaction are components of an expansion of power – be it through scientific research or investments in Russia's fossil fuel industries.¹⁶ This has led to the Arctic becoming relevant in a global power competition between China and the United States. US Secretary of State Pompeo warned in 2019 that Beijing's Arctic activity risks creating a "new South China Sea."¹⁷

12 Paal S. Hilde. 2014. Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic. In *Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional Dynamics in a Global World*, Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (eds.), 153-155. London: Routledge, 2014.

13 Katarzyna Zysk. 2013. Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Restraints. In *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World*, Barry Scott Zellen (ed.), 281-296. Calgary, AB: Calgary University Press. op. cit.

14 Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev. 2014. Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard and Soft Power?. *Polar Journal* 4(1): 68-87.

15 Sanna Kopra. 2013. *China's Arctic Interests*. Arctic Yearbook, 1-16. Available at: <http://www.arcticyearbook.com/2013articles/51-china-s-arctic-interests>.

16 For more on this, see Mía M. Bennett. 2017. Arctic Law and Governance: The Role of China and Finland (2017). *Jindal Global Law Review* 8(1): 111-116; Kai Sun. 2014. Beyond the Dragon and the Panda: Understanding China's Engagement in the Arctic. *Asia Policy* 18(1): 46-51; Timo Koivurova and Sanna Kopra, eds. 2020. *Chinese Policy and Presence in the Arctic*. Leiden, NLD: Brill Nijhoff.

17 The Guardian. 2019. *US Warns Beijing's Arctic Activity Risks Creating 'New South China Sea'*. The Guardian, 6 May. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/06/pompeo-arctic-activity-new-south-china-sea>.

The Ugly: The Complexity of Bilateral Relations

There is one further political dynamic that requires examination: bilateral interactions between Arctic states. These relations are naturally informed by the regional and global dynamics already addressed. However, to unpack the issue of national security in the circumpolar region, we must also focus on how the Arctic states interact on a regular basis with each other. This is where things get ugly, both because some relations are more fraught than others, and because it is difficult to draw generalizing conclusions across the region.

Central here is the role the Arctic plays in considerations of national defence. This varies greatly amid the Arctic Eight, because each country prioritizes and deals with its northern areas differently.¹⁸ For Russia, with its vast Eurasian empire, the Arctic is integral to broader national defence considerations.¹⁹ Even though these considerations are also linked to developments elsewhere, investments in military infrastructure in the Arctic have a direct regional impact, in particular for the much smaller countries in its western neighbourhood – Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Indeed, for these three Nordic countries, the Arctic is fundamental to national defence policy, precisely because this is where Russia – as a great power – invests considerably in its military capacity.²⁰ Especially Norway, a founding member of NATO and located on the alliance’s “northern flank”, is increasingly concerned with the expansive behaviour of the Russian military in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea.²¹

The Arctic arguably does not play the same pivotal role in national security considerations in North America as in northern Europe.²² Even while pitted against the Soviet Union across the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea during the Cold War, Alaska and northern Canada were primarily locations for missile defence capabilities, surveillance infrastructure and a limited number of strategic forces.²³

Commentators have even argued that the most immediate concerns facing the Canadian Arctic today are not defence capabilities, but rather social and health conditions

18 Hilde, “Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic.” op. cit.

19 Alexander Sergunin. 2014. *Four Dangerous Myths about Russia’s Plans for the Arctic*. Russia Direct, 25 November 25. Available at: <http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/four-dangerous-myths-about-russias-plans-arctic>

20 Leif Christian Jensen. 2017. An Arctic ‘Marriage of Inconvenience’: Norway and the Othering of Russia. *Polar Geography* 40(2): 121-143. Håkon Lunde Saxi. 2011. *Nordic Defence Cooperation after the Cold War*. Oslo Files, March 2011. Available at: <https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-xmliui/bitstream/handle/11250/99335/SAXI%2c%20Nordic%20defence%20Cooperation%20after%20the%20Cold%20War%20%282011%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

21 E.g. Paal Sigurd Hilde. 2019. Forsvar Vår Dyd, Men Kom Oss Ikke for Nær. Norge Og Det Militære Samarbeidet i NATO [Defend Our Virtue, but Do Not Get Too Close. Norway and the Military Cooperation in NATO]. *Internasjonal Politikk* 77(1): 60-70.

22 Including Greenland, which is geographically part of North America but politically part of the Realm of Denmark.

23 Andreas Østhagen, Greg L. Sharp, and Paal S. Hilde. 2018. At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s Approaches to Security in the Arctic. *Polar Journal* 8(1): 163-181.

in northern communities, and their poor rates of economic development.²⁴ This does not discount the need for Canada to be active in its Arctic domain and to have Arctic capabilities. However, this perspective differs from the crucial role that the Russian land border holds for Finnish and Norwegian (as well as NATO) security concerns.²⁵

In conclusion, security and – essentially defence – dynamics in the Arctic remain anchored at the subregional and bilateral levels. Of these arrangements, the Barents Sea/European Arctic stand out. Here, bilateral relations between Russia and Norway are especially challenging in terms of security interactions and concerns. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Russian investments in Arctic troops and infrastructure have had little impact on the North American security outlook. Approaches by Russian bombers and fighter planes may cause alarm, but the direct threat to North American states in the Arctic – compared to that of its Nordic allies – is limited.²⁶ This is also why Canadian troops have been exercising in the Norwegian Arctic in recent years, and not vice versa.

However, bilateral dynamics like in the case of Norway and Russia are multifaceted, as the two states also engage in various types of cooperation, ranging from co-management of fish stocks to search-and-rescue operations and a border crossing regime.²⁷ In 2010, Norway and Russia were able to resolve a longstanding maritime boundary dispute in the Barents Sea, partly in order to initiate joint petroleum ventures in the disputed area.²⁸ These cooperative arrangements and agreements have not been revoked following the events of 2014,²⁹ a clear indication of the complexity bilateral relations in the Arctic.

Future Concerns

The central question in the Arctic is how much developments occurring at a regional level can be insulated from events and relations elsewhere. If the goal is to keep the Arctic as a separate, exceptional region of cooperation, the Arctic states have managed to do a relatively good job, despite setbacks due to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

24 Wilfrid Greaves and Whitney P. Lackenbauer. 2016. *Re-Thinking Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic*. OpenCanada, 23 March. Available at: <https://www.opencanada.org/features/re-thinking-sovereignty-and-security-arctic/>

25 Østhagen, Sharp, and Hilde, “At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s Approaches to Security in the Arctic.” op. cit.

26 Ibid, p. 176.

27 From 2012, Norwegians and Russians living less than 30 kilometres from the border have been able to travel across the border without a visa.

28 Arild Moe, Daniel Fjærtøft, and Indra Øverland. 2011. Space and Timing: Why Was the Barents Sea Delimitation Dispute Resolved in 2010?. *Polar Geography* 34(3): 145-162.

29 Lars Rowe. 2018. Fornuft Og Følelser: Norge Og Russland Etter Krim (Sense and Sensibility: Norway and Russia after Crimea). *Nordisk Østforum* 32: 1-20; Andreas Østhagen. 2016. High North, Low Politics Maritime Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. *Arctic Review on Law and Politics* 7(1): 83-100.

The most pressing regional challenge, however, is how to deal with, and talk about, Arctic-specific security concerns, which are often excluded from cooperative fora and venues. Any Arctic security dialogue is fragile and risks being overshadowed by the increasingly tense NATO–Russia relationship in Europe at large. Paradoxically, precisely what such an arena for dialogue is intended to achieve (i.e., preventing the spillover of tensions from other parts of the world into the Arctic) is the very reason why progress here is so difficult. A more pan-Arctic political role for NATO is, for the very same reason, difficult to imagine.

One starting point, however, would be to focus on practical forms of cooperation – implemented through mechanisms such as a code of conduct,³⁰ or an expansion of the Incidents at Sea cooperation that was put in place between the United States and the USSR in 1972, and subsequently Canada/Norway and the USSR in 1989/1990.³¹ Recognising that one specific part of the Arctic, the part that links to the North Atlantic, is where these concerns are most pressing, is a first step towards dealing with these growing security concerns.

30 Depledge et al.

31 OSCE. 2017. *Journal of the 854th Plenary Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-Operation*. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/5/320231.pdf>.

Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)³²

First of all, I would like to thank the organizers of this Seminar, in particular Licinia Simão, coordinator of the Atlantic Centre, and Helena Carreiras, director of the National Defence Institute, for the kind and honorable invitation. It is an honor for me to be part of such a distinguished panel and discuss with you different experiences of Atlantic multilateral cooperation.

