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THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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ISABEL FERREIRA NUNES COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A LITERATURE REVIEW NICOLETTA PIROZZI EUROPEAN UNION COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: WHAT'S IN A NAME? LUÍS CABAÇO A ABORDAGEM GLOBAL DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA: UM DESAFIO ATUAL LARS-ERIK LUNDIN THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION: FOCUS ON THE EU OFFICIAL FERNANDA FARIA "UM POR TODOS E TODOS POR UM"? ATORES E DIMENSÕES DA ABORDAGEM GLOBAL DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA ANA PAULA BRANDÃO EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY ACTORNESS: THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH HAMPERED BY POLICY DIFFERENTIATION JOSÉ COSTA PEREIRA E DILARDE TEILĀNE THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN THE HORN OF AFRICA MATTHIAS DENECKERE, VOLKER HAUCK E CRISTINA BARRIOS THE EU ENGAGEMENT IN PROTRACTED CRISES: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH?

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O conteúdo dos artigos é da inteira responsabilidade dos autores

Em junho de 2016, a Alta Representante para a Política Externa e de Segurança da União apresentou, aos representantes dos Estados-membros da União Europeia (UE), uma nova Estratégia Global da UE para a política externa e de segurança. No elenco de prioridades, da ação externa da União, aquele documento destaca o conceito e prática de abordagem abrangente (*comprehensive approach*), a par dos objetivos da segurança, da resiliência dos estados e das sociedades, da ordem regional cooperativa e da promoção da governação global no século XXI. Este número temático da *Nação e Defesa* é dedicado a uma análise detalhada e representativa de perspetivas e entendimentos distintos sobre conceitos e práticas de abordagem abrangente, no plano académico e da análise política. Neste sentido, os artigos que o compõem versam sobre várias conceptualizações possíveis sobre abordagem abrangente, identificando os propósitos e desafios que a enquadram, bem como os procedimentos, os instrumentos e os recursos necessários ao reforço mútuo de novas práticas cooperativas, quer no quadro nacional dos Estados-membros, quer no quadro europeu.

Isabel Ferreira Nunes examina os contornos conceptuais da abordagem abrangente presentes na literatura, identifica os desafios que se colocam à segurança internacional nesse contexto, relacionando a sua prática com a ambição transformativa da União Europeia no âmbito regional e internacional. Com base numa segunda revisão da literatura, a autora analisa como é que os processos de adaptação aos requisitos de abordagem abrangente, e respetiva implementação através de ações de coordenação interna e cooperação internacional, são tratados e operacionalizados em três grupos distintos de Estados-membros da UE.

Nicoletta Pirozzi analisa a origem, a evolução e as perspetivas atuais relativas ao debate sobre abordagem abrangente da União, no seio das instituições europeias e das comunidades de peritos, avaliando os esforços e condicionantes à sua operacionalização, em particular no que respeita ao desenvolvimento de capacidades na área da segurança-desenvolvimento. Conclui com uma reflexão sobre o futuro desta metodologia de atuação no seio da União considerando a adoção da Estratégia Global da União Europeia.

Luís Cabaço privilegia a dimensão metodológica da prática de abordagem abrangente da União Europeia e a forma como esta incentiva a combinação e otimização de diferentes recursos ao dispor da União, necessidade esta de carácter imperativo face ao desenvolvimento de um arco de crises a sul e leste da Europa. O autor examina o âmbito, os requisitos e os benefícios do emprego da abordagem abrangente em cenários internacionais de crises e conflitos militares e não-militares.

Erik-Lars Lundin desenvolve a sua análise para além dos tradicionais limites de aplicação da abordagem abrangente no exame das crises e conflitos, valorizando o seu impacto sobre as condições funcionais, presentes nos quartéis-generais da União, em Bruxelas e nos teatros onde decorrem missões e operações.

Fernanda Faria reflete sobre as potencialidades políticas, os instrumentos e os atores que conferem à União uma capacidade única, no plano internacional, para abordar as várias dimensões da segurança e do desenvolvimento. Reconhece que, sendo esta uma mais-valia europeia, está também na origem da dificuldade em a Europa se pronunciar e atuar de uma forma una. A autora considera que a falta de uma clara visão e liderança política limita a ação externa europeia, não obstante os progressos obtidos na adaptação de instrumentos e mecanismos da UE, destinados a melhorar a coordenação e ação conjunta no âmbito do sistema europeu.

Ana Paula Brandão identifica e analisa as implicações da diferenciação política existente no quadro da União, no que respeita ao emprego de uma noção de abordagem abrangente, no domínio da segurança. Os efeitos das ameaças transnacionais sobre a segurança interna e internacional afetaram o âmbito das agendas de segurança e o alcance da cooperação interna e internacional dos estados e da União Europeia. A autora analisa as consequências desta realidade sobre o desempenho internacional da UE nas vertentes da sua autonomia, capacidade e presença.

José Costa Pereira e Dilarde Teilane reconhecem o método de abordagem abrangente como o melhor instrumento para a gestão dos problemas complexos, que afetam a segurança da região do Corno de África, em particular ao nível das causas da instabilidade. Os autores reconhecem que o emprego conjunto de diversos instrumentos e políticas permitem desenvolver um modo de atuação que se tem revelado adequado e gerador de estabilidade e desenvolvimento sustentável na região. Para tal, a União terá que continuar a fomentar uma visão estratégica comum em torno da prevenção, do desenvolvimento de capacidades existentes e de um modo de ação estrutural em relação às crises na região.

Matthias Deneckere, Volker Hauck e Cristina Barrios concluem este caderno temático identificando e debatendo os contextos heterogéneos em que emergem situações de instabilidade e fragilidade de natureza estrutural. A natureza estrutural das vulnerabilidades, que afeta hoje estados e sociedades, reclama a presença de uma liderança europeia coerente e promotora da estabilidade, resiliência e desenvolvimento regional. Este artigo examina de uma forma detalhada os instrumentos financeiros ao dispor da União, considera o papel específico dos Estados-membros naquele quadro e evidencia o esforço europeu no sentido da harmonização de conceitos, estratégias e mecanismos de coordenação da ação externa da União, ao nível político e operacional.

Na secção extra dossiê são abordados dois temas distintos, que refletem sobre o impacto regional da política externa de dois atores globais: a Índia e o Reino Unido. Jitendra Nath Misra reflete sobre a posição da Índia na ordem internacional e as consequências da sua ascensão regional. O artigo analisa o desempenho externo do governo de Narendra Modi, tendo por base o manifesto eleitoral do

partido do governo e reflete sobre os obstáculos à ambição de ator global por parte da Índia, condicionada por processos de continuidade e mudança da política externa daquele país.

A perspetiva de uma saída do Reino Unido da União Europeia, na sequência do referendo de junho, tem marcado a agenda política europeia e adensado o debate relativo aos seus efeitos sobre o futuro curso do projeto europeu. Neste contexto, Carlos Branco avalia as possíveis consequências do referendo no domínio da política externa, segurança e defesa da União Europeia, no quadro das relações transatlânticas, equacionando os desenvolvimentos futuros e as repercussões geopolíticas resultantes de um novo equilíbrio de poder na Europa.

Vitor Rodrigues Viana

The EU Comprehensive Approach:
Concepts and Practices

Comprehensive Approach in Crisis Management: A Literature Review

Isabel Ferreira Nunes
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Abstract

The article consists of a literature review on comprehensive approach guided by five dimensions from a conceptual focus to the application of comprehensive approach. This includes an examination of concepts, security challenges, impact, EU international level of ambition and implementation by Member States. With this purpose, the study aims at first, to examine the conceptual boundaries of comprehensive approach by considering in literature how researchers select particular effects of comprehensiveness to define the concept. Second, to analyze the security challenges inherent to comprehensive approach. Third, to examine how comprehensive approach is part of the EU transformative project needed to tackle crisis comprehensively. Fourth, to assess how the definition of level of ambition determines a more comprehensive role for the EU. Fifth, reviews the literature on the implementation processes of comprehensive approach from the perspective of national agencies and agents of selected EU Member States.

Resumo
Abordagem Abrangente na Gestão de Crises: Uma Revisão de Literatura

Este artigo consiste numa revisão da literatura sobre abordagem abrangente orientada por cinco dimensões compreendendo desde as questões conceptuais às práticas de abordagem abrangente incluindo: conceitos, desafios à segurança, impacto deste método de intervenção, nível de ambição e modalidades de implementação. Com este propósito, o presente estudo visa os seguintes objetivos. Em primeiro lugar examina os seus limites conceptuais na literatura, ponderando como é que são analisados vários efeitos particulares de abordagem abrangente. Em segundo, analisa os desafios da segurança internacional em contextos de abordagem abrangente. Em terceiro, debate em que medida a abordagem abrangente é parte integrante do papel transformativo da UE, no quadro da gestão de crises. Em quarto, avalia como é que a definição de um dado nível de ambição por parte da UE pode determinar um papel internacional e mais abrangente por parte da União. Por último, revê a literatura e aborda como é que as agências e agentes nacionais de um grupo de Estados-membros da União se adaptam aos requisitos da abordagem abrangente e a implementam.

Introduction

Comprehensive approach presents analytical challenges that pertain from conceptual and empirical perspectives, due to the lack of analytical consensus and distinct institutional and processual adaptation of actors, which may further or hamper its practical implementation. Additionally, comprehensive approach generates a high degree of expectation regarding problem solving, when its goal is focused on problem addressing, which leaves it susceptible to criticism. Its successful implementation is not a simple task, given comprehensiveness involves very diverse perceptions, interests, instruments and policies. Various situations affect comprehensive approach. First, the presence of limited political will or selective political solidarity to engage in situations of crisis management and conflict resolution, as well as the narrow effort made by regional local actors to assume the responsibilities that come with ownership, do impact on an efficient comprehensiveness. Second, the systemic effects of current threats and risks, affect differently actors in the international system[1] and their willingness and capacity to allocate the required resources necessary to prevent, mitigate, manage and contain instability. Third, a growing number of state and non-state actors, that intervene in crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization, add complexity to comprehensiveness given they held different goals, institutional cultures, resources and distinct security practices. Despite the fact that a wide variety of stakeholders present in complex crisis situations may contribute to enhance representativeness of interests and increase the number of the resources available, it may also pose challenges to internal coordination and external cooperation. Finally, the presence of systemic threats and risks in current international affairs, also calls for a broader approach to crisis prevention, management and resolution, which comprehensive approach and action may help to achieve.

The present study has five aims[2]. First, to examine the conceptual boundaries of comprehensive approach in literature. Second, to analyze the security challenges that may affect comprehensive approach. Third to examine how comprehensive approach is part of the EU transformative role needed to tackle crisis comprehensively. Fourth to assess how the definition of level of ambition may determine a more comprehensive role for the EU. Fifth, addresses how two distinct categories of Member States adapt to implementation of comprehensive approach.

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1   In the context of this research by actors, one refers to the stakeholders such as the European Union, international and national institutions, civilian (comprehending personnel from various sectors and fields of expertise), police and military personnel that have a role in implementing comprehensive approach in crisis management and conflict resolution.

2   Issues related to assessment and planning of comprehensive approach actions at the operational level will not be dealt with in the context of this study.

Conceptualizations of Comprehensive Approach

Conceptualization results in an attempt to organize a given part of reality, by identifying the nature and scope of a specific phenomenon. Comprehensive approach is used by many in different ways, in terms of the 'priorities, means and end-states' (Goor and Major, 2012, p. 2) identified. Its conceptual boundaries are as complex as its empirical practice. In the framework of this study, comprehensive approach pertains to how state and non-state actors coordinate and cooperate in order to prevent, manage and solve the root causes and the consequences of instability and insecurity, by finding ways to work in an integrated manner[3], combining instruments leading to sustainability of security, stability, reconstruction and development[4]. This interpretation draws attention to the multidimensional nature of the concept of comprehensive approach and its practice. Our understanding of comprehensive approach regards the implementation of sustainable approaches before, during and after crisis occur and it is related with preventive and reactive practices and methods of internal coordination, within state and non-state actors and external cooperation with external partners. Comprehensive approach is as much as a product of exogenous complex factors, related to the contemporary nature of threats and risks, as a process of internal and external adaptation to challenges by governmental agencies and security organizations. As Pirozzi (2013, p. 7) sustains, comprehensive approach "can be considered as the policy response to the evolution of the concept of security beyond the conventional, state-centric and militarizes terms of the bipolar era". Whether we consider it from the analytical or empirical point of view, comprehensive approach occurs beyond the traditional boundaries of the security dilemma among state actors, striving for military strategic advantage and favourable to the use of force. Additionally, comprehensive approach can be perceived as an inclusive process of

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3   In the United Kingdom and in a comprehensive approach context , the expression 'integrated' "refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims and it concerns a situation where no one in one government department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts" (International Security Information Service, 2014, ft.1, p. 4).

4   The notion of 'comprehensive action' is originally sourced in the United Nations (UN) model, design to improve coordination among UN departments' instruments under the designation of 'Integrated Missions'. It is part of UN planning of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. It blends the security dimension with those of development, human rights, gender and humanitarian aid, in transitional phases from conflict to sustainable peace. In this context, the UN adopts what is designated as Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) in order to facilitate the implementation of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. IMPP is seen as a "dynamic continuous process allowing for activities and objectives to be revised, as the mission's understanding of its operational environment grows and as that environment itself changes" (United Nations, 2008, p. 56).

cooperation by systematizing "processes and mechanisms, promoting continuous interaction and exchange between often segregated policy communities" (Merket, 2016, p. 22) from the security environments.

In 2014, the EU Council Conclusions (2014a, § 2) acknowledge comprehensive approach both as "a working method and a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its broad array of existing tools and instruments, could collectively develop, embed and deliver more coherent policies, implement more efficient working practices and achieve better results". In 2016, the High Representative at the occasion of the European Council held on the 28th and 29th of June presented the new *EU Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (High Representative, 2016), stressing the evidence that "the meaning and scope of comprehensive approach will be expanded underlining the need for the EU to act before, during and after crisis and conflicts unfold"[5].

From an academic perspective, comprehensive approach offers a new analytical dimension regarding the EU external action and crisis management, offering new ground for research by providing a view on "new concepts and policies for a more coordinated approach to crisis management" (Gross, 2008, p. 9). At the empirical level, it provides a field of observation of new forms of securitization, calling attention to the benefits of preventing and reacting to insecurity, with the help of broader security options throughout the whole cycle of crisis and conflicts, at diverse levels and with the contribution of different policy dimensions. The current complexity and volatility of the international security landscape, in the domain of crisis and conflicts poses additional difficulties when one seeks to draw very precise and

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5   The document offers two, among many other, aspects of interest to this study. The first pertains to the title given to the new EU global strategy, by stressing the aspects of '*shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe*' and only in the subtitle referring to 'A *Global Strategy* for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' (italics added by the author). The second, the fact the expression 'comprehensive approach', widely used in the Joint Communique presented by the Commission/HR in 2013 (see High Representative/European Commission, 2013). On the European Council Conclusions of 2014 on the EU's comprehensive approach see (Council of the European Union, 2014) and on the Action Plan on the implementation of comprehensive approach presented in 2015 by the European Commission see (European Commission, 2015a). Comprehensive approach is often replaced, throughout the 2016 document, by the expression of 'integrated approach' commonly used by Member States such as the France, The Netherlands and Denmark in their national policy documents (see further ahead in this article on the section of 'EU Member States Implementation of Comprehensive Approach: A Review'). It is important to recall that both the European Council that closed the Dutch EU Presidency and the presentation of the High Representative document to the Council were disturbed by the result of Britain's referendum. Only the close team that worked with the High Representative may explain whether that influenced the final text issued by the HR, but it is pertinent to raise the question.

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all-inclusive definitions of the interactions required to stabilize crises and conflicts, mitigate future root causes of instability and create conditions for sustainable security, peace and development. The growing complexity of international crisis, due to the contemporary nature of security, leads to the fact comprehensive approach is on demand and is a widely used method of external action, although requiring better coordination and wider cooperation.

Literature on comprehensive approach often reflects a unidimensional approach, which probably results more from the difficulty to capture all the features that characterizes current security governance[6]. The complexity of security environments and the growing level of interdependence among security actors, lead researchers to look for 'specific aspects of comprehensiveness' (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 224) by selecting particular effects of comprehensiveness. Literature on comprehensive approach reflects to some extent this unidimensional approach, which probably results from the complexity of implementing it and from the diversity of actors involved, leading researchers to narrow down their object of study and privilege a single dimension.

Literature on comprehensive approach regards three traditional levels of analysis. The first looks into 'whole-of-government approaches' related to the interaction between the traditional field of foreign policy, with those of justice, police, development aid, disaster relief and humanitarian action at the international level. A second body of literature concerns 'intra-agency' within institutions, regarding horizontal coordination with respect to processes of comprehensiveness, namely those related with how institutions enable comprehensive approach and how comprehensive approach may lead to institutional reform. A third group of contributes values 'interagency' pertaining to cooperation processes of comprehensiveness between institutions, notably governmental departments (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 9; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 224; Friis and Jarmyr, 2008, p. 4).

In this study, the literature review conducted on comprehensive approach allows to identify four possible levels of research: security governance; institutionalization and institutional change; cooperation-coordination and enhanced civil-military relations.

Security Governance
The first dimension of comprehensive action comprises network governance approaches, as dealt with in literature about security governance, contributing to

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6   To Smith (2013, p. 33) "new forms of security governance result from learning processes origi-
    nated in how well new procedures and new institutional roles help solving security problems"
    and "new procedures and institutional roles result from adaptation processes, which translate
    into new responsibilities (conceptions of place in the world), rules (institutional rules and orga-
    nizational structures) and resources (material and non-material assets)" (Idem, pp. 36-37).

understand how actors coordinate and cooperate within and between organizations, irrespective of traditional power and government centred relations. In this case, comprehensive security governance, as Krahmann (2003, p. 11) observes "denotes the structures and processes which enable access of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central (sole) political authority"[7]. This body of literature focuses on how changes in the security environment lead to a shift from state centric actorness in international problem solving, to a situation where both governmental and non-governmental actors take a role, being that many of the actors that take part in decision-making are located above the state level. Security governance consists of a system of regulation of security "relations at the regional or international level set aside governments" (Kirchener, 2006, p. 949) established by "political actors other than governments" (Webber *et al*., 2004, p. 5). Within a security regime, decision-making is 'horizontally dispersed' (Krahmann, 2003, p. 13) (as in comprehensive coordination) in the absence of an 'overarching governmental authority' (Webber *et al.*, 2004, p. 5) and policy implementation is decentralised, self-enforced, being actor's 'compliance of a voluntary nature' (Krahmann, 2003, p. 13; Nunes, 2011, pp. 60-63)[8]. In the EU comprehensive action, one can identify distinct forms of comprehensive governance pertaining to different forms of strategic action. This occurs among the EU main decision-making bodies at various levels of governance, both in its intergovernmental level with respect to crisis management (Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP – and Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) and its supranational dimensions regarding the domains of development aid, civil protection, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Woollard (2013) introduces a distinction between a broad and narrow understanding of comprehensive action[9]. The first, regards the integrated "EU approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of coun-

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7   Text in brackets added by the author.

8   In a EU context, although Member States retain a great number of competences and financial and material resources to implement security and defense policies, the EU through CSDP comprises common institutions and processes that 'guide and restrain... (common) action' (Keohane, 2002, p. 15) and facilitate common action that otherwise could not be put into practice, leading to comprehensive approach.

9   This divide between the intergovernamental and supranational decision-making is also identified by Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011, pp. 231-232) as responsible for introducing a logic that may affect interaction and cooperation, being considered as one of two situations. It may create tensions between structural and operational elements of security or it may cause tensions between the internal and external dimensions of security.

tries" (Idem, p. 1). In this case, integrated means general acceptance by "all relevant EU institutions and policies, 'tools' and activities to implement these objectives" (Idem, ibidem). In a EU context broad comprehensive action is operationalized through thematic or regional strategies and narrow comprehensive approach applies to the action plans that result from them. A narrow expression may also consubstantiate an interpretation of comprehensive approach drawing on the possibility of civil-military integration within military and civilian CSDP actors (Idem, ibidem). Limiting comprehensive approach to crisis management, thus restraining it to the area of competences of the EEAS, contradicts the nature and scope of the concept itself, which in our understanding regards all relevant actors, that take part with different policies and instruments, in different stages of external action in order to prevent, manage and solve security problems, being security regarded in a broad sense.

Other views on security governance convey a perspective which value the conditions of institutional 'inclusiveness and horizontal coherence' (Schroeder, 2011, p. 50). Schroeder observes that, inclusiveness occurs when inter-organizational coordination comprehends all "relevant actors in devising coordinated answers to a complex security challenge" regardless institutional affiliation. Horizontal coherence takes place when actors share horizontal coordination provisions, working "towards enhancing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a specific cross-cutting goal" (Idem, ibidem). The same author argues that security governance allows to evaluate comprehensiveness strength in four parameters: "durability (stability of interactions over time), intensity (frequency of interactions), level (formal and informal coordination venues) and membership of inter-organizational coordination (number, profession and policy arena of involved actors)" (Idem, pp. 50-51). Studies with a more applied outlook highlight the importance of comprehensiveness to the internal domain played by the horizontal dimension (adequate level of internal security in complex environments involving law-enforcement, border management, judicial cooperation, civil protection, political, economic, financial, social and private sectors); and the vertical dimension of security, comprising international cooperation, EU security policies, regional cooperation between Member States and Member States' own policies at those levels (FOCUS, 2011, p. 7).

Institutionalization and Institutional Adaption
On what concerns institutional adaptation, perspectives in literature consider the process of institutionalization of comprehensive approach in three different ways. Some look at institutional adaption from the point of view of external efficiency and impact of the EU, as a way to enhance external coherence and comprehensiveness of the Union's policies. Others view institutional adaptation, for instance the

review of the EEAS[10], as a consequence that enables a more effective comprehensive approach. A third group of authors take a closer look into how new capabilities and other resources may enhance the visibility of the Union as an external actor, thus enabling better comprehensiveness.

The dimension that assesses efficiency and impact understands comprehensive approach as the result of integrated action, caused by processes of institutional adaptation among 'centralized institutions', vital to the implementation of comprehensive approach. This regards the levels of 'strategic and operational planning' (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 228) where different political actors, such as the High Representative, the President of the European Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee, EU Military Staff and the Commission (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 17) play a role in the decision-making structure. None of these EU bodies has centralized or overarching authority across all the EU policies, strategies and instruments. European security governance is shaped, conducted and limited by constitutive norms, centered on willing compliance (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42, Protocol 10), on the respect for Members States preferences, for their constitutional constraints and for the security and defense commitments agreed in the framework of other international organizations (Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 28 and 42).

As observed by Gebhard and Norheim-Martisen (2011, p. 231) "Europe shares an external portfolio mainly constituted by its external trade policy, development cooperation and regional cooperation, as well as of loose intergovernmental coordination within the European Political Cooperation". This means that from an early stage, the EU benefited from a unique experience as an international actor, whose external action is characterized as having a comprehensive nature due to the scope of actors, policies and instruments involved. Although the European Community originally appeared as a regulatory, economic and social actor, soon it evolved into a normative, security and defense player, which led to a structural adaptation of the European Union on "how these new components of external action could be reconciled with the structural instruments the Community, already had at its disposal"

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10 The European External Action Service (EEAS) was established by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, which entered into force in 2009. The EEAS was meant to strengthen the European Union on the global stage and to 'ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between those areas and its other policies' (Council Decision, 2010/427/EU).. The EEAS was officially launched on January 1st 2011 and since then its structure was revised in October 2014 in order to improve the crisis management services and the Foreign Policy Instruments Service. A draft review was presented in July 2015 in order to "streamline planning and decision making procedures related to CSDP missions and operations (…) in cooperation with Member States (…) guided by the November 2013 Council conclusions on CSDP and the December 2013 European Council Conclusions" (Council of the European Union, 2013,§ 3).

(Idem, ibidem). The political divide that characterized the implementation of two different paths within Europe, one of intergovernmental nature, regarding the management of political affairs and another of supranational orientation, concerning economic and social matters, is consequential over the development of comprehensive approach by connecting the domains of foreign policy to those of trade, crisis management, development assistance and humanitarian aid.

The literature on institutional change regards institutional adaptation in a twofold manner: as a source and a consequence of implementation of comprehensive approach. As a source of comprehensiveness, the constitution of the EEAS helps streamlining and improving the decision making process, seeking to guarantee the consistency of the Union's external action and generate better coordination between EU actors and cooperation among all relevant external partners. The EEAS can be understood as what the literature (Lehmann, 2011, p. 27) refers to as a 'complex adaptive system', which process of organization responds to external crisis with further 'centralization of decision-making authority' thus concentrating power and 'more control' in tackling crisis 'between actors or between actors and their environment' (Idem, pp. 30-32). This view of a complex adaptive system regards the process of adaptation of actors and decision-making processes when crises occur, causing disruption of the status quo of a given system as 'existed before the crisis occurred' (Idem, p. 29). It generates a centralization of power and resources on national executives (in the case of the EEAS on EU actors) and a 'reduction of actors involved' (Idem, p. 32) (in the EEAS case, materialized in a review and simplification of its structure) in order to better manage crisis and restore control and stability.

Consequently, the discrete reviews of the EEAS[11] since 2011, reflect a slow process of institutional adaptation of the EU's external service towards comprehensiveness, in order to attain more effective policies and improve the global impact of the EU presence. This was materialized by the High Representative, with the agreement of the President of the European Commission, on the constitution of a Commissioner's Group on External Action aimed at "creating a more structural underpinning for the comprehensive approach with the aim of further enhancing strategic coherence" (High Representative/European Commission, 2013; High Representative

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11 Since 2011, the EEAS has gone various institutional adaptations in 2014 and 2015 leading to a simplified structure with the creation of three Deputy Secretary Generals, responsible for Economic and Global Issues, Political Affairs and CSDP and Crisis Response, to whom the Managing Directors of the EEAS geographical and thematic desks answer to.

In the future, an assessment of the competences of the High Representative may be desirable, due to the too broad scope of responsibilities as High Representative responsible for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy, as Vice President of the Commission, Foreign Minister of the Member States under the EU rotating Presidency and Head of the European Defense Agency (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Article 18.4).

2015). Additionally the new Crisis Response System, within the EEAS, reflects the need for better internal coordination. The latest revision of the crisis management procedures meets this demand with the creation of a *Crisis Management Board*, connecting the horizontal aspects of EEAS crisis response functions, in liaison with Commission and Council General Secretariat, the chairman of EU Military Committee, the Chair of the Political and Security Committee, the geographical managing directorates and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy and the *Crisis Platform* created to facilitate information share and provide political and strategic guidance for further action and planning. This last body meets on an *ad hoc* basis and is activated in response to a crisis. It includes the EEAS, the European Commission and Council Secretariat.

Comprehensive approach emerges as a central concept to the EEAS review process "which makes the EU distinctively able to tackle all aspects of a foreign policy issue" (EEAS, 2013, p. 3). The revision of the EEAS corresponds to a process of adaptation through institutional change, where the practice of comprehensive action requires the institutionalization of comprehensive approach within the EEAS, as a whole. Two categories of challenges have been shaping the developments of EU comprehensive approach. On the one hand, exogenous challenges pertaining to the proliferation of non-state actors with long lasting destabilizing effects, leading to new crises in wider geographies following the 'Arab Springs' movement. On the other, endogenous problems, such as the financial crisis in the Eurozone and closer interdependence between internal-external security threats led to an increased need for better 'coordination and effectiveness in crisis response', to 'network and pool resources more efficiently' (Ashton, 2014, p. 12) and ultimately to a 'common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy' (Mogherini, 2015, p. 3). Earlier, this concern with commonality, comprehensiveness and consistency led the former High Representative Ashton to focus the EEAS review proposal on "crisis prevention, mobilizing different strengths, capacities and working in partnership (as) the key principles underpinning policy in dealing with conflicts and crisis" (Ashton, 2014, p. 14). To the former High Representative, comprehensive approach is a process of "bringing together all of the different policies or instruments for a common purpose, which is to endeavor to tackle issues and problems before they evolve into a crisis (…) in order to be effective we need to join forces and pool resources – those of the External Action Service, the Commission and the EU Member States, complemented by strong partnerships across the world" (Idem, ibidem). This conceptualization of comprehensive approach, as defined at the highest institutional level of the EU external representation, stresses the importance of three dimensions: (1) the preventive impact of comprehensive approach; (2) the need for complementary degrees of internal and external coordination and cooperation; (3) the coexistence of distinct policy levels operating jointly within the European decision making structure.

The third dimension of institutional adaptation present in the literature concerns how comprehensive approach may cause the development of new capabilities (Smith, 2013, pp. 36-41). Smith recognizes comprehensive approach as a cumulative process of addition of new capabilities (e.g. military and police forces) connecting defense and security domains to the existing EU civilian/foreign and economic policy tools, in order to improve the EU's effectiveness and coherence as a global actor. EU's comprehensiveness means a special focus on 'preventive action' by making use of 'EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem' (Idem, p. 37) and results from a combination between EU policing/military capabilities and 'longstanding expertise' (Idem, p. 38). This definition, although illustrative of the empirical application of the concept, appears at odds with the concept itself, due to the fact comprehensive approach may occur before, during and after a crisis, thus requiring a condition of sustainability, aiming at not only one security target, but multiple ones, with a multidimensional scope.

To Smith (2013, p. 33) adaption to new security conditions result from learning processes originated in how successfully new procedures and new institutional roles help solving security problems. The same author observes that "comprehensive approach is not just about improving functionality; it has also much to do with the EU's conception of itself as a responsible global actor', being perceived as an 'EU trademark in international politics'" (Smith, 2013, p. 40). The set-up of new institutional roles, instruments and procedures among the EU institutions and Member States result from various adaptation processes. First from new roles that come with newly perceived responsibilities related with the conceptions of place an actor has in the world. Second, from the adoption of new rules (institutional rules and formal organizational setting). Third, from the adaptation of the resources employed in long term stability, such as the role of civil society, the development of state building capabilities and the implementation of programmes of security sector reform (SSR) in combination with foreign and economic policy tools (Smith, 2013, p. 33 and pp. 36-37) made available by the EU. In fact, Gross (2008, pp. 14-15) considers SSR not only as a key concept to improve governance in post-conflict situations, but also as one of the most frequent indicators of civilian-military cooperation, especially when in articulation with processes leading to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The geographical and thematic strategies adopted by the EU, namely those for the Horn of Africa, Sahel and Gulf of Guinea are outlined around the principle of perceived responsibilities of 'support for welfare of the people of Horn of Africa', tackle 'the root causes of the extreme poverty and towards creating the grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development' in the case of the Sahel region and 'helping states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law and effective governance across the region' in the case of Gulf

of Guinea[12]. These strategies, which result from a new comprehensive approach to security are being supported in their implementation by strengthening regional cooperation with relevant actors, by enhancing capacity building and by using the financial support of programmes sourced in the EU and in relevant international and regional organizations.