I will focus my intervention on the experience of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA, in English, or ZOPACAS, in Portuguese, Spanish and French). My initial statement will focus on three topics: what ZOPACAS is; its current relevance; and how ZOPACAS could converge with other coordination mechanisms and institutions.

What is ZOPACAS?

ZOPACAS was established in 1986 by Resolution 41/11 of the United Nations General Assembly, proposed by Brazil and co-sponsored by thirteen neighboring countries. It comprises 21 African States – South Africa, Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Cameroun, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo – and three South Americans – Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Uruguay has acted, since 2013, as president “pro tempore” of ZOPACAS.

According to Resolution 41/11, the General Assembly “1. Solemnly declares the South Atlantic, in the region situated between Africa and South America, a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic” and “3. Calls upon all States of all other regions, in particular the militarily significant States, scrupulously to respect the region of the South Atlantic as a zone of Peace and cooperation, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension into the region of rivalries and conflicts that are foreign to them.”

The establishment of the South Atlantic as a “Zone of peace and cooperation” reflected the fundamental concern of the South Atlantic countries with the possibility of transposing the East-West rivalry to the South Atlantic.

32 Opinions expressed by the panelist are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil.

With the objective of consolidating the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, until then merely a concept, as a forum for intergovernmental coordination and collaboration, Brazil organized a meeting of high-level representatives in Rio de Janeiro, from 25 to 29 July 1988. Since then, six other ZOPACAS ministerial meetings have been held: in Abuja (1990), Brasília (1994), Somerset West, South Africa (1996), Buenos Aires (1998); after a long hiatus of almost 10 years, Luanda Ministry (2007); and Montevideo (2013). In addition, a ZOPACAS round table was held in Brasília in 2010. The holding of the VIII Ministerial Meeting of ZOPACAS remains pending. Initially scheduled for 2015, it was postponed by the government of Cape Verde, the designated host country, “sine die”.

ZOPACAS has then become a member-led political coordination mechanism and cooperation platform with a broad agenda. The Montevideo Action Plan, approved in 2013, defines six lines of action to deepen cooperation among ZOPACAS countries, namely: mapping and exploration of the seabed; protection and preservation of the marine environment and living marine resources; air and maritime transport and port security; maritime security; defence; and public safety and fight against transnational organized crime.

Since 2007, Brazil has championed the revitalization of ZOPACAS. In accordance with the Montevideo Action Plan, Brazil sponsored the following initiatives: a) I Seminar on Safety and Surveillance of Maritime Traffic and Search and Rescue of ZOPACAS (Salvador, 2013); b) ZOPACAS Peacekeeping Operations Seminar (Salvador, 2015); c) colloquium “ZOPACAS and security in the South Atlantic” (Brasília, 2019); d) webinar “The contribution of ZOPACAS to Economic Development and Maritime Security in the South Atlantic” (virtual, 2020); and e) 1st ZOPACAS Maritime Symposium (virtual, 2021).

Last July 29, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 75/312 on ZOPACAS, presented by the Mission of Uruguay, as the current “pro tempore” president of the mechanism, and co-sponsored by 24 other countries, including Brazil. The adoption of the text, six years after the approval of the last resolution on the subject, is the result of a process initiated by Brazil in 2019, when the draft resolution began to be discussed. The significant number of co-sponsorships, more than double that raised by resolution 69/332, in 2015, reflects the support of South Atlantic states for ZOPACAS.

Why is ZOPACAS still relevant today?

ZOPACAS was conceived in the context of the Cold War. The international order has since changed tremendously. However, I would argue that ZOPACAS is nowadays more relevance than ever since the end of the Cold War.

First, ZOPACAS is still relevant to address the current security challenges in the South Atlantic. Having overcome the Cold War tensions, the South Atlantic countries face new challenges to peace and security related to the use of maritime space. The main ones are: piracy and armed robbery at sea; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (“IUU fishing”); drug trafficking; and terrorism. Security challenges in the region,

including piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, cannot be addressed through an exclusively military approach. The consolidation of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace, cooperation and stability demands a comprehensive approach that recognizes the close relationship between maritime security, good governance, environmental protection and socioeconomic development.

In this context, ZOPACAS represents a unique forum for consultation and cooperation, both because of its composition and its thematic scope, and, therefore, can offer comprehensive solutions and effective methods in the fight against maritime insecurity and in the promotion of peace in the South Atlantic.

Second, ZOPACAS is the only forum that reflects the commitment of African and South American countries to the South Atlantic identity. We have our own identity as a region. Brazilians are proud of this shared identity and value the historic ties that unite Brazil with other South Atlantic countries, especially those on the African coast. ZOPACAS is the result of this identity shared by South Americans and Africans and helps to consolidate it.

Third, ZOPACAS is extremely relevant because it is based on the key principles of national sovereignty, local ownership and regional leadership. Differently from other coordination mechanisms, ZOPACAS is founded on the strict respect for the sovereignty of the South Atlantic countries, favors South Atlantic countries' leadership role in dealing with their own matters and recognizes socioeconomic development as the foundation for a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic.

How could ZOPACAS converge with other coordination mechanisms and institutions?

ZOPACAS is by no means exclusive. Synergies with other mechanisms, organizations and institutions with an Atlantic vocation should be encouraged. After all, the expectation of the South Atlantic countries to count on the support of the international community for a lasting solution to the current challenges is legitimate.

ZOPACAS should work with the Atlantic Centre, as an institution dedicated to produce and disseminate knowledge and foster dialogue, in order to strengthen the South Atlantic identity and regional solutions to regional problems, always in strict respect for national sovereignty.

The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic helps sustain a multipolar international order where dialogue and cooperation between sovereign nations prevail. The preservation of the South Atlantic as a space free of weapons of mass destruction and of external disputes and military presence acquires renewed importance in a context of growing rivalries between major military powers.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Working Session 2

Informality and variable geometry in multinational cooperation

Alexander Shaheen

Diplomat, UK Foreign Office

The invariable geometry of multinational cooperation

Mr. Ali Shaheen from the Maritime Security Team in the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office spoke on the topic: “the informality and variable geometry in multinational cooperation”. Mr. Shaheen began by congratulating Portugal on all their efforts in establishing the Atlantic Centre and for bringing together colleagues for this seminar.

Mr. Shaheen centred his remarks on the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG) and emphasised his comments were based on his own personal view, having experienced the UK’s co-chair of the G7++ FOGG.

Mr. Shaheen explained that the G7++ FOGG is a multilateral maritime working group that seeks to improve maritime security in West Africa. It was set up in 2013, to support capability building in littoral states and coordinate international efforts to support the Yaoundé Code of Conduct – the regional maritime security architecture set up in the same year and signed by 25 countries in West and Central Africa. Mr Shaheen detailed that the G7++ FOGG itself is composed of the G7 countries, the Gulf of Guinea countries, and several other countries and international bodies such as Portugal, the UNODC and INTERPOL.

Mr. Shaheen went on to explain that since 2014, the G7++ FOGG has been co-chaired by one country from the Gulf of Guinea and one country from the G7, with the idea that G7 co-chair will assist the regional leader in marshalling efforts to combat maritime security.

Mr. Shaheen spoke about the complicated nature of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. He explained that while the region has the highest rates of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the world (in 2020, 95% of global kidnapping for ransoms at sea took place in this region), many other crimes continue to contribute to maritime insecurity. These include drug trafficking, cargo theft, vessel hijacking and illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing.

The G7++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea works to address all maritime security issues in the region and so, to Mr. Shaheen, the G7++ FOGG must take a multifaceted approach and hence the welcome formation of the G7++ FOGG’s 6 working groups on Legal issues, Finance, Maritime Domain Awareness, Education, Training & Exercises, and finally the Blue Economy.

Mr. Shaheen explained that these elements all make the G7++ FOGG a group of variable geometry because progress requires working with multiple different partners, on multiple different issues to progress different objectives. While not unexpected, as maritime issues are broad and affect different actors differently, Mr. Shaheen suggested that this does mean multilateral cooperation is the key.

In 2021, the UK is co-chair of the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea in 2021 with Senegal. Mr. Shaheen outlined the UK position, of advocating improved maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea by supporting regional African partners to find regionally-led solutions. The UK considers the G7++ FOGG as the right way to do this and the right way channel international efforts to support the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.