Coordination and Cooperation

On the fourth dimension of the literature review conducted, one identifies that the adaptation processes that have comprehensive approach as a goal, pose analytical and empirical challenges to internal/external coordination within the EEAS, pertaining to the need and will to have a higher degree of influence concentrated at the High Representative level – as compared to other EU actors like the European Commission and Council – with consequences over the competences balance among EU actors and the incentives to generate political will by Member States[13]. As Duke (2014, p. 30) points out, coordination not only requires a better definition of the role and mission of the EEAS, but also willingness of Member States to incorporate decisions at the EU level, in the face of limited consensus, which may hamper the EEAS ability 'to shape external actions' and effectively implement comprehensive approach and action. The latest EEAS review proposal relates effectiveness in the implementation of comprehensive approach, with improvements in coordination and impact on future institutionalization of cooperation. This applies to distinct EU actors namely the EU delegations and the EU Special Representatives and external partners, whether one refers to third countries or other international organizations (EEAS, 2013, p. 5).

The processes of internal coordination and external cooperation leading to comprehensive action are suggested in literature through two interpretations. On the one hand, that of authors focused on the coordination challenges posed by the increasing internal-external nexus in security relations (Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009)[14] and that examine the challenges leading to better engagement and policy

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12 See Council of the European Union 2014/ 7671; Council of the European Union 2011/ 16858; European Union External Action Service, 2011.

13 The Review document was careful on the preservation of the Commission's competences in the current architecture; its role was even reinforced with the addition within the EEAS of the Commission's service of the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) responsible for the implementation of specific budgets such as the Instrument for Stability and Foreign Policy regulatory instruments. On the draft version of the future EEAS structure (dated 24 July 2015) the FPI is preserved and positioned on the upper part of the EEAS structure, together with the EU Military Committee.

14 The report issued by the HR ahead of the June 2015 European Council also stressed the importance of developing synergies between the area of Freedom/Security/Justice affairs and CSDP,

coordination among actors. On the other, authors that perceive the political divides or competences 'boundary disputes' (Blockmans and Nbauer, 2013; Major and Mölling, 2013; Merket, 2013) as a major source of disengagement from better coordination practices. At the EU level, these disputes between decision-making levels and policy actors are particularly evident in the case of foreign policy, development aid and humanitarian action.

In the context of literature concerned with coordination and cooperation, the EU comprehensive approach results from the presence of several conditions (FOCUS, p. 7). First, at the internal level, the EU comprehensive approach results from a will to improve the Union's strategic approach to the EU external action.[15] Second, a growing involvement in crisis management leads to develop partnerships and consequently to more frequent cooperative practices between the EU and different institutions and actors. Third, the construction of a 'shared strategic vision' and better cooperation between civil-military actors and EU institutions are essential conditions for comprehensive approach to happen. This view emphasizes the value of a European common approach to crisis and the role of coordination among EU institutions, complementarity of EU policies (CSDP, development assistance and humanitarian aid) and cooperation with external actors. Tardy's (2015, p. 32 and pp. 36-37) contribution to the understanding of comprehensive approach leads to reexamine the debate about EU actorness and further reflects on the possibility of an objective impact assessment of the EU external action which Gebhard and Norheim-Martisen (2011, p. 226) refer to as "EU's (specific) qualities and performance as a comprehensive security actor"[16].

At the conceptual level, comprehensive approach refers to harmonization of principles and better outline of integrated and complementary action in complex crisis. At the practice level, it highlights the complexity of engaging various sectoral approaches in crisis management, it combines different organizational cultures and involves the use of distinct instruments from individual actors at different stages, throughout the crisis cycle. As Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011) observe, at the EU level, this poses a challenge due to its 'complex multilevel structures', which involve a "large number of institutional actors and policies that need to be coordinated across bureaucratic, organizational and functional boundaries" (Gebhard

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notably in the framework of the European Union Internal Security Strategy adopted in 2014 and The European Agenda on Security agreed in May 2015 (High Representative, 2015, pp. 5-6).

15 Regarding the notion of strategic approach, we share Biscop (2015, p. 8) perspective that the EU strategic approach is place beyond the simple act of 'reacting to things'; is 'not about everything'; it is not a 'compilation' or 'replacement' of Member States' foreign policies, but rather a complement to it and it should regard the EU best comparative advantage when compared to other security organizations (Nunes, 2010, p. 64).

16 Brackets added by the author.

and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 222). Consequentially, the EU is 'virtually meant to act comprehensively' (Idem, ibidem) appealing to its founding myths as a civilian, normative and ethical power in the domain of security[17]. Comprehensive approach may be considered as an incremental process of coordination. It gets more effective, as organizations improve their own internal practices of coordination; as actors are willing to attain or strengthen the habit to cooperate with others and Member States perceive that their preferences and interests resonate among the international organizations they integrate.

Comprehensive approach holds a set of defining principles that inform the definitional boundaries of the internal-external relation[18]. It implies 'collective ownership and responsibility' (Civil Society, 2013, p. 2), meaning that no single actor 'can claim' full property of the instruments and processes involved in comprehensive approach, but also that ownership presupposes consensual agreement on actors and actions to be pursued. Also due to the diverse universe of actors, comprehensive approach suggests 'obligation of transparency' (Idem), which requires better practices of 'information sharing', internal 'coordination' and external cooperation among likeminded actors and organizations. Action is, according to the same source, context oriented not 'instrument driven', a principle of action which is difficult to trace in complex crisis, where actors and interests representatives are multiple, thus enabling the prevalence of different preferences. Finally, it claims observation of 'principles underpinning the different instruments', actors and actions, as well as identification and evaluation of the advantages in the application of different instruments such as those in the field of foreign policy, military, police, humanitarian and development according to local requirements and needs.

The scope of the concept of comprehensive approach must also be explained in the framework of the full span of crisis and conflict cycles. Some authors (Gebhard, 2013, p. 2) consider this kind of "functional holism across the conflict cycle more of an idealist aspiration than an attainable goal". As Goor and Major (2012, p. 1) note, comprehensive approach is about 'sustainable conflict transformation' aiming at preventing, managing, solving or stabilizing crisis and conflicts, developing sustainable institutions, governmental structures, democratically elected or with transitional representative functions, as well as encouraging social and economic development of societies and communities. At this level, comprehensive approach

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17 See Nunes (2011).

18 See *Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting (*2013). The Civil Society Dialogue Network is a mechanism design to promote dialogue between civil society and European policy-makers on matters related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union through the Instrument for Stability and by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, in co-operation with the European Commission and the European External Action Service.

regards a mode of intervention jointly, side by side or in sequence in terms of actors and policy instruments (Binder *et al.*, 1971; Pirozzi, 2013, pp. 11-13).

Currently, there is no full explanatory theory of crisis, for which it is difficult to attempt to produce a general approach to comprehensive approach from the point of view of actors' sequential intervention in crisis prevention, management and conflict resolution. State and non-state actors have different institutional cultures, competences and resources, which may shape the collaborative manner and the impact of the means employed in one stage of crisis, as compared to another. Not all actors have or make available a full array of instruments, whether by reasons of mandate, organizational and institutional designed or interest. However, this may determine how international organizations or state actors may work effectively jointly, side by side or in a sequential manner. Thus, the type of action underpinning the concept of comprehensive approach may be affected by the institutional design of the international organizations involved and by Member States own security and institutional culture. The manner in which actors get involved in comprehensive approach, through cooperation and coordination, are also important as a definitional feature of it, as Drent (2011, pp. 8-9) and Hauck and Rocca (2014, p. 28) observed. This is a characteristic particularly noticeable in the humanitarian assistance field, level at which civil-military cooperation may occur during and after the crisis period has occurred. Comprehensive approach refers to the actions "undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner by national and multinational civilian government agencies, military forces, international and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, as well as (by) the private sector in order to achieve greater harmonization in the planning, management, and evaluation of coalition interventions in complex contingencies and emergencies" (Multinational Experiment 5, 2009, p. 2). Effective coordination and cooperation may also function as a benchmark to assess positive impact among security providers and donors.

Civil-Military Coordination
The fifth and last dimension of comprehensive approach identified in literature, and also the most traditional of all, regards civil-military coordination (CMCO) and concerns the intervention of distinct communities of experts in a simultaneous or sequential manner in crisis management and post conflict stabilization, that is when civilian missions (e.g. police mission) are combined or succeed a military operation. As observed by Gross (2008, p. 11), CMCO refers to a new 'culture of coordination' and a 'prerequisite for the elaboration of an effective crisis response' blending 'continued co-operation', 'shared political objectives', 'well defined tasks for EU actors' and 'synchronization of activities in theatre'. This approach resembles what may be branded as a strategic approach to cooperation, not in the sense

of an approach adopted to meet opposing wills, but rather a far-reaching perspective meant to safeguard common objectives through task division and synchronized or sequential action. Improvements on better civil-military cooperation[19] increased after 2002, at a time when the EU was looking for both an internal strategic consensus, surrounding the drafting of the European Security Strategy and better cooperation in terms of external relations with strategic partnerships with other security organizations, namely NATO[20] and UN[21]. In both cases, institutional adaptation and institutionalization of cooperation occurred, facilitating a more comprehensive approach to civilian-military affairs. These initiatives led to the formalization of closer contact at the highest echelons of the EU and NATO structure, namely between the EU High Representative and NATO and the UN respective Secretary-Generals; between the EU Political and Security Committee and NATO North Atlantic Council and UN Deputy Secretary-General; between EU-NATO Military Committees and International Staffs; between the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission services and the UN Secretariat and also in capabilities development through the NATO-EU Capability Group. The EU and NATO, since then, have been developing closer cooperation in crisis management, capability development (e.g. combat on terrorism, maritime, piracy, cyber-security and organized crime) and political consultations[22] reflecting the notion that a growing fragmentation of external threats pressed for the formalization of comprehensive modalities of cooperation.

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19 The development of comprehensive approach dates back to crisis management in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in central Europe with the crisis in Central Europe, namely in Bosnia. The EU civil-military involvement in Bosnia at a time when a military EU-led operation broadly (EUFOR Althea between December 2004-November 2014) coexisted for a period of time with a civilian police mission (EUPM between January 2003 to June 2012)

20 The agreement on better EU-NATO cooperation was celebrated under the comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, concluded in March 2003, preceded by the conclusions of NATO's Washington Summit (1999), the European Council in Nice (December 2000) and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (December 2002). This agreement would enable the EU access to NATO planning, command options and the use of NATO capabilities. See also European Commission 2003/526 final and European Commission 2001/231 final.

21 In June 2002 the EU-UN Declaration on co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis management, underlined the commitment of the EU to contribute to the United Nations efforts in conflict prevention and crisis management and the Swedish Presidency of 2001 took forward the mandate to identify 'areas and modalities for co-operation with the UN in crisis management' namely in the context of civilian and military aspects of crisis management in the Western Balkans, Middle East, Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and West Africa.

22 A closer civil-military cooperation implied a process of institutional adaptation at the political-strategic echelons of both organizations, among groups of experts EU and NATO Military Committees, between the European Defense Agency and NATO's Allied Command Transformation and between NATO and EU's Situation Centres, among others arrangements.

In June 2015, the EU-UN common priorities expressed at the 70th United Nations General Assembly (September 2015-2016) underlined a cross sectoral, cross-policy approach stressing the commitment towards effective multilateralism; common participation in peace and security reviews; comprehensive review on non-proliferation and disarmament; cooperation regarding counter terrorism; climate change; humanitarian rights and international law; protection of humanitarian space; gender issues and open, free and secure cyberspace[23]. The partnership EU-UN is still considered a good case of cooperative success, when compared with the cooperative relation developed between the EU and NATO. Despite the institutionalization of cooperative relations between the EU and NATO, this is less visible for internal and external reasons, which impair joint comprehensive approach for two reasons. From the internal point of view, due to the position of some Alliance members that held this cooperative process hostage of their own national interests[24]. From the external point of view, due to the fact local actors have often been using competition between organizations and disagreements among Member States in order to maximize benefits (Michel, 2013, p. 263). This was particular evident during AMISOM, where NATO and the EU where engage separately, rather than jointly, in the support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aiming at ending violence and improve the humanitarian conditions in the field.

To sum up comprehensive approach is both a concept and a practice that pertains to adaptation of international actors to the changing international environment. It deals with causes and consequences of crisis and conflicts and seeks a durable rehabilitation of local actors, decision-making structures and administrations vital to the security and development of states and communities, in complex security environments. Comprehensive approach encompasses different actors and levels of action comprising civilian and military actors, state-centric and non-state centric actors, governmental and non-governmental actors working at various stages, for instance that of security, development and humanitarian action or those of justice, social and economic levels, both in hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures.

Challenges Inherent to Comprehensive Approach

The implementation of comprehensive approach faces institutional and procedural challenges conditioned by the diversity of political, strategical, societal and humanitarian players[25]. If the international security of post-Cold War offers an exogenous

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23 Available at http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_16584_en.htm.

24 The position of Turkey regarding the EU and Cyprus and of Greece towards Macedonia has led to a less effective EU-NATO cooperation as desired.

25 In the EU structure, three levels of decision making intervene in crisis management. There is a first level of intergovernmental nature, pertaining to CSDP and Common Foreign Security Policy instruments. A second one of supranational nature, with respect to the European Com-

challenge to the implementation of comprehensive approach, because international risks and threats are more complex and fragmented, the internal process of Europeanisation of CSDP appears to press for the development of new methodologies and instruments of comprehensive approach that followed institutional adaptation within CSDP. The European level emerges as the best 'framework for the elaboration of security policy' (Webber *et al.*, 2004, p. 14) complemented with thematic and geographical strategies. If the first (European level of decision-making), enables internal coordination essential to comprehensive approach. The second (thematic and geographical strategies), provides the topical and geographical focus that guide policies and helps defining the scenarios for European comprehensive action. The internal procedural diversity of the Union raises practical questions related to the implementation of CSDP and comprehensive approach due to the fact the nature and structure of European security offers to Member States a choice to participate on the basis of informal 'loose cooperation' (Howorth, 2007). This facilitates a more flexible process of institutionalization, coordination and cooperation within the EU, which encourages comprehensive thinking and action. Various authors perceive European security as a relational system characterized by collaborative practice described as complex multilateral and multinational coordination; high level of institutionalized cooperation (Smith, 2004; Bono, 2004) and coalescent Europeanization of Member States' security policies (Radaelli, 2006; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Tonra, 2013). As Joenniemi (2007, p. 140) observes, in Europe "cooperative engagement works as a normative goal" improving the habit of shared policy practices among Member States. Some authors perceive the lack of a specific juridical and regulative dimension of this cooperation as a highly effective setting for the comprehensive implementation of European security and defence (Pape, 2005; Mattern, 2005). To others, it is a challenge at the origin of severe setbacks in European policy formulation, capabilities generation and international actorness (Hyde-Price, 2004 and 2008; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005) that may affect European comprehensive approach and action.

Another challenge facing the implementation of comprehensive approach regards the need to avoid Member States decision makers and respective bureaucracies to influence the contents of the mandate to launch missions and operations in order to preserve national interests, sometimes at odds with the attainment of a common approach to security challenges. Comprehensive approach is not deprived from

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mission's role in external cooperation, humanitarian aid and development. A third level, regards specific intra-European competences that result from the EEAS responsibilities in crisis management; from the coordination practices between the EEAS and the Commission's Foreign Policy Instruments integrated in it, and from the attempts to facilitate closer relations between the EEAS services at the political and strategic level and the EU Special Representatives and EU delegations.

self-help approach to cooperation among security and defense organizations and it may even offer the opportunity for agencies to strive for their corporate interests, which in itself may be a challenge to effective implementation of comprehensiveness. It may be affected by rivalry, competition and duplication within EU institutions, between Member States interests and other actors, which adds complex challenges to the background against which comprehensive approach is operationalized and implemented. This has been increasingly difficult to contain given the complexity of the situations in which a comprehensive approach methodology is recommended. The EU mandates and thematic and regional strategies, which frame a comprehensive approach perspective, should be broader in scope, but also inclusive and flexible. This would facilitate consensus, encourage political will and generate the necessary resources in theatre, thus facilitating adaptation to unpredictable developments, occurrences and contingencies in theatre. Comprehensive approach is about making better use of a wide spectrum of resources and combined instruments and practices that produce a complex network of interactions, which pose challenges to the national interest of Member States, to their security cultures and practices in complex crisis.

Additionally, the working methods within the EU may constitute a challenge to comprehensive approach. Right after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the agreement on EU procedures to generate capabilities, shows evidence of a propensity to build up capabilities, before outlining the goals, the strategies and the scenarios where they could be employed (Nunes, 2016 and 2010; Bono, 2004; Bailes, 2008). In recent years, this tendency seems to be gradually replaced by the introduction of better-structured approaches to coordination and cooperation, through the agreement on action plans, enhanced partnerships and 'more for more' developmental programs, which characterize current EU regional and thematic strategies and partnerships.

Procedures of coordination and cooperation in European comprehensive approach lead actors to work jointly, side by side or in sequence and to overcome the difficulties of implementation of adequate sequential action is a challenge to sustainable crisis response. The EEAS and the European Commission are structured to safeguard subsequent phases of long-term stabilization, in particular through the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Commissions' agencies for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), as well as Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) programs. All these are valuable assets that may help successful transition across different stages of crisis and conflicts among distinct actors[26]. The accomplishment of sustainable responses to cri-

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26 To our knowledge, insufficient research has been developed on whether or not the impact of comprehensive approach is greater when there are well established formal cooperation relations between the actors, for instance if the crisis occurs in regional contexts where the Euro-

sis, by states and organizations, do not depend exclusively on their capacity to generate the required resources, but from their ability to generate political will, reach consensus and be prepared to intervene in a comprehensive manner before, during and long after crisis occurred. In this context, the prior existence of formal relations among actors may help to implement comprehensive approach, facilitating the use of practices leading to better coordination, in consecutive stages of engagement by one or various actors in theatre.

The success of comprehensive approach depends on the ability of the actors involved to guarantee a good degree of transition from prevention to development. First by creating the conditions for stabilization during transitional phases of crisis management or during and following conflict resolution. Second, by strengthening institutions and local actors in order to mitigate, in a structured manner, the sources of insecurity and violence. Third, by committing local authorities and other relevant local actors to take ownership of the institutions, administrations, instruments and processes leading to security, stability and development. Fourth, by ensuring an efficient transition among EU instruments from CSDP missions and operations, to Commission programs and projects, working in parallel with Member States' bilateral and multilateral initiatives, in the context of other international organizations, present in theatre (Pirozzi, 2013, p. 17). Diversity of actors and multiplicity of resources may improve comprehensiveness, complementarity, representativeness and legitimacy of comprehensive approach practices. By offering diverse cooperative options, it may better meet the variety of security demands in theater, but it also may run the risk of inefficiency due to the divisions posed by different interests, institutional and collaborative practices in place.

The presence of various actors in theatre may affect comprehensiveness. The EU has to struggle with the tensions caused by the systemic influence projected by hegemon states at the international level[27], by the regional impact of other organizations missions and operations in theatre[28] and by the effects of Member States and local actors' clashing interests and preferences[29] at a given time, with considerable

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pean Neighbourhood Policy applies or if conversely, such formal relations do not necessarily determine the success of comprehensive approach initiatives.

27 As Koschut (2014, p. 355) notes in the end of the Cold War, the introduction of an 'out of area' security practice by NATO, beyond the traditional area of application of the Washington Treaty further impediments, disagreements and lack of coordination among transatlantic allies, that have different perceptions of risk and threat, distinct constitutional arrangements and various types views on force projection. These type of tensions generated among allied security communities may add another constrain to the effectiveness of comprehensive approach.

28 See Drent *et al*. (2015).

29 For further reading on the effects of global versus national and local spaces impact over security conceptions and practices, see Aris and Wenger (2014).

impact on threat perceptions. Although the experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria called the attention to the utility of a comprehensive approach, in prevention, post crisis and post conflict recovery, leading to the creation of provincial reconstructions teams in the case of Afghanistan[30], comprehensive approach is not yet designed to help fighting sources of insurgency, violent radicalization and terrorism. Nevertheless, improvements are visible with respect to increasing resilience of states and societies with the introduction of the EU 'Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa' (2011), the 'Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel' (2011), the 'EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea' (2014) and the establishment of action plans, such as the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, together with the setup of EU Trust Funds, an important financial instrument that may contribute to improve sustainable comprehensiveness. So far, three large EU Trust Funds have been created: the 'EU Bêkou Trust Fund for Central African Republic' (July 2014), the 'EU Regional Trust Fund for Syria' (2014) and the 'EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa' (2015) with the aim to improve the EU and its Member States capacity to 'deliver more flexible, comprehensive and effective joint support in response to emergencies' (Hauck *et al.*, 2015)[31]. These aid instruments may help improving funds allocation and monitorization and facilitate engagement of third parties, partner countries and other international and regional organizations in the funds management, as an integrant part of comprehensive approach.

To the presence of different interests and to the complexity of regional crisis environments, one must add the challenge posed by local 'relevant' players and regional actors in regional crisis, as well as the role local cultural, social or even religious actors and practices may play in comprehensive approach[32]. Still in the domain of the challenges facing comprehensive approach, ownership matters to a successful process of stabilization, reconstruction and development. The EU official discourse has been dedicating a growing interest to capacity building of local actors in order to ensure security by their own means. This implies the development of efforts to empower local ownership of political and judicial institutions, good governance, rule of law, boarder management, public health management and social and economic development.

The challenges facing the implementation of comprehensive approach are not a European idiosyncrasy, but rather a commonality to most international actors com-

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30 For a view that corroborates this one see Hauck and Rocca (2014, p. 18).

31 For a detailed analysis on the EU Trust Funds see Hauck *et al.* (2015).These funds are instruments of external aid, guided to countries, regions and globally to help solving emergency situations or post-conflict crises.

32 See Tardy (2014).

mitted to it. Among the current major challenges one may identify, first the complexity of assuring successful transition across the various phases of crisis management and conflict resolution, from prevention to development. Second, to effectively commit ownership to the processes of local capacity building. Third, to complement simultaneously or in sequence, all the EU instruments from CSDP, to development aid and humanitarian relief. Fourth, to accomplish an adequate balance between diverse actors, with distinct collaborative practices present in theatre. Fifth, to guarantee the impartiality of representativeness and safeguard of interests in regional crisis, which would add legitimacy to comprehensive approach and action. Sixth, to assure that comprehensive approach brings together sustainable solutions by gathering instruments oriented to long-term action, as those of foreign policy and financial, development and humanitarian aid.

Comprehensive Approach as Part of the EU Transformative Role
The definition of a given international level of ambition comprises a definitional approach, which affects both how actors identify and select what is relevant and prioritary. The EU security follows a holistic approach that combines the dimensions of security with those of foreign policy, external relations, development, humanitarian aid and military action, where needed and possible, with those of preventive action, capacity building and rehabilitation of fragile states and societies. At the EU level, considering that the CSDP is neither an organization nor a defense structure, one must keep in mind that, as an intergovernmental policy it gathers Member States with different strategic cultures and preferences that conduct foreign, security and defense policy unilaterally and bilaterally, with the help of coalitions of the willing or in the framework of global and regional security organizations. Additionally, the EU and CSDP are not the only platforms through which Member States can project their common preferences and interests at the global and regional level, but just one of several. This means that, an EU's comprehensive approach is and will be less affected by the so called 'clear' definition of level of ambition[33] or by the presence of a traditional 'strategic concept', but rather by Member States' perception of power and influence and how comprehensive approach will contribute to it. As Gebhard and Martissen (2011, p. 222) observe, security is as "much a matter of physical safety, political freedom and economic stability as of environment balance or sustainable development". The contemporary strategic environment has changed the nature of strategic culture and the way traditional

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33 The Union's international goals and 'level of ambition' have already been stated in the European Security Strategy (2003) and The Report on the Implementation (2008), which identify the threats and means to mitigate them and with the support of several policy, thematic and regional strategy documents.

concepts of influence, power, force projection (e.g. use of military force and terri-torial conquest) and influence are perceived, being gradually replace by alterna-tive dimensions of influence projection and impact. At this level the EU can, through comprehensive approach, develop its competitive advantage among other secu-rity actors. The experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria have proven repeatedly, that not all security problems require military solutions[34] and that the impact of military power does not necessarily generate more stable and secured relations.

Authors that are critic about the EU's ambition to become a global actor (Hyde-Price, 2004 and 2006) and to adopt comprehensive approach (Mattelaer, 2013) as an instrument of international actorness, are often confined to traditional archetypes on 'security communities' that recognize NATO and the United States as efficient international actors and the global and military scope of their reach, as assets that give them a strategic advantage over other security actors. Constructivists, such as Buzan and Wæver (2003), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), liberal institutionalists as March and Olsen (1998) and even English School proponents, such as Dunne and Wheeler (1999) have contributed to explain the EU external behavior as a transfor-mative project, of which comprehensive approach is an important part. These authors underlined the value of 'normative and cultural diffusion or influence', identifiable in the EU strategies for the Sahel region, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa and Middle East, where implementation of comprehensive approach has been recently tested.

Comprehensive approach gives the EU the possibility to pursue a transformative goal, regarding fragile states and societies. However, this transformative role depends from the capacity of local relevant actors to incorporate processes of change exogenously given. Despite the fact regional organizations like the EU, Afri-can Union and NATO are being influenced by one another (Aris and Wenger, 2014, p. 290) the capacity of local-levels (relevant regional and local actors and organiza-tions) to become embedded in a given process of change, exogenously transmitted, is often transformed through a process of 'norm reframe', adopted to the extent it may be understood, accepted and incorporated by local actors into their systems of believes and security practices. This condition of embedment in the other's system of norms and values is crucial for a successful implementation of comprehensive approach. This is more unlikely to happen in regions and countries affected by the consequences of recurrent crisis and intractable violent conflicts, in the context of

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34 Biscop (2016, p. 25) observes that the military option can be used as a preventive instrument to escalation and that in 'a strategy based on pragmatic idealism, can only be an instrument of last resort' and it should become the last resort when 'vital interests and/or the Responsibility to Protect cannot otherwise be upheld' then Europe should be ready to act.

which, ill-defined or multiple interlocutors struggle for power positions, fueling violence and instability. Successful comprehensive action encompasses the '*transference to*' and '*adoption by*' of political and strategic culture norms and practices, as well as practices of internal coordination and external cooperation, which may be foreign to recipient actors[35].

Externally the new EU global approach, as presented at the European Council of June 2016, highlights the utility of comprehensive approach, how it may help improving the impact of the EU's external action and a better perception on its transformative nature. The EUGS states that 'Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships "(…) A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Internally, if the perceptions of power and influenced, shared by decision makers and Member States representatives, are conformed with such a transformative role, as mentioned earlier, then the EU or CSDP are likely to focus on a level of ambition that stresses the normative, preventive, holistic and multilateral dimensions of European security, rather than the strategic approach of national interest, national security, military gain and unilateral action, thus strengthening the very concept of comprehensive approach.

The EU transformative role, through comprehensive approach is also shaped by the presence of Member States own security culture and practices. Friis and Jarmyr (2008, p. 10) consider that national interests may obstruct 'policies and practices at both strategic and operational levels' and so can the presence of distinct security cultures and practices among Member States, leading to disagreements on goals, means and ends and ultimately to deficient coordination and cooperation. Whenever Member States collectively define common understandings on their external level of ambition, this occurs for reasons of collective trust, consensus building, operational reliability or dependability of Member States, translated into how they select organizations, such as the UN, NATO or the EU/CSDP[36] as preferred security and strategic partners. As Lehne (2013, p. 16) observes, actors commit themselves to "influence international developments in accordance with their values and interests". These choices are guided by an assessment on which of

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35 Italics added by the author.

36 It is important to note that each of these security organizations share different security and strategic cultures and employs distinct levels of use of force. Additionally, Member States, due to very practical reasons, such as scarcity of resources and elevated costs of maintaining military forces exclusively assigned to one security organization, face difficulties in keeping forces answerable and ready available to various organizations. Consequently, countries tend to assigned similar force packages, if not the same force package to different organizations and to give priority to that on which operational reliance is higher in a specific security scenario.

them better meets current security challenges, whether one refers to the EU in Georgia and the Horn of Africa, the UN and EU in Congo, NATO in Afghanistan and Libya or France in Mali. This does not mean that Member States are less committed to strengthening comprehensive approach, but simply that Member States with distinct national interests, different memberships in security organizations and diverse levels of strategic autonomy or dependency are likely to favour the organization or strategic partner[37], which is perceived or is better equipped to perform successfully on a given security challenge.

A successful transformative impact means several things to distinct international actors. In the EU case it means to hold specific civilian assets for instance: experience in rule of law, security sector reform and border control in complex crises; to share specific expertise in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; to have specific proficiencies in institutional building and civilian administration, in mentoring, advising and monitoring, in development aid and in humanitarian relief; or to be able to blend the use of long[38] and short term instruments[39] that better meet the root causes of instability, crisis and conflicts, without resort to force. These civilian niches of expertise can preventively maximize impact over recipient countries, enabling the EU to act as a unique security supplier, better fitted to implement comprehensive action.

EU Member States Implementation of Comprehensive Approach: A Review

The current state of research on the implementation of comprehensive approach offers various comparative perspectives[40] that outline different units and distinct levels of analysis. Hauck and Rocca (2014) and Friis and Jarmyr (2008) seem to offer the best explanatory approaches to Member States' implementation of comprehensive approach. Hauck and Rocca (2014, pp. 34-41) identify as main units of analysis major EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, and assesses 'national agencies and agents' approaches in different levels of analyses of external relations and how they shape implementation practices of comprehensive approach. These are then mapped by

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37 Strategic partners tend to cooperate with organizations which political structures resemble best their own, especially on what regards decision-making structures.
38 The European Commission shares a strongly embedded culture of economic, financial and social incentives regarding development aid culture.
39 CSDP missions and operation in crisis prevention, management and response are set to meet immediate security concerns.
40 For a comparative research on selected EU Member States and international organizations, namely the EU adaptation to comprehensive approach, see Friis and Jarmyr (2008); Major and Schöndorf (2011); Hauck and Rocca (2014), Post (2015) and Merket (2016). For a specific outlook on comprehensiveness on defence matters, see Santopinto and Price (2013).

the authors against variables that may condition foreign policy formulation and implementation, such as political and strategic purpose; scope of implementation of comprehensive approach as referred in policy documents; degree of interaction among national agencies; degree of institutional formalization of cooperation; funding method and level of support to the EU comprehensive approach. The first variable, formalization of political and strategic purpose regards the roles prescribed by state actors, which characterize the values, interests, preferences, policies and strategies actors choose to pursue in their external relations, providing them a 'common narrative and a roadmap' (Gross, 2013, pp. 11-16) for foreign policy during crisis. The second variable refers to the scope of comprehensive approach, whether actors choose a system wide approach (including systemic approach that binds diplomacy, security, crisis management, humanitarian relief, development aid, rule of law, business and trade cooperation); a medium range approach (diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action and development) or a narrow approach (limited to civil-military coordination). The third variable found in literature regards the degree of interaction among national agencies, as a pre-condition for comprehensiveness. Interaction (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 34) may range from a low level characterized by simple information share, to a medium level where information is shared and some activities are coordinated and a high level of integration[41], where policy formulation and coordination occurs and is corroborated in policy documents, joint programming, implementing and monitoring. The fourth variable pertains to institutional formalization of cooperation indicating the cases where actors engage in '*ad hoc* cooperation', 'flexible arrangements' or highly formalized initiatives characterized by 'standardization and predictability' (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 34) in the context of an agreed institutional framework. These choices are themselves conditioned by functional dependency among actors at the strategic and operational levels and by perceptions on institutions organizational efficiency. This means that an actor can be perceived as efficient according to the size and power of its military capabilities used is crisis management or in function of specific proficiencies in stabilization, reconstruction, capacity building, developmental and humanitarian instruments (Nunes, 2016).