Mr. Shaheen went on to define some benefits of the G7++ FOGG forum. First, he pointed to its role as an inclusive space for all to contribute, with each stakeholder offering unique expertise, allowing genuine collaboration and reinforcing the need for a joined-up, coordinated response. The most important benefit of the G7++ FOGG according to Mr. Shaheen was that it allows countries in the affected region to be the ones setting the agenda.

Mr. Shaheen went on to speak on the importance of deconfliction: a critical role of the FOGG is to ensure regional efforts and international efforts are all harmonised and effective as possible.

Mr. Shaheen explained that the sheer number of actors and issues involved means that naturally there will be a myriad of initiatives focused on maritime security in West Africa, some of which are disparate, and others which overlap – at a local context or wider. Mr. Shaheen suggested an example: a country could receive training from another country that builds their capability for responding to incidents at sea. If there is no communication, the next month, the same country could receive similar training from a third country. The result would be that one country receives two lots of training when perhaps there's another country in the region that could have extracted more benefits from that training. Similarly, at a regional level, Mr. Shaheen explained that if two initiatives are competing or even seen to be competing, there can be confusion, conflict, an inefficient division of resources and a curtail of progress. To Mr. Shaheen, this is why a concerted focus on deconfliction is critical in any form of multi-national cooperation.

Mr. Shaheen explained that the G7++ FOGG Virtual Working Group 4, focused on Education, Training and Exercises, has led the group's deconfliction effort. This group works to support the Interregional Coordination Centre in ensuring that all capacity building efforts of international partners are appropriately matched to the needs of regional countries. Mr. Shaheen outlined the rationale by which the working group's members will identify, by consensus, the needs, the priorities, and issues for Yaoundé Architecture-harmonised training plans.

At the same time, Mr. Shaheen spoke on deconfliction requiring the recognition of and communication with other initiatives. Mr. Shaheen pointed to the Gulf of Guinea context, where there are many effective initiatives at both the operational and tactical level. For example, Mr. Shaheen highlighted the recently established Gulf of Guinea-Maritime Collaboration Forum – a tactical, operational forum aimed at countering piracy – and its similarities to the G7++ FOGG's Operations Group. To Mr. Shaheen, it will be critical that there is effective communication between those two initiatives.

Mr. Shaheen ended his remarks with three lessons learned from his experience working within the co-chair of the G7++ FOGG.

The first lesson is that a key requirement for an effective grouping is engagement from all stakeholders concerned. As previously mentioned, there are many different maritime crimes that touch different states in different way. The priority in one area may be piracy while in another it may be illegal fishing. The challenge with G7++ FOGG is ensuring the forum works and is working to address the issues that each regional country sees as key. Addressing each stakeholder concerns will ensure each stakeholder is engaged. This will ensure that the forum will be seen as an even more valuable use of time, while also ensuring engagement, collaboration and ultimately, progress.

The second lesson suggested by Mr. Shaheen centred on connecting expertise. The stakeholders in maritime security go beyond just countries and international organisations. Stakeholders can include, for example, the shipping industry, civil society organisations and NGOs. To Mr. Shaheen, when working together in multinational cooperation, the solutions must work for those affected. Often those most affected can offer important insights and play a key role in devising solutions. Mr. Shaheen detailed the G7++ FOGG's efforts to increase the involvement of industry and civil society, nothing their wealth of expertise that cannot be ignored.

Finally, Mr. Shaheen mentioned the importance of momentum. When working across different geographies on different issues with different stakeholders, it can take time to bring the right people to the table. Infrequent meetings can lead to time being lost and progress slowing. Mr. Shaheen noted the inevitability of staff turnover in international organisations but without momentum and institutional memory, progress cannot hope to be at the pace that ensures stakeholders are engaged and emboldened.

Mr. Shaheen thanked the chair, his fellow panellists and the audience.

Kirsty McLean

Deputy Director Africa Engagements Division (N52), US Navy

This paper covers US Naval Forces Africa's contribution to the multilateral security system, lessons learned from OBANGAME EXPRESS and our vision and plans for 2022.

Security Cooperation Model

Our main program is Africa Partnership Station. APS has four lines of effort: Capacity Building, Exercises, Operations and Engagements.

Our Building Partner Capacity program includes training and equipment in areas where we see capability gaps, including maritime domain awareness, patrol boat maintenance, law enforcement, interagency and strategy development.

APS also funds the development and sharing of SeaVision, a web based common operating picture, chat and analysis tool fed by various data streams. We maintain a program of engagement through ship deployments and key leader engagement. APS has brought a number of US ships to Atlantic Africa, beginning in 2007 with the deployment of the USS Fort McHenry and most recently the USS Hershel "Woody" Williams.

Lessons Learned from Obangame Express

Our main Gulf of Guinea exercise is OBANGAME EXPRESS, which has just completed its 10th iteration. The exercise focuses on maritime domain awareness, communication and coordination between navies to interdict threats at sea.

What have we learned? Firstly, the strengths. Obangame means "togetherness" and the exercise has helped build a community. The 2021 iteration included 32 participating nations from around the world and nearly 100 individually evaluated events. The 2022 exercises is shaping up to be even better.

OBANGAME exercises the Yaounde Code of Conduct, the maritime security framework for West and Central Africa signed in 2013 between 22 signatory states. The exercise has become more decentralized to fully utilize the Yaoundé architecture of maritime operations centers.

Another strength is the Senior Leadership Seminar, where heads of Navies and other Flag Officers gather to provide direction to the exercise, review the current maritime security environment and develop ideas.

We have also discovered some weaknesses. Firstly, there is a real need to build the trust between all of the parties by sharing information. The only way to strengthen an organization or institution is to use it. In my view, if we want the African navies to be well funded and supported at the national level, we need to champion them.

There are a lot of opportunities to grow. We would like to see more African leadership and training teams, more use of SeaVision COP and chat, and an escalation of naval capabilities. We can also learn from other regional exercises, such as Grand African Nemo and most importantly African exercises.

What are the current threats in the region? Piracy has become a big problem. In 2020, there were 135 crew members kidnapped – 130 of them in the Gulf of Guinea. Hijackers are armed 80% of the time and the average kidnapping incident occurring over 60NM from land, the furthest over 200NM. The IMB is recommending that vessels in the region remain 250 NM from the coast.

What does this mean for regional navies and for OBANGAME? The rise in kidnapping incidents further away from shorelines demonstrates the increasing capabilities of pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. This needs to be met by increasing the capabilities of African Navies. They will need to operate much further from shore than they are used to, and need better intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information. Helicopters offer a stand-off capability, and drones offer a cheaper form of ship-based MDA. Boardings are likely to be opposed and violent. Safe rooms are safe for less than a day and industry reps have pushed for armed guards and escorts. In summary, piracy is an economic threat that requires investment in GoG Navies.

Multinational Coordination in the Gulf of Guinea

How do we better support our Gulf of Guinea partners? The ecosystem for multinational cooperation in Atlantic Africa is now quite comprehensive.

In 2022 will provide more support to the Yaoundé Maritime Operations centers as they conduct and coordinate maritime patrols. We have scheduled several patrol periods in the Gulf of Guinea. We plan to synchronize our ship schedules with European and African partners to provide more persistent coverage in the region.

In terms of security cooperation, we are aiming to conduct voyage repairs in the Gulf of Guinea and to conduct port visits, bilateral exercises and subject matter expert exchanges, including with our marines. We will invite African, European and Brazilian Naval personnel to embark our vessel in order to improve coordination and conduct at sea training and law enforcement activities. We will take every opportunity to exercise with partner vessels and assets in the region, especially helicopters. We will endeavor to provide more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information to partners and exercise regional sharing networks. We are open to new ideas, looking forward to another successful OBANGAME exercise, and are excited about spending quality time in the region in 2022.

The Azores archipelago and its ultracentrality

It is an honour to be here today at this 3rd Atlantic Centre Seminar.

In the global diplomatic game, the Azores archipelago is indeed small in size. It is so territorially. However, it is not so in geopolitical and geostrategic terms in the context of international relations.

This region of ours, in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, provides the country and the European Union with a greater margin of influence and action far beyond its territorial dimension. We are, therefore, talking about transatlantic relations and its Atlantic “ultracentrality”.

If in the north we privilege our relationship with Azorean communities scattered both in the United States and in Canada, in the south we can also find a strong presence of Azoreans in states such as Brazil. This presence extends as far as Hawaii.

But it is our triple identity, namely Azorean, Portuguese, and European, that seems essential.

This European cradle of ours, wrapped in the mantle of an Outermost Region, established in the famous article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, gives the Portuguese State a particular functional power on the world political chessboard.

To be an Outermost Region of the European Union is to belong to a transnational community based on nine regions located in the western Atlantic, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and the Amazon basin.

This dispersion and geographical remoteness, both from their respective Member States and from the European continent itself, while on the one hand is a challenge for these territories – I am talking about factors such as the difficult climate and terrain, economic dependence on certain products, costs related to insularity, etc. – on the other hand, it is an asset for the projection of the respective states, in this case Portugal, Spain, and France, in much more distant areas.

They are located in “strategic areas of the globe”, representing an effective presence of the European Union beyond its borders. They are therefore attractive to the major powers and their respective foreign policy actions.

Let us take the case of the Azores archipelago. The defence cooperation ties between the United States and Portugal are well known.

For the Americans, “counting on the logistical support of the Lajes base in the Azores, in order to be able to project their power towards Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East itself, in the event of a conflict in one of these regions,” has guaranteed their presence in the archipelago until today.

The Azorean archipelago played an important role in ensuring Portugal’s ability to negotiate with the United States, whether during World War II, by providing logistical

facilities to the allies, or during the Cold War and its support to the West, by providing it with functional power.

It is a clear example of how an archipelago of small territorial size became large enough to influence cooperation between states, and even today the US still has an interest in maintaining its presence there (despite the significantly reduced number).

Nevertheless, given this progressive reduction of the US military presence in the Azores, a subtle Chinese interest in those Atlantic islands has emerged. However, the United States still has a presence in Lajes, even if it is reduced in number.

What is certain is that any relationship between powers of different sizes in terms of military prospects and defence itself must be based on “very well-defined interests”, particularly between a superpower like the United States and a small state like Portugal.

Exerting influence in small territorial parcels, existing all over the globe in order to increase a nation’s power of influence, has been a constant game in the dispute of the great powers.

The other side of things is that these small parcels or small states gain, momentarily, negotiating capacity, whose ability should not be limited only to an economic whole. It must encompass defence and military cooperation.

The insular dimension is, therefore, a reality that increasingly aggregates transnational interests. But it lacks a defence policy based on international cooperation.

Allow me, therefore, to refer to the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira as key pieces for Portugal and for the Euro-Atlantic area.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to be aware of a new variable in the face of “variable geometry in multinational cooperation”. I am talking about something that may be decisive for cooperation in the Atlantic, namely the creation of an Atlantic macro-region.

The most recent discussion that led the Committee of the Regions to adopt a set of proposals aimed at strengthening cooperation between the Atlantic regions of the European Union, involving Portugal, Spain, France and Ireland, aims to improve the response capacity to the challenges caused by Brexit and COVID-19 and to boost crucial sectors of the blue economy, from fisheries to trade, tourism and transport.

This has been a topic widely debated in several European institutions, including the European Parliament, and also involves the creation of a Task Force in the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions of Europe, the CPMR, clearly demonstrating the interest generated by other European regions around this issue.

Now that the foundations have been created for an Atlantic macro-region in the areas previously announced, it would be interesting to envisage, in the medium/long term, an approach based on a security and defence policy involving these regions.

Firstly, in the mapping of needs and, subsequently, in the establishment of partnerships which aim to strengthen ties that guarantee an effective defence of the Atlantic.

The Outermost Regions will play a fundamental role here, and there must be specific strategies for them, given that they contribute greatly to a wide sphere of influence of the European Union’s maritime dimension, are also natural laboratories in scientific terms and, given their geostrategic position, are also crucial to activities related to space matters.

It is, therefore, fundamental to achieve a macro-regional vision where the security and defence component can be covered.

Going further, it is important to consider the Macaronesia region and inter-island cooperation.

The Azores appear to be essential to this relationship, not only because of the ties that already exist with our neighbouring region Madeira, but also with the Canary Islands and Cape Verde. The strengthening of archipelagic cooperation must be continually expanded to include other archipelagos, with the Portuguese-speaking ones being of particular interest, and therefore a future involvement of São Tomé and Príncipe.

In this sense, the Azores are, with enormous clairvoyance, geopolitically and geostrategically determinant to leverage new external cooperation agreements, whether through international projects, within the scope of the European Union, or through future cooperation and defence protocols based on a pole-to-pole Atlantic strategy.

Allow me one last reference to the Atlantic Centre. We believe in its mission to promote the capacity building of Atlantic defence as a Multilateral Centre of excellence.

The fact that you are embracing Terceira Island for this project, which is expected to be fruitful, is also a source of pride for the Autonomous Region of the Azores.

Ana Santos Pinto

Assistant Professor, NOVA University of Lisbon

I was challenged to share some experiences on multinational and multilateral cooperation under the 5+5 Defence Initiative and how this experience could be useful to the Atlantic Centre development.

The 5+5 Defence Initiative is framed by the 5+5 Dialogue. This is a sub-regional forum covering several policy areas, such as energy and environment, health, education, culture or tourism, as well as defence. The Defence Initiative has developed, over the last decades, in a more intensive way.

The 5+5 Dialogue and Initiative were launched in the beginning of nineteen nineties by Western Mediterranean countries, both from the Northern and Southern shores. Its members include, from the Northern shore, Portugal, Spain, France (which are also Atlantic countries), as well as Italy and Malta, and from the Southern shore, Mauritania and Morocco (also Atlantic countries), as well as Tunisia, Algeria and Libya.

The main objective of this initiative is to enhance multilateral cooperation through concrete actions and exchange of experiences, which, at the same time, promote a greater understanding and trust between Member states.

The 5+5 Defence Initiative evolved from an informal forum to discuss common security threats – mainly in the Mediterranean – and debate different perceptions, to a more structured cooperation framework, especially after 2004, with the first Defence Ministers meeting. The Initiative is always based on consensus, both on political declarations and practical activities.

It is focused on four cooperation areas that result from a common interpretation of the member countries regarding security priorities, taking into account the differences in state organisation in the different countries. These areas are: Maritime Surveillance, Air Security, Education and Research and Armed Forces Contribution to Civil Protection.

It has a simple institutional structure, based on three pillars:

- Ministerial Meeting (once a year, for political guidelines reflected in an annual Action Plan)
- Steering Committee (twice a year, or exceptionally when a member country requires it; for monitoring the implementation of the Action Plan and the development in each cooperation area)
- And Chiefs of Defence Meetings (once a year, review each year activities that were undertaken and prepare the annual activity plan).

The core of 5+5 activities are on the several projects that, yearly, are undertaken, where Maritime Surveillance and Education and Training have a prominent role.

I can detail other projects later in the Q&A, but allow me to highlight two:

- CEMRES (*Centre Euromaghrébin de Recherches et d'Etudes Stratégiques*)

Is responsible for a Research Project each year that results from the priorities defined by the ten member countries and counts on the participation of civil and military

researchers. The annual report, that is the outcome of a common effort, is presented at the Ministerial Meeting and aims to provide the decision-makers with a sub-regional overview of security threats, perceptions and recommendations.

In my experience, this a very interesting and stimulating discussion forum, where each participant learns a lot about the others' views and develop a working-based network that is beneficial for all.

- 5+5 Defence College

Is responsible for organise training activities at initial, intermediate and advanced level, for civil and military staff of each member country. Each training module is organised by a member country and, ideally, the activity should be shared collectively in the 10 member countries.

There is a permanent “Educational Committee”, with representatives of the 10 countries, that coordinates the activities and prepares the action plan for the coming years.

Major benefits from this model, include:

- Flexibility (each member country choses the activities in which they want to take part, that can be on bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral framework)
- Informality (meeting and debates occur in very open discussion base, where building a common ground is the key, as well as understanding each one's point of view and perceptions)
- Practice-oriented (the effort is not so much on institutional meetings, but on organising exercises and projects, promoting common training and exchange of experiences, knowledge and good practices.

Major shortcomings, include:

- Lack of a specific budget, which means that all projects and activities are based on each member country contributions, that can differ from year to year and jeopardise the continuity of medium- and long-term projects.

In the development of these projects – such as the 5+5 Initiative or the Atlantic Centre – the most important factor for the success is ‘commitment’. Members should be, voluntarily, committed to confidence-building measures; to listen to other members and know their perceptions; should be committed to building something in common, shared by all, even if that means small steps in a long road.