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41 The UK's Stabilisation Unit offers a useful definition to 'Integrated Approach' (as promoted by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) referring to 'people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims. An integrated approach recognises that no one Government Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation context and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of Government Departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2014).

Being comprehensive approach a joint effort among different internal and external actors, it entails different security and strategic cultures, varied interpretations on the 'rule of force' and the 'force of rules', distinct levels of political and operational trust relaying on diverse degrees of interdependence and functional dependency from a dominant power, an alliance or other multilateral security institutions. Such dependencies affect the very concept of comprehensiveness, how it is implemented and which strategic partners are more likely to guarantee successful comprehensive action. This set of conditions is closely related to institutional formalization, addressed in the study conducted by Hauck and Rocca (2014) and concerns the national and international orientation of actors. This will predispose them, in particular state actors, to implement 'comprehensive approach beyond the national institutional set-up' leading them to divide external tasks by cooperating bilaterally with other EU Member States, collectively with alliances, multilaterally with organizations and with other local actors. The fifth variable identified in literature is funding, combining the possibility to manage dedicated funds to the military, diplomatic, developmental and humanitarian dimensions in an integrated manner, allowing assessing how much pooled funding is dedicated to fragility and conflict affected states and societies through crisis management, recovery (including resilience), development and stabilization programs and projects.

Drawing on a comparative review of the work of Hauck and Rocca (2014), Friis and Jarmyr (2008), Major and Shöndorf (2011), Post (2015) and Santopinto and Price (2013) one can observe the following findings. The countries which have global foreign policy goals, that are internationally more active, strategically abler and that often issue formal policy guidelines under the form of strategic documents (United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), that establish formal coordination and cooperation between national governments and agents, are among the ones that have been implementing comprehensive approach in a more efficient way. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France and Denmark are among the ones with the most developed institutional and processual settings to accommodate comprehensive approach.

The four countries, which are in the forefront of implementation of comprehensive approach, appear to share similar attitudes towards comprehensive approach. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and France with global foreign interests, have opted for strategic and targeted approaches to implementation of comprehensive approach with the involvement of relevant national actors, with responsibility for external action. Consequently, this suggests that guided and inclusive approaches to internal coordination and external cooperation facilitate effective implementation. Motives to engage in comprehensive approach range from 'national security reasons', growing 'power decline' (Post, 2015, p. 370) and 'operational benefits'(Idem, p. 340) in the British case, to anchor comprehensive

approach to a national strategic concept in the Danish case and to engagement in comprehensive approach for reasons of 'national economic interests' (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 39; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 1 and p. 3), as in the Dutch case. Denmark being the major donor in development programmes, practices comprehensive approach as a way to implement development aid and develop peacekeeping missions (Rosgaard, 2008). France employs comprehensive approach as an instrument to bridge its own national security and development policies.

Among these Member States, authoritative documents support comprehensive approach such as the 'National Security Strategy' (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2008; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010) in the case of the UK; the 'Guideline on the Integrated Approach' and the 'International Security Strategy' in the Dutch case[42]; and the 'Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, 2013' and the 'French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013'. These documents, inform national visions on international affairs, define foreign policy goals, streamline decision-making and cross-sectoral internal coordination and external cooperation.

In the face of current threats and risks diplomacy, development, defense, trade, health and justice policies are closely connected and institutional adaptation determines external action, whether one refers to the British and Danish 'whole of government approach' or the Dutch and French 'integrated approach' (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, pp. 35-36 and pp. 38-39); Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark *et al.*, 2013). In the four cases the national agency(ies) leading the process of formulation and implementation of comprehensive approach take the form of joint leadership, gathering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Netherlands, France and Denmark), plus Overseas (UK)[43], Defence (in all the cases) and ministerial development agencies, plus the Ministry of Justice in the Dutch case. In the Dutch and Danish cases non-governmental and private sectors play a significant role (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 48).

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42 See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014). In 2013, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frans Timmermans addressed a letter to the President of the House of Representatives on 'International Security Strategy' suggesting that integrated approach would only succeed if actors engage in the deployment of integrated instruments such as 'diplomacy, development cooperation, defence, the police, the justice system and trade'. See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs DVB/VD-073/2013 and Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014.

43 In the case of the United Kingdom, the inter-policy approach adopted led to the creation of an inter-agency unit first named 'Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit' and later 'Stabilization Unit', which gathers representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Ministry and the Department for International Development Managed with a joint funding pool. Similarly, the United States settled an 'Office for the Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization' (Friis and Jarmyr, 2014, p. 4).

The UK, Denmark and The Netherlands allocate dedicated funds to the implementation of comprehensive approach (Hauck and Rocca, 2014) facilitating the aggregation and sharing of financial, human resources and expertise, thus creating a solid material support base for comprehensive action[44]. France has no shared funding, although representatives of the Ministry of Finance attend inter-ministerial meetings (Idem, p. 36) gathering Defence, Foreign Affairs and the French Development Agency.

Another set of countries, such as Germany and Sweden reveal distinct case studies. Although internationally active and committed, both countries hold reservations regarding the use of military force in external relations. In the first case, the motive to engage in comprehensive approach pertains to a manifestation of military commitment (Post, 2015, p. 370) by other means and a source of legitimacy (Idem, p. 390). In the Swedish case, it is a way to enforce norms and principles and promote 'international development cooperation' (Post, 2015, p. 371) reflecting an international ambition to export its own 'crisis management norms' (Idem, pp. 355 and p. 390), with a specific interest on prevention. Both privilege the use of preventive, civilian and soft power instruments, a trend which is gaining visibility among the EU official regional positions for fragile states and societies[45].

Formal strategic initiatives guide comprehensive approach, in the German case the Action Plan on 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding' (2004)[46] and 'White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr' (2016)[47]. In the Swedish case, a 'Total Defence' concept (Post, 2015, p. 324) employed to deal with 'civil-military action' guides comprehensive approach and action.

Institutional adaptation takes the form of a German Inter-Ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention design to steer the interministerial external dimension of policies and international cooperation in support of the implementation of 'networked security'. In the Swedish case a dedicated agency, supervised by the Ministry of Defence, coordinates non-military actors and Stockholm

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44 For instance, the UK common funding to the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, under the authority of the National Security Council, announced in June 2013 for former Yugoslavia, was of £1 billion combining defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence), see International Security Information Service (2014, ft.1, p. 4). In Denmark, a Fund for Peace and Stability was also established.

45 Council of the European Union (2011) 16858/11; Council of the European Union 2014/7671 and European Union External Action Service (2011).

46 The Action Plan defines crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral task at both government and civil society level and identifies the respective national structures involved. See German Federal Government, 2004 [accessed on 12nd April 2016].

47 German Ministry of Defence (2006). See also Major and Schöndorf (2011, p. 3).

has been a strong supporter of a 'European level conflict prevention approach' (Hauck and Rocca, 2013, p. 38). This preference is a structural feature of Swedish foreign policy, leading it to present an 'Action Plan Preventing Violent Conflicts', which was endorsed in 1999 by Member States (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

The document acknowledges the role of different actors and according to Post (2015, p. 327) led to the organization of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a way that would strengthened cross sectoral coordination in conflict prevention. Later in 2001, during the Swedish EU Presidency, the adoption of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, during the Gothenburg Council, led to a European valorization of the civilian instruments in crisis management and to the creation of the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. On what concerns the leading agencies for comprehensive approach, Germany's network security structure, present in its interministerial organization, fragmentizes decision making and does not lead to obvious institutional adaptation, being coordination conducted on an *ad hoc* basis using 'various conceptual approaches, present among relevant actors, without pre-settled mechanism for joint analysis, development and implementation' (Major and Schöndorf, 2011, p. 3) of crisis management policies. This occurs despite the fact a Federal Government Representative is responsible for connecting ministerial departments to the higher ranks of political decision-making (Idem, p. 3). In the Swedish case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides considerable input to Sweden's involvement in international conflict management, while an agency responsible for non-military actors working in conflict situations and natural disasters relief is coordinated by the Ministry of Defence (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 36). In both cases, national leading agencies pursue a much less structured coordinated action, when compared with the first group of countries, showing preference for a more plural and network centric coordination among civil-military, developmental and humanitarian actors.

On strategic preferences and strategic partners, Germany and Sweden show preference for 'leading from behind' actively contributing to the domains of development and humanitarian action. While Germany has been more reluctant to engage directly in military action, it has been very active in post conflict situations, perceiving comprehensive approach as a way to compensate its less visible military commitment in international missions. To Berlin, a UN mandate is a requisite for external action and the EU is recognized as a preferred partner for civilian crisis management, post conflict reconstruction and humanitarian action, furthering European integration. Sweden focuses its preferences on those partners who can promote its policy goals regarding 'international development cooperation' (Post, 2015, p. 371). While the UN can provide the necessary legal and legitimate background to multilateral external action. The EU can make available financial instru-

ments and make use of Germany's expertise on developmental programmes and policies, as well as on humanitarian action.

On the application of financial resources regarding fragility situations, none of the two countries has shared or dedicated funding sources.

The last variable pertains to collective agency or how Member States internally translated collective will into implementation of comprehensive approach is indirectly addressed by the literature reviewed. The external level where collective agency of comprehensive approach is reproduced, is also different across the countries studied, denoting distinct worldviews and expressions of strategic preference in the way foreign, security policy and external cooperation are conducted. Strategic preference is conditioned by political and operational trust and by perceptions of common interests, common threat and shared opportunities. This results in selective commitment of states, in function of the level of institutional integration among international organizations (NATO, EU or United Nations).[48] Those with preferential relations with the United States and NATO, that are more likely to make use of force, notably in its military dimension and are already engaged in long term missions and operations, in the follow up of which comprehensive action may be applied, tend to opt for the implementation of comprehensiveness, bilaterally, with one international organization or under the format of a coalition of the willing. For those actors that privileged a strong legal base, on which to ground external action for reasons of legitimacy, legality, acceptance and representativeness, international players, such as the United Nations and the EU offer the preferential institutional platform, through or with which to implement comprehensive action.

The study conducted by Friis and Jarmyr (2008) on implementation of comprehensive approach isolates three alternative analytical categories distinct from previous studies: whole of government approach; inter-agency level of collaboration and intra-agency initiatives, testing them in terms of efficiency, consistency, ability to respond to insecurity, to set up policies and to add legitimacy to external action (Idem, p. 4). Major and Shöndorf (2011) complement these contributes by addressing how views and practices are observed among Member States (United Kingdom, France and Germany) (Idem, pp. 2-4) and how actors (inter-ministerial agencies) responsible for international coordination (Idem, pp. 4-6) adopt comprehensive approach in order to attain a more effective external cooperation with the EU, NATO or the UN. Svenja Post (2015) on the one hand, centers her research on the national institutional set up of Member States, how this affects the competences boundary divide among national actors and addresses how this applies to interac-

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48 See North Atlantic Council (2006); United States State Department (2013) and High Representative and the European Commission, JOIN(2013)30 final.

tion with collective security actors. Post (2015, p. 379) considers that "approaches differ in accordance with the particular administrative-political framework and crisis management context, in which the respective institution or government operates". This author also underlines the role played by national interests and preferences and how they inform Member States positions within the EU. Post considers that the implementation of comprehensive approach by state actors relates closely to how far the development and conceptualization, adopted by international organizations, is perceived "as to be compatible with their own crisis management background and needs" (Idem, p. 372). This leads to conclude that the utility of comprehensive approach to Member States' foreign policies is evaluated through the lenses of national preferences. Consequently, individual actors are likely to pursue their own objectives, leaving comprehensive approach exposed to inter-institutional rivalries and different 'institutional weights' of national actors in the international stage. This observation is valid, both to explain the behaviour of Member States and EU institutions, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), towards implementation of comprehensive approach. At this level, it appears that acceptance of 'a power base' and presence of a 'clear authority position', as related to other actors, are defining conditions to the implementation of comprehensive approach (Post, 2015, p. 380).

Still in the context of how comprehensive approach is reproduced in collective agency, strategic partnerships are also important instruments of external cooperation between the EU and other international actors. These foreign policy instruments correspond to a notion of international cooperation in a loosen format able to mobilize ways to address global and regional issues, where comprehensive solutions matter. In the context of EU's strategic partnerships, the domains of crisis management, capability development and political consultations are the most important dimensions of cooperation. Cooperation between the EU and the United Nations (UN)[49] is the most institutionalized and old cooperative relation and both organizations share similar goals and methods of cooperation. The UN is one of the organizations with the longest experience on comprehensive approach and action, through its integrated missions, meant to overcome the limitations of traditional peacekeeping in order to adapt to new forms of total war or intractable crises and conflicts by introducing a 'mission approached holistic or full service operations'[50]. A few aspects may limit cooperation for instance the presence of too many actors involved in the process of implementation of comprehensive approach, competition between EU bodies such as the European Commission (DEVCO) and those of the United Nations (UN Development Programme; United Nations Conference on

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49 See Jorgensen and Laatikainen (2004); Tardy (2011) and Cîrlig (2015).

50 See Weir (2006); Harmer (2008) and Rubinstein *et al.* (2008).

Trade and Development and United Nations Human Settlements Programme). The UN is often considered an ineffective actor, with a low record of implementation and limited international representation of collective interest, conditioned by the veto system among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which may impact negatively on cooperation. The positive side of cooperation lies on the fact the UN and the EU are able to balance each other through complementary resources, made available according to similar normative frames and values. Since early 2000, both organizations formally shared analogous perspectives on global threats (United Nations, 2004). The UN strengthens legitimacy of comprehensive action through its mandate and scope of representativeness, while the EU through the Commissions' programmes and projects can place its financial weigh in implementing comprehensive approach (Gowan, 2014, p. 277).

Cooperation between the EU and NATO may further the implementation of comprehensive approach, as long as one understands that NATO and CSDP have different security identities and purposes, which does not mean that interests and actions cannot be shared[51]. The EU through CSDP is better equipped to engage in preventive action using reconciliatory strategies that connect security, development and governance. The combination of CSDP crisis management tools and the Commission's Foreign Policy Instruments enable it to take the lead on non-military emergency operations, linking actions in crisis management with those of development aid and humanitarian relief.

On the other hand, NATO as a defence organization based on strategic dependence among allies, centred on strategic supremacy of a superpower and that of strategically more capable allies, has higher strategic leverage due to the military weigh at its disposal. It is perceived as more efficient due to the size, deployability, impact of its capabilities and collective nature of its defence identity, which works as a mutually reinforcing driving force among allies. NATO's cooperative initiatives towards comprehensive approach in the domain of crisis management and conflict resolution cannot succeed without the bilateral support of allies, of the EU Member States and UN focus on stabilization, reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid. During the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO endorsed a 'Comprehensive Political Guidance' stating that while "NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations" (North Atlantic Council,

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51 This part of the study draws on the findings presented by Nunes (2016) at the 'EU Strategic Partnerships EU-NATO Relations' at the international seminar 'The European Union Global Strategy'.

2006, §7). Better cooperation between the EU and NATO on comprehensive approach, in particular regarding civil-military dimension, requires better planning, command options and capabilities for CSDP missions, depending from those Member States strategically more able and capable. Enhanced European command options for CSDP operations, through the EU planning cell for CDSP operations within SHAPE, in close connection with the EU Military staff for military operations, are already a reality. This capability can be supported by the existing five headquarters offered by the UK, France, Italy, Greece and Germany, under the Union's implementation of a 'framework nation' concept, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, through which leading nations may offer particular capabilities.

This partnership contains some limitations that result from a prevailing notion that effective strategic partners are only possible among equals, that share a grand strategy and integrated approaches to security and defence policy at the conceptual, doctrinal and operational level and very precise strategic definitions and approaches on why, where and how to act. The cases referred earlier show that among and within Member States, this is often the case. A more contested, connected and complex world, as the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) suggests, requires strategic approaches to security partnerships, able to meet the diversity of challenges in a tailored made and flexible manner, adaptable to emergent security and defence challenges and risks, leading to better European coordination and external cooperation with the Alliance. For the moment, CSDP and development cooperation should focus on what they do best that is, to develop non-exclusively military emergency missions and operations. While NATO should focus on military dissuasive and reactive action, towards high intensity military contingencies, without meaning that Europe, in the medium term, should not be able to act at the high end of the military operational spectrum. The EUGS, given that one of the focus of the document is partnerships, could have also contributed to help reassessing functional cooperation between CSDP and NATO, underlining their complementary strategic purposes and their specific contribution to regional and international security. This is a difficult task, considering that NATO and the EU comprise states with distinct strategic cultures and outlooks, which affect the comprehensiveness of the agendas of security organizations, the very concept of strategic partnership and the choice of preferred strategic partners, whether one refers to the EU/CSDP or NATO.

A full implementation of comprehensive approach may also depend from a successful accomplishment of EU missions and operations in the higher spectrum of security and defence. With this in mind, a new way should be paved to solve the problem of access to NATO's command, control and planning capabilities by CSDP operations, under the Berlin Plus agreement. This could be done, whether by introducing an 'opt-out clause' option, for those NATO allies and European Member

States that often block the use of this mechanism, therefore abstaining without impairing access to those capabilities by the EU, as a part or a whole. On capabilities, the European Defence Agency has identified deficits, which a better and rational cooperation with NATO and the US could help overcoming, namely on what concerns strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, surveillance and reconnaissance. In the future, the possibility to develop a 'Berlin Plus Reversed' agreement through which, the development of EU civilian capabilities could be made available to other organizations in crisis management and post conflict reconstruction, would also further the EU international role in comprehensive approach.

A clearer position of the US administration on European defence would also be welcomed. This would facilitate the building of coalitions of the willing, under a NATO-EU partnership flag and the strengthening of commitment regarding Permanent Structure Cooperation among like-minded and strategically capable EU partners, without unnecessary overstretch of capabilities. A strong comprehensive transatlantic security agenda implies that information and knowledge on strategic affairs should be shared, that cooperation among those who can and will, does result in added value to prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution and that coordination and cooperation occurs among those that can offer the best and most sustainable solutions to local, regional and international security problems.

Conclusion

Comprehensive approach does not correspond to a new, but rather an adaptive response of state and non-state actors to international security challenges. The complexity of current challenges to international security requires better internal coordination, stronger external cooperation and more committed participation of local relevant actors.

On the concept of comprehensive approach, one may acknowledge that there is a general agreement on its broad conceptual delimitation on what it is and what it does, although the volatility of current international security and stability makes it difficult to generate an all-inclusive concept and practice. On what it is, it is generally described in academic literature and in organizations' policy documents as a process hold by different stakeholders, intended to prevent, mitigate, manage and solve crises and conflicts, at different stages of fragility of states and societies. As for what it does, it impacts within state and non-state actors' policies and organizational structures and it predisposes them to cross-sectoral administrative and managerial adaptation or reform of the external dimension of policies, for which they are responsible for. It also has consequences over the stability and future development of recipient countries of missions, operations and development projects and programmes.

Theoretically, comprehensive approach offers a challenging field of research on: institutional and organizational adaptation to the current security environment; new conceptualization of security practice; possibility to solve the security dilemmas through comprehensive approach as a transformative project; norm/practices incorporation and security governance; comprehensive approach as a cause of institutional reform and institutional reform as a consequence of implementation of comprehensive approach; comprehensive approach as a way to enhance resilience to fragility of states and societies; new securitisation of coordination, of EU bodies, policies and cooperation practices among strategic partners. At the empirical level, comprehensive approach suggests interesting outlooks on foreign policy and national interests; addresses prevention and sustainability as mitigating elements of insecurity and contributes to a better understanding of crises and conflicts cycles. The second part of the study identified the various challenges that comprehensive approach entails and that mirror the current security environment. The first regards the successful ability to ensure transition across the various phases of crises and conflicts, from preventive action to peace and sustainable development. The second concerns ownership and the possibility to strengthened local actors and institutions, helping them to become more resilient and committed to stabilization, reconstruction and sustainable development. The third pertains to complementarity of instruments from CSDP missions and operations, to the programmes and projects of the European Commission, to bilateral and multilateral commitments of Member States in the organizations present in theatre. The fourth, results from the diversity of actors that take part in crisis and conflicts, which may make consensus more difficult to reach, legitimacy harder to attain and efficiency more complex to achieve due to the presence of various interlocutors. These are often perceived by security providers as authoritative and representative of states and communities' interests, sharing different collaborative practices or having no previous collaborative tradition. Diversity also increases competition among actors hampering a positive cooperation. The last challenge identified in the study respects to timing and sustainability of solutions to crises, considering that different policy and security instruments (e.g. foreign policy, crisis management, financial support and development aid) require different times associated to long term/short term presences and support in theatre.

On the third section of the article, the definition of a EU level of ambition that includes a more comprehensive role for the EU was addressed, examining how it affects how actors think, what is relevant and what is prioritary. Current security challenges, from security governance to energy and food sustainability, claim alternative ways to project influence and generate impact other than military power. Recent crises such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria prove that the military instrument is one among many contributing to a more secure environment. Com-

prehensive approach suggests a transformative project, which success depends from the ability of local actors to adopt changes exogenously given. Norm incorporation by local relevant actors is a transformative effect with consequences over providers/donors and its accomplishment a sign of positive impact of comprehensive approach among recipients. This condition occurs when norms are understood, accepted and incorporated by local actors into their systems of beliefs and security practices. It involves a process of norm transference and norm adoption and implementation from the security governance level to sustainable development practices. This transformative intension is also conditioned by how security cultures and practices may affect effective coordination and external cooperation with partners and local actors, when norms and procedures are incorporated leading to agreements on goals, means and ends at the strategic and operational level.

In the final section of this study, aspects of implementation at the national and collective level were chosen from academic and policy oriented literature, with the support of policy documents, in order to assess which units and levels of analysis are selected to explain the implementation of comprehensive approach. The units of analysis found in literature are all internationally active EU Member States in the security, defense, foreign policy, trade, developmental and humanitarian dimensions of external relations. All share an external behaviour anchored to global, targeted and structural foreign policies sustained in reasons of national interest, converted into formal policy guidelines. This leads to conclude that comprehensive approach is not, in most of the cases, free of self-help motives, but rather a foreign policy instrument of national interest.

The levels of analysis considered to assess implementation of comprehensive approach regard those expressed by political and strategical goals stated in political-strategical documents; on the degree of interaction among national agencies; formalization of institutional cooperation and shared financing methods. These determine the way comprehensive action is developed bilaterally, collectively or multilaterally. Comprehensive approach is adopted by the majority of actors as a way to strengthened states' position in international affairs, to safeguard economic priorities, to bind different national policies interests or to reinforce cooperation with partners that may further Member States international peacekeeping commitments and development aid programmes. The degree of interaction, as expressed in literature, ranges from close coordination among all external dimensions of public policies, to the traditional civil-military cooperation, with various levels of information exchange and joint action. Institutional formalization of cooperation in comprehensive approach varies from contingent and unilateral to collective, whenever political, strategic and operational trust facilitates cooperation among strategic partners. In most cases, literature show that the leading national agency for comprehensive approach is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the

Ministries of Defence, Trade, Justice and agencies responsible for development cooperation. Dedicated lines of financing are only present in two cases that of the United Kingdom and Denmark.

The collective expression of comprehensive approach resonates actors' preferred strategic partnerships, through which distinct strategic outlooks inform different practices of comprehensive approach. This situation affects the very understanding of comprehensiveness of security agendas, including different perceptions of threat, risk and the use of force across allies, which shape the choice of preferred strategic partner (United Nations, EU or NATO). Member States, such as the United Kingdom and France, which are strategically more capable, are likely to engage in comprehensive action with other like-minded partners (NATO), whenever it empowers the global impact of their interests. Germany as a normative power strategically focused, makes the military dimension of comprehensive action dependent from a UN mandate. To The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden with a good record of international engagement and an extensive international cooperative practice, comprehensive action is a way to strengthen their international role and complement policy initiatives and programmes in terms of foreign, security and defence policies within NATO and the EU.

The last decade has been a formative experience on comprehensive approach to the European Union, to Member States and partners due to the transnational and cross-sectoral impact of current challenges and the means required to meet them. Better cooperation and coordination have become main conditions for successful comprehensive action. Comprehensiveness will only work effectively, if security providers and beneficiaries contribute to create states and communities that are more resilient, willing and able to contribute to their own security and development, while advancing a more efficient cooperative security with international and regional organizations, meant to enhance ownership. Similarly, the choice of external partners to further comprehensive action should follow a benchmark approach led by consistent political solidarity, targeted and efficient cooperation and long term sustainable solutions during and after crisis and conflicts occur.

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European Union Comprehensive Approach: What's in a Name?

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Abstract

The article departs from the idea that the concept of comprehensive approach was adopted as an EU distinctive characteristic in managing crises. The new institutional context given by the Treaty of Lisbon and the growing number and complexity of the global challenges to be addressed by the EU contributed greatly to its operationalization. At the conceptual level, the scope and aim of the EU's comprehensive approach have been partially defined by a Joint Communication adopted in 2013 and further clarification has been added in the new EU Global Strategy, presented by the High Representative at the European Council of June 2016. Nevertheless, important divergences among Member States, as well as institutional divides and operational obstacles still hamper its effective implementation.

This article aims at analyzing the inception, evolution and current perspectives of the EU's comprehensive approach, with a view to feed the ongoing debate in the EU's institutions and among the experts' community. The first part offers an overview of the development of this concept from the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the European Commission/High Representative's Joint Communication. It is followed by an assessment of the efforts and gaps towards its operationalization, looking in particular at the cases of capacity building in security and development, joint programming in development cooperation and migration. It concludes with a flare on the way ahead following the presentation of the EU Global Strategy.

Resumo

Abordagem Abrangente no Contexto da União Europeia: O Significado de um Nome

O artigo parte da ideia de que o conceito de abordagem abrangente passou a ser adotado como uma característica distintiva da União Europeia no que respeita à gestão de crises. O novo enquadramento institucional dado pelo Tratado de Lisboa e o crescente número e complexidade dos desafios globais com os quais a União procura lidar, em muito contribuiu para a sua operacionalização. Ao nível conceptual, o âmbito e objeto da abordagem abrangente da União foi parcialmente definida por um Comunicado Conjunto adotado em 2013 e pela Estratégia Global da União a ser apresentada pela Alta Representante em junho de 2016. Contudo importantes divergências entre Estados-membros, bem como entre as clivagens existentes entre instituições europeias e os obstáculos operacionais ainda impedem a sua efetiva implementação.

Este artigo tem por objeto analisar a génese, evolução e perspetivas atuais sobre a abordagem abrangente da União com o propósito de incentivar o debate em curso nas instituições europeias e entre as comunidades de peritos. A primeira parte oferece uma perspetiva sobre o desenvolvimento do conceito desde a adoção da Estratégia Europeia de Segurança até à entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa e à adoção pela Comissão Europeia e Alta Representante do Comunicado Conjunto. A segunda parte avalia os esforços e lacunas relativas à sua operacionalização, considerando em particular a questão do desenvolvimento de capacidades na área da segurança, desenvolvimento, programas conjuntos na cooperação para o desenvolvimento e migrações. Conclui com uma perspetiva sobre o futuro da abordagem abrangente da União considerando a adoção da Estratégia Global da União Europeia.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has gradually developed the concept of comprehensive approach as its distinctive feature in managing crises (Faria, 2014, pp. 3-7). However, its definition and operationalization were given a decisive boost in the post-Lisbon phase, in connection with both the new institutional context created by the Treaty, and the rising number and complexity of the global challenges to be addressed by the EU. At the conceptual level, the scope and aim of the EU's comprehensive approach have been partially defined by a *Joint Communication* adopted by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) in December 2013, and further clarification has been added in the new *EU Global Strategy*, presented by the High Representative at the European Council of June 2016. Nevertheless, important divergences among Member States, as well as institutional divides and operational obstacles still hamper its effective implementation.

This article aims at analysing the inception, evolution and current perspectives of the EU's comprehensive approach, with a view to feed the ongoing debate in the EU's institutions and among the experts' community. The first part offers an overview of the development of this concept from the adoption of the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the European Commission/High Representative's *Joint Communication*. It is followed by an assessment of the efforts and gaps towards its operationalization, looking in particular at the cases of capacity building in security and development, joint programming in development cooperation and migration. It concludes with a flare on the way ahead following the presentation of the *EU Global Strategy*.

The Troubled Path towards the Conceptualization of the EU's Comprehensive Approach

Before Lisbon, the EU had already modelled its *European Security Strategy* on a new concept of security, in particular by recognizing the indissoluble link between internal and external aspects of security, as well as between security and development (European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 3). The *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* confirms this inclusive approach, by affirming that "drawing on a unique range of instruments […]", the EU has "worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity" (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 2).

In the specific sector of crisis management, in the pre-Lisbon phase the EU had substantially adopted the NATO's perspective on comprehensive approach, which is conceived as an expanded Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), meaning essen-

tially the cooperation among different actors (political, civilian and military) in theatre. It comes out from the recognition that military means, although essential, are not enough to meet current complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. NATO's reflection on this concept has evolved itself and in the *Strategic Concept* adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 the Allies have accepted to enhance their contribution to comprehensive approach in two main directions (Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010, paragraph 8-9): (1) to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy; (2) to contribute, when required, to stabilization and reconstruction through an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management. In March 2011, NATO agreed on an updated list of tasks for its *Comprehensive Approach Action Plan*, which are being implemented by a dedicated civilian-military task force. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Allies agreed to establish a civilian crisis management capability at NATO Headquarters and within Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) (NATO, 2014).

In the second semester of 2009, the Swedish presidency of the EU insisted on the concept of comprehensive approach by translating it essentially in civilian-military synergies in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 22). As a consequence, comprehensive approach has coincided for a long time with the imperative to use all the tools at the EU's disposal (political, civilian/development and military) together in theatre.

In the post-Lisbon period, the comprehensive approach has been developed in a much broader framework, essentially by enlarging its scope and assigning grater responsibilities on its development and implementation to the High Representative, who is also Vice President of the European Commission (VP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The challenge launched by the Lisbon Treaty is to break out of the 'CSDP box' and interpret the comprehensive approach in the dimension of the EU's external relations, with the concurring contribution of different policies and actors (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). This development has been accompanied by a reflection on the most appropriate instruments to be used by the EU to provide an added value in crisis management, in comparison and in cooperation with other actors and by a transition of the focus of civilian-military cooperation from the field level to the planning phase in Brussels. Nevertheless, the shift from "the question of how to coordinate other tools with a CSDP mission" to "a much broader issue of how to intermingle a range of instruments, prioritize these and centre the work around a diplomatic effort led by the EEAS in cooperation with Community instruments" has proved difficult to realize (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).

A good overview of the competing visions of comprehensive approach still rooted in the different EU's institutions can be derived by a number of recent public interventions by their high level representatives on this subject. In particular, the stance kept by crisis management structures of the EEAS seems to be still anchored to a CSDP-centred mentality, which identifies CSDP with crisis management and advocates the need to combine it with other EU tools, i.e. diplomatic, economic, developmental, humanitarian. The comprehensive approach is intended as the 'European way' to do crisis management and exemplified with the '3Ds' approach: diplomacy, development and defence/security.