International organisations (IOs) are created with the aim of solving collective action problems when a crisis arises. Yet, member states have repeatedly established ad hoc crisis responses in situations where IOs might be expected to play a central role. ADHOCISM asks what is the impact of ad hoc crisis responses on international organisations?³³ In this way, ADHOCISM wants to contribute to filling this knowledge gap through a systematic study of ad hoc crisis responses in two policy domains: security and health. With this paired comparison, ADHOCISM wants to tap into a broader empirical governance phenomenon. Ad hoc crisis responses are here understood as loose groups of actors that agree to solve a particular crisis at a given time and location outside of an existing international organisation in the same policy domain. Ad hoc crisis responses can, in the short-term, lead to more rapid and effective crisis responses among like-minded states, but if international organisations are no longer seen as the principal instruments to confront global challenges, the risk is also that the relevance of these international organisations will diminish, and similar trends may unfold in other domains.

The complex web of international and (sub-)regional organisations has been one of the principal subjects of inquiry in international relations. While, initially, much scholarly attention went to explaining the proliferation of IOs, focus gradually shifted to studying the effects of this wider palette of options.³⁴ A central claim has been that memberships in institutions with similar mandates increases the chances of *forum-shopping*, reflecting a functionalist logic.³⁵ Member states can nowadays select from an increasingly broad menu of options in global governance, ranging from traditional multilateral strategies by working through formalised IOs, unilateral solutions via so-called ‘governance clubs’ to informal governance,³⁶ of which loose ad hoc crisis responses are an integral part. The result is an era of “contested multilateralism” (Morse & Keohane, 2014) or “global governance in pieces”.³⁷ Governance clubs and informal multilateralism or ad hoc coalitions are often seen as more effective, flexible and nimble than IOs. At the same time, they are criticised for lacking legitimacy.

33 NUPI. 2021. Ad hoc crisis response and international organisations (ADHOCISM). Available at: <https://www.nupi.no/Om-NUPI/Prosjekter-sentre/Ad-hoc-crisis-response-and-international-organisations>.

34 K. J. Alter, and Sophie Meunier. 2009. The politics of international regime complexity. *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 13-24; Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2019. The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering. *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(6): 883-905; Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal. 2013. *Institutional Choice and Global Commerce*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

35 Daniel W. Drezner. 2009. The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity. *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 65-70; Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2009. Overlapping institutions in the realm of international security: The case of NATO and ESDP. *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 45-52.

36 Charles Rogers. 2020. *The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance are Shifting, and Why It Matters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

37 Stewart M. Patrick. 2015. *Multilateralism à la Carte: The New World of Global Governance*. Valdai Papers 22. Available at: <https://valdaiclub.com/files/11399/>

Scholars tend to agree that IOs at global, regional and sub-regional levels overlap in terms of mandate and memberships, which can lead to cooperation or competition to be first responders.³⁸ More recently, Hofmann has highlighted how the interplay between membership overlap and preference diversity might not only lead to forum-shopping, but also to “brokering” and, more disruptively, even “hostage-taking”.³⁹ In general, membership overlap between institutions with a similar geographical and functional mandate is seen as offering states the chance to pick and choose the vehicle that best suits their interests.⁴⁰ Obvious examples include the EU’s and NATO’s security architecture, but military crisis response interests by the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ad hoc coalitions like the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (JF-G5S) in Mali,⁴¹ the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) fighting Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast Somalia (CGPCS) are equally good illustrations.⁴² As such, inter-organisationalists not only highlight these opportunities of forum-shopping and cooperation, they also increasingly stress the risk of rivalry between institutions, such as competition for resources and legitimacy.⁴³ What we thus see is an increasing literature theorising the effects of overlapping organisations, but so far with a blind eye towards the impact of ad hoc coalitions on the multilateral system.

For many good reasons, ad hoc coalitions are mostly viewed in a positive fashion. They are seen as giving member states more choice and flexibility, *inter alia* creating “a framework for states to cooperate while pursuing their national interests”.⁴⁴ Ad hoc coalitions also avoid bureaucratic delay and do not create precedents for future crises responses.⁴⁵ They enable states to pursue national interests⁴⁶ and avoid bureaucratic

38 Malte Brosig. 2010. The Multi-actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa. *International Peacekeeping* 17(3): 327-342.

39 Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2019. The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering. *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(6), 883-905.

40 See e.g. Yoram Haftel, and Stephanie Hofmann. 2019. Rivalry and Overlap: Why Regional Economic Organizations Encroach on Security Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(9): 2180-2206.

41 G5 Sahel. 2021. ‘DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ’. Available at: <https://www.g5sahel.org/category/nos-activites/defense-et-securite/>.

42 MNJTF. 2021. ‘Home’. Available at: <https://mnjtffmm.org/>; IMO. 2021. ‘Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) WG 5’. Available at: <https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Pages/Contact%20Group%20on%20Piracy%20off%20the%20Coast%20of%20Somalia.aspx>.

43 Joachim Koops, and Rafael Biermann (eds.). 2017. *The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics*. London: Palgrave MacMillan; Malte Brosig. 2017. Regime Complexity and Resource Dependence Theory in International Peacekeeping. In J. A. Koops & R. Biermann (Eds.), *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics* (pp. 447-470). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

44 Matthew Brubacher, Erin Kimball Damman, and Christopher Day. 2017. The AU Task Forces: An African response to transnational armed groups. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 55(2), p. 11.

45 Yf Reykers, and John Karlsrud. 2017. Multinational rapid response mechanisms: Past promises and future prospects. *Contemporary Security Policy* 38(3), 420-426.

46 Matthew Brubacher, Erin Kimball Damman, and Christopher Day. 2017. The AU Task Forces: An African response to transnational armed groups. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 55(2): 275-299.

delay and future precedents.⁴⁷ Rynning has underscored the strategic need for better connecting coalitions of the willing, institutions and so-called “tents” or contact groups – where ad hoc coalitions are viewed as the “sharp end of the spear” and IOs and broader groupings of like-minded nations can offer necessary strategic guidance and political legitimacy.⁴⁸ Other scholars have focused more on the on-the-ground effects of institutional proliferation and ad hoc coalitions. Ad hoc coalitions allow states to remain more in control – of, for instance, their military troops or personnel – and they provide an opportunity for “pivotal states” to “buy allies” through financially or politically rewarding third parties “to serve in multilateral coalitions”, in order to pursue national goals.⁴⁹ However, this approach does not explain the continued investment in rapid response mechanisms such as the AU African Standby Force, the EU Battlegroups or the NATO Response Force, all of which have not been put to use to date.

A key problem is that the term ‘ad hoc coalitions’ is generally used as a catch-all concept, which does not reflect empirical complexity. Ad hoc coalitions can differ in e.g. duration, resources, membership, geographical scope and relationship to formal IOs.⁵⁰ Because we lack understanding about what ad hoc crisis responses are, we also do not know how different ad hoc coalitions might affect existing and emerging IOs. We do not know if, when, and how these ad hoc coalitions compete with, or perhaps even undermine, established or developing IOs. In this way, also the long-term effects of ad hocism and the resilience of IOs to this phenomenon remains a black-box.

Cases and methods

To advance knowledge on ad hoc coalitions, ADHOCISM will establish a dataset on ad hoc crisis responses in global health and security. In health, the case study will be on the relationship between the World Health Organization (WHO - IO) and the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi), the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and their joint COVAX project. In the security domain our case studies will be the AU African Standby Force and EU Battlegroups (IOs) and the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram (MNJTF); the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (JF-G5S) and Operation Barkhane, primarily in Mali; and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).

47 John Karlsrud, and Yf Reykers. 2019. *Multinational Rapid Response Mechanisms: From Institutional Proliferation to Institutional Exploitation*. London: Routledge.

48 Sten Rynning. 2013. Coalitions, institutions and big tents: The new strategic reality of armed intervention. *International Affairs* 89(1), 53-68.

49 Marina E. Henke. 2019. *Buying allies: Payment practices in multilateral military coalition-building*. *International Security* 43(4): 128-162; see also Randall W. Stone. 2013. Informal Governance of International Organizations. *The Review of International Organizations* 8(2): 121-136.

50 John Karlsrud, and Yf Reykers. 2020. Ad hoc coalitions and institutional exploitation in international security: Towards a typology. *Third World Quarterly* 41(9): 1527-1529.

ADHOCISM will also quantitatively and qualitatively map select member states' strategic choices to explore and explain variation among ad hoc coalitions, and their relationship with IOs in the same domain. Through a set of case studies, it will make a significant academic contribution to our understanding of the complex interrelations between member states, ad hoc coalitions and IOs.

Besides Karlsrud and Reykers, the team includes Malte Brosig (University of Witwatersrand), Stephanie C. Hofmann (European University Institute) and Pernille Rieker (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs).⁵¹

51 This chapter of the report has previously been published as a blogpost with the Network for Strategic Analysis (NSA), available at: <https://ras-nsa.ca/publication/ad-hoc-crisis-response-and-international-organisations-adhocism/>.