On her side, the former HR/VP Catherine Ashton has promoted a far-reaching objective for the comprehensive approach, which seeks agreement "at the highest political level, […] on a set of actions which, in a country in crisis, will deliver a solution to that crisis, and a long-term commitment to the political and economic development of that country", and refers to a broad spectrum of aspects, including "political, diplomatic, security, military, humanitarian, civil protection, border management", but also "immigration, consular activities and energy". The former HR/VP intended to operationalize the comprehensive approach "by better linking our conflict prevention, mediation, development and conflict resolution activities", while the CSDP should be reinforced both in terms of 'hardware' (military and civilian capabilities) and 'software' (how we plan and conduct operations, engage with partners" (Speech by High Representative, 2010).

On the other side, the European Commission continues to centre the notion of comprehensive approach on the elaboration and implementation of conflict-sensitive approaches in development cooperation and the need to address root causes of crises. This is reflected in a constant recall to European Commission's work on fragile countries, conflict prevention and peace-building, as well as justice and security sector reform. In line with this approach, the *Agenda for Change*, adopted by the European Commission in October 2011, advocates a differentiated approach to development cooperation and recognizes the importance of meeting specific needs of countries in fragile and crisis situations and of keeping state-building as a central element of support strategies (Agenda for Change, 2011).

A clear indication of the difficulty to find a common understanding and a shared implementation path among EU institutions and Member States came from the lengthy process for the elaboration of a *Joint HR/EC Communication on Comprehensive Approach*, aimed at bringing some definitory clarity and offer a single EU interpretation of this concept. The adoption of this *Joint Communication* was blocked for long time by the traditional inter-institutional competition over spheres of influence and approaches to crisis management: whilst the European Commission feared a politicization of humanitarian aid and development cooperation, Member States were suspicious about a possible denaturalization of CSDP. Originally

expected for September 2012, it was firstly delayed to the first semester of 2013 and then adopted only in December 2013.

The *Joint HR/EC Communication* has achieved the objective to set out a common understanding of the EU's comprehensive approach in relation to the specific field of 'external conflicts and crises', but speaks about a joint application more broadly "in the EU's external policy and action" (European Commission/High Representative, 2013, p. 2). It does not dictate policy or approach for specific countries or region, nor does it propose a blueprint for EU action in any particular crisis (Council of the EU, 2015a, p. 2). As indicated by EU institutions involved, "the comprehensive approach is not about 'what to do' but 'how to do it' and how to make the best use of the EU's collective resources and instruments, with a particular focus on conflict and crisis situations" (Council of the EU, 2015a, p. 2).

In the *Joint Communication*, comprehensiveness is intended as: (1) the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, and (2) the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States (European Commission/High Representative, 2013, p. 3). These indications entail a double challenge: at the operational level, it means ensuring a sequenced transition between different instruments, within the EU but also with Member States; in terms of content, the *Joint Communication* places the connection between security and development among the key underlying principles of the comprehensive approach, but stresses that the different competences and added value of the EU's institutions and services, as well as of the Member States, in the fields of humanitarian aid, development assistance and CSDP should be fully respected. It also points on the need to elaborate context-specific responses (European Commission/High Representative, 2013, p. 4).

The *Joint Communication* finally defines eight measures to enhance coherence and effectiveness of EU external policy and action in conflict of crisis situations (European Commission/High Representative, 2013, pp. 5-12): (1) develop a shared analysis of the situation or challenge; (2) define a common strategic vision; (3) focus on prevention; (4) mobilize the different strengths and capacities of the EU; (5) commit to the long term; (6) link the internal and external policies and action; (7) make better use of the role of EU Delegations; and (8) work in partnership with other international and regional actors.

Operationalizing the EU Comprehensive Approach

Now that the EU has equipped itself with a joint definition of the matter, the real challenge remains in its implementation.

It must be recognized that, even in the absence of a single concept document on comprehensive approach, EU institutions and Member States made some progress in its operationalization in the immediate aftermath of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. As an example, it is fair to say that the two 2011 Strategies for the

Sahel and the Horn of Africa are a specific legacy of the Treaty's appeal to "consistency" in the EU's external action (Article 21 TEU) and can be considered as a first attempt to put comprehensive approach into practice by joined-up instruments and through the cooperation among the institutions involved.

The *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel* (2011), for example, has been conceived after two years of intense work by all the concerned institutions (EEAS, European Commission, Council of the EU) and implemented through instruments ranging from the Instrument for Stability now Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the European Development Fund and the CSDP. In the Horn of Africa, the tasks assigned to the maritime operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the training mission for Somali soldiers EUTM Somalia, and the regional capacity-building mission EUCAP Nestor have been combined with development and humanitarian assistance, including Commission programmes on Critical Maritime Routes and Maritime Security. However, it is still unclear if experiments such as the *Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa* (2011) should be considered as the product of a genuine effort to identify a collective purpose for EU engagements and translate the comprehensive approach into practice or more as a reverse engineering exercise, consisting in the development of a conceptual hat aimed at providing *ex post* coherence to a number of different and often non-aligned activities conducted by the EU in crisis theatres.

With a view to outline how key actions will be taken forward, implemented and reported, the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on comprehensive approach adopted in May 2014 urged the adoption of an action plan in the first quarter of 2015 (Council of the EU, 2014a, p. 21). The *Action Plan 2015* has been produced by EEAS and Commission staff with the aim of setting out concrete and practical actions for implementation both at EU and national level (Council of the EU, 2015a, p. 2). It is confirmed the understanding that the comprehensive approach is a 'working method' which should guide the EU external action across all areas (Council of the EU, 2015a, p. 3). Accordingly, the Action Plan selects a number of key issues to be taken forward and a limited number of countries and regions as privileged fields of implementation. Two priority actions are identified (Council of the EU, 2015a, pp. 4-5):

(1) Define a common strategic vision through the development of *Guidelines for Joint Framework Documents* (JFDs). JFDs should be a joint endeavour of EU institutions and Member States, with Embassies and EU Delegations on the ground playing a key role, and rely on a shared context analysis of a particular country or region. This shared analysis should be translated into a common strategic vision for future EU and Member States engagement which could link up all the relevant dimensions (political engagement, development cooperation, external dimension of internal policies, trade, economic cooperation, CSDP, etc.);

(2) Mobilize the different strengths and capacities of the EU through: (a) capacity building in support of security and development, with a view to fill the gap in the provision and funding of training and equipment to partner countries and regional organizations to sustain their efforts to better prevent and manage crises; (b) transition, namely earlier and more coordinated planning between EEAS and Commission services, as well as Member States or hosting authorities, to enable a smooth transition from one form of EU engagement to another, i.e. from CSDP to development cooperation; and (c) rapid deployment of joint EEAS, Commission and Member States field missions and/or staff to reinforce EU Delegations through new methods.

The priority areas for implementation are identified in the Sahel region, Central America, Afghanistan and Somalia. In all these scenarios, the EU is engaged through different actors, policies and instruments, thus representing relevant cases to pilot new forms of comprehensive approach along the lines of the Action Plan.

It is interesting to underline that the adoption of the Action Plan has inaugurated a new operation phase of the comprehensive approach, through which concrete initiatives will be identified and revised on an annual basis. The *Action Plan 2016-17* is currently discussed by relevant services in EEAS, Commission and Member States, with the contribution of external experts through consultation meetings. Its scope will be expanded to include new geographic areas – from the neighbourhood to Asia – and additional themes, in particular migration, joint programming and gender in conflict.

Beyond the institutionalized process carried out in the framework of the Action Plan, the comprehensive approach has been translated into practice through a series of *ad hoc* initiatives, ranging from capacity building to migration and development cooperation.

Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development

One of the most debated and interesting initiative is the *Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development* (CBSD), based on the Joint Communication adopted by the European Commission and the High Representative in April 2015 (European Commission, 2015) and the Council conclusions on CSDP of May 2015 (Council of the EU, 2015b, p. 8), which called to explore options, notably in terms of financial instruments, in this regard. This initiative testifies a gradual shift of both the security and development communities on the need to further integrate not only at the conceptual level, but also through concrete actions, and the activities carried out by the EU in the sector of capacity building of third countries and regional organizations to manage crises are particularly suited for experimenting this enhanced cooperation.

The mandate of recent CSDP missions deployed by the EU has been increasingly focused on assisting, advising, mentoring and training local authorities in per-

forming tasks such as security sector reform, institution-building, development of national strategies. The EU is increasingly reluctant to to deploy executive missions, in favor of an approach that follows the principle of ownership by local actors and privileges capability-development rather than direct involvement. Political considerations are at stake in such decision, as the empowerment of partner countries is an appealing concept and simultaneously puts the EU in a safer place against accusations of scarce effectiveness or limited impact on the security situation. Nevertheless, the focus on supporting local constituencies through training, mentoring and advising activities and accompanied by the financial package of the European Commission can become a special feature of the EU's crisis management model and its added value in comparison with other security actors.

In fact, in order to compensate the scarcity of funds in the realm of CSDP, crisis management institutions have increasingly involved the European Commission and requested the identification of additional financial instruments (namely the European Development Fund, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace or the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) to support the EU's action in security-related sectors, including rule of law, security sector reform, border management, etc. The use of matching funds has been facilitated by the creation of the EEAS, especially through the tasks assigned to Geographic Departments in the EEAS in the programming cycle of development cooperation managed by the European Commission and the establishment of the Foreign Policy Instrument within the EEAS with competence on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget. The identification of relevant instruments and resources to support CSDP actions is now an essential element in each Crisis Management Concept, both during the implementation of missions (i.e. EUCAP Nestor, EUCAP SAHEL Niger and EUTM Mali) and in the planning of exit strategies (i.e. EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo, EUAVSEC South Sudan and EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina), with the handover of responsibilities to other EU stakeholders. However, the accomplishment of a real integration among different EU external policies remains a challenge for the EU: crisis management and development cooperation are still distinguished sectors, both in Brussels and in national capitals.

The CBSD initiative can represent a real quantum leap in this regard, as it proposes to identify relevant resources to fill the gaps in the way the EU builds the capacity of partners in the security sector by complementing CSDP missions with short- and long-term financing and provision of training and mentoring, non-lethal equipment and infrastructure improvements (European Commission, 2016, p. 3). This is currently done only through *ad hoc* arrangements that do not ensure effectiveness and sustainability. Its actual implementation still encounters the resistance of key actors in the European Commission, especially in the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) and the Legal Service. However, it can be

facilitated by a recent agreement reached at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which updated and clarified the reporting directives for official development assistance (ODA) on peace and security, particularly by making a number of security-related programmes and security sector reform ODA-eligible (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). The options currently considered to fund this initiative are: (1) adapting existing instruments, such as the African Peace Facility[1] or the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace[2]; (2) creating a facility in the framework of existing financial instruments; (3) proposing a new dedicated instrument; (4) revising the Athena mechanism[3] to cover the supply of equipment to the military of partner countries (European Commission, 2016, p. 5).

Joint Programming in Development Cooperation

Joint Programming is identified by the *Joint Communication on Comprehensive Approach* as one of the elements of the EU's engagement to build peaceful and resilient societies. According to the *EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid and Development Effectiveness* held in Busan in 2011, Joint Programming is a process whereby the EU and Member States (and other interested donors and partners) take strategic decisions based on a comprehensive view of donors' support to a given partner country (Council of the EU, 2011b). In this direction, the Joint Programming is foreseen in 55 countries in order to make the EU and its Member States' development cooperation more effective. Its aim is to present a united package of support, led at country level by the EU Delegations and Members States Embassies (European Commission/High Representative, 2013, p. 11). The Council Conclusions of May 2014 specifically recall the need to conduct Joint Programming in accordance with the principles of the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (Council of the EU, 2014b, p. 4), which commits its signatories – including the EU

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1   The African Peace Facility was established in 2004 and is financed through the European Development Fund. It constitutes the main source of funding to support the African Union's and African sub-regions' efforts in the area of peace and security with an overall amount of more than 1.9 billion Euros.

2   The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) succeeded to the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2014 and is one of the EU external assistance instruments to prevent and respond to actual or emerging crises around the world. IcSP funds can cover: (1) urgent short-term actions in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis; and (2) longer-term capacity building of organizations engaged in crisis response and peace-building. A financial envelope for the IcSP of 2,338,719,000 Euros is foreseen for the period 2014-2020.

3   Athena is a mechanism that was set up by the Council of the EU in 2004 and is aimed at administering the common costs (such as transport, infrastructures and medical services) of EU operations with military or defence implications. It is financed by Member States (with the exception of Denmark) in accordance with their Gross National Product (GNP).

and 13 Member States – to improve current development policy and practice with a view to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transition out of fragility. Joint Programming has become a reality in European international cooperation practice, but it is still struggling to become a strongly established – if not binding – European norm due to the multiplicity of practices at EU and national level (Helly *et al.*, 2015, p. 34). In the *EU Global Strategy*, Join Programming in development is explicitly mentioned as a tool to be further enhanced together with the comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises (High Representative, 2016, p. 49). Based on this prescription, its implementation could be reinforced through a revised *European Consensus on Development*, matching the new global agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Helly *et al.*, 2015).

Migration

The comprehensive approach has started to be applied not only to the EU's engagement in situations of conflict and fragility beyond its borders, but also to different sectors that lie at the intersection between internal and external policies. In the field of migration, the *EU Integrated Political Response Arrangement* (IPCR) has been activated in October 2015, under the Luxemburg Presidency. Created in June 2013, the IPCR process is led by the Presidency, with the support of the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and the EEAS, and centred on COREPER. It includes an Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) capability and a Web Platform for information sharing, through which it has produced weekly information reports. In the first months of its operationalization, it has functioned through periodical meetings among relevant stakeholders in EU institutions and other actors, including Member States, UN agencies, local partners, etc. on specific topics such as Central Mediterranean, Turkey, and others. This mechanism, if adequately reinforced and expanded, could become a central element for a new approach to migration, involving all interested parties in the assessment and planning of interventions in countries of origin and transit to address the root causes and the push factors of the phenomenon in a more comprehensive manner.

The Way Ahead: the Comprehensive Approach in the EU Global Strategy

In her answers to the European Parliament questionnaire in view of her appointment as new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini declared her commitment "to fully implement the measures put forward by the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises" (Mogherini, 2014, p. 5) and placed at the centre of her mandate as both High Representative and Vice President of the Commission "to take a comprehensive approach at EU external action, ensuring coordination, coherence and synergies between the different instruments, both financial and policy-wise" (Mogherini, 2014, p. 8).

As it stands in the current debate at the EU level, the comprehensive approach can be considered both as a specific way of addressing "all stages of conflict or other external crises" through "a wide array of policies, tools and instruments at its disposal", building on the reciprocal relations between security and development, and, more broadly, "the central organizing principle of the EU's external action" (Kempin and Scheler, 2016, p. 2).

The *Strategic Review* released by the High Representative in June 2015 mentions the comprehensive approach as the framework in which "several action tracks are programmed to enhance the security-development nexus in capacity building missions" (Strategic Review, 2015, p. 14) and considers it as the guiding concept of the EU's engagement in external conflicts and crises, connecting it explicitly to the realm of CSDP (Strategic Review, 2015, p. 18). At the same time, the need for a 'joined-up approach' among the various actors and instruments of EU external action is recognized "in virtually every aspect of the EU's presence in the world" (Strategic Review, 2015, p. 18).

This paved the way for the wording and substance of the *EU Global Strategy*, which confirmed the relevance of implementing the comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises "through a coherent use of all policies at the EU's disposal" (High Representative, 2016, p. 9), while pointing out the need for a joined-up approach across external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of EU's policies (High Representative, 2016, p. 11).

The *Strategy* includes an integrated approach to conflicts among the priorities of the EU's external action and clearly indicates that "the meaning and scope of the comprehensive approach will be expanded" (High Representative, 2016, p. 9). According to the document, this should be done in three main directions: (1) a multi-phased approach: the EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, investing in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere; (2) a multi-level approach: the EU will act at different levels of governance, including local, national, regional and global dimensions; and (3) a multi-lateral approach: the EU will foster and support broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships to achieve sustainable peace (High Representative, 2016, pp. 28-29).

Moreover, the *Strategy* calls for action to make the EU's external action more joined-up and include the comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises as one of the policy innovations to be further enhanced, together with joint programming in development (High Representative, 2016, p. 49). The document also offers a full menu of possible initiatives to be taken at policy and institutional levels to generate coherence among different policies, between the internal and external dimensions of policies and across financial instruments (High Representative, 2016, pp. 49-51).

The recognition of the comprehensive approach as a distinctive feature of the EU's engagement in crisis management in the *EU Global Strategy* is expected to bring additional political weight to this concept. Nevertheless, in order to make it a meaningful tool to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the EU on the ground, the process of its implementation started with the 2015 Action Plan and various *ad hoc* initiatives should be integrated, rationalized and targeted towards key objectives. Beyond the specific working methods adopted in the various fields of intervention, it should be clear that the final aim is to bring EU institutions in Brussels (especially the European Commission and the EEAS), Member States representatives in Brussels and in national capitals, and actors on the ground (EU Delegations, CSDP missions, EU Special Representatives, national embassies) to engage with other relevant partners in a common effort to ensure security and development in countries affected by conflicts and fragility. This should be done in line with a joined-up approach that: (1) starts from a common assessment of the situation on the ground; (2) mobilizes the different instruments at the disposal of the various actors; and (3) identify priorities for action together with local and international partners.

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A Abordagem Global da União Europeia: Um Desafio Atual

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Diretor dos Serviços Multilaterais da Direção-Geral de Política Externa (DGPE) desde setembro de 2015. Anteriormente desempenhou a mesma função na Direção de Organizações Económicas Internacionais da DGPE. Como diplomata, ocupou vários postos na Embaixada de Portugal em Londres e na Delegação Portuguesa junto da NATO em Bruxelas. Anteriormente desempenhou as funções de Chefe de Divisão da Direção de Assuntos Multilaterais, durante a Presidência da OSCE, foi conselheiro diplomático junto do Gabinete do Secretário de Estado para a Política Externa e Cooperação e foi Chefe de Serviços para a área Europa, Ásia e Oceânia no Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros.

Resumo

Este artigo evidencia a emergência do conceito e prática de abordagem abrangente da UE como metodologia de trabalho destinada a combinar e otimizar diferentes recursos ao dispor da União Europeia. O uso de um método de abordagem abrangente adquiriu relevância renovada com o desenvolvimento de um "arco de crises" a sul e leste. O Tratado de Lisboa e a recente apresentação de uma Estratégia Global da UE recentraram o valor da abordagem abrangente no quadro da ação externa da UE. O autor examina o âmbito, os requisitos e os benefícios do emprego daquela metodologia em cenários internacionais de crises e conflitos militares e não-militares.

Abstract
EU Global Approach: Present Challenges

The article highlights the emergence of the concept and the practice of the EU comprehensive approach from the perspective of a working method aimed at combining and optimizing distinct EU resources. The use of comprehensive approach has acquired greater relevance with the development of an "arc of crisis" surrounding Europe from south and east. The Treaty of Lisbon and the recent presentation of the EU Global Strategy positioned comprehensive approach at the centre of the EU's external action. The author examines the scope, requirements and benefits of employing a comprehensive approach in the current international scenario of complex military and non-military crises and conflicts.

A União Europeia e os seus Estados-membros vêm há muito preconizando a necessidade de adotar uma resposta comum e integrada para a gestão de crises e a prevenção de conflitos. Reconhecendo a implicação que estas têm para a segurança da União e as diversas dimensões de que a própria segurança se reveste, tal necessidade foi corporizada na adoção de uma formulação a que se chamou *Comprehensive Approach* e que encontrou acolhimento na tradução portuguesa como Abordagem Global, conceito que, contudo, não tem definição acordada entre os Estados-membros.

A sua origem remonta à Estratégia Europeia em Matéria de Segurança, aprovada pelo Conselho Europeu em dezembro de 2003 onde já se defendia a conveniência de desenvolver uma visão integrada da segurança como resposta ao conjunto de novas ameaças e desafios então identificadas: "Contrariamente ao que se passava com a ameaça maciça e visível da Guerra Fria, nenhuma das novas ameaças é puramente militar, nem pode ser combatida com meios exclusivamente militares; todas elas requerem uma conjugação de instrumentos" (A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003, p. 7 § 3)[1].

Os Estados-membros e as instituições, partilhando o interesse em avançar mais rapidamente no sentido de potenciar esta visão integrada têm dado passos seguros nessa direção. O tema foi inscrito na agenda política do Conselho da União Europeia e trabalhado pelo Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa, pela Comissão Europeia e pelo Parlamento Europeu. Nesse sentido, foi objeto de conclusões e comunicações conjuntas.

Esta visão integracionista não é exclusiva da União Europeia e discussões semelhantes têm lugar igualmente nas Nações Unidas, na OTAN e na OSCE. Esta circunstância potencia igualmente uma outra dimensão da Abordagem Global, a da cooperação entre organizações internacionais complementando ações e otimizando meios, assim estendendo a sua capacidade de atuação com menor custo de meios.

A Abordagem Global é, pois, um método de trabalho que de forma sistemática tenta ligar as políticas e os instrumentos para a ação externa da União Europeia de forma abrangente e mais coerente.

Atentos os desenvolvimentos no terreno e a subsistência de um "arco de instabilidade" a leste e a sul da Europa, a Abordagem Global da União Europeia mantém-se oportuna, útil e, mesmo, cada vez mais necessária para fazer face aos desenvolvimentos em matéria de crises e conflitos externos com que a União Europeia e os seus membros se vêm confrontando.

A discussão da Abordagem Global mantém também a sua atualidade no momento em que discutimos a revisão da Estratégia Europeia em Matéria de Segurança da

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1   Disponível em https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

União Europeia, numa discussão abrangente que culminou com a apresentação no Conselho Europeu de junho de 2016, da Estratégia para a Política Externa e de Segurança da União Europeia, EGUE. Aliás a própria EGUE permitirá colocar a Abordagem Global no centro da atuação da União Europeia com recurso a uma visão atual e refrescada das ameaças, dos desafios e das oportunidades à sua segurança.

Apesar da inexistência de uma definição acordada, existe um amplo consenso acerca da necessidade da União Europeia responder aos desafios de segurança transnacionais do século XXI mediante uma Abordagem Global. A mobilização do conjunto de instrumentos disponíveis no seio da União para a prevenção, resposta e recuperação de crises é cada vez mais necessária e o Tratado de Lisboa veio contribuir para a sua integração.

Também a Comunidade Internacional vem reconhecendo esta necessidade de desenvolver uma atuação coerente como resposta à gestão de conflitos e crises, tendo em consideração que a natureza das operações internacionais se alterou profundamente, tanto no que se refere à sua frequência como à sua dimensão e complexidade. No decurso dos últimos vinte anos, a gestão de crises e as operações de estabilização ou de consolidação da paz, sejam elas conduzidas pelas Nações Unidas, pela União Europeia, pela OTAN ou pela OSCE, têm evidenciado a necessidade de promover também uma coordenação efetiva entre atores internacionais.

A gestão de conflitos e crises complexas requere ainda um conjunto de atores internos diversificado. Para além dos próprios governos, também a sociedade civil, as agências nacionais e a academia ganham em trabalhar de forma coerente e coordenada. Esta coordenação necessita, para além de um compromisso de longa duração, de criar e manter essa mesma coerência no planeamento e na implementação de políticas e instrumentos. A Abordagem Global implica, pois, a integração política da segurança com o desenvolvimento, através de mecanismos e culturas que promovam o conhecimento e a colaboração partilhada.

Como outras organizações ou atores relevantes na área da gestão de crises, a União Europeia desenvolveu um conjunto de instrumentos com o objetivo de promover sinergias entre os seus processos internos. Estes instrumentos – políticos, diplomáticos, comerciais, de segurança, desenvolvimento ou humanitários –, articulam-se já, de forma mais ou menos explícita, com o objetivo de colocar em prática uma Abordagem Global que, de uma forma estratégica e orientada, trate não apenas os sintomas, mas também as causas profundas e estruturais dos conflitos e da instabilidade.

Foi com esse fito que foram negociadas e adotadas conclusões do Conselho, em novembro de 2007, no decurso da Presidência portuguesa da União Europeia[2], em

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2   Disponível em http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15067-2007-INIT/pt/pdf.

maio de 2014[3], no seguimento da Comunicação Conjunta de 2013 da Comissão e da Alta Representante ao Parlamento e ao Conselho[4], e o Plano de Ação de 2015[5].

A Comunicação Conjunta da Alta Representante e da Comissão Europeia, de 11 de dezembro de 2013, retoma o sucesso da intervenção europeia no Corno de África, no Sahel e nos Grandes Lagos como justificação para uma maior coerência entre os domínios da ação externa, e entre estes e as demais políticas da União, coerência essa acrescida pelo quadro institucional reforçado com a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa. Naquela comunicação, feita três anos após o dealbar das chamadas "primaveras árabes", a Alta Representante e a Comissão comprometem-se a aplicar no âmbito da política e da ação externa da UE a visão conjunta da Abordagem Global em matéria de crises e conflitos externos que explanam de seguida. Ali defendem que tal entendimento abrange todos os ciclos de conflito ou de crise externa, desde o alerta precoce e a preparação, prevenção de conflitos, resposta e gestão de crises até à recuperação rápida, estabilização e consolidação da paz, a fim de ajudar os países a retomarem a via do desenvolvimento sustentável a longo prazo.[6]

Para responder a estas ameaças a comunicação identificava "um vasto leque de políticas, ferramentas e instrumentos" que "cobrem os domínios diplomático, de segurança, da defesa, financeiro, comercial, da cooperação para o desenvolvimento e da ajuda humanitária", recordando tratar-se a União do maior bloco comercial do mundo e do primeiro doador mundial de ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento e de ajuda humanitária. Entre os desafios então elencados e que enformam a Estratégia Global da União Europeia, encontravam-se as alterações climáticas e a degradação dos recursos naturais, as pressões demográficas e os fluxos migratórios, o tráfico ilícito, a segurança energética, as catástrofes naturais, a cibersegurança, a segurança marítima, os conflitos regionais, a radicalização e o terrorismo[7].

Entre os instrumentos capazes para operacionalizar este objetivo, a Comunicação preconizava o uso interligado do Centro Europeu de Resposta de Emergência e a Sala de Situação da UE, o intercâmbio de informações em Bruxelas e no terreno, aqui destacando as delegações, missões e operações de Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD), os representantes especiais e as agências da UE. Uma maior interligação entre a ação da UE com a dos Estados-membros era igualmente defen-

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3   Disponível em http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf.

4   Disponível em http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0030&from=pt.

5   Disponível em http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7913-2015-INIT/en/pdf.

6   Disponível em http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0030&from=pt

7   Idem.

dida. A Comunicação acrescentava ainda que deveria ser prestada uma especial atenção à prevenção. A ligação entre as políticas e a ação a nível interno e externo mereceu então também um especial destaque, ali se salientando a relevância que políticas no domínio da pesca, do transporte marítimo ou da energia poderiam ter na prevenção ou na estabilização.

O Conselho da União Europeia, na sua reunião de 12 de maio de 2014, debruçou-se sobre o tema da Abordagem Global retomando muitas questões realçadas na Comunicação Conjunta. Dando ali destaque à relevância das estratégias regionais, para o Corno de África, o Sahel e o Golfo da Guiné, bem como o trabalho temático então em curso no âmbito da segurança marítima e da cibersegurança, os Ministros, salientaram ainda a relevância do conjunto de instrumentos dedicados à prevenção e à deteção precoce. Preconizaram também uma ligação mais forte entre as missões civis e operações militares PCSD e a conveniência em usar, na sua totalidade, o Enquadramento Político para a Abordagem de Crises. O Conselho destacou então a interligação desejada entre a PCSD e as áreas de liberdade, segurança e justiça, bem como a conveniência em inserir as missões e operações PCSD numa estratégia mais ampla da UE por forma a reforçar o seu impacto.

Com base nestas Conclusões, a Alta Representante e a Comissão prepararam um Plano de Ação que foi apresentado em 14 de abril de 2015.

Ali, de forma sistemática, foram priorizadas para o ano findo as seguintes ações: definição de uma visão estratégica comum e mobilização das capacidades UE. No que àquela concerne é evidenciada a necessidade de desenvolver linhas de orientação para documentos-quadro conjuntos e, em relação às diferentes capacidades, preparar iniciativas de reforço de capacidades em matéria de segurança e desenvolvimento, tomando em especial como ponto de partida o Mali e a Somália, enquadrando a transição entre diferentes instrumentos (UE e Estados-membros, bilateral ou multilateralmente) e preparando mecanismos para permitir a rápida projeção de missões conjuntas no terreno e o reforço das delegações da União. O Plano de Ação destaca ainda algumas regiões ou países acompanhados pelo sistema de alerta precoce, como o Sahel, o Afeganistão ou a Somália, ali se referindo a prioridades tão diversas como a prevenção e a contra radicalização, o controlo fronteiriço, as migrações e a mobilidade, a criação de condições para fixar os mais jovens, o financiamento da transição, a formação policial, a continuada assistência humanitária, o reforço de capacidades em matéria de segurança e desenvolvimento ou o relacionamento empenhado com a União Africana.

É agora, pois, necessário desenvolver esforços para implementar estes compromissos. Um dos principais desafios com que a União se depara tem que ver com a necessidade de integrar diferentes medidas e, consequentemente, diversos instrumentos, estruturas ou técnicas. Tanto é complexo, mas essencial se quisermos atingir o imenso potencial da União Europeia nesta matéria.

A Abordagem Global deverá sempre iniciar-se por uma decisão política e ser colocada em prática desde a fase de planeamento, por forma a poder ser implementada com sucesso. Esta metodologia deverá basear-se numa crescente coerência do processo político nas diferentes formações do Conselho e nas instituições europeias, com vista a criar sinergias e evitar duplicações. Só esta coerência permitirá que a União Europeia aja de forma clara e integrada, servindo como veículo para a ação coletiva europeia baseada em compromissos normativos. Só através da integração das diferentes políticas, meios e instrumentos será possível ligar as áreas da segurança e do desenvolvimento e reforçar positivamente o nexo segurança e desenvolvimento para o qual a Abordagem Global é direcionada. Esta necessidade de promover o reforço mútuo de ambas as áreas é hoje bastante clara. A União tem consistentemente sublinhado que a segurança é pré-condição para o desenvolvimento e que sem desenvolvimento e erradicação da pobreza não haverá paz sustentável.

Para a Abordagem Global ser verdadeiramente eficaz, como vimos, deverá abranger todas as áreas relevantes de atividade, pelo que as medidas de "Capacitação para a Segurança e Desenvolvimento"[8] são necessárias para tornar o processo de estabilização previsível e gerível. Criar e promover condições políticas, económicas e sociais para a estabilidade é condição necessária para garantir a segurança e o desenvolvimento e determina a aquisição de capacidades essenciais nos setores da segurança e da defesa. A situação atual, no que aos esforços de capacitação em matéria de segurança se refere, estende-se por um conjunto alargado de políticas públicas e faz apelo a diferentes instrumentos usados na construção de instituições legítimas e sustentáveis, incluindo na área da justiça, no setor da segurança, na guarda costeira ou na polícia de fronteiras. As atividades de capacitação incluem também, *inter alia*, o acesso aos instrumentos internacionais de diálogo político, cooperação técnica, formação e fornecimento de equipamento ou material considerado essencial.

O "arco de instabilidade" a sul, com que a Europa se depara, propulsionado por um crescente número de Estados afetados por baixas taxas de crescimento económico, elevadas taxas de crescimento demográfico e instabilidade, confere à Abordagem Global uma relevância acrescida e reforça os argumentos tendentes ao desenvolvimento de princípios gerais que possam ser postos em prática para a promoção da segurança humana de forma global.