**Reflections
on the
Atlantic Centre**

Licinia Simão

Coordinator, Atlantic Centre

Good afternoon

The Atlantic Centre was developed at the behest of the Portuguese Government, and its subject matter is constantly evolving. We do not see this as a weakness, but rather as a strength because it has evolved in accordance with the dialogues that we are establishing with all the partners who have approached us, and we have also adapted to the needs that have arisen.

The Centre has defence and security at its core, but we have a vision of security that is comprehensive and relevant to many of the topics discussed here today. Regarding maritime security, for instances, having navy ships at sea is important for security, but it is not the kind of thing that is going to help us respond to all the insecurities that we know about. In that sense, the Armed Forces and Ministries of Defence will have a limited contribution to make on the issue of security in the Atlantic.

We took this broader perspective in order to understand what is more urgent to discuss, and we think we have made a good decision because important topics are slowly crystallising and becoming clearer. For the Portuguese Government, for example, we have heard about the importance of the Azores, which offers visibility to key positions at the centre of the Atlantic.

The priorities we have identified complement the priorities of our partners in all Atlantic continents. With 19 countries at this moment who have signed the political statement, we hope that we can extend it to more members, through an ongoing commitment to develop the Centre and its activities.

Another key aspect here is the development of the principle of complementarity. What we can conclude from our speakers today is that we do not need too many initiatives that may be a burden on the resources we have available, which are scarce and need to be well managed. The first area of value here is the need for constant dialogue. I do not believe there can be “too much dialogue”, especially when the geopolitical context is changing so fast. For those of us, who are providing a platform where different countries can discuss how they see constant changes, we believe we can avoid misunderstandings already from the start. To me, that is a service to regional peace and security.

The political platform that we are establishing at different levels, starting with the Ministry of Defence and other relevant Ministries, by virtue of the institutional context of the different Atlantic countries, will help them to converge in this dialogue. I think we are moving towards achieving a conflict resolution approach and gaining trust through knowledge and dialogue. It is a platform that considers all the Atlantic countries, and it is something that has never been done before.

On the issue of research, if we bear in mind all the speakers today, it is noticeable that there is a considerable lack of information in many areas. Concrete information that can serve and inform public policy and decision-making, that can influence the allocation of resources to solve the specific problems we face. We certainly will not be able to solve

all the problems – there are just too many –, but with the help of others, it will give us an advantage. This is the case with the National Defence Institute, our host today. The Atlantic Centre does not have to do its own research from scratch, it can provide input to the research of partners who are already on board with this initiative. I would say that is the way forward: to highlight specifically and in a timely way, aspects that need to be researched and studied in order to assist in the development of public policy, so that we can put it on the agenda and create further partnerships to project the results in a timely way.

We will certainly set some of the priorities, I can tell you that the issue of great power competition is on the table and we want to develop a report, possibly next year, on what exactly the rise of great power competition means for the Atlantic as a whole, because often what is available are partial studies that discuss China's growing presence in Africa, or Russia's growing presence in South America, or EU approaches in Africa or the US. What does this mean in practice when looking at the Atlantic in its entirety? More Russian presence in Latin America, how does this affect the Arctic? Or how do Chinese strategies affect the Mediterranean and elsewhere? We would like this report to help reorganise existing perspectives on the balance of power in the Atlantic, and we are working with partners in that direction.

We are also working on studies that will help us understand what the Atlantic Centre can do in terms of capacity-building. We are committed to a number of principles that we would like to implement and one of them has to do with ownership, which was something also talked about a lot today. We therefore need to develop training and capacity-building processes more closely with those who are going to benefit from them. Instead of starting with a pre-formatted training course, we are taking the time to develop it in cooperation with the partners who are going to benefit from it, with countries in specific regions that we want to discuss with. It will take time, it will be more demanding, but the process itself is something that we can benefit from, it is not just about the training.

This is an example of the main principles that we would like the capacity-building activities of the Atlantic Centre to reflect. We are already working on this particular report, I hope that will give us food for thought about what the difficulties are in implementing certain approaches to capacity-building, what are the niches that the Centre can best take advantage of, etc.

Finally, and of course this has an impact on the overall view of the Atlantic Centre, these three aspects are not individual, they intertwine and that is how we would like it to be. It was very interesting today to hear the perspective of the Navies and the speakers who were Navy officers because they talked about the military presence, and the strengthening of the military presence in the Atlantic and how that can help other strategies supporting not only the fight against illegal activities in the Atlantic Ocean, but also, as Carmen mentioned, communities facing events related to climate change. This is something we should consider together with other types of responses: more military presence, where, in what form, how, etc. The EU Coordinated Maritime Presences are already taking place, focused on the Gulf of Guinea and the fight against piracy, this

is a good example of how greater coordinated military presences can be beneficial and well-received, and so we need to understand specifically what role can be assigned to the Armed Forces in this regard.

I also noted what Ana Santos Pinto said in this last panel about the importance of having dialogues on security matters. Andreas also mentioned how important it is, especially in a context of greater tensions, to have formats to address security matters through dialogue, even if this needs to be complemented by other areas that are less political or where dialogue can be less complicated. Nevertheless, it is important to have areas and formats where difficult issues can be addressed in an open and honest way. This is something we are happy to provide if participating states feel it is something they need.

That is perhaps the final note, in addition to my comment in the last panel about perceptions and identities, that creating a common Atlantic identity is something that would make sense on specific problems, and it must be done in respect of the many differences that are well demarcated in the Atlantic. Respecting those differences of perspective and understanding them will certainly allow us to have a more coherent approach to what we call the whole of the Atlantic.

My final comment is to invite you all to continue the discussion on this initiative. We are going to add you to our mailing-list which we call “Friends of the Atlantic Centre”, so you can consider yourselves friends of this initiative as of today, and we hope that you can come to us in terms of identifying opportunities for cooperation, and we are happy to give visibility to your initiatives, as long as they are in line with the objectives of the Atlantic Centre. I hope that this will be another moment to grow our network of friends and to create new opportunities for collaboration in the future.

Thank you very much to all of you who have shared your opinions with us, thank you very much.

Patrícia Daehnhardt

Co-coordinator, Reflection Group on the Atlantic, National Defence Institute

Prof. Helena Carreiras, Director of the National Defence Institute

Prof. Licínia Simão, Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre

Dra. Ana Paula Moreira, Deputy Director of the General Directorate for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Distinguished guests and invited speakers

First of all, I would like to express my thanks to the Director of the National Defence Institute, Prof. Helena Carreiras and to the coordinator of the Atlantic Centre, Prof. Licínia Simão, for the invitation to participate in the III Seminar of the Atlantic Centre and to participate in the closing ceremony of this important seminar, and to do so as the coordinator of the Reflection Group on the Atlantic, together with Prof. Carlos Gaspar, here at the National Defence Institute in Lisbon.

The Reflection Group on the Atlantic here at the Institute is a forum for debate on transatlantic and European issues relevant to foreign and defence policies within the North Atlantic area, and which brings together experts from research centres and ministries, academics, diplomats, parliamentarians and the military.

The Atlantic, of course, is an area particularly relevant for Portugal: as a country located in the middle of the Atlantic, as the geographically most Western member of the European Union, and with the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira, Portugal has followed a multi-vectorial foreign policy, simultaneously focusing its interests on the European continent, the transatlantic dimension and relations with the United States and in the South, relations with South America, and on the whole of Western Africa.

The Reflection Group on the Atlantic thus followed with interest the development of the Atlantic Centre, its launching in May 2021 on the Azores Island of Terceira and the signing of the Centre's Declaration by now 19 states to foster and promote a more integrated security policy approach to Atlantic issues.

It has been a particular pleasure for me today to accompany the proceedings of this seminar on the security ecosystem in the Atlantic and to listen to the ideas on good practices and lessons learned, and reflections on existing formal and informal cooperative multilateral and multinational initiatives that address security issues. This afternoon's fruitful discussions allow me to reflect on its findings and on where potential synergies can be found to facilitate engagement between the Atlantic Centre and the Reflection Group on the Atlantic regarding some common interest in the future in trying to address common security threats and challenges.

Regarding NATO, in the post-Cold War period, the Alliance remained a regional alliance because its centre continued to be the pluralist security community of the North Atlantic area whose political and territorial integrity is guaranteed by the Washington Treaty. At the same time, the Alliance consolidated itself as the main international organization with

global responsibilities because it became the core institution guaranteeing international security and stability in an area not limited to the North Atlantic area.