Como já referi, uma das ferramentas mais importantes de que a União Europeia dispõe e que tem vindo a ser crescentemente usada num conjunto cada vez mais exigente de respostas à gestão de crises é a PCSD. É hoje já impossível imaginar a

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8   Disponível em http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC 0447(01)&from=EN

UE desprovida de uma PCSD forte e eficiente. Apesar da sua visibilidade e robustez, a PCSD continua a merecer críticas, muitas vezes injustas. A sua crescente eficácia será, pois, a chave para o seu sucesso. Esta pode ser reforçada através de um conjunto de medidas, como por exemplo pelo desenvolvimento de um Centro de Serviços Partilhados que poderia servir para ultrapassar procedimentos morosos e complexos, bem como muitas das questões logísticas que sempre surgem aquando do lançamento de novas missões. Poderia também ser reforçada pela crescente ligação da formação ao envio de elementos para o terreno, mediante um treino cada vez mais proactivo e sistemático, em especial no que concerne ao pessoal que integrará missões civis. A este respeito é, ainda, possível melhorar o notável trabalho desenvolvido pelo Colégio Europeu de Segurança e Defesa (CESD) e pelas instituições suas parceiras, orientando as atividades de formação para a consolidação de uma PSCD mais forte e eficiente e cada vez mais integrada na Abordagem Global.

Também o mecanismo *Athena*[9] poderá, com base nas lições aprendidas, ver alguns dos seus procedimentos revistos com o objetivo de melhorar a sua gestão sem acarretar custos acrescidos para os Estados-membros.

O papel das Delegações da UE, nunca é demais acrescentar, é também aqui da maior importância, sobretudo por estarem particularmente bem posicionadas para promover a coerência e a integridade da Abordagem Global no terreno. É necessário nesse sentido dotar as Delegações com as ferramentas e os recursos humanos apropriados nas áreas de segurança e defesa, para cujo efeito poderia ser ponderada a criação de uma bolsa de peritos de segurança e defesa a nível europeu.

Mas o sucesso da Abordagem Global no terreno dependerá também de uma eficaz cooperação entre organizações regionais e internacionais e parceiros bilaterais. Neste contexto é de saudar a relação com a OTAN que merece ser alargada, em linha aliás com as conclusões do Conceito Estratégico adotado em 2010 na Cimeira de Lisboa.

O sucesso desta cooperação dependerá também da aceitação dos países recipientes e o princípio fundamental da apropriação local. Para tanto é importante que a UE assegure que as suas ações são exequíveis, se traduzem em resultados sustentáveis e possam ser progressivamente dirigidas para aqueles países ou organizações que se possam tornar parceiros autónomos com envolvimento idêntico ao da União Europeia.

Uma palavra final sobre comunicação. A UE deve dispor de uma comunicação estratégica eficaz, com recurso a mensagens claras e inequívocas direcionadas para audiências selecionadas. A comunicação estratégica, dentro e fora da União, deve

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9 Estabelecido em 2004, gere o financiamento dos custos comuns necessários à execução das operações da UE que têm implicações militares ou no domínio da defesa.

tornar claros os objetivos da Abordagem Global e, como tal, ser instrumental para o seu sucesso.

A Abordagem Global continua, pois, sem prejuízo dos futuros desenvolvimentos relacionados com o referendo britânico sobre a saída da União Europeia, a apresentar-se como o método mais apropriado para prevenir e gerir crises porque articula e otimiza as capacidades mais eficazes da UE.

The Comprehensive Approach and European Union External Action: Focus on the EU Official*

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PhD in Political Science and International Relations, he was a former Swedish diplomat (1976-1996) and served in the European Commission from 1996-2009 and as EU Ambassador to international organizations in Vienna. Currently, he is a Distinguished Associate Fellow at SIPRI, specialized in European security policy. He is an elected member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences.

Abstract

This article was finalized shortly after the UK referendum announcing a Brexit and the European Council receiving a new European Union Global Strategy for foreign and security policy. Momentous times when "business as usual" hardly is an option inside EU institutions. The approach to the topic is broader than the topical issue of comprehensiveness in conflicts and crises. An effort is also made to take into account the actual working conditions of EU staff at headquarters in Brussels and in the field. The author argues that key messages to staff to apply a bold and ambitious comprehensive approach, will now be necessary and the academic and think-tank community needs to be helpful to this end.

Resumo

A Abordagem Abrangente e a Ação Externa da União Europeia: Perspetiva de um Representante Nacional na UE

O presente artigo foi concluído pouco depois do referendo no Reino Unido e do Conselho Europeu ter acolhido uma nova Estratégia Global da União Europeia para a Política Externa e de Segurança. A abordagem adotada nesta análise posiciona-se para além dos limites da abordagem abrangente aos conflitos e crises. Neste sentido dar-se-á atenção às condições funcionais presentes nos quartéis generais da União, em Bruxelas e no terreno. O autor debate a necessidade dos funcionários europeus adotarem uma abordagem abrangente, corajosa e ambiciosa, reconhecendo-a como um requisito, devendo igualmente as comunidades académicas e de analistas pertencentes a think-tanks corresponderem a este importante desafio.

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*   The paper is dedicated to those European Union officials who, in such difficult circumstances, continue to try to provide added value to EU external action in widely different policy areas of relevance to security.

Background

The paper is a spin-off effect from the interviews that the author carried out in the EU institutions in preparation for a handbook on EU and security published in 2015 (Lundin, 2015). Scores of group discussions have fed into the analysis with: actual or prospective EU officials working as CSDP leaders, heads of political sections in EU delegations, desk officers in one of the external relation DGs of the European Commission, Member State Ambassadors posted to a key multilateral organization and local agents doing political reporting on behalf of an EU delegation. Above all, it is of course influenced by the author's experience as an EU official from 1996-2011.

The essay refers to many categories of staff. It includes administrators deployed to headquarters and to delegations, who in their work primarily apply a geographic perspective to external action policies, with just a few also working on the multilateral level. It includes a limited number of desk officers at headquarters focusing on thematic issues such as human rights and the rule of law. It includes the entire arm of EEAS, the European External Action Service that is in charge of CSDP, the common security and defense policy, including civil-military missions and explicit security policies, such as counter-terrorism and conflict prevention. It notably also includes staff in several other structures in charge of implementation of external action policies based on the community method, including the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development

(DEVCO), to name a few of the most relevant DGs in the Commission – there are others, such as those dealing with trade, maritime, energy, environment, cyber and other thematic policies of relevance to security. It is important to note that in many security contexts, just to take one example – trafficking and migrant smuggling – the principal interlocutors from the EU structures work in internal DGs in the Commission.

Wishful thinking regarding further short-term reforms or new resources is left aside. Instead, the focus is on low hanging fruits both for the hierarchy and for staff itself. How can the responsible units produce more, sometimes with less staff?

Officials Face Increasingly Difficult Challenges

The current situation facing EU structures as regards security contains a paradox. The general public in Europe, strongly influenced by populist tendencies, often blames the EU for not having done enough to counter serious security-related problems, notably irregular migration.

At the same time, there are many arguments put forward to the effect that the EU should not do more but rather less in the future.

As regards hard security, skeptics point to a more important role of NATO, not least given the NATO Summit in July 2016 in Poland. As regards border security many advocate more focus on national frontiers. As regards Ukraine, many see the leading role not to be on the level of the EU but belonging to a few important Member States. And the determination to ask the EU to take a leading role in the Middle East is simply not there. The High Representative (also Vice President of the Commission, HR/VP) after some years of hesitation was asked to put forward a European global strategy to the European Council in June 2016. This strategy may, however, become even harder to implement than the initial perceptions about the conditions for implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy. In 2003 the number of issues on the table was much smaller. And the European Union counted on the possibility to work in close collaboration with at least two strategic partners, the United States and Russia. Now the relationship to Russia is defined as a strategic challenge rather than as a partnership (HR/VP, 2016) and the ability of whoever is elected President of the United States, for instance, to get a trade agreement with Europe ratified is very much in doubt. And what is more: the two remaining American presidential candidates agree on the absolute requirement of Europe taking more of the burden concerning defense and security in and around Europe.

In a rational world, this would lead to serious preoccupations in Europe about how to mobilize the necessary political will to deal with the security challenges ahead. In a real world political leaders seem to focus more on to what extent they will be able to maintain power on the national level. And they will need to take into account very much increasing skepticism of their constituencies about the role of the EU.

On the level of the top hierarchy of the EU structures in the real world, the central preoccupation may in this situation be how to do damage limitation concerning maintaining essential solidarity between the EU Member States in implementing already agreed decisions – for instance on how to share the migration challenge. As noted by European Council President Donald Tusk on Twitter in April 2016: "Solving the root causes of migration cannot be ignored but too often sounded like an alibi for doing nothing in Europe."

The Natural Reaction when Faced with Difficulties: Look Down

The posture of the EU official in such a situation may lead to even less attention to the need for a comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises than before. The fatigue when it comes to speaking in a language of grand strategy may be over-whelming unless efforts to beef up morale are deployed by the top hierarchy and by supporting efforts from the outside.

The EU official is in any case faced with substantial difficulties from his or her personal perspective when it comes to security. Especially as regards officials with a background in the Commission, he/she has typically not been recruited to the EU

on qualifications relating to security in a broader sense. In many cases, particularly as regards temporary agents recruited from the Member States, he/she may not be very familiar with what the EU actually can do on security at large; without a significant experience of working with the EU, the structures in Brussels may be perceived as black boxes. For example, it took some time before the military experts in the EU came to the view that it was important to cooperate with the Commission on something more than the financing of small civilian projects in the field.

It was only in a few specific contexts that a large number of EU officials dealing with security problems from different perspectives came to the understanding that wider coordination is a necessary condition for success. The most cited case in point may be the Horn of Africa and piracy. But in that context, it also soon became apparent that to develop real coordination on maritime security a lot of actors need to work together. It would take time, and it would be difficult to determine who has brought the most significant contribution to the table. In the case of maritime security, which was a cross-sectoral policy product together with the European Commission more than 300 stakeholders were involved including major international players such as the United States, Russia, India, and China (Lundin, 2015). Not least the importance of private sector contributions became more than obvious.

It goes without saying that no individual EU official will be able or advised to push for such a level of coordination in an area without substantial support from the hierarchy. The hierarchy cannot give such support without being very selective when implementing the European global strategy. It also, goes without saying that the HR/VP is not likely to make such recommendations unless there is intense political pressure from Member States and unless there is substantial evidence through reporting from the field that such an ambitious approach makes sense.

The EU Mobilizes in Crisis: the Need for Three Compelling Messages from the HR/VP to Staff

The golden opportunity for the EU official to make a difference through advocating an early, bold and ambitious, comprehensive approach comes before and during a crisis. Wishful thinking would have it that crisis would be prevented through early action as proposed in the EU global strategy. For that to happen there are, however, at least three important messages that the EU hierarchy needs to send to staff.

First, that people need to think ahead and look widely seeking to enhance situational awareness. An essential element in staff evaluations should, therefore, be willingness and ability to discuss lessons learned and appreciate the importance of the work of others inside and outside the EU. Unique focus on EU visibility and the implementation of the project in which the EU official may be engaged in, should not be sufficient. Each EU official needs to adopt a learning attitude, not only through engaging in training – the budget for training, particularly, in EU delega-

tions is very limited. Each EU official needs to be enabled by his/her hierarchy to use resources on the Internet to familiarize him or herself with the link between what he/she is doing and what others are doing. Only through such an effort can the potential of wider coordination be identified. And only through such knowledge can the proper role of the EU, often as a catalyst in very complex environments, be proposed. Routine reporting to the head of delegation, weekly or monthly reports to headquarters may be useful, but the proof of their effectiveness will be the content and the extent to which important messages are received vertically and horizontally in the organization, including in communication with Member States. For this to happen a lot of work will need to be deployed on wider analysis which may not need to be sent immediately but rather form the basis for contingency planning. Thinking ahead also needs to include contingency planning as regards crisis coordination. A looming crisis initially may be perceived to signal failure, and it's only natural that whoever feels in charge of the policy relating to the crisis will try to do whatever can be done to prevent it from escalating him or herself. Sharing responsibility with others is not an easy decision. Early contingency planning in this regard can help to win back time otherwise lost in establishing effective coordination including both crisis management expertise and other relevant services. The rivalry in the past concerning who should be in the lead in emergency coordination should be possible to overcome.

Secondly, the hierarchy will need to take some responsibility for the risks that security work entails for individual officials and express confidence in their ability to do multitasking. The current predominant focus in EU training is on how to respect information security regulations and how to promote sound financial management (EEAS Human Resources Report, 2015). Both these types of training focus on what not to do. But the HR/VP has to stress that she and many other leaders in the EU structures need to know. Otherwise, the risk is that essential knowledge never is communicated, that non-action is deemed a safer alternative in a difficult security situation, which also could include potential threats to an official. More widely, it is also important for the top hierarchy to express general confidence in the ability of staff to act on behalf of the EU. It is important to counteract the tendency to focus on the HR/VP alone beyond setting up of a cluster of Commissioners in support of EU external action. The role of EU Special Representatives, EU heads of delegations and many other actors who can help to communicate and coordinate must be upgraded, including by entrusting important functions to Member State representatives. In this sense, this essay concurs with the recommendation made by Sir Robert Cooper in a recent publication stressing the importance of individual EU ambassadors and of better cooperation with the Commission (Cooper, 2016). For him, as well, the issue of implementation of the European Union global strategy is now to a large extent a question of organization. Regarding external communica-

tion increasing emphasis thus needs to be put on the uniformity of the message that the EU sends, not on who delivers it.

Third, the hierarchy, not least in the Commission, will need to stress even more firmly that project budgets, are to be seen as a raw material that needs refining as any other raw material in modern society. The prevailing trend over more than a decade to package assistance in substantial portfolios, sometimes being delivered to a partner government in the form of budgetary support, needs to be reviewed. The fact that the international community pays for at least two-thirds of the national budget of Afghanistan (Craig, 2014) does not in itself cater for success. In many security-related areas, it is just impossible to achieve the desired impact without working with the money. The area of the rule of law, including human rights, is a serious case in point where simplistic notions of conditionality often don't work. Clearly, this puts the requirement on a political ex-ante evaluation of proposed projects much higher than has been the case in some security-related areas over the last years. Especially in the intergovernmental sphere, the hesitation to do a serious analysis of impact and feasibility before taking decisions has been unyielding. The responsibility for dealing with resource problems, including how to cope with shortages regarding staffing, has often been pushed down to the level of heads of delegation and directors. The EU needs to undertake serious reviews of the implementation of policies more often.

The Potential Negative Power of an EU Official Should not be Underestimated
The author, after significant interaction with EU officials over the last years, following on to his background in the EU, assumes the following: the main instinct of the typical official will in a period of uncertainty be to play it safe, first of all respecting the rules and procedures of the organization. Security policy is, however, an area, which requires initiative and calculated risk-taking. It is not enough just doing what you are told. It means to favor action over non-action. Here it is important to note that the negative power of many officials in the system is significant. The hierarchy may promise things to be done, for instance by committing funds to implement projects, missions or operations. But there will be scores of officials needed to implement these instructions swiftly. If they play it safe, implementation will be significantly delayed or not taking place at all. As regards the realization of the European Union global strategy, playing it safe will mean waiting for not only general but also operational and precise instructions – putting it to the hierarchy to take the risks.

Security policy in the EU is only slowly becoming explicit and comprehensive – and internal security has come first.

The history of EU involvement in security is not very encouraging, although significant steps forward have been taken in the last decades. For a very long time, the

notion of the EU as a peace project was not explicitly endorsed in the EU's treaties. Integration and its role for peace were seen as an implicit goal unto the end of the 90s. When the European Security and Defense Policy was set up after British – French agreement at the bilateral summit in Saint Malo in 1998 (Lundin, 2015), the focus was not on what the EU could do as whole for security. Rather a dedicated service was set up in the Council Secretariat governed by consensus rules and financed through a minuscule budget. The entire EU budget, which is handled by the European Commission, was not explicitly to be used for these purposes. The European Commission as a consequence did not widely use concepts such as security policy or crisis management until a few years later, after 9/11 (Lundin, 2015). This practice turned out to be untenable when the West and the world faced terrorist threats requiring a considerable upgrade of internal as well as external security structures in the EU.

Leaders could no longer afford to be passive regarding the need for a comprehensive approach. The first major example was indeed 9/11 when the EU structures were required to search for every possible contribution to a comprehensive action plan, stretching existing competencies to the limit. For the first time, the United States not only looked for European burden sharing in defense but also looked for harmonized European systems governing internal security. Significant efforts were deployed to deal with the situation even before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force at the end of 2009. What had been an embryo of internal security services before 9/11 grew into several directorate generals. And security approaches to some community policy areas turned into significant thematic initiatives in many sectors ranging from cyber, energy, climate change, migration, organized crime and counterterrorism, et cetera. The internal security strategy first adopted in 2010 enumerated a finite number of priorities and set out operational implementation plans in particular areas. Further steps were taken in this direction in 2015, particularly as regards irregular migration.

Comparatively Modest Ambitions on the External Side
But on the external side goals remained much more modest. The first HR of British nationality, also acting as VP of the Commission after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, graciously accepted a role as defined by Member States: the entire EEAS was to be set up not as a change management project with strategic ambitions regarding resources and organization. No, in her own words, it was to be an aircraft to be assembled in flight, while implementing a consistent reduction of staff with 1% for each budget year. One-third of the administrators was to be recruited from Member States. And available resources in the system coming from the European Commission and the Council Secretariat had to be distributed thinly across the world. Fewer than 1000 administrators (EEAS Human Resources report, 2015) had

to be spread across more than 130 delegations as well as across the entire service at headquarters level. The main ambition to have at least a few administrators also in the smaller EU delegations led to the need to reduce some strategic capabilities existing before the entry into force of the treaty: significantly by abolishing the significant planning unit serving Javier Solana in the Council Secretariat. EEAS also attempted to reduce support staff to EU Special Representatives. The need to give attention to the main thematic challenges with the Commission could not be given priority. For instance, when cyber security developed into a policy of importance initially only one single national expert in the EEAS could be deployed to work on this topic.

The Need for a Helicopter Perspective in External Action

When looking for success in external action of relevance to security it has for more than a decade been obvious that one needs to focus on the end state after major operations and projects. When so doing the issue is less one of successful project implementation or the safe return to the base of a military unit. The issue is more about the net EU impact on the situation, as a catalyst for change in an enormously complex situation on all levels. What for a long time made decision-makers in the EU hesitate about the usefulness of an EU global strategy was of course precisely this complexity and constant change also on the strategic level. What is more, experiences before and after the Arab Spring also illustrates the need to look back to lessons learned. And every local situation needs to be put into a wider regional perspective. Effective implementation requires coalition building, which means identifying other relevant actors in every situation. In the end, a helicopter perspective needs to be developed when pursuing security-related endeavors.

Comprehensiveness as a policy and as a method (in French '*approache globale*') is a natural part of the effort to promote effective leadership by zooming out and develop a strategic overview of what needs to be taken into account when implementing a strategy or policy. This insight has been growing gradually over several decades inside and outside the EU. Thus there was an explicit reference to the need for a comprehensive approach by the American administration (i.e. Richard Armitage) when referring to a lack of effectiveness in Korea policy towards the end of the 90s. The need for a comprehensive concept of security including human rights and democracy was a standard feature of the EU approach to the OSCE particularly after the Cold War, which means seeing the comprehensive approach as a policy. Conflict prevention mainstreaming was set out as a goal for all external policies by the European Commission in 2001 and can be seen as a comprehensive approach in terms of method. In the absence of agreement on the proposal to develop a global strategy for the EU much effort was put into the comprehensive

approach to external action in the years leading up to a communication from 2013 followed by an action plan for 2015, selecting some geographical cases. The new Neighbourhood Policy was not included in the action plan. Instead, a case-by-case approach was developed with an emphasis on countries outside the neighborhood. To some extent, the notion of a comprehensive approach is also related to the discourse on the coherence of EU external policies. This requirement, which has been an element in EU treaties before Lisbon, was, of course, a central part of the negotiations ahead of the Treaty, which entered into force in 2009. The notion that the EU punched below its weight was a standard argument in this context given the fact that many see the EU mainly as an economic power.

Who Can Help and What Can the Official do for Him/Herself?

So one would have thought that resources should be put at the disposal of the EEAS to be able to develop sufficient training programs to enable people to understand how others work. The global strategy will be helpful, of course, in this regard but more targeted efforts will be necessary. Budgetary constraints lead to pessimism about what realistically the system can produce in the form of training programs.

To deploy personnel without training is of course anathema in CSDP. The European Security and Defense College is essential, and exercises are important. CSDP staff needs sufficient training.

Not much of this can be said for staff training in other areas. European Union Member States typically recruit diplomats as future generalists. And there are many other specialist personnel categories in the Commission and the EEAS that have received no more general security training, beyond the understanding of more formal security regulations governing the security of information and infrastructure.

In the EEAS there is training for instance for heads of political sections in EU delegations in order, not least, to improve political reporting. But this is only the beginning. The proof of the pudding will be to see the comprehensive approach perspective applied in concrete cases.

The Role of Think-tanks and the Academic Community

For the literature produced by think-tanks and others to be useful, it needs to be presented to the expert readers in the correct way.

Experts, particularly in the field, but also desks at headquarters are not likely to take advice seriously if they detect a lack of understanding of the real difficulties to work in the field. The way experts perceive the messages coming from the think-tank community is fundamental for the impact these messages are going to have. Doing evaluations of field work is easier said than done. The risk is that the intended

readership approaches the evaluation from a damage limitation perspective: how can I influence the evaluator to give a more positive image of my work?

So it may be that more or less the same study with the same recommendations in substance may be received very differently by the intended readership; whether there is respect for the difficulties of working in the field or not. It is also fundamental if that the person bringing the message is seen as representing a special interest; be it regarding more money to be allocated to a specific sector or for that matter more resources to be assigned to a particular type of research.

As a former practitioner in EU structures and on the level of a Member State, it is also important to note that objections to the validity of the recommendations of a particular case study often may be very practical and close to the personal situation of a practitioner. There may be problems in the hierarchy; there might be very simple constraints regarding financial or administrative/legal rules. A comprehensive approach which does not refer to the importance of such internal constraints is therefore not likely to be seriously taken into account.

A practitioner also more often than not may point to a lack of time when being asked to coordinate more, to apply more comprehensive approaches, to write more analytic reports. He or she may readily acknowledge the potential usefulness of such endeavors but may quickly add that this is an academic endeavor rather than something that he or she realistically can implement. He/she may also add that, of course, such wider ambitions may be useful but do not belong to the job description of the practitioner in question.

The moment think-tank experts researchers preach a message rather than seek to help the practitioner to do a better job is, therefore, likely to be the time when the practitioner stops reading or listening.

In the end, the practitioner may benefit mainly from two types of contributions from the outside: (1) providing a frame of reference for organizing incoming information; (2) assistance not in terms of actual learning but in how to find information quickly by zooming out more widely than in the past.

To succeed in creating situational awareness in a wider sense, using a helicopter perspective, this requires more or less daily efforts on the part of the official. To make this possible presence on social media, for instance on Twitter is likely to be crucial.

In the end, arguably, it is only with such a wider situational awareness that the official is likely to interact with confidence inside and outside the EU in a proactive way on security, willing to take calculated risks in support of EU Global Strategy implementation.

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"Um por Todos e Todos por Um"? Atores e Dimensões da Abordagem Global da União Europeia

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Resumo

Após o voto pelo 'Brexit' e com as múltiplas crises que a UE enfrenta, a questão da abordagem global da UE dificilmente estará no topo das preocupações e prioridades dos Estados-membros. Este texto apresenta, porém, vários motivos pelos quais se justificaria atribuir mais relevância a esta discussão no atual contexto europeu. O vasto leque de políticas, instrumentos e atores que conferem à UE a capacidade de abordar várias dimensões da segurança e do desenvolvimento no plano internacional são uma clara mais-valia da UE. No entanto, esta multiplicidade de atores e dimensões contribui também para as dificuldades que a UE tem em agir e falar 'a uma só voz'. A falta de uma clara visão e liderança políticas continua a ser o eterno 'calcanhar de Aquiles' da ação externa europeia, não obstante progressos significativos na adaptação de instrumentos e mecanismos da UE com vista a uma maior coordenação e trabalho conjunto no âmbito do sistema europeu. Pragmatismo com ambição é, portanto, a opção mais provável da UE para avançar no sentido de uma abordagem global eficaz, que terá necessariamente que ir a par com uma discussão mais ampla sobre a União que queremos.

Abstract
One for All and All for One? Actors and Dimensions of the European Union Comprehensive Approach

In the aftermath of the 'Brexit' vote and amid the several crisis the EU is dwelling with, the issue of the comprehensive approach will hardly be EU Member States' primary concern or priority. Yet, as argued in this paper, there are a number of reasons why this discussion is important for the EU, and even more so in the current context. EU's wide range of policies, instruments and actors that allow it to address multiple dimensions of security and development, are a clear added-value for EU's external action. But the multiplicity of actors and dimensions that are EU's strength, also weaken its ability to act and speak as a coherent 'one' in the international stage in the absence of clear political vision and leadership. This unresolved leadership issue is not likely to go away anytime soon – if ever – despite significant progress in adapting tools and mechanisms for coordination and joint work in the EU system. Pragmatism with ambition is therefore EU's most likely option to push through the commitment towards an effective comprehensive approach. But this is a path that inevitably has to go hand in hand with a clearer view of what kind of Union we want.

No rescaldo do referendo em que uma escassa maioria de ingleses e galeses votaram pelo 'Brexit', receios e riscos de desunião pairam sobre ambos os lados do Canal da Mancha. As ondas de choque tanto a nível político e económico como social são ainda imprevisíveis, quer para o Reino Unido como para a União Europeia (UE) e no plano internacional. O que parece certo é a saída do Reino Unido da UE – ou de parte dele caso a Escócia e a Irlanda do Norte optem por sua vez por saírem do Reino Unido para se manterem na UE. Pela primeira vez, a UE depara-se com a provável saída de um Estado-membro depois de sucessivas fases de alargamento, para o qual aliás o Reino Unido muito contribuiu como estratégia contrária ao aprofundamento do projeto político europeu. Quando não conseguiu travar iniciativas de aprofundamento com vista a uma união política, monetária e financeira, o Reino Unido manteve-se tanto quanto possível à margem através de múltiplos *opt-outs*, nomeadamente do Euro, da zona Schengen, de questões de justiça e segurança. Mas não é o único Estado-membro a fazer uso de *opt-outs*.

Independentemente da futura saída do Reino Unido e não obstante a ilusão isolacionista dos adeptos do 'Brexit', este continuará a ser um parceiro da UE e ator nas questões europeias, nomeadamente em matéria de política externa e de segurança. Mas não será certamente *business as usual*. A confiança no projeto europeu e nas suas instituições, já muito afetada pelas crises financeira e migratória, não sai incólume com o 'Brexit'. Não se trata apenas de comunicar melhor o que é o projeto europeu, mas também e sobretudo de definir que União os 27 Estados-membros querem para o futuro. São de esperar discussões difíceis e possíveis divisões entre os 27 e internamente, no seio dos Estados-membros. Alguns veem na saída do Reino Unido uma oportunidade para aprofundar o processo de integração. Outros reclamam uma revisão fundamental, mais democrática e flexível, na forma de construir o projeto europeu que tenha em conta nomeadamente diferentes níveis de preparação e interesse dos seus membros. Sobretudo, não há uma visão e estratégia única sobre o futuro da UE. Uma fase prolongada de 'turbulência' e indecisão pode afetar a confiança no futuro do projeto europeu ainda mais do que a esperada saída do Reino Unido.

A Relevância da Abordagem Global

A abordagem global da UE – isto é, a sua capacidade de federar atores à volta de posições comuns e agir em uníssono em matéria de política externa e de segurança (ver caixa) – não é nem uma questão nova (Faria, 2014), nem a prioridade principal dos atores políticos europeus no presente contexto. Mas não deixa de ser, por isso, uma questão central e pertinente ao debate que se anuncia, por várias razões.

O que é a Abordagem Global da UE?
O Conselho Europeu define a *abordagem global* como um *método* geral de trabalho e um conjunto de medidas e processos concretos com vista a melhorar a forma como a UE no seu conjunto, com base numa visão estratégica comum e com as ferramentas e instrumentos de que dispõe, pode desenvolver e aplicar políticas, ações e práticas de trabalho para chegar a resultados mais coerentes e eficazes. Por outras palavras, trata-se da forma como a UE, coletivamente, define e implementa políticas e ações, e mobiliza o conjunto dos seus meios e instrumentos para uma ação externa coerente e mais eficaz, de acordo com o disposto no Tratado da UE[1].

Primeiramente, a forma como a UE define e gere os seus objetivos, interesses e prioridades no plano internacional ou global é um elemento inerente à discussão sobre a UE que queremos e aos seus objetivos fundamentais. Outro fator cada vez mais premente tem a ver com a crescente interligação entre políticas internas e a ação externa da UE – as questões das migrações, da segurança interna, ou ainda de políticas económicas, agrícolas ou comerciais são um bom exemplo. Além disso, a coerência e a capacidade de ação da UE são fatores fundamentais para a sua credibilidade (abalada em parte pelo 'Brexit'), quer enquanto projeto, quer enquanto ator internacional. *Last, but not least*, a pressão para a racionalização e eficácia na utilização dos meios financeiros disponíveis é cada vez maior face às restrições orçamentais, e tenderá a agravar-se com a saída do Reino Unido. A sua contribuição financeira representa entre 13 a 15 por cento do orçamento geral da UE e do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento (FED), além da contribuição adicional do Reino Unido para a Facilidade de Apoio à Paz em África no âmbito do FED[2], entre outros.

Para muitos parceiros, uma ação coerente e integrada por parte dos doadores em geral é uma necessidade, sobretudo em países afetados por fragilidades estruturais ou em situação de conflito ou pós-conflito – para onde, aliás, a UE canaliza mais de metade da sua ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Mas é também uma necessidade interna conforme já referido, sobretudo nas áreas de confluência de objetivos de política interna e externa como nas questões das migrações ou da luta contra o terrorismo.

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1 Conclusões do Conselho Europeu, 12 de maio de 2014, p. 17 [online], disponível em http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/PT/foraff/142828.pdf.

2 O FED é o principal instrumento da ajuda comunitária no âmbito da cooperação para o desenvolvimento dos Estados de África, das Caraíbas e do Pacífico (ACP) assim como dos países e territórios ultramarinos. O FED é financiado pelos Estados-Membros e está fora do orçamento geral da UE. O Fundo inclui um envelope financeiro – a "Africa Peace Facility" (APF) – através do qual a UE e os Estados-membros (através de contributos voluntários) têm financiado operações de paz em África levadas a cabo maioritariamente pela União Africana (UA) e por organizações sub-regionais africanas.

O contexto de crise financeira reforça ainda mais essa necessidade de uma ação conjunta e coordenada, tanto mais que nenhum país pode, sozinho, dar resposta à amplitude e complexidade dos atuais desafios de segurança e de desenvolvimento. Este é aliás um dos argumentos subjacentes à *Estratégia Global da UE* recentemente proposta pela Alta Representante da UE para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança e Vice-Presidente da Comissão Europeia, Federica Mogherini[3].

Mais-valias da UE

É amplamente reconhecido no seio das instituições europeias e entre Estados--membros que uma das principais mais-valias da União Europeia reside no vasto leque de políticas, atores e instrumentos de que dispõe, bem como a sua presença em 139 países no mundo e a sua capacidade financeira. As instituições europeias e os Estados-membros são, juntos, o principal doador a nível mundial, contribuindo com mais de 50 por cento da ajuda global. A UE é de facto um ator global, com potencial para uma ação mais abrangente e integrada do que a dos seus Estados--membros individualmente ou de outras organizações e atores internacionais com âmbitos de ação mais restritos, ou meios mais modestos.

Os seus diferentes instrumentos e políticas permitem-lhe agir sobre uma variedade de condições e fatores inter-relacionados de crise ou fragilidade face aos múltiplos desafios e complexidade destes contextos em matéria de desenvolvimento, paz e segurança. Por exemplo, uma abordagem holística e integrada à questão da emigração clandestina ou ainda na luta contra o terrorismo e radicalização em países parceiros poderá ter que integrar simultaneamente: políticas de (re)inserção social e económica (acesso a serviços de base como saúde e educação; formação profissional, apoio à criação de micro/pequenas empresas), a par com cooperação política e diplomática (intercâmbio de informação; proteção dos direitos humanos e respeito dos princípios do estado de direito e governação democrática), reforço de capacidades no setor da segurança (por exemplo em matéria de controlo de fronteiras) e controlo democrático destas instituições, ou ainda ações de informação e sensibilização (por exemplo, contra as mensagens de radicalização ou sobre os riscos e estratagemas das redes de tráfico humano/imigração clandestina). A mesma necessidade de abordagens multifacetadas aplica-se a outros objetivos da ação externa da UE, sejam eles a segurança alimentar, a boa governação dos recursos naturais em países em vias de desenvolvimento ou a estabilização política de países em situação de pós-conflito, entre outros. Uma abordagem multifacetada e abrangente potencia soluções mais sustentáveis, se ancorada num bom conhecimento do contexto, virem em apoio a dinâmicas

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3   *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, junho de 2016 [online], disponível em http://europa.eu/global strategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf.

locais e estarem em sintonia com esforços de outros parceiros regionais ou internacionais. Não basta ter os instrumentos necessários. São igualmente importantes o processo de mobilização e coordenação dessas capacidades no seio da UE, bem como o modo como são utilizadas em cada contexto específico. É importante também relativizar a importância do papel dos atores externos em processos de transformação que são primordialmente endógenos e da competência de atores locais. O papel dos atores externos é sobretudo de apoio ou facilitação – dificilmente de liderança, por mais importante que seja a sua presença e influência. No entanto, uma ação descoordenada e insuficientemente ancorada no contexto local por parte de atores externos, além de ineficaz, poderá ter um impacto negativo sobre o contexto em questão e afetar a credibilidade da UE.

Este potencial da UE não está, porém, a ser suficientemente usado. A *Estratégia Global da UE* reconhece-o e reafirma a importância primordial da abordagem global em situações de crise e conflito, bem como na prevenção e estabilização de contextos frágeis. Mas reafirma também a abordagem global como método geral de trabalho da UE, nomeadamente:

- O investimento nas várias dimensões da política externa;
- A mobilização dos seus diferentes atores para uma ação conjunta coerente, credível e baseada numa visão comum da situação em questão e da resposta possível por parte da UE;
- Atuar em parceria com uma diversidade de atores locais, regionais e internacionais.

A Estratégia também alerta para a necessidade de desenvolver capacidades em setores onde a UE carece ainda de instrumentos e de meios financeiros e humanos (particularmente nas áreas da segurança e defesa) para realizar esse potencial de ator global, deixando assim a mensagem de que o método é importante, mas não é tudo. A realização do potencial da UE enquanto ator global depende também da vontade política e investimento dos Estados-membros de trabalharem em conjunto e de se dotarem dos meios e capacidades necessárias.

Se a necessidade de uma abordagem global é consensual entre atores europeus, as dificuldades para a pôr em prática são múltiplas, a começar pela complexidade dos contextos em que a UE opera, muitos dos quais são Estados afetados por diferentes níveis de fragilidade. Mas para além dos fatores contextuais incontornáveis, a própria arquitetura institucional da UE, desenvolvida com vista a um equilíbrio de poderes, constitui uma primeira dificuldade.

Multiplicidade de Atores e Dimensões da Ação Externa da UE

A abordagem global é uma '*responsabilidade partilhada*' das instituições e serviços da UE, mas também dos Estados-membros, nas capitais e nos países terceiros. Os Estados-membros continuam a ser atores chave da política externa europeia, na gestão

de crises e na mobilização de capacidades nas áreas da segurança e defesa, definindo no Conselho Europeu as orientações estratégicas e políticas da UE. Mas as competências, instrumentos, políticas e capacidades relevantes para a ação externa estão cada vez mais distribuídas por uma variedade de atores, a diferentes níveis do sistema europeu, numa rede institucional complexa.

A Comissão Europeia

A Comissão Europeia (CE) é um dos principais doadores, a nível mundial, de ajuda ao desenvolvimento e humanitária, sendo responsável pela gestão e coordenação da ajuda e resposta europeias em situações de crise ou de catástrofe humanitária, dentro ou fora das fronteiras da UE. A CE não só gere os instrumentos financeiros de ação externa, como tem também um papel importante no desenvolvimento e implementação de outras políticas relevantes para a ação externa europeia, como é o caso das políticas comerciais, pescas, energia, política e normas ambientais, migrações e outras. Estas competências estão distribuídas por várias direções gerais (DG) e, dentro destas, por diferentes serviços da Comissão.

Assegurar uma visão comum e uma coordenação efetiva no seio da CE é desde logo uma tarefa complicada. Cada uma destas DG e/ou serviços tem objetivos e prioridades específicas, nem sempre facilmente conciliáveis – por exemplo entre a DG Comércio e a DG da Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento (DEVCO) ou a DG Ambiente. Alguns serviços têm os seus próprios instrumentos financeiros (geográficos ou temáticos), com regras, tempos e modalidades de cooperação distintas. Por exemplo a gestão do Instrumento para a Paz e Estabilidade, do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento, do Instrumento Europeu para a Democracia e Direitos Humanos e outros está distribuída por vários serviços.

A Alta Representante e o Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa

O Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa (SEAE), criado em dezembro de 2010 com o Tratado de Lisboa, e liderado pela Alta Representante, é o órgão responsável pela definição de uma visão estratégica e pela coordenação interinstitucional e coerência da política externa da UE. O mandato da Alta Representante é claramente o de coordenar a política comum de segurança e defesa e dar voz à política externa comum da UE, juntamente com os Chefes de Missão em cada um dos países em que a UE está representada.

A estrutura híbrida do SEAE – constituído por funcionários da Comissão Europeia, do Secretariado do Concelho Europeu e por diplomatas dos Estados-membros destacados – reflete a natureza da missão do mais recente órgão institucional da UE. As suas divisões geográficas, em coordenação com as Delegações da UE (DUE), são responsáveis pela análise, definição e acompanhamento das relações com países terceiros. As divisões temáticas do SEAE orientam, apoiam e asseguram a coorde-

nação e coerência das posições e ações da UE sobre questões transversais como os direitos humanos, democracia e questões globais ou multilaterais. O SEAE inclui também uma divisão responsável pela coordenação da política de segurança e prevenção de conflitos, bem como estruturas civis e militares para a planificação e coordenação de '*missões de gestão de crises'* decididas e monitorizadas pelo Conselho Europeu que continuam a existir como um universo paralelo dentro do SEAE (ou a ser vistas como tal dentro da própria instituição). Estas missões de gestão de crises são como um ator em si, com estruturas de controlo e comando próprias. A interligação e a coordenação das missões PESD com as Delegações da UE e outros atores no terreno e em Bruxelas tem sido objeto de crescente atenção, estando todavia ainda em fase de discussão mecanismos que garantam uma participação mais abrangente na sua planificação (mais integrada).

Se bem que o Tratado de Lisboa tenha definido um mandato para o SEAE e para a Alta Representante, a clarificação do papel destes novos atores na arquitetura institucional e operativa da UE foi um processo gradual e não sem tensões ou conflitos de poder interinstitucional. À medida que as estruturas do SEAE se foram construindo, foram sendo melhor definidos os respetivos papéis e a divisão de trabalho entre (e no seio) das instituições. Subsistem algumas dificuldades tanto na relação com os Estados-membros/Conselho, que continuam a ser os atores primordiais na definição da política externa e de segurança e defesa da UE, como com a CE, responsável pela gestão da ajuda europeia.

As Delegações e Representantes Especiais da UE

As DUE em países terceiros não são uma instituição em si – são uma extensão da CE e do SEAE – mas são o ator 'na linha da frente' da política externa da UE e o interlocutor imediato dos países parceiros, representando a UE. Estando mais próximos da realidade no terreno e assegurando a coordenação entre as instituições europeias e os Estados-membros e outros parceiros *in loco*, as DUE são um ator primordial tanto na definição, como na implementação de uma abordagem global da política externa da UE em países terceiros.

Apesar de assumirem um papel proeminente na arquitetura institucional pós-Tratado de Lisboa enquanto representantes da UE (e não apenas da CE), a capacidade de algumas DUE em matéria de recursos humanos é em muitos casos ainda abaixo das necessidades, particularmente em Estados frágeis, e a sua margem de manobra política por vezes limitada por Bruxelas e/ou as capitais europeias. A personalidade do Chefe de Delegação (Embaixador da UE), especialmente a sua capacidade em instigar e liderar uma visão política comum na DUE e entre Estados-membros, é também um fator chave para uma efetiva liderança política e estratégica da UE.

Mas para além da Delegação (e dos Estados-membros), a UE tem também por vezes Representantes Especiais, nomeados pelo Conselho com o objetivo de dar maior

visibilidade política à UE no terreno e reforçar e promover em cada contexto e no plano internacional a estratégia e os interesses da UE. Ao contrário das Delegações, os Representantes Especiais não gerem fundos. O seu papel é fundamentalmente político e de análise, diálogo, representação e coordenação da ação europeia, mas enquanto tal sobrepõe-se em parte ao papel do chefe de Delegação ou Embaixador da UE no país.

O Conselho Europeu

O Conselho Europeu, ou grupo de chefes de Estado e de Governo dos Estados-membros da UE, é o principal órgão decisório da UE. A política externa da UE, em particular a sua política de segurança e defesa, é uma prerrogativa dos Estados-membros. Como cada Estado-membro tem a sua própria política externa, incluindo prioridades e interesses particulares a cada um, a tomada de posição e decisões para uma ação comum são por vezes um processo árduo de negociação e nem sempre bem-sucedido ou que limita a resposta europeia a um mínimo denominador comum – geralmente aquém das possibilidades e necessidades de resposta à situação.

Além disso, por questões práticas e operativas, diferentes grupos de trabalho discutem e preparam a tomada de decisão que terá lugar no Concelho, que reúne em diferentes formações (Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros, do Desenvolvimento, da Economia e Finanças, etc). Nos grupos de trabalho (temáticos e geográficos) do Concelho participam representantes dos Estados-membros, a Comissão e/ou o SEAE (ou ambos). Cada um destes grupos discute, em sede separada, questões que podem ser pertinentes para vários grupos de trabalho (como foi por exemplo o caso da discussão da Comunicação da CE e da Alta Representante sobre a Abordagem Global), de forma a permitir que cada grupo desse o seu parecer, e que as perspetivas e preocupações fundamentais de cada um destes grupos pudessem ser tomadas em consideração[4]. Não estão previstas reuniões conjuntas de dois ou mais comités ou grupos de trabalho sobre questões de interesse comum, nem consta que tal tenha acontecido até agora. Por exemplo, as missões (civis ou militares) no âmbito da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD) tendem a ser discutidas apenas no Comité Político e de Segurança (COPS) e no CIVCOM ou no EUMC, quando geralmente estas acontecem em contextos onde a UE tem um longo historial de cooperação e experiências que devem ser tidas em conta. Nestes casos, outros setores e atores da ação externa europeia são geralmente consultados ao longo do processo, geralmente a título informal.

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4   Cinco grupos de trabalho do Conselho foram chamados a dar o seu parecer sobre a Comunicação: o Comité de Desenvolvimento (CODEV), o Comité Militar (EUMC), o Comité para a gestão civil de crises (CIVCOM), o Grupo Político-Militar (PMG), e o Comité para a ajuda humanitária e alimentar (COHAFA).

O mesmo tipo de 'compartimentalização' acontece também com as reuniões do Concelho a nível ministerial: a reunião conjunta de Ministros do Desenvolvimento e da Defesa durante a Presidência portuguesa da UE em 2007 para a discussão do nexo segurança e desenvolvimento foi uma das raras ocasiões em que tal aconteceu.

Administração e Diplomacia Nacionais dos Estados-membros

No caso de alguns Estados-membros, sobretudo pequenos Estados cujas delegações têm menos pessoal, os mesmos representantes acompanham diferentes grupos de trabalho, mas tal não garante necessariamente uma abordagem global e coerente por parte desses Estados. De um modo geral, cada administração e diplomacia nacional deparam-se com problemas e desafios semelhantes aos que a abordagem global da UE procura dar resposta, ou seja: coordenar e conciliar a diversidade de atores, interesses e perspetivas que existem igualmente ao nível de cada administração. A maior parte dos Estados-membros não tem mecanismos próprios para uma abordagem global a nível nacional, o que compromete em parte esforços para um acordo e implementação de uma abordagem global ao nível da UE[5]. As diferentes culturas políticas e administrativas dificultam desde logo uma visão e interesse comum no seio dos Estados-membros e entre eles sobre o que deve ser a abordagem global da UE. Os riscos de falta de incentivos ou vontade política ao mais alto nível para uma abordagem global da UE são por isso reais, não obstante as declarações e iniciativas de vários Estados-membros sobre esta e outras questões relacionadas[6].

O Parlamento Europeu

Apesar de ter um papel limitado na definição da ação externa da UE, o Parlamento Europeu (PE) não deixa de ter alguma influência e poder de pressão sobre a CE, a Alta Representante e o Conselho quanto às escolhas e decisões em matéria de política externa e de segurança. O PE é um ator a ter em conta e a envolver na discussão sobre a abordagem global nomeadamente pelo seu papel de *watchdog* das instituições e políticas europeias e pelo seu poder de aprovação do orçamento comunitário (que inclui a maior parte dos instrumentos de ação externa, com exceção dos instrumentos extraorçamento, como é o caso do FED). Por exemplo, a flexibilização das regras e procedimentos na utilização dos instrumentos financeiros – especialmente

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5   Ver nomeadamente Wilton Park (2012, § 14) ou ainda Hauck e Rocca (2014).

6   É o caso, por exemplo, da abordagem da UE quanto ao reforço de capacidades para a segurança e o desenvolvimento em países terceiros – a questão do *train and equip* – em discussão desde inícios de 2015 e que tem sido objeto de longas e difíceis negociações internas e entre Estados-membros.

importante para a articulação de uma resposta integrada da UE – é uma questão onde o parecer do PE influi.

Gerir a Complexidade Institucional da UE

A abordagem global pressupõe e obriga por isso a um trabalho conjunto entre diferentes atores, cujo mandato, interesses ou prioridades políticas e *modus operandi* não são necessariamente confluentes. Cada um traz consigo também capacidades e experiências específicas; instrumentos financeiros próprios; modalidades, tempos de intervenção e processos de tomada de decisão distintos que nem sempre facilitam a articulação das diferentes políticas e intervenções dos atores europeus. Além disso, a leitura que cada ator faz do contexto e da estratégia a adotar podem divergir na ausência de uma análise comum. Gerir esta diversidade e complexidade institucional constitui um dos principais desafios a uma efetiva abordagem global por parte da UE, cujo ponto de partida deve ser uma análise comum ou pelo menos partilhada.

Ao nível interinstitucional e em particular na relação entre o SEAE e a CE, questões ligadas à competência legal dos serviços e instituições, à liderança ou autoridade política e à utilização dos fundos europeus são fatores principais de tensão. Cabe ao SEAE definir os objetivos e estratégia política em cada contexto, bem como desenvolver e coordenar com os outros atores a implementação da estratégia europeia, com o auxílio dos instrumentos financeiros, geridos pela CE. O facto de o SEAE não possuir fundos ou instrumentos financeiros próprios alimenta receios de instrumentalização da ajuda europeia ao desenvolvimento e humanitária para fins essencialmente políticos ou de segurança. Para os atores humanitários, a questão da abordagem global é particularmente delicada, especialmente em contextos onde há missões PESD ou quando o posicionamento político da UE não é neutral – ou não é visto como tal. Ainda que a ajuda humanitária não seja um instrumento de política externa, a estratégia política e a ação externa da UE e/ou de parceiros podem contribuir para reduzir o espaço de ação humanitária, já cada vez mais limitado em muitos contextos de conflito armado.

A UE tem feito passos significativos e ajustamentos importantes ao longo dos últimos anos no sentido de desenvolver abordagens mais integradas e coerentes, especialmente em contextos de crise ou fragilidade. Portugal foi aliás um dos países que contribuiu para a reflexão e mudanças no sentido de adaptar a resposta europeia em contextos de fragilidade e desenvolver uma abordagem integrada às questões de segurança e desenvolvimento nestes contextos – temas que foram uma prioridade da Presidência portuguesa da UE em 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007). O plano de ação para a implementação da abordagem global da UE, adotado em 2015, deriva aliás de um processo iniciado nessa altura[7].

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7 Para uma análise dos antecedentes do plano de ação ver Faria (2014).

Não obstante estes esforços e progresso realizados, a UE ainda não aplica de forma sistemática a abordagem global à sua ação externa. O processo é gradual e continuará a fazer face a obstáculos de natureza diversa (políticos, institucionais e organizativos, contextuais). Dois aspetos em particular são de salientar pelo seu impacto na efetiva capacidade e nível de ambição da abordagem global por parte da UE: (1) a adequação dos mecanismos, instrumentos e processos de tomada de decisão da UE; e (2) a questão da visão e liderança políticas no seio da UE.

Flexibilizar a Capacidade de Resposta da UE

Ao longo da última década em particular, a UE tem vindo a adaptar processos e mecanismos de trabalho, bem como as regras de programação e gestão dos seus instrumentos financeiros com vista a flexibilizar e melhorar a sua capacidade de resposta às necessidades políticas e operacionais em situações de crise ou fragilidade. Esse esforço incluiu a criação de novos instrumentos como o Instrumento para a Paz e a Estabilidade, de facilidades financeiras como a Facilidade para a Paz em África no âmbito do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento, ou ainda de Fundos Fiduciários geridos pela CE.

Esta adaptação decorre nomeadamente da reconhecida necessidade de articular, por um lado, ações de natureza diversa e, por outro lado, ações de curto prazo ou de emergência (como a estabilização ou a gestão de crises e a ajuda humanitária) e intervenções de natureza estrutural, a mais longo prazo, como o desenvolvimento ou a consolidação da paz e do Estado. Com frequência, a realidade no terreno não corresponde a uma estafeta de intervenções: estas necessidades coexistem e são interdependentes. Requerem por isso estratégias de apoio integrado, com intervenções contíguas e coordenadas que nas suas áreas específicas possam contribuir para objetivos comuns de estabilidade e desenvolvimento sustentável.

Assim, são cada vez mais prática corrente as comunicações conjuntas da CE e do SEAE/Alta Representante nas áreas da política externa (por exemplo sobre a capacitação para a gestão de crises ou o apoio à reforma do setor da segurança) ou ainda a adoção de estratégias geográficas (Estratégia Conjunta UE-África; Sahel; Corno de África; Grandes Lagos, etc.) e/ou temáticas (sobre migrações, luta contra o terrorismo, cibersegurança, segurança marítima, etc.). No âmbito destas e outras áreas de ação política da UE, tem havido um claro esforço por parte do SEAE e da CE em desenvolver mecanismos conjuntos que reúnem diferentes serviços relevantes e instituições da UE (como os grupos temáticos ou ainda as task force para países/ regiões em crise ou conflito); linhas de orientação política comuns; instrumentos de análise e identificação/planificação conjunta (para a análise de conflitos, o alerta precoce, a identificação conjunta de prioridades para a ação humanitária e de desenvolvimento, entre outros); programação conjunta; ou ainda ações de formação conjunta (CE, SEAE e/ou Estados-membros) para o reforço de capacidades na

sede, nas Delegações da UE e nas capitais e no sentido de promover abordagens abrangentes e uma "cultura" de trabalho conjunto entre atores europeus de diferentes quadrantes e proveniência institucional que vai para além do que são os documentos e iniciativas públicas.

Paralelamente, a UE tem procurado e progredido de forma gradual na adaptação dos seus instrumentos financeiros e mecanismos de gestão. Os instrumentos financeiros permitem à UE agir sobre um amplo leque de questões ou trabalhar com um vasto leque de atores internacionais e locais (Estados, organizações e atores da sociedade civil, setor privado, organizações regionais). No entanto, nem sempre a sua articulação é conseguida ou efetivamente procurada pelos serviços competentes ou incentivada pelas respetivas chefias, em parte devido à rigidez e complexidade de alguns procedimentos ou à morosidade dos processos de decisão.

No quadro financeiro plurianual para 2014-2020, a CE procedeu à simplificação da regulamentação dos instrumentos financeiros de ação externa, estabelecendo uma regulamentação comum à maior parte destes instrumentos, e uma maior flexibilidade nalguns procedimentos com vista a maximizar o seu potencial e facilitar a rapidez de resposta da UE. Desde 2013, a CE tem também a possibilidade de criar e gerir fundos fiduciários, juntando contribuições comunitárias e dos Estados-membros, e abertos a outros doadores e financiadores privados. Esta nova modalidade confere à UE maior visibilidade e poder de decisão sobre a utilização da ajuda europeia, conferindo-lhe também maior flexibilidade e rapidez para uma resposta atempada e eficaz a situações complexas ou de crise[8].

Ainda é cedo para avaliar plenamente o impacto e resultados de muitas destas medidas. Outros fatores, nomeadamente a visão e liderança política, poderão ter um papel determinante na efetiva utilização e maximização das potencialidades permitidas por estas reformas e adaptações no sistema europeu.

Deficit de Visão e Liderança Política

Análises e avaliações apontam com frequência para a falta de liderança ou apoio, ao nível da hierarquia institucional ou política da UE, como um dos principais fatores de bloqueio (ou falta de progresso) para uma ação externa mais coerente, coordenada e abrangente. Receios de ceder prerrogativas ou evitar a "interferência" de outros atores ou instituições dominam por vezes sobre esforços de coordenação e ação conjunta ou a prossecução de objetivos no terreno.

A Comissão liderada por Juncker procurou resolver algumas destas questões, sem alterar ou questionar papéis e mandatos estipulados no Tratado da UE. A nova Comissão pôs um forte acento na liderança política e no trabalho de equipa ao nível

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8   Ver, por exemplo, Hauck *et al.* (2015).

do Colégio de Comissários, do qual faz parte também a Alta Representante na sua qualidade de Vice-Presidente da Comissão. Cabe à Alta Representante o papel de coordenar a equipa de comissários para as relações externas, cuja formação pode variar em função das prioridades ou temas em questão. A nova Estratégia Global da UE recentemente proposta pela Alta Representante fornece o quadro geral para a orientação política e estratégica da ação externa.

O verdadeiro teste é traduzir agora estas grandes linhas da política externa da UE numa visão e liderança políticas mais concretas e específicas, tanto no plano político e diplomático como em exercícios aparentemente mais técnicos, mas profundamente políticos, como a programação. Nesta última, compete ao SEAE, juntamente com as Delegações da UE – em concertação tanto quanto possível e desejável com os parceiros – definir as prioridades da programação e consequentemente, da atribuição dos fundos europeus. O SEAE participa assim e de facto lidera juntamente com a CE a programação dos fundos europeus para a ação externa (incluindo do FED)[9]. O primeiro exercício de programação conjunta, em 2014, revelou no entanto diferenças nas prioridades da Comissão, do SEAE e das Delegações, nomeadamente no que respeita à escolha dos setores de concentração da ajuda[10], testemunho das dificuldades em traduzir na prática o princípio da liderança política do SEAE. Uma das dificuldades maiores para uma efetiva liderança política na UE reside na ambiguidade legal e institucional sobre a quem compete de facto a liderança política. As mudanças institucionais introduzidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa – especialmente a criação do SEAE – e a crescente afirmação da UE enquanto ator político global trouxeram novos atores e mais complexidade à ação externa da UE. Por um lado, a CE tem sido chamada a alargar as suas competências em matéria de política externa, resultado da crescente interligação entre políticas internas e externas – direções gerais como a da Migração e Assuntos Internos, Ambiente ou Assuntos Marítimos e Pescas, entre outras, participam agora com frequência na discussão, planeamento e implementação de ações externas da UE. Por outro lado, a representação externa da UE é uma competência da Alta Representante e das Delegações da UE, apoiadas pelo SEAE e por Representantes Especiais da UE, de acordo com a orientação política dos Estados-membros no Conselho. É a estes últimos que cabe, em última instância, o poder de definir e decidir da política externa da UE. O grau de autonomia destes atores encarregues de representar a UE não está, porém, clara-

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9   No caso dos fundos fiduciários da UE, o SEAE não tem um papel formal na sua programação, mas logicamente esta deve ser coerente com a estratégia política definida e coordenada pelo SEAE.

10 De acordo com o documento de reorientação da política europeia de desenvolvimento – a Agenda para a Mudança (2011) – a ajuda ao desenvolvimento deve concentrar-se em três setores, podendo ir até quatro setores em países frágeis.

mente definido, existindo nalguns casos riscos de sobreposição de mandatos, como já referido. Além disso, nem sempre a política externa bilateral dos Estados-membros é coerente e concordante com a linha política ou a estratégia por eles definida no Conselho.

Não é por isso surpreendente que a liderança política na UE se continue a debater com correntes contrárias, ora de comunitarização, ora de renacionalização. Com frequência, a escolha acaba por ser feita de forma muito pragmática, em função dos interesses e oportunidades em cada contexto, ajudados pela capacidade e engenho diplomático dos representantes europeus no terreno para colher essas oportunidades (o papel da UE no Zimbabué é um exemplo ilustrativo).

Em Conclusão: Que Abordagem Global por Parte da UE?

A abordagem global da UE terá que ser igualmente pragmática e o seu nível de ambição variável pelas várias razões já apontadas. Não obstante os esforços no sentido de adaptar os mecanismos, instrumentos e processos de trabalho conjunto ao nível das instituições europeias, a multiplicidade de interesses, dimensões e atores da ação externa europeia – que constituem a sua mais-valia – podem também levar à sua paralisia e a uma fragmentação ainda maior da ação externa da UE. Além disso, as perspetivas no seio das instituições e atores da ação externa europeia diferem sobre se a abordagem global deve centrar-se nas situações de gestão de crise, ou se deve ser uma prática generalizada a toda a ação externa da UE.

A abordagem global da UE não deve por isso ser uma questão de tipologia de contextos, já que não é necessariamente em situações de crise ou de urgência que os interesses ou perspetivas nacionais confluem (como é aliás patente por exemplo na questão da emigração). Também não deve ser um fim em si mesma, nem tem que ser um procedimento estandardizado que se repete em cada contexto. Quais os atores e as dimensões pertinentes deve ser uma decisão em função de cada contexto e dos objectivos propostos de acordo com as capacidades.

A abordagem global é sobretudo um processo que além de adaptado ao sistema da UE deve ser igualmente adaptável às condições de cada situação e ao nível de ambição possível – e evoluir com a mesma. Isto requer vontade, determinação e visão políticas para sustentar o esforço a que uma estratégia abrangente e coordenada obriga, tanto em situações de crise como em situações que, sendo consideradas menos urgentes, mereçam menos a atenção dos Estados-membros. Em contextos onde os Estados-membros têm políticas ou interesses divergentes, a CE e o SEAE devem poder constituir o núcleo duro da abordagem global da UE e liderar o processo no terreno e em Bruxelas até que haja condições para alargar o nível de ambição da abordagem global. Qualquer que seja o cenário, a capacidade da UE para uma efectiva abordagem global na sua ação externa está intimamente ligada à questão fundamental referida no início deste texto sobre a União que queremos.

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European Union Security Actorness: The Comprehensive Approach Hampered by Policy Differentiation

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Abstract

The purpose of the article is to analyse the implications of policy differentiation for EU's comprehensive approach in security matters. The change in the post-Cold War security environment (opportunity) favoured the explicitness of the (pillarised) security actorness of the European Union. Following the 9/11 attacks, the EU adopted an ambitious security approach that confirmed four interconnected dynamics: expansion of the security agenda, externalisation of internal security cooperation, internalisation of Common Security Defence Policy, and cross-pillarisation. It was an upgrade for the assertion of the European Union as a comprehensive and multi-functional security actor, endowed with autonomy, capability and presence. Since then, the EU narrative and practices on Comprehensive Approach have been applied to several security problems such as crises and conflicts, organised crime, piracy, cybersecurity, failed states, trafficking in human beings, radicalisation, hybrid threats. The comprehensive approach combined with a global (reach) ambition impose unique requirements on EU. A major challenge to EU's security actorness is policy differentiation in the security domain. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU acquired legal personality, enabling it to conclude treaties and to assume external representation. This also means that, for the first time, external and internal security policies evolve in the framework of an International Organisation. The Treaty also overcame pillarisation, transferred the cooperation on internal security to the TFEU, introduced amendments in the continued search for the Union's external coherence and demonstrated the dynamism of the policies of the former second and third pillars. However, the adjustments that were introduced denote a constructive ambiguity, patent in the existence of provisions enabling a comprehensive action, on the one hand, and of a hidden pillarisation, on the other hand, aggravated by the absence of an explicit concern with the coherence between the external and internal dimensions of security ('the missing link').

Resumo

A Actorness Securitária da União Europeia: A Abordagem Holística Comprometida pela Diferenciação Política

O artigo tem por objetivo analisar as implicações da policy differentiation para a comprehensive approach (CA) da União Europeia no domínio da segurança. O ambiente do pós-Guerra Fria (oportunidade) favoreceu a explicitação da actorness de segurança da UE. Após os ataques terroristas de 11 de Setembro de 2001, a União adotou uma abordagem ambiciosa demonstrativa de quatro dinâmicas interconectadas: expansão da agenda de segurança; externalização da cooperação no domínio da segurança interna; internalização da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa; transpilarização. Tal representou um avanço em benefício da afirmação da UE como ator de segurança holístico e multifuncional, dotado de autonomia, capacidade e presença. Desde então, a narrativa e as práticas europeias generalizam-se a diversos problemas de segurança tais como crises e conflitos, crime organizado, pirataria, cibersegurança, Estados Falhados, tráfico de seres humanos, radicalização, ameaças híbridas. Esta abordagem associada a uma ambição de actorness global impõem exigências únicas à UE. Um dos principais desafios decorre da policy differentiation na área da segurança. Com a entrada em vigor das alterações introduzidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa, a UE passou a estar dotada de personalidade jurídica, o que lhe permite celebrar tratados internacionais e ter representação externa. Tal significa que, pela primeira vez na história da construção europeia, a cooperação no domínio da segurança (interna e externa) desenvolve-se no âmbito de uma Organização Internacional. O Tratado de Lisboa também superou a estrutura em pilares, introduziu alterações com vista a reforçar a coerência da atuação externa do ator europeu e comprovou o dinamismo cooperativo no âmbito das políticas dos antigos segundo e terceiros pilares. No entanto, os ajustamentos consagrados pelo Tratado Reformador evidenciam uma ambiguidade construtiva patente nas disposições que favorecem uma ação holística, por um lado, e na pilarização encoberta, por outro, agravada pela ausência de uma preocupação explícita com a coerência entre as dimensões interna e externa da segurança (the missing link).