More recently, recognising the increasing international instability due to geopolitical great power competition, NATO is now embarked on defining its New Strategic Concept which it will adopt at the Madrid summit, in June of next year. At its last summit in Brussels, in June 2021, NATO's communiqué identified the containment of Russia and collective defence as NATO's strategic priority. However, the emergence of China as a disruptive factor, and its qualification as NATO's 'systemic rival', has changed this perception, given the potential for a diminished transatlantic consensus on how to deal with this new global actor, on the one hand, and the possibility of a strategic convergence between Russia and China against allied democracies, on the other. For Portugal this means an increased interest in a European and Atlantic consensus on how to evaluate China's international strategies and avoid the consolidation of a new alliance between these two countries.

This raises 2 points. First, as the global stability of the international system is at stake, NATO assumes more global responsibilities beyond the North Atlantic Ocean. While the alliance of democracies that US president Joe Biden refers to does not necessarily mean the enlargement of NATO, it does signal the willingness of the democracies of the Alliance to cooperate with democracies outside the Alliance, including those of the South Atlantic, to maintain and reinforce international stability, in a model of 'strengthened partnerships' between like-minded countries with a declared interest in ensuring the stability of their region.

Thus, the Alliance has every interest in cooperating with the democracies in the South Atlantic, in a concert between like-minded countries that cooperate to dissuade non-democratic powers that might put the international balance at risk. This applies to the South as much as to the High North: one example of such responsibility lies in what the Atlantic Centre's Policy Brief published a year ago identified as the "growing competition between Atlantic and non-Atlantic powers, which is expected to further increase with the opening up of the Arctic route, and taking a toll in maritime dynamics" (Atlantic Centre Policy Brief, Oct 2020).

Second, it is important that the whole of the Atlantic remains an area free from external interference from non-democratic powers. This interference can have implications for the overall maritime security of the Atlantic, at the level of the freedom of navigation and commercial routes, geopolitics of cables or deep-sea mining, or in developments in coastal areas with effect for the Atlantic country as a whole. Thus, as the policy brief states, "keeping the Atlantic as an area of peace and security, in itself an indispensable precondition for investment, trade, development and prosperity" (p.8) is a priority of every Atlantic partner. In this sense, the reinforcement of strategic partnerships with the pluralist democracies of the Atlantic and beyond, would mean elevating NATO's partnerships in the wider Atlantic area to a higher level, also given the possibility of an anti-Western coalition between the two revisionist powers.

Thus, the challenges that the Atlantic as a whole faces are big and they are increasing, even if the Atlantic at the moment is not an area of geostrategic competition *per se*. But in the medium term this can contribute to making the "alignment of threat perceptions or defence and security priorities between the many different Atlantic states" even more difficult.

Today's Seminar has thus reflected on these and other topics related to the challenges emerging in the wider Atlantic and I would now like to briefly comment on its two working sessions and pick up some of its main ideas:

The first session focused on the intersection and overlapping of multilateral entities in the Atlantic and on mapping good practices and lessons learned arising from this interaction. Four wider conclusions were identified:

First, the mapping of institutional lessons learned: how fit for purpose are the existing institutions and cooperation mechanisms today? To what extent would they benefit from a wider membership and how should they adapt?

Second, in the domain of maritime security, best practices have shown the utility of naval forces at sea, to respond to maritime threats. For example, increasingly the North Atlantic depends on the maritime security in the South and vice versa, showing that partnership frameworks in the South already exist.

Third, on NATO-EU cooperation, both organisations have found a way of complementing each other in three main drivers in maritime security: coherence, complementary and interoperability.

Finally, the relevance of the Atlantic Centre to help link different areas between the wider Atlantic and bridge the link between the North Atlantic, the Arctic and the South and the importance of the increasing linkage between issues of hard security, intelligence sharing, maritime and human security and climate change.

The second session focused on less visible fora and more informal solutions, but with considerable potential for this debate, including informal dialogue platforms and multinational exercises due to variable geometries. Some conclusions stand out:

First, the main advantages of an informal approach are efficiency of tailor-made responses, the flexibility of the pick and choose approach; the transparency that informality allows for; a more practice-oriented approach that avoids an over-institutionalized approach. A major shortcoming of this, however, is a lack of a specific budget, which can jeopardize the longevity of multiannual projects.

Second, the success of each informal initiative is what states make of it as it depends on the participating countries' political commitments that associated states choose to make.

Finally, shifting identities and changing perceptions seem to be better accommodated in informal coalitions of the willing.

So overall, this Seminar has highlighted that despite many national goals, there is room for some commonality of interests that link together different regional areas of the Atlantic, from the Arctic to South America, from to the Mediterranean to West Africa, from the Caribbean to Southern Africa, and for multilateral Atlantic institutions to continue engaging in shared security concerns, connecting expertise and sharing best practices of cooperation to function as a platform for political dialogue among the wider Atlantic community of experts and practitioners.

And to end on a positive note, the main take-away thus is "keep up the good work"! Thank you very much!

Ana Paula Moreira

Deputy Director of the General Directorate for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Representatives from the Atlantic Countries, EU Institutions, International Organizations and Agencies,

Representatives from the Academic world, Universities and Institutes,

Coordinator of the Atlantic Centre, Professor Licínia Simão

Director of the National Defence Institute, Professor Helena Carreiras

Co-coordinator of the Reflection Group on the Atlantic of the National Defence Institute, Professor Patrícia Daehnhardt

Ambassadors and Guests

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to say a few words at the end of the III Seminar of the Atlantic Centre, a project that I have been accompanying from almost its inception.

I want to congratulate the Centre for organizing this initiative that allowed for the exchange of views and reflections on the security and stability of the whole of the Atlantic.

The Atlantic is one of the pillars of our foreign policy. This arises from inescapable and well-known geographical and historical constraints.

In fact, Portugal is a European nation, with cultural roots in the Latin and Mediterranean cultures, turned to the Atlantic, that we have always seen as an “open door into the world”.

That has led the way for Portugal to establish relations with partners from Africa, North and South America, Asia and beyond, from wherever the seas could take us to, leading us to perform the 1st globalization.

As the European nation with the oldest fixed land borders, already in the XIII century, Portugal has developed its foreign policy as a sovereign nation, striking a balance between its continental integration in Europe, and its natural vocation to look at the Atlantic as a source of strategic depth.

Since the XV century Portugal made a clear choice of crossing the oceans looking for new realities, new cultures, new opportunities, giving birth to the Portuguese speaking world today united in the CPLP. This reality is very well portrayed by the Portuguese author Virgílio Ferreira in one of my favourite Portuguese sentences: “*Da minha língua vê-se o mar*”, “From my language we can see the ocean”.

With the 3rd largest continental preservation shelf in the world, at the crossroads of the North and the South Atlantic, between Europe, America, and Africa, it is easy to understand why Portugal is so keen in promoting initiatives that contribute to the stability and development of the Atlantic, where our core geopolitical centrality lies.

It was thus natural that Portugal was one of the founding members of NATO.

A committed supporter of the transatlantic bond, Portugal has actively engaged in the promotion of the security and stability of the North Atlantic area, in a 360° approach.

This means a comprehensive look at the threats and challenges arising from different strategic directions, not just the east, but also the South, where new dangerous dynamics, affecting the Atlantic area, require an increased attention.

For years the Atlantic has been considered as an ocean of security, growth, prosperity, and economic development.

Several geopolitical, economic, and social developments have however challenged this notion.

Climate change, as well as illegal unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU), organized criminal networks, and manmade disasters, the impressive numbers of piracy attacks, armed robbery and kidnapping in the Gulf of Guinea, are nowadays a daily concern.

To those worrying threats we need to add new ones, like Cyber threats, the unpredictable risks presented by disruptive technologies and the great potential of Hybrid threats being used in maritime disputes.

On top of that, increasing geopolitical competition among great powers, for resources and trade routes, pose a major risk for something taken for almost granted not long ago: open seas and oceans.

More than ever before we depend on open and secure seas and oceans, meaning both maritime safety and maritime security.

When 90% of world's trade in goods worldwide is sea based, and more than 95% of intercontinental global internet traffic transits through undersea cables, carrying 10 trillion of financial transfers daily, it is clear there is need for action.

We need to secure effective supply chains, fight transnational organized crime, protect common underwater resources and critical infrastructures, safeguard major economic sectors, and preserve maritime environments.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is a huge task. No country could ever answer those challenges alone.

To safeguard open and secure seas and oceans, governed by international law and commonly shared values, within a multilateral rules-based order, we need to work together joining efforts to succeed.