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The Monnet Project is a response to a Westphalian security concern (inter-state conflict) resorting to post-Westphalian non-security means: supranational, incremental institutionalism. The European integration process has operated a 'silent revolution' in International Relations and has shown its dynamism in three essential aspects: deepening, enlarging and building a post-Westphalian polity. The internal dynamics facilitated, sometimes even enhanced, by the international environment, favoured the emergence of the economic actor (in a first phase), of the international actor and, after the Cold War, of the security actor (ongoing process).

In a context in which the community discourse has been fertile in identifying Europe's challenges in a globalised world[1], amongst which we find the post-Westphalian security challenges, it is paramount to reflect upon the contribution of EU comprehensive approach to the security governance of the European Union. The Union has been innovative in creating a *de facto* security community that overcame the European interstate conflict, and since the end of the Cold War it endeavoured to address the multi-sector and transnational threats of a complex security environment:

> "The threats facing Europe, no longer exclusively 'hard', but rather often 'soft', no longer respect the geopolitical borders of the nation-state and the EU. More importantly still, they traverse and resist the institutional 'borders' and arrangements traditionally designed to manage them (social agencies, informational authorities, police, etc.). The most significant effect of this shift is that the lives of citizens are no longer regulated at the physical borders. The border operations traditionally provided for by the nation-state (border controls and security guards, passport authorities, etc.) have in this way shifted outwards. At the same time, a growing number of European and

1   See for instance: "Lecture by Javier Solana, Secretary General/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the Inauguration of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, on 'Global Challenges for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy'", Warsaw, 16 October 2002; "Press Conference at EU Informal Summit Hampton Court", 27 October 2005; European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006 – Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility" (COM/2006/278), Brussels, 2006; "Speech by Javier Solana EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 'Europe's Answers to the Global Challenges" at the University of Copenhagen, 8 September 2006", Copenhagen, 2006; "Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome", Berlin, 25 March 2007; Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions: The European Interest: Succeeding in the Age of Globalisation: Contribution of the Commission to the October Meeting of Heads of State and Government" (COM/2007/581), Brussels, 2007; "Comunicado de Imprensa da Presidência sobre o Conselho Europeu Informal [de Lisboa]", Lisboa, 19 de Outubro de 2007; Foreign Commonwealth Office, "Global Europe: Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges", 2007; "EU Declaration on Globalisation" (annex), "Brussels European Council – 13/14 December 2007 – Presidency Conclusions", Brussels, 2007.

international organizations have taken on increasingly dominant roles entirely detached from nation-state sovereignty, further contributing to the interrelatedness of non-national institutions and regions, and further weakening both the role and capacity of traditional sovereignty arrangements." (Burguess, 2009, p. 315)[2].

The widespread use of the 'Comprehensive Approach' (CA)[3] in EU security narrative and practices raises several questionings about the what (is the CA), the why, the how (to implement it), and the 'with what effects'. Considering that the main challenge to this ambitious approach (of an actor in-making without exclusive powers in the sensitive domain of security) is the 'how', this Article focus on policy differentiation as a constraint to EU Comprehensive Approach. In this line of thought, the main research question is formulated as follows: How the Lisbon Treaty contributed to the CA in security matters? The main argument is that the Lisbon Treaty legally enshrined the comprehensive approach of the actor, in line with the previous cross-pillar tendency catalysed by the 9/11 events and by the nature of the main challenges to European security. The amendments introduced by the Treaty show, however, a constructive ambiguity patent in the coexistence of provisions enabling a comprehensive action in the security domain, on the one hand, and of a hidden pillarisation based in policy differentiation applied to internal and external security, on the other hand.

The Article begins by framing the research on EU's security policy. The second section traces the path of EU security actorness towards a comprehensive approach. The third section focus on the changes inserted by Lisbon Treaty with relevance to

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2 "The world faces traditional and non-traditional security fears. Many of our countries are targets of terrorism, which eight years on from September 11, 2001, we must recognize is down, but by no means out. There are fragile states to contend with as well as the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, authoritarian regimes, and the threat of extremism. Globalization has also thrown up non-traditional security challenges with no respect for national frontiers. Global pandemics can spread faster; a lack of secure and sustainable energy could push us into a world-wide recession; and climate change, beyond its environmental consequences, could have serious geopolitical and social repercussions." (Barroso, 2009).

3 This is part of a general international trend. The same expression (or similar expressions) are being used by Governments ('Whole-of-government approach', UK and US; '3D', Canada and Netherlands) and IOs ('integrated approach', UN; 'Comprehensive Approach', NATO; 'Comprehensive Approach', African Union and OSCE; 'WGA', OECD). The same or near-by expressions share the same rationale – coherence (through coordination) across different policies and actors –, but they are applied to different areas depending on the actor (e.g., UN – peacebuilding; NATO – civil-military). Coning (2008, p. 7) distinguishes four elements of coherence in the Comprehensive Approach: agency coherence; whole-of-government coherence; external coherence; external/internal coherence. Coning and Friis (2011) elaborated a matrix to analyse those forms of coherence based on six categories – ('actor's') union, integration, cooperation, coordination, coexistence, competition.

security actorness. The final one analyses the policy differentiation in the security domain.

Towards a Holistic Perspective on EU Security Actorness

In the first phase of definition, the European security actor followed the state model, based on the separation between external security and internal security, reinforced by the pillars structure. This is the reason why the research followed specific non-communicating agendas, but the prevailing trend was the analysis of the issue of 'European security' within the framework of the second pillar. Accordingly, the subject of European security actorness acquired relevance following the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Vasconcelos, 2009). The implementation of operations on the ground has contributed to the visibility and subsequent recognition of the security actorness by external actors, inheritors of the realist legacy which values the military component and the classic distinction between the external and internal dimensions.

The research on EU 'internal security'[4], in the broader framework of cooperation in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) field, developed autonomously, mostly using the contributions from criminal and legal sciences:

> "For a long time literature dealing with security issues in the context of European integration tended to focus only on traditional external and particularly military security issues. Yet during the 1990s internal security started to occupy increasingly prominent place on the agenda of the European Union." (Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, 2003, p. 1)

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4   The cooperation in internal security has developed in the broad domain of Justice and Home Affairs/Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Until the Lisbon Treaty the most common terminology was 'Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters'. The designation of [EU] 'internal security' was consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty. For the first time in the TEU the terminology 'national security' appears unexpectedly associated to internal security, leaving the reader with a methodical doubt concerning the conceptual difference (not clarified by the legislator) between both. In previous Treaties, 'internal security' referred to the Member States internal security. The setting up of the COSI deepened the collective dimension of 'internal security' in the common area. The explanation for the terminological diversification is presented in a report by the British Parliament: "On 12 July 2007 Mr. Murphy gave oral evidence to this Committee on the June 2007 European Council. Discussing the distinction between national security and internal security, he said that the latter phrase was previously in common use but was in his view open to misunderstanding, since it had come to describe "two different but not mutually exclusive things. Internal security was the internal security within Member States but also internal security within the European Union, and we wished to move away from the possibility of misunderstanding, which is why we have now moved towards the description of national security, and the fact that it is for the first time explicit in the terms of this Treaty." (United Kingdom, 2008b, p. 158). In rigour, the EU cooperation in this field reports to 'transnational security'.

Furthermore, one should note that the first pillar had also concurred to the building of the security actor, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building. Considering the initially economic bias of the international organisation (EEC), which began by asserting itself in the realms of trade policy, development cooperation policy and humanitarian aid, it is only natural that it easily incorporated the nexus peace-development/poverty-conflict and thus favoured action over the *root causes* of conflicts[5]. This connection, which is also reflected on the introduction of the security component in the agreements with developing countries, enabled inter-pillars coordination, namely between the first and second ones. Within the framework of the development policy revision started in 1995, the EU included conflict prevention in the development policy, initially associated with Africa[6], with a focus on conflict analysis, early warning and early action.

The cross-pillar approach adopted in the fight against transnational terrorism associated to the increase in the civilian dimension of the ESDP, required an inter-pillar coordination and a rising role for the Commission in the field of security (*lato sensu*). These developments have induced the theorisation of the European Union as a comprehensive and multidimensional actor, in which *EU Security Governance* by Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (2007) is framed. The authors organise the EU's response into four categories that cover the three former pillars: *prevention* (inter/intra-state conflict prevention through the building of democratic institutions and the consolidation of civil society), *assurance* (peace-building), *protection* (internal security), *compellence* (implementation of the CSDP through peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement autonomous missions). Gradually, the Union constituted itself as "the facilitator of joint action", defined "its role as an autonomous security actor" and legitimised "its partial displacement of the state" (Kirschner and Sterling, 2007, p. 122).

The present analysis applies a combined theoretical framework. The above mentioned Kirschner and Sterling's security governance theorisation is articulated with the conceptual elements of actorness conceived by Bretenthorn and Vogler (2007) to

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5   See for instance "European Commission Checklist for Root-causes of Conflict/Early Warning Indicators" [online], available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/cp_guide_en.pdf.

6   See Council of the European Union, 1995. *Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping in Africa*; Commission of the European Communities, 1996. *The EU and the Issue of Conflict in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond*; Council of the European Union, 1998. *The Tool of Development Co-operation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution*; Commission of the ECs, 2001. *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention* (COM/2001/211); Council Conclusions on Security and Development, 2007. More recently, the comprehensive regional strategies also focused on Africa: Sahel (2011), Horn of Africa (2011), Great Lakes (2013) and Gulf of Guinea (2014).

EU international dimension: presence – "ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence externally, to shape perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others"; opportunity – "factors in the external environment of ideas and events that constrain or enable actorness"; capability – "the availability of policy instruments and understandings about the Union's ability to utilize these instruments, in response to opportunity and/ or to capitalize on presence". Concerning the latter criteria, a specification in called: institutional capacity (autonomous institutions and specialized bodies, and institutional processes, including decision-making processes within the IO); policy capacity (agenda-setting, adoption, implementation and monitoring of policies); legal capacity (legal personality and capacity to adopt legal instruments); resources (human, material and financial resources). This article addresses one of the elements of the mentioned criteria: policy capacity[7].

The Evolving Security Actorness: From Pillarization to Comprehensive Approach
The economic specialisation of the European international organisation and the debacle of the European Defence Community Project, associated to the nature of the threat and the guarantee of the security needs by the USA and NATO during the Cold War, postponed the inclusion of the security agenda. Although the clarification of the security actor (and subsequent theorisation) only materialises in the post-Cold War, one can say that the problematic issue of security is ubiquitous in the European integration process.

Underlying the creation of the ECSC, there was a classic reactive security concern against a globalised European war and one preventive of a new inter-state conflict. The Monnet project built upon an institutionalised and gradual strategy aimed at guaranteeing the Franco-German peace (and thus European peace) through the integration of the coal and steel sectors in a post-Westphalian organisation. "European integration has always involved the use of economic cooperation to reduce political conflicts among EU Member States" (Smith, 2004, p. 7).

Countering the (realism) scepticism concerning the usefulness of the 'community' concept in the world of *power politics*, national interest and anarchy, the European Union has proved it possible, even if at a regional scale, to fulfil "[T]he idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust" (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 3).

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7   Regarding the subcriteria of decision-making, the Article addresses only the formal decision-making procedures. According to Kaunert and Léonard (2012, p. 426), "it is not sufficient to only observe the formal decision-making rules in order to determine whether an area of security policy is governed intergovernmentally or supranationally, or by a mixture of both". But the fact is that the binding decisions are adopted through those procedures, whether ordinary or special.

Countering centuries of inter-state conflict, the European states have built a community in which there is "a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way" (Karl Deutsch, quoted in Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 6). Set on "an institutional and societal transnational base" (Ole Waever quoted in Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 6) and having a structural common interest in keeping inter-state peace and security, the relations among Member States have been characterised by mutual trust and predictability.

Internal pacification had a spill over effect on the external area. Different policies have contributed to international security and stability, especially, on the one hand, the enlargement policy that extended the security community to new States and supports the transition of candidate States and, on the other hand, the development cooperation policy which is based upon the security-development nexus.

In a first phase, an implicit security actor was built, later evolving to the creation and consolidation of an expansive security community that favoured the use of non-security means. The end of the Cold War, the implosion of the Soviet Union, the decreased American presence in Europe and the expansion of the (widened and deepened) security agenda, created the opportunity for the actor's upgrade to a new stage. The weaknesses of its actions in neighbouring intra-state conflict situations (Balkans) and the concern with the transnational threats in an internally borderless market catalysed the clarification of the security actor thanks to the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar) and the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (third pillar)[8]. This explicitness was reinforced by the Amsterdam Treaty with the formalization of the actor's military (and civilian) component (ESDP) in the second pillar's framework, the specialisation of the third pillar and the externalisation of 'internal security' also within this pillar's framework.

The trace towards a comprehensive approach is connected with EU international actorness, more specifically with the imperative of coherence (horizontal policy and institutional coordination at European level) and consistency (vertical coordination between the European and Member States levels) in EU international presence. In the security domain, early initiatives regarding the fight against organised crime, a security challenge prioritized by the creation of an European internal market, required interpillars (3rd and 1st pillars) coordination[9]; the improved role of the Union in conflict prevention demanded interpillars (2nd and 1st pillars) coordination[10].

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8   In the Maastricht Treaty, the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) concerned also cooperation in the fields of immigration and asylum.

9   See recommendation 6 of the Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime (Adopted by the Council on 28 April 1997) regarding the fight against corruption.

10 For the prevention of conflicts, peacebuilding and structural stability contributed several policies domains from the 1st (trade, finance, development, environmental policies) and 2nd pillars (CFSP/ESDP).

The upgrade from interpillarisation to cross-pillarisation came from the need to fight the complex threat of terrorism after the 9/11. The materialization of the threat, firstly in the US and then in EU Member States, inaugurated a new stage in the actor's construction, tempering the fragmented pillarisation: "The European Union will intensify its commitment against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach that will incorporate all of the Union's policies" (European Council, 2001, p. 1). Although the focus of the European fight was placed on the police and judicial instruments, the complexity of the threat justified a cross-pillar approach underlined by the four axis – prevention, protection, pursuit, response – of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of the EU, 2005). The coordination between the pillars concerning security previously required both by conflict prevention (1995) and by the externalisation of cooperation in the 'internal security' realm (1999), reached a new level by contemplating the three pillars simultaneously – cross-pillar coordination. In 2004, the 'Conceptual Framework' (European Council, 2004) countered the European legacy to fight terrorism with judicial and police instruments, and declared for the first time the possibility of using ESDP including internally (internalization of an external policy).

Since this period, the EU narrative and practices on Comprehensive Approach have been applied to several security problems such as crises and conflicts[11][12] (from prevention to peabuilding), organised crime[13], piracy[14], cybersecurity[15], failed sta-

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11 "The ideas and principles governing the comprehensive approach have yet to become, systematically, the guiding principles for EU external action across all areas, in particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution" (High Representative and European Commission, 2013).

12 See annex 4 ("Overview of How Different Instruments can be Combined to Provide a Comprehensive Package of Crisis Assistance") of "Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management" (European Commission, April 2003).

13 "The high level of safety in the area of freedom, security and justice presupposes an efficient and comprehensive approach in the fight against all forms of crime" (The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: a European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium, 2000, [online], available at http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f3b0c604-969c-4234-86d8-0213e3baa4a4.0006.02/DOC_1.

14 "While bearing all aspects of organised crime, piracy is a complex issue that can only be overcome by combining political and diplomatic efforts with military and legal action, development assistance and strong international coordination. With all these tools at its disposal, the European Union (EU) is in a unique position to contribute to international efforts, and addresses that challenge through a 'comprehensive approach' tackling both current symptoms and root causes of the problem." [online], available at http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/index_en.htm). "Addressing the adverse effects of piracy through the range of relevant instruments and of other forms of organised crime (e.g. trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs), of terrorism but also the effects of irregular migration – all offshoots of poverty and insecurity in the region." (Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011).

15 "Due to the potential or actual borderless nature of the risks, an effective national response would often require EU-level involvement. To address cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion, activi-

tes[16], trafficking in human beings[17], radicalisation[18], hybrid threats[19]. Differently from NATO, the EU approach is not restricted to the civil-military coordination, and, distinctly from UN, surpasses the security-development nexus. It is a holistic perspective to deal with "wicked" security problems, from conflicts and crises to cyberthreats, from external to internal and cross-border challenges.

The first document presenting the EU's 'security doctrine' confirmed this comprehensive tendency: a holistic security concept, an interdependence of threats (threats dynamics/'threat multiplier'), the security nexuses (security-development; internal-external security) (Brandão, 2015). The European Security Strategy (European Council 2003) corroborated yet another relevant change in the actor's discourse:

> "It stands for a discursive turn in the sense that the very theme of (external) security is no longer off-limits to the EU in the way it traditionally used to be. (…)' Whereas the EU previously pertained to security in a rather indirect manner and did so mainly through its structural essence by providing a unifying centre rather than appearing itself explicitly as a securitizing agent vis-à-vis the external environment, the new doctrine seems to be part of efforts that aim at bolstering the Union's actorness on the international scene." (Joenniemi, 2007, p. 136).

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ties should span across three key pillars– NIS, law enforcement, and defence – which also operate within different legal frameworks" (Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace JOIN/2013/ 1 final).

16 "The European Community (…) will develop a comprehensive approach to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises" (Council, Representatives of the Representatives of the Member States European Parliament and Commission, European Consensus on Development, 2005)

17 "[EU Anti-trafficking Coordinator] tasks include addressing the urgent need to ensure consistent and coordinated strategic planning at EU level and with international organisations and third countries, to address this issue in a comprehensive manner." (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – *The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016* – COM/2012/286 final).

18 "The European Council of 12 February 2015 at which Heads of State and Government called for a comprehensive approach, including initiatives regarding social integration, among others, which are of great importance to prevent violent radicalisation" (Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the role of the youth sector in an integrated and cross-sectoral approach to preventing and combating violent radicalisation of young people, 14 June 2016)

19 "A holistic approach that will enable the EU, in coordination with Member States, to specifically counter threats of a hybrid nature by creating synergies between all relevant instruments and fostering close cooperation between all relevant actors" (Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats a European Union Response JOIN/2016/018 final).

In the same line, the first EU Internal Security Strategy (Council of the EU, 2010), appealed to a holistic concept of internal security, a comprehensive approach to deal with the common threats and the interdependence between the internal and external components of security. *A posteriori*, the first document to clarify the common understanding of 'comprehensive approach' (to external conflicts and crises) was only adopted in 2013 followed by an Action Plan in 2015[20]: "Comprehensiveness refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States" (High Representative, 2013, p. 3). The updated strategies and priorities in the security area (European Commission, 2015; European Council, 2016) consolidated this comprehensive trend[21].

In order to understand the CA (in the security field) in its complete spectrum, it is worth considering also 'the why'. The literature on the issue advances two main arguments. The pragmatic argument underlines the need to avoid duplication and promote synergies, considering the co-dependency between civil and military security (Rintakoski and Autti, 2008). The political argument demonstrates that the European Union uses the CA narrative to show its positive uniqueness and differentiation as a global security actor (Germond, McEnery and Marchi, 2016; Chappell, Mawdsley and Petrov, 2016). In addition, it should be stressed that the CA trend has been favoured by mutually reinforcing contextual, legal and institutional factors. The Post-Cold War environment has been characterized by complex multidimensional and cross-border security problems and a broad understanding of security in terms of threats, security objects, security providers and instruments (multissectorial and multilevel security). This widener/deepener perspective has also been nourished by the security nexuses narrative and practices (internal-exter-

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20 Council of the EU, 2015. Joint Staff Working Document – *Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises – Action Plan 2015* (7913/15).

21 "We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy" (High Representative, Strategic Review – *The European Union in a Changing Global Environment* – Executive Summary, 2015); "The EU response must therefore be comprehensive and based on a coherent set of actions combining the internal and external dimensions, to further reinforce links between Justice and Home Affairs and Common Security and Defence Policy" (European Commission, "The European Security Agenda", COM/2015/185); "All the dimensions of a Europe that protects its citizens and offers effective rights to people inside and outside the Union are interlinked. Success or failure in one field depends on performance in other fields as well as on synergies with related policy areas" (Strategic Guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in: European Council Conclusions, 26/27 June 2014); "The European Union and its Member States can bring to the international stage the unique ability to combine, in a consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice. Further improving the efficiency and effectiveness of this EU Comprehensive Approach" (European Council Conclusions, 19/20 December 2013).

nal security, civil-military security, development-security, among others). In legal terms, the combined use of instruments from different pillars to fight against common threats and, most significantly, the changes inserted by the Lisbon Treaty (EU legal status, the end of the pillars structure, the transference of internal security to the TFEU, the High Representative as member of both the Council and Commission) created the Treaty basis for the CA. Finally, regarding the institutional dimension, it is manifest the interest of the Commission in promoting the CA also in the security domain. In order to reverse an historical absence from this sensitive domain, the Commission pushes for the combination of multiple instruments to face complex security problems, particularly those from policy areas in which the institution has expertise and influence.

The Lisbon Treaty: Advances and Ambiguities in the Security Domain
Similarly to previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty ensured continuity, formalised actual amendments and introduced innovative elements whose scope can only be perceived as they are implemented. Reaffirming the objectives of making the European Union institutionally more efficient, closer to the citizen, more efficient and coherent in external action, it introduced a goal concerning global challenges (Portugal, 2007).

In this reforming context, the CSDP and, particularly, the 'internal security', stood out as the most dynamic areas of the last revision. Before analysing specific changes, three transversal changes that also have implications in the security domain should be highlighted.

First, the Lisbon Treaty ended the dual (EC/EU) system in force since 1993 that penalized the Union's action capacity and its external recognition. Endowed with unique legal personality[22], EU assumes the external representation, and it is capable of celebrating treaties and of participating in International Organisations. This means that, for the first time, CFSP/CSDP and 'internal security' evolve in the framework of an International Organisation under International Law. Beyond the legal meaning, Solana underlined the political importance of this change that facilitates the recognition, visibility and readability of the Union: "it would be easier for third countries to understand the EU without the complication of dealing with, and sometimes signing agreements with, different entities." (United Kingdom, 2008a, p. 33).

Second, the Treaty overcame, if only on the surface, the Thatcherian pillar matrix, coming closer to the tree-like Delors matrix and consecrating *de jure* the tendency initiated by the *de facto* cross-pillarisation, namely in realms such as external relations, security and the environment benefiting the actor's coherence and efficiency.

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22 "The Union shall have legal personality" (Article 47 of the TEU).

The policies of the former second and third pillars were brought under the jurisdiction of a single entity; however, we can state that there subsists a disguised pillarisation, namely concerning the decision-making, with implications in the realms of external action and security. In fact, the CFSP (and the CSDP) maintains a separate legal character[23] that safeguards its intergovernmental nature. Concerning the Commission's right of initiative, it is restricted to the Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

> "Through its creation of a new HR (who partly represents the Commission), the Lisbon Treaty has elevated the Commission's voice in CFSP. However, whereas in the current EU Treaty, the Commission has the right to submit proposals to the Council (current EU treaty, Article 20, paragraph 1) and was "fully associated" with CFSP (current EU treaty, Article 18, paragraph 4), under the Lisbon Treaty it will lose this right – this now being associated solely with the High Representative" (Daghan, 2008, p. 3).

The CFSP's specificity also justifies the CSDP exclusion from the scope of Article 352 of the TFEU (Wessels and Franziska, 2008). Furthermore, it should be noted that, contrary to the simplification established by the Constitutional Treaty, the above mentioned domains are under the aegis of both treaties. So, concerning the security domain, the CFSP and the CSDP remain in the European Union Treaty (TEU), whilst the 'internal security' was transferred to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Finally, the creation of the posts of European Council President and High Representative intends to contribute to the inter-institutional and inter-policies coordination in a context of further continuity. The innovative formula associated to the European Union's institutional complexity and the absence of a clear division of competence generates "role conflicts between the President of the European Council and the High Representative" (Wessels and Bopp, 2008, p. 18).

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23 "The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union" (Article 24 of the TEU).

CFSP/CSDP

The inherited concern with the coherence of the international actor justifies the text defining the principles and goals of the Union's external action[24] that connects the two treaties (TEU and TFEU). Having safeguarded the intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this was the formula that was found to promote the unity (principles and objectives) in diversity (of the policies).

The main change in the realm of the CFSP was the redefinition of the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council's face for the CFSP and, simultaneously, Vice-President of the Commission for Foreign Relations, who also presides over the Council of Foreign Affairs, conducts the foreign policy and the common security policy and represents the Union in the international scene in matters pertaining to the CFSP. When an EU common position is approved on "a theme that is on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, the Member States that have a seat in it ask that the High Representative be invited to present the Union's position" (Article 34 of the TEU). The High Representative is supported by the new diplomatic service – European External Action Service (Article 27, nº3 of the TEU)[25] – comprising officials from the Council, the Commission and the Member States that, by overcoming the old dual structure of the first and second pillars, intends to contribute to the EU's external coherence and visibility, countering the parallel and, sometimes, conflicting 'diplomacies' of the Commission and the Council.

Along the lines of previous revisions, the Treaty confirmed the controlled extension of majority voting in the Council, from now on also applicable to the approval of proposals presented by the High Representative (Article 31, nº2 of the TEU) with the possibility of extending its use being left open (Article 31, nº3 of the TEU).

The constructive ambiguity which has emerged as a tendency of the process of European integration, explains some of the opposite readings of the Treaty as well as the efforts to tone the opposites:

> "They [the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty] could be interpreted as a major step forward in the direction of a strengthened, more coherent and more effective international actor with more supranational elements; but they may also be seen as demonstrating an ever-refined mode of 'rationalised intergovernmentalism'. After

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24 See: nº1 and nº2, Article 21 of the TEU (Title V "General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy"); Article 205 of the TEU (Part V "The Union's external action", Title I "General provisions on the Union's external action").

25 See Council of the EU (2009) and Rettman (2010).

an in-depth analysis of the ideas and norms contained in the new treaty, the institutions and the instruments, the authors find more evidence for the second interpretation, but also traces for a 'ratched fusion' as a third alternative explanation." (Wessels and Bopp, 2008)

The ESDP, now designated Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), illustrates the above mentioned trilogy: continuity of what is essential, *de jure* statement of *de facto* situations and controlled innovation. The continuity is patent in the policy's intergovernmental nature, as well as, in reaffirming the CSDP as an integral part of the CFSP and in the will to build "a common defence policy that may lead to a common defence" (Article 24, nº1 of the TEU).

The enlargement of the Petersberg missions advanced by the Thessaloniki European Council, by the Headline Goal 2010 and by the European Security Strategy, has a legal base[26] and a 'solidarity clause' in case of a terrorist attack or a natural or human made catastrophe (Article 222 of the TFEU) that stipulates the use of "all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States". The European Defence Agency, established by the Council in 2004[27], is now formally part of the legal Framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (Article 42, nº3 and 45 of the TEU).

Three innovative elements deserve a special reference. First, the flexibility of cooperation in the defence realm in three different ways or processes: permanent structured cooperation[28] open to States that fulfil 'higher criteria'[29], aimed at participating in the major European equipment programmes, organising multinational forces, forwarding combat units available for immediate action; reinforced cooperation among a minimum of nine States; an *ad hoc* cooperation delegating a specific mission on a group of States (Article 42, nº5 and 44 of the TEU) which, according to Gerrard Quille (2008, p. 6), could be shaped as a multinational force or as a Battle-

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26 Article 43 of the TEU: "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories".

27 See Council Regulation (EC) n°2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders.

28 See the nº6 of Article 42 and Article nº46 of the TEU. At the Informal Meeting of the Defense Policy Directors (Madrid, 19-20 March) Spanish Presidency presented its goals for defense matters and debated issues concerning the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The meeting initiated also the debate about Permanent Structured Cooperation (España, Gobierno, 2010).

29 See Protocol (n°10) on Permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union.

group. At this level it is also possible to find dual effects: on the one hand, conditions have been created to facilitate the development of European cooperation in the sensitive realm of defence; on the other hand, the eventual implementation of a permanent structured cooperation between the big countries could result in a 'two-speed Europe'.

The second novelty is the 'mutual defence clause' binding the states to help and assist a Member State which has been the target of an armed aggression on its territory (Article 42, nº7 of the TEU) This notwithstanding and in consonance with the 'civil' nature of the EU, and unlike NATO's defence clause, it does not specify the resort to the use of armed force.

Finally, the decision-making process has become more agile through the introduction of qualified majority voting (establishment of a permanent structured cooperation) and the funding of missions thanks to the implementation of procedures that guarantee a quick access to the community budget[30] and to the creation of a fund made of contributions from the States[31] to finance preparatory activities of missions that cannot be included in the Union budget (Article 41, nº3 of the TEU).

The dynamism of the young CSDP can be interpreted as "a greater willingness by the Member States to develop a 'military arm' of the EU" (Daghan, 2008, p. 4). However, it should be noted that its development will take place in the (controlled) framework of intergovernmental cooperation and that NATO remains the "foundation of collective defence" (of its Member States) and "the appropriate forum to fulfil it" (Article 42, nº7 of the TEU). To this, accrues the known limitations of resources, as well as the confirmed tendency for the predominance of civilian missions, both of which condition the progress of the military component. Finally, the enlargement, the diversification of missions and the growing number of mixed (civilian/military) missions, will make the need for a coherent comprehensive security actor more pressing.

'Internal Security'

The issues pertaining to 'internal security', formerly under the aegis of the third pillar, were transferred to the TFEU and moved into title IV, dedicated to the "Area

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30 "The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament" (nº3, Article 41 of the TEU).

31 Similar to *Athena* mechanism.

of Freedom, Security and Justice" (AFSJ)[32], constituting one of eleven areas of shared competence.[33]

The 'communitarisation' of the third pillar is considered one of the most innovative transformations of the Treaty[34]: adoption of regulations, directives and decisions, according to the community method (ordinary legislative procedure and by qualified majority, based on proposals from the Commission); control of the implementation of rules by the Commission and by the Court of Justice; EU representation by the Commission in international relations and negotiations. This change can be explained by the compensatory effect of the market opening that had already been at the origin of the formalisation of JHA cooperation by the Maastricht Treaty, which was intensified after 09/11.

Bringing together issues concerning 'internal security' and immigration and asylum under the same title (title V of the TFEU), emulating the Maastricht model, this time in a community framework, confirms a (negative) securitising movement only (formally) interrupted by the Amsterdam Treaty (Brandão, 2007, pp. 57-86). This movement is reinforced by the security logic of the external borders, as demonstrated by two of the objectives set for these policies: "carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders"; "the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders" (Article 77, n°1 of the TFEU)[35].

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32 Title V ("Area of freedom, security and justice") substitutes title VI of the TEC ("Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons"). Besides of chapters on "Policies on borders checks, asylum and immigration" (chapter 2) and "Judicial cooperation in civil matters" (chapter 3), it also includes chapters 4 (Judicial cooperation in criminal matters") and 5 (Police cooperation).

33 Internal market; social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; economic, social and territorial cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice; common safety concerns in public health matters (Article 4 of the TFEU).