As a staunch supporter of multilateralism, one of the other pillars of the Portuguese foreign policy, we are actively engaged in the United Nations efforts to address Millennium goals, climate change, migration, and oceans sustainability.

That is why we are organizing together with Kenya the incoming Ocean's Conference next year.

In the same vein, we consistently worked in the development of the EU maritime Security Strategy and made maritime security a priority of the Portuguese Presidency of the EU of the Council of the European Union.

We pushed to strengthen the EU's role as a global maritime security provider, namely in the Gulf of Guinea, where we are confronted with an increasingly worrying trend of attacks and instability.

The EU has approved last semester a first-ever pilot project of Coordinated Maritime Presences focused on the Gulf of Guinea. An initiative aiming at effective coordination of naval and air assets by EU Member States.

Through EU delegated cooperation, Portugal has been implementing “Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security” (SWAIMS), a project that provides forensic equipment, quick response assets, and capacity-building to strengthen the management of the Rule of Law at Sea.

As a firm believer in the value of cooperation and dialogue, Portugal is an active member of all the initiatives that contribute to the stability, security, and development of the Atlantic.

We support the Yaoundé Architecture in the promotion of greater maritime security, that we see benefits in being complemented by the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, which we co-chaired in 2016 with Cape Verde.

Through the initiative “*Mar Aberto*” (Open Sea) and our bilateral defence cooperation with Portuguese speaking countries, we have been assisting countries and building capacity in multiple domains.

In the same spirit we decided to develop the Research Centre – AIR CENTRE, aiming at providing technological and scientific solutions for urgent needs in the Atlantic, in the domains of the ocean, climate, and space.

Ladies and gentlemen

The Atlantic Centre fits into the same logic. The new evolving political and security environment requires a global approach to the Atlantic, that benefits from the active involvement, views, and experiences of different nations across and along both shores of the Atlantic.

The discussions that took place today, and the added value of initiatives like Gulf of Guinea Maritime Coordination Forum-SHADE led by the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), from whose Director-General we heard earlier today, or the ongoing work between UNODC, Nigeria and Ghana, on new legislation drafting on current trends of piracy and maritime insecurity, show the benefits of multilateral and multinational initiatives.

They also confirm the Atlantic Centre as a role to play as a wide platform of dialogue, exchange of experiences and best practices, that brings together a whole of the Atlantic approach to the threats and challenges, in a comprehensive manner.

The fact that the Atlantic Centre proposes a broader holistic approach to security that goes beyond the military understanding, encompassing the root causes of insecurity, brings added value to the multilateral and multinational cooperation.

Because we believe in the merits of this exercise, we hope that to the 19 Nations represented at the Atlantic Centre, that ensure a vast north to south participation, others will join and will be soon participating in the activities of the Atlantic Centre.

With these few words, ladies, and gentlemen, it is an honor to be here today wishing a fruitful follow up to this work.

Intervention by His Excellency the Portuguese Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, Augusto Santos Silva, at the III Atlantic Centre Seminar dinner reception

Dear Minister of National Defence

Dear Coordinator of the Atlantic Center

Dear Director of the National Defence Institute

Dear Ambassadors,

Dear representatives from the Atlantic Countries, EU Institutions, International Organizations and Agencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to say a few words at the end of the third Seminar of the Atlantic Center.

Let me start by congratulating the Atlantic Centre for convening this seminar - the third one organized since 2019 -, providing the opportunity for experts and policymakers to deepen their reflection on security issues affecting the stability of the whole of the Atlantic.

For well-known geographical and historical reasons, the Atlantic is one of the main pillars of the Portuguese foreign policy.

Given the present international security context, one of the most complex issues maritime nations need to address – and to which Portugal dedicates significant attention – is maritime security.

The oceans are a valuable source of growth and prosperity. Portugal, as well as the other Atlantic nations, depend on open, protected and secure seas and oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy security, tourism and good status of the marine environment.

Let me refer two concrete examples that illustrate the importance of the oceans in today's world:

- Around 90% of trade in goods worldwide uses maritime routes, many of them located across the Atlantic.
- At the same time, more than 90% of the world's digital communications transit through submarine cables; in a digital era, the protection of these critical infrastructures becomes a necessity.

The Atlantic has usually been regarded as a secure ocean. However, the impacts of climate change, the impressive numbers of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as competition for resources and trade routes, challenge that notion, forcing us to rethink our engagement in the Atlantic.

Let me focus on the Gulf of Guinea. Data from 2020 and the first half of 2021 point to the persistence, but also to the fast-changing nature of the threats in the Gulf of Guinea. Previously low-risk areas are now witnessing a higher number of attacks, kidnappings are on the rise, and fishing vessels are being attacked first, so they can be used as a disguise to reach larger merchant ships.

It was during the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU that the EU approved the first-ever pilot project of Coordinated Maritime Presences focused on the Gulf of Guinea. This initiative was a first tangible step towards a more effective coordination of naval and air assets in the region.

Portugal has been also actively engaged in the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, which we co-chaired in 2016 with Cape Verde and which we see as a key venue for regular dialogue between international and regional actors on security issues, complementing the existing Yaoundé Architecture.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The new Atlantic environment is largely shaped by a rapidly evolving political and economic equation not only involving the traditional North-North links, but also the global South. There are therefore many reasons to take a more expansive approach to the Atlantic, embracing a wider geographic space, and with greater weight given to actors and issues in the southern Atlantic.

That is precisely one of the main objectives of the Atlantic Centre and one of its added values: to promote a platform of dialogue and cooperation with the capability of bringing together all these countries and promoting a whole of Atlantic approach to the challenges and threats affecting our collective security.

Another added value of the Atlantic Centre is to propose a different and broader approach to security, that goes beyond a strict military understanding and encompasses areas such as economic security, human development, humanitarian support, development cooperation, climate change, cyber security, among many others.

Today's seminar was focused on one of the central priorities of the Portuguese external policy: multilateralism. More concretely, the theme of the seminar – “Unpacking the multilateral security ecosystem in the Atlantic” – aimed at mapping and promoting synergies between existing multilateral and multinational initiatives dealing with security across this vast area.

Debates have shown the added value of multilateral cooperation and the good practices that we can draw from the different actors active in the field of security across the Atlantic.

Today, 19 Nations are represented at the Atlantic Center, ensuring a wide coverage from the north to south. We expect others to join in the near future.

As the Atlantic space is expected to continue to play a global role, we will continue projecting the importance of this Centre, and the need and the advantage of having more countries and organizations actively participating in its activities.

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	5	O Futuro da Comunidade de Segurança Transatlântica
	4	Segurança Nacional e Estratégias Energéticas de Portugal e de Espanha
	3	As Relações Energéticas entre Portugal e a Nigéria: Riscos e Oportunidades
2010	2	Dinâmicas Migratórias e Riscos de Segurança em Portugal
	1	Acerca de “Terrorismo” e de “Terrorismos”

II SÉRIE

2009	4	O Poder Aéreo na Transformação da Defesa O Programa de Investigação e Tecnologia em Veículos Aéreos Autónomos Não-Tripulados da Academia da Força Aérea
	3	Conhecer o Islão
	2	Cibersegurança Segurança e Insegurança das Infra-Estruturas de Informação e Comunicação Organizacionais
2008	1	Conflito e Transformação da Defesa A OTAN no Afeganistão e os Desafios de uma Organização Internacional na Contra-subversão O Conflito na Geórgia

I SÉRIE

2007	5	Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas Modelos de Reforma Institucional
	4	A Estratégia face aos Estudos para a Paz e aos Estudos de Segurança. Um Ensaio desde a Escola Estratégica Portuguesa
2006	3	Fronteiras Prescritivas da Aliança Atlântica Entre o Normativo e o Funcional
	2	Os Casos do Kosovo e do Iraque na Política Externa de Tony Blair
	1	O Crime Organizado Transnacional na Europa: Origens, Práticas e Consequências

III SEMINÁRIO DO CENTRO DO ATLÂNTICO

A publicação deste IDN Cadernos, dedicado ao III Seminário do Atlantic Centre, visa tornar públicos os contributos recolhidos durante este evento que reuniu, em Lisboa, um conjunto de especialistas em questões atlânticas. O objetivo residiu em refletir sobre as iniciativas multilaterais e multinacionais existentes, ajudando a identificar dinâmicas e formatos de cooperação e complementaridade que contribuam para gerar soluções duradouras face a ameaças comuns à segurança no contexto regional partilhado do Atlântico.

Instituto da Defesa Nacional
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