34 "(..) the powers of the Commission under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall not be applicable and the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in the version in force before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, shall remain the same, including where they have been accepted under Article 35(2) of the said Treaty on European Union" (Article 10, Protocol n°36).

35 The Treaty formalises a comprehensive concept of 'integrated border security system', defined by the JHA Council in December 2006: "Frontex promotes a pan European model of Integrated Border Security, which consists not only of border controls but also other important elements. The first tier of the model is formed by exchange of information and cooperation between Member States, immigration and repatriation. The second tier is represented by border and customs control including surveillance, border checks and risk analysis. The third tier is linked with cooperation with border guards, customs and police authorities in neighbouring coun-

Aiming at reinforcing operational cooperation in the 'internal security' domain, the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) was set up within the Council, "in order to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union" (Article 71 of the TFEU). This innovation was justified by the need to counter the efficiency and transparency deficit of operational cooperation, all the more urgent in the context of the anti-terrorist fight. Underlying the initial proposal of the new structure were the principle of clear separation between legislative and operational tasks[36] and the overcoming of the pillarisation of 'internal security'[37].

In the framework of the previous AFSJ multi-annual programme, one of the priority tasks of the new organism was the conception, follow-up and implementation of a global internal security strategy: "terrorism and organised crime, drug trafficking, corruption, traffic of human beings, people smuggling and arms trafficking, among others, keep on threatening the EU's internal security. The spread of cross-border criminality has become an urgent challenge demanding a clear and global response." The Internal Security Strategy "should take into account the External Security Strategy, due to "the existing inter-relation that exists between internal security and the external dimension of threats" (Conselho da União Europeia, 2009, p. 36). Having overcome the British resistance, the Lisbon Treaty provided for the possibility of establishing a 'European Public Prosecutor's Office' (Article 86 of the TFEU) to fight crimes that may jeopardize the Union's financial interests.

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tries. The fourth tier is connected with cooperation with third countries including common activities" Frontex (n.d). External border security is historically related with internal market (see: Commission of European Communities, 1988. "Completing the Internal Market: an Area without Internal Frontiers" (COM (88) 350); "Communication of the Commission to the Council on the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community Borders" (COM (1988) 640 final, 1988). The Amesterdam Treaty attributed competences to EC (first pillar) regarding external border controls (Article 62 and 66 of the TEC). In 2001, a 'European Border Police' proposal was presented by Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, and rejected by UK and other Member States. In 2002, the European Commission approved in 2003, the European Commission approved the communication "Towards integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union" [COM (2002) 233]. Frontex (Regulamentation (EC) nº 2004/2007) implemented "the concept of integrated border management". See also Frontex (2009).

36 See Bunyan (2003).

37 "Abolishing the pillars enables all the authorities concerned with 'internal security' to be covered for the first time, not merely police forces but also those responsible for customs and civil protection. The abolition of the pillars in this way will be welcomed by all practitioners who stress that cooperation must cover a broader field than merely police aspects in order to ensure internal security. The consequences of the 11 September attacks have shown the importance of mobilising all services and of cooperation between disciplines" (Secretariat of the European Convention, 2003).

Policy Differentiation in Security Matters: Differentiation against Comprehensive Approach?

For the purpose of our analysis, we intend to answer to both questions – "what powers are allocated to the central institutions" (Hix, 2007, p. 580) and how decision-making process works – in the security domain. In spite of the evidence that "politics, government, and policy-making now exist in many contexts either outside or beyond the classic Weberian state" (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983, quoted by Hix, 2007, p. 580) and that the state is no longer the only security actor, the first genuinely supranational governance system demonstrates the resilient centrality of the Westphalian actor in security matters.

The EU policy-making system is highly complex, also due to differentiation across policy domains. 'Policy differentiation' is understood as differentiated degree and nature of EU involvement and consequent differentiated policy-making and decision-making and associated power distribution among EU institutions across policy domains[38]. This is explained by the traditional tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, European solidarity and state sovereignty, common interest and national interest(s), collective declaration and unilateral action. The case of security is relevant since the differentiation is present inside the same (broad) policy area (see table 1 and figure 1).

The Maastricht Treaty inserted the security policy area based in a pillarised structure. Although under "a single institutional framework" which should "ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities" (Article C), the three pillars had relevant policy-making differences that affected the role of EU institutions, including the European Commission. Those differences were the result of the major distinction between community (1st pillar) and intergovernmental (2nd and 3rd pillars) decision-making methods and policy instruments. It should be notice that this separation between the Community and intergovernmental instruments had been a trend since the times of EPC and due to a French insistence (Duke, 2006).

In spite of the changes inserted by the Lisbon Treaty, the resilience of state power in security matters is still patent is several elements: special decision-making procedures; (Council/European Council) decisions by unanimity; legislative initiative by Member States; emergency breaks; exclusion of legislative acts; no obligation to apply decisions/joint actions (through abstention); exclusion of political and/or jurisdictional control; implementation of decisions by the Member States.

Overall, the external security is under the intergovernmental method (special procedure) and internal security follows the community method (ordinary legislative

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38 Alternative meanings of the concept: differentiation of involvement in EU policies across Member States ('flexible integration'); functional or sectorial differentiation across policies. It is not the case for the purpose of this article.

procedure) (see table 2). However a more attentive look reveals constructive ambiguities in both security components. The blurring of the dichotomy the two decision-making methods is a general trend as noted by Antonio Missiroli (2011, p. 1): "[S]pecially after the entry into force and subsequent implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the traditional distinction (and opposition) between the so-called 'community' and 'inter-governmental' methods in EU policy-making is less and less relevant. Most common policies entail a 'mix' between them and different degrees of mutual contamination".

Regarding the CSDP, the general guidelines defined by the European Council are implemented by the Council. This institution also exercises political control over CDSP missions. The preparation of decisions involves several actors – ministers, diplomats, staff officers and the High Representative. The later also ensures the coherence of EU external action, make proposals for the development of the policy and implement decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. The decision-making regarding the launching of CSDP's crisis management operations is even more specific considering its casuistic[39] nature. The proposal may come from the High Representative or Member State[40]. The Council, supported by its specialized bodies, is the decision-maker: consensus on the interest of engaging in a mission considering its political, strategic and capability implications (Political and Security Committee); approval of the Crisis Management Concept, of the Concept of Operations and of the Operation Plan; decision to take action; approval of the legal decision to launch the operation (Council decision [year]/[serial number]/ CFSP on the launching of a civilian/military mission).

The centrality of the Council, the unanimity rule (for all CSDP decisions) and the *ad hoc* state participation in the missions, among other features, demonstrate the intergovernmental nature of cooperation in the realm of security and defence. In spite of this, it is possible to find an "emerging pattern begins to look more like intergovernmental supranationalism" (Howorth, 2013, p. 449) since "decisions in security and defense policy are very often shaped and even made by small groups of relatively well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to supranational as it is to inter-governmental" (Idem, p. 436): the socialization of EU bodies' members and the consensus construct promote a *de facto* supranational move. According with Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard, "the EU has entered into a phase of supranational governance in the area of security" through a two-

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39 The launching of a CSDP mission does not obey to a rigid procedure.

40 Political and Security Committee (PSC), the main preparatory and management body for CSDP missions; European Union Military Committee (EUMC); Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM); Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD); European Union Military Staff (EUMS); Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

stage process: "(1) cross-border security issues generate greater demand for EU legislation, which (2) supranational organisations supply" (Kaunert and Leónard, 2012, p. 426).

As mentioned before, the Lisbon Treaty 'communitarised' the field of 'internal security'. For the first time, the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 87, paragraph 1, of the TFEU) based in the joint decision of the Council and the European Parliament is applied to a security domain, combined with the qualified majority voting in the Council. However there is a special procedure (Article 87, paragraph 3, of the TFEU) for operational police cooperation through which the Council decide by unanimous voting after consulting the European Parliament.

In fact, it remains clouds of intergovernmentalism in the communitarisation of internal security: the right of initiative is not exclusive of the Commission, since a quarter of the Member States can put forward a legislative proposal (Article 76 of the TFEU); there is an exemption to the judiciary control laid down in Article 276 of the TFEU; the unanimous voting in the Council and the consultation procedure are applicable to certain matters[41]; "the strategic orientations of the legislative and operational programme" are defined by the European Council (Article 68 of the TFEU); the *opt-out* possibility[42] and the 'emergency brake' (Article 82, nº3 of the TFEU).

Beyond those ambiguities and blurring dichotomies, the true is that the two components of security follow different decision-making procedures based on a diverse distribution of powers among the central institutions. Moreover the respective outputs are distinct in terms of its legal nature (see table 3). This differentiation constitutes a puzzlement considering the European ambition of global (in terms of geographical reach) comprehensive and coherent security actorness.

Final Remarks

The post-Cold War period demonstrated that the State is not the only referent object of security: it is not the only target of threats, nor the sole 'supplier' of security. The different referent objects face multilevel and multissectorial threats. Conflicts are predominantly intra-state and tend to potentiate transnational threats. Therefore, the post-Cold War (in)security environment requires a European governance system that combines a diversity of actors, policies and tools.

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41 Operational police cooperation (Article 87, nº3 of the TFUE), passports, identity cards, residence permits (Article 77, nº3 of the TFUE), establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office (Article 86, nº1 of the TFUE).

42 See: Protocol (nº21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; Protocol (nº22) on the position of Denmark. "While the Lisbon Treaty, for the vast majority of Member States, has the effect of 'homogenising' a communitarised Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the position of the other Member States, is made only more anomalous" (Brendan, 2008, p. 1).

In a Cold War context, the EEC successfully faced the Westphalian challenge of inter-state conflict through non-security means and the post-Westphalian institutionalism. The change in the post-Cold War security environment (opportunity) favoured the explicitness of the security actorness of the European Union. In the post-Cold War, the European Union asserts itself as a comprehensive and multifunctional security actor. A post-Westphalian actor which distinguishes itself from intergovernmental international organizations in terms of its emergence (integration), evolution (deepening and enlargement) and nature (combines supranational, intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational features) and, more specifically, distances itself from intergovernmental security organizations in three crucial aspects: it is a polity (although *sui generis*); it has the competence and the means to fight a diversity of threats in the security spectrum; it is not restricted to the security domain, being able to use non-security tools to the advantage of that domain.

It is perceivable that there is a progressive institutionalisation of the security actor whose performance has positive outputs – security community, extension of the community to new states, contribution to security and stability in the neighbouring areas, intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational threats:

> "While the role of individual EU Member States remains critical and many states exercise considerable freedom of action outside the EU on security matters (…), the EU nonetheless remains the aspiration and focus of efforts to meet jointly the tasks of security governance that cannot be net alone or only met poorly by any individual states. Moreover, the EU serves as an autonomous security actor as well as a clearing station for Member State efforts to cope with the array of security challenges" (Kirshner and Sperling, 2007, p. 20).

The post-post Cold War created the opportunity for the implementation of a comprehensive and multidimensional security strategy. The fight against transnational terrorism had a relevant impact on the EU security actorness: upgrading of the security agenda and expansion of the security rationale in external relations; importance of transnational threats to security and consequent aware of the potential capacity of EU by coordinating and combining means and policies; cross-pillar/comprehensive security approach; externalization of 'internal security' cooperation; internalization of CSDP; EU presence as a security actor.

The Lisbon Treaty, like the preceding ones, derived from a compromise among different perspectives on the European integration process, as well as from the historic tension between active solidarity and state sovereignty, which explains the constructive ambiguity(ies). The latest revision of the Founding Treaties confirmed the tendency towards the actor's gradualist construction, associated to the prioritization of security issues on the European agenda. The Treaty attributed legal status to EU, took a 'small step' to overcome the pillarisation, transferred cooperation on

internal security, the TFEU, introduced amendments in the continued search for the Union's external coherence and proved the dynamism of the policies of the previous second and third pillars. These changes constitute 'little big' steps that facilitate the European Union's comprehensive action in the security realm. However, the intergovernmental idiosyncrasies (unanimous Council decisions, emergency brakes, opt-outs, among others) remain in place and put the actor's efficiency at stake.

The European actor reproduced the Westphalian model based on the separation between the internal and external security dimensions, formalized through the pillar structure. The growing complexity of the security challenges called for inter-pillarisation in the 1990s and cross-pillarisation in the post-post-Cold War. These developments reasserted the European Union as a comprehensive and multi-functional security actor and, consequently, they intensified the coherence imperative. The issue of coherence initially arised associated to the Union's international actorness. In spite of the *de facto* cross-pillarisation in the realm of security and the assertion, recurrent in official documents, of the nexus between the external and the internal security components, the theme of the coherence of the security actorness is not explicitly conveyed in the Treaty. The 'end' of the pillars may in fact enhance the inter-policies coordination, but the hidden pillarisation combined with the *sui generis* communitarisation of (EU) internal security may contribute towards the differentiated progress concerning CFSP/CSDP to the detriment of the security actor's coherence. Thus, the bridge linking the external and internal dimensions of security has yet to be built.

The states and (security) IGO's demonstrated their limitations/lack of adaptation to the security challenges of the post-Cold War, namely the transboundary security problems, so the Union presents itself, also in this area, as a laboratory – a laboratory of the post-Westphalian security actorness and of the security governance in complex environments. The European narrative assumes a comprehensive approach that includes the internal-external security nexus, to deal with those security problems. This contrasts with policy differentiation between the two components of security, the 'Gordian Knot' of security governance – an ambitious action[43]; and an intractable problem[44] – that undermines the actor's coherence, consistency, efficiency and visibility.

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43 The 'Gordian Knot' Operation was the major, most expensive and most controversial Portuguese military operation during the colonial war.

44 "Turn him to any cause of policy,/The Gordian Knot of it he will unloose,/Familiar as his garter" (Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 1 Scene 1. 45-47).

Appendix

Table 1 – Actor's Powers in the Security Domain

Actors		Security Domain	Powers
States		External	– to put into effect the CFSP
		Internal	– legislative initiative (1/4 of the Member States)
EU Institutions	*EurC*	External	– to identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the CFSP/CSDP – to define and implement the CFSP – [EC President] external representation of the Union on issues concerning its CFSP
		Internal	– to define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning
	CEU	External	– to frame the CFSP and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it – [High Representative] to put into effect the CFSP – [High Representative] to submit to the Council proposals to the development of CFSP/CSDP carried out as mandated by the Council
		Internal	– adoption of legislative acts
	Com	External	– to propose policy developments – to ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks (acting under the authority of the Council and in close contact with the Political and Security Committee)
		Internal	– legislative initiative – political control
	EP	External	– to ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative – to be regularly consulted by the High Representative – to debate on progress in implementing the policy (twice a year)
		Internal	– adoption (with the Council) of legislative acts (except operational cooperation) – political control – to accept/reject international agreements (consent procedure)
	EUCJ	External	– no jurisdiction with the exception of monitoring compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and reviewing the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the TFEU
		Internal	– jurisdictional control (except operational cooperation – Article 276)

Legend: CSDP=Common Security and Defence Policy; CEU= Council of the European Union; CFSP=Common Foreign and Security Policy; EC= European Council; ECom= European Commission; EP=European Parliament; ES= External Security; EUCJ= European Union Court of Justice; IS=Internal Security; TEU=Treaty on the European Union; TFEU=Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

**Figure 1** – Policy Cycle(s): External and Internal Security

External Security   Internal Security

Implementation
Member States
Council
High-
Representative

Agenda-setting
European Council
Council
High Representat
Member States

Implementation
Council (COSI)
EU specialized
agencies
Member States

Agenda-setting
European Council
European
Commission
Member States

Decision-making
European Council
Council

Decision-making
Council – European
Paliament

Table 2 – Decision-making in the Security Domain

External Security	Internal Security
Intergovernmental method	(*sui generis*) Community method
Specific rules and procedures – Proposals: High Representative; Council; Member States – Adoption: European Council; Council	Ordinary legislative procedure – Proposals: European Commission; 1/4 Member States – Adoption: Council and European Parliament
– Unanimity – decisions by the European Council and the Council	
– Constructive unanimity – abstention by a Member State (although it will not be obliged to apply the decision, it will accept that the decision commits the Union and will refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision) – Qualified majority – decisions by the Council when defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision or a specific request of the European Council.	Special legislative procedure [operational cooperation] – Adoption: Council after consulting the European Parliament – Qualified majority – Unanimity in certain matters

Table 3 – Outputs of the Security Domain

External Security	**Internal Security**
[no legislative acts]	[legislative acts]
– European Council – decisions (related to Union's strategic interests and objectives concerned with relations with a country/region or a theme) – Council – decisions (common position or joint action)	– regulations – directives – decisions

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The Comprehensive Approach in the Horn of Africa*

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Abstract

The article acknowledges that the EU Comprehensive Approach is the right methodology and it should be used to contribute to tackle the complex problems the Horn of Africa is currently facing and its root causes. The authors recognize that only the joint employment of diverse tools and policies and by doing it in close co-operation with our Member States, it will be possible to have a meaningful intervention that will play its role in helping achieve stability and sustainable development in the region. The article takes the case of Somalia as a test case for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach and concludes that the results have been encouraging. Notwithstanding the efforts made by the international community and the EU in particular, local ownership of the process and political will to restore a sustained peaceful environment remains crucial. The article concludes that the EU, collectively, has to define a common strategic vison, to focus on prevention, to mobilize existent strengths and capacities and to commit to a long-term Approach regarding crises in the region.

Resumo
A Abordagem Abrangente no 'Corno de África'

O artigo parte do reconhecimento de que o método de abordagem abrangente é o melhor instrumento a aplicar na gestão dos problemas complexos que afetam a região do 'Corno de África' e no combate às suas causas. Os seus autores reconhecem que, apenas através do emprego conjunto de diversos instrumentos e políticas e de uma estreita cooperação entre Estados-membros será possível desenvolver um modo de atuação significativo, capaz de produzir um efeito de estabilidade e desenvolvimento sustentável na região. O artigo adota como estudo de caso sobre implementação de abordagem abrangente, o caso da Somália, concluindo que os seus efeitos se têm revelado eficazes. Pese embora os esforços desenvolvidos pela comunidade internacional e pela União Europeia em particular, a apropriação dos processos e vontade política para restaurar um ambiente de paz sustentável permanece como uma condição essencial. O artigo conclui, que a UE deve definir coletivamente uma visão estratégica comum, centrar-se na prevenção, mobilizar recursos e capacidades existentes e centrar-se numa abordagem de longa duração em relação às crises na região.

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* The article reflects solely the authors' view and does not convey an institutional perspective.

Introduction

Suppose you were born in Somalia in the mid-nineties. You might have some studies at elementary level but you did not progress further. As a matter of fact you are the eldest on your family that is now father-less since his tragic death as collateral damage to another bombing in the city a few months ago. You know you need to help your mother feed your brethren and you are counting your options. Work for one of the militias? Dangerous, you could be maimed or killed. Join al-Shabaab? They might actually pay more than the militias but the risk is equally high, your life could be at stake. Migrate? But even if you could find the money to pay the traffickers to bring you to Europe who knows how long it would take to be able to start sending some support home (in case you arrive safely which is less than granted). Activities related to piracy? You know how to navigate a boat, so the basic skill is there.

Therefore, that is an attractive proposition in the sense that the benefit – even if the lion's share goes to the gang leaders – is reasonable and the worse you can expect if things go bad is to find yourself in prison for a while, unless you have the bad chance of meeting some of the most robust engagement by a few specific navies. So, it is a no-brainer what our young man is going to rationally decide as his future. Did the idea of a steady job did crossed his mind? Perhaps, as not all Somalis, far from it, are involved in illegal activities. The question here is to find it, in particular in a fragile country where a visible and active administration disappeared before you were born, where you cannot count on the state to really be there to help you.

An attentive reader might question the apparent lack of moral dilemma in his choices. Like he was weighing all options as fair and equal, the notion of right and wrong apparently absent from his equation. Should this surprise us when he lives in a country where conflicts have been solved at gun point, where force, not rule of law, is prevalent, where the economy is run outside any regulated channels?

We are perhaps over-dramatizing here, in particular because the piracy route is now dramatically drying to a point of almost no-activity as a consequence of the good work done by EUNAVFOR 'Atalanta' and other strong international efforts, NATO included, making it impossible for the fictitious young man of the previous paragraph to choose a future ransoming ships passing by the coast of his country (and hopefully, like many others who considered piracy as a professional activity, he is now converted to earn his life as a fisherman).

However, the main principle we would like to demonstrate remains valid. People do not become pirates as an emotional decision or just for the sake of financial benefits; they check the advantages and disadvantages of each option and compare it to other possibilities when analysing how to support themselves and their families (and, because of their upbringing, immune or at least reasonably distant for any

moral percept). The missing regular job option (and the fisherman's job can be seen as a low-income option insofar as Somalia practices artisanal fishing subject to competition from others because the Somali federal government does not have neither the ability nor the political will to control its territorial waters and correspondent catch) was in any case hard to find for someone with limited qualifications and probably would need some kind of patronage to even get to an entry point.

This basic truth – piracy problems have their origin in land – took perhaps some time to grasp and irrespective of the success of 'Atalanta', which will cannot be sustained forever, some voices were claiming earlier in the process that we should have a broader look at the problem if we wanted to give a chance for a sustainable solution, while we should also consider the larger issues of a fragile state in Somalia and the lack of stability in the region.

The Horn of Africa
Though a definition of the limits of the Horn as a geographic entity can vary according to the sources, Europeans tend to include in the mix Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. All countries where conflict has gained roots or is latent, from the continuous hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea to the just-finished civil war inside South Sudan, passing through the unresolved situation in Darfur and the al-Shabaab activities in Somalia (Djibouti is usually more preserved but a border conflict with Eritrea has not been untangled and skirmishes were a reality as late as last year).

The Horn is precisely at an historical fracture line between different cultures, diverse economies and distinct religions, where longstanding conflicts dating from ancestral times have never been totally resolved, or are repeating themselves with cyclical frequency, where one can even say that the effects of climate change have exacerbated the competition for scarce resources and amplify the opposing interests of its inhabitants, peasants, herders or city dwellers. If you throw in this complex scenario the existence of fragile states that are unable to provide basic health, education and safety nets to their constituents and are prone to nepotism, authoritarian temptations, asphyxiated political space and corrupt practices, the risk of unending conflicts and even implosion multiplies exponentially.

Somalia has been for three decades a good example of what could go wrong when a situation gets out of control, the state reduces itself to a minimum and the population remains at the whim of a few warlords competing for power and influence. On top of all that, there is not even an attempt to obtain buy in from the regions on what should be the political model for the future, opening the way for further conflict. It also lays the ground for self-denominated reformist zealots to try to impose by force a retrograde view of society irrespective of the will of the people they subjugate.

However, the Somali society has proved there and again how resilient she can be. Those few outsiders who have travelled to Mogadishu in the last few years do not speak about a beaten and disappointed population, rather to one that know how to adapt to the prevailing situation, with entrepreneurial spirit and a willingness to escape from a destiny that is not written anywhere as inescapable. There is hope things can finally change and essentially there is pressure on the political elites to find compromise solutions that allow for the conflicts to end and for security to be restored, which will be paramount if the country wants to return to a peaceful environment.

From an EU perspective, a peaceful and stable Africa, Horn included, is an avowed objective. Not only it will bring an end to warfare which has a deep impact on people's lives and on the capacity for countries to place themselves in the path of sustainable development but also will have a positive effect in the security of neighbouring regions, including our own continent. The threats in the modern world don't need to be classic military-oriented activities; they are more multiform and adaptable to exploit circumstances where they can thrive. Terrorism, epidemics, drug trafficking, uncontrolled population flows, to quote a few, all have the potential to harm and disrupt and as such it is in our interest to co-operate with our African partners to fight those phenomena and address their root causes to prevent their continuation or their renewal.

The Comprehensive Approach

There has been a lot of debate about what is the EU Comprehensive Approach or, to give it its full name, the EU Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crisis. If one reads the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission[1] it will be hard to find a single identifiable definition. The drafter, certainly aware of how burdensome it would have been in a consensus-based organisation like the EU to obtain a swift agreement in framing an encompassing definition where everyone would feel satisfied while still readable, avoided the trap by smartly spreading all over the text snippets of information about what he or she meant. Therefore, we will find words like 'consistence', 'effectiveness', 'coherence' or expressions like 'making optimal use' or 'drawing on the full range of its [the EU] instruments and resources' providing some clues about the objective of the exercise. It should also be noted the concern in

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[1]   The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. JOIN(2013) 30 final, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 11.12.2013. Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf.

explicitly identifying the prerogatives of the institutions and Member States that should not be affected by the novel approach.

Conversely, in the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council Meeting of May 12, 2014, on the Comprehensive Approach, a sort of definition is attempted that give another input about what was at stake: "The Comprehensive Approach is both a general working method and a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments, collectively can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective policies, working practices, actions and results"[2].

Some ideas, thus, can be developed on the basis of this clarification. Firstly, the Comprehensive Approach is not a policy by itself and does not pretend to replace any existing or future policy – it is just a working method embodying a set of concrete measures and processes; secondly, it implies the existence *ex-ante* of a common strategic vison by the EU – read in conjunction with the Communication it is legitimate to think that here 'the EU' means the institutions and the Member States – which will combine its tools and instruments to pursue an objective; thirdly is it is a collective effort – so all branches within the EU – to reach for effectiveness of policies, practices, actions and results.

The Council also defines that the need for the Comprehensive Approach is most "acute" in crisis and conflict situations and in fragile states. Although giving a general orientation about where the priority lies, the Council does not close the door for the 'working method' to be used elsewhere (probably once it proves successful). Going back to the Joint Communication, there is a Comprehensive (no pun intended) description of how the approach can actually work by pinpointing its different stages. Shared analysis is the beginning (Is there a potential conflict? Who is involved? How do we expect the situation to evolve? What are the potential risks of an action or inaction?). Who shall be in charge? An array of people: Member States intelligence services, EU Delegations, CSDP missions – if existent –, EUSRs – if relevant – or other EU agencies – if involved. Then the EU, collectively, move to define a common strategic vison, to focus on prevention, to mobilise existent strengths and capacities and to commit to the long-term. This last point is particular important. Some critics were adamant that the Comprehensive Approach was no more than a narrow-minded EEAS internal juggle to bring together civilian and military aspect of its crisis-management tasks.

The presence of many stakeholders from different corners of Brussels definitely buries that interpretation, complemented by the emphasis put in the need to sus-

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2   Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach. Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014, available at http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/05/12/.

tain a long-term engagement. What we have here is the possibility of combining the ability of the Member States to gather information with the capacity of the EEAS to manage crises, the CSDP tools that can be swiftly mobilised to intervene on the ground and respond to short-term issues, the EU delegations permanent political dialogue with host countries or the Commission capacity of putting together diverse development or partnership funds to ensure a long-term perspective (those examples don't pretend to be exhaustive or to limit what each participant is able to do according to their mandates).

Fundamentally, instead of each one working exclusively in its niche, an opportunity becomes open for a communality of positions and a co-ordination of efforts under a unified vision. For a long time, the sometimes alleged territorial approach of the EU agencies and its Member States has been repeatedly criticised by many observers in the civil society and think-tank communities. The Comprehensive Approach at least in paper seemed to be a step in the right direction. But does it work in practice? It is what we intend to check in the next chapter by focusing on the concrete example of one of the original pilot projects: Somalia.

The Somalia Case

Somalia was a natural candidate for testing the application of the Comprehensive Approach having in mind the complexity of its situation and the use of several different EU instruments trying to help Somalians to rebuild a peaceful state. The Lisbon Treaty made it possible, the piracy off the coast of Somalia made it indispensable.

The country is one of the poorest in the world, ranking in 52nd position out of 52 in the Mo Ibrahim index, with a GDP per capita that does not reach even 300 dollars a year, which economy depends considerably on Diaspora remittances and still licking the wounds of a long-lasting and only recently finished civil war. If you add a fragile, inconsequent administration, unable to impose its authority on the country – or providing basic services to its constituents – and facing a terrorist group having a global jihad on its political agenda, it is easy to understand that the obstacles to revert to a normal situation were (and still are) huge. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to portray Somalia as a failed state. Against a backdrop of political pettiness and a fractured approach to ruling that have slowed progress, the country has been able to gather momentum and start rebuilding its still fragile but workable institutions. Though Somali ownership of the process was fundamental – other interventions coming from abroad had proved their inability to provide any durable solution – there was also a growing understanding by the Somali elites in the last 10 years or so that without the support of the international community neither reconciliation nor development would be achievable.

Naval operation 'Atalanta' was a step in the right direction to ensure that Somali waters would not serve as platform to impair the freedom of the seas. For the piracy phenomenon, though, to be eradicated, a simple military operation, which could not be sustained long-term, was not enough and requested the support of other measures. One problem still to be dealt with is the legal situation of those that were apprehended by the operation which in itself is evidence of the need to solve the more general question of the need to establish the rule of law. We could speak here almost of retrofitting a chain-reaction: for the people to have hope and feel socially productive they need jobs. For the jobs to appear you need a peaceful, investment-friendly environment. For that environment to be created you need an accountable, capable government that has authority and resources to police its territory and is able to offer alternatives to those tempted to cross the line, like our fictional young man at the beginning of this text. So for the international community the challenge is to help the government by sustaining and enhancing the role of the administration, by generating capacity-building, by helping it to obtain those resources (human and financial), by providing equipment, by training officers, by starting development projects and ultimately by creating conditions for a safe and fruitful trade.

Without going into detail of each and every project either started or on the pipeline that the EU is supporting, we can underline some of the more significant. We have already spoken about naval operation 'Atalanta' but there are two more CSDP missions in the country: EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor. The former, firstly located in Uganda and with the co-operation of the Ugandan Defence Forces, but since January 2014 based in Mogadishu is focused on specialised training in a range of actions from counter-intelligence to combat. The latter is dedicated to reinforce capacities in the realm of maritime security, first at regional level and since 2015 focusing solely in Somalia.

An AU-led operation authorised by the United Nations Security Council, AMISOM, formed by contingents coming from Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia has been active since 2007, fighting the jihadist movement al-Shabaab. Through the European Development Fund, and more concretely through its African Peace Facility, the EU has been supporting this long lasting effort of the region to bring stability to Somalia and free people from terrorism to the tune of approximately 200 million EUR each year which are used mostly to pay troop stipends.

EDF support, though, is not confined only to this particular activity. The 11[Th] EDF national Indicative Programme foresees and amount 286 million Euros to be disbursed until 2020 with particular focus in three sectors: (1) state building and peace building; (2) food security and building resilience; and (3) education. For 2015, for instance, there were programmes in resilience (25 million €), support to state building and peace building sectors (48 million €), operational support to air services (15,7 million €) and reintegration of mixed migration flows (50 million €).

However, this does not represent the totality of the EU support, since horizontal thematic instruments also have programmes that support concrete projects in Somalia and ECHO is funding humanitarian needs (394.5 million € between 2008 and 2015). If you add EU Member States development initiatives to the equation the volume of funds available is even more impressive.

Therefore, all those programmes sail in the some direction, combining existent instruments to achieve what Somalis themselves are claiming is needed: governance and institution building, help resolving ongoing conflicts and potential future ones, minimise the impact of security challenges (like piracy), support economic growth and encourage regional cooperation. A document approved by the Somali authorities after a very wide internal consultation of stakeholders, called the 'The Somali Compact' determines the priorities of the country for the next three years. This document, signed in Brussels in 2013 following the 'Busan principles', calls for an inclusive overview of the different but inter-related needs of the Somali population and the federal state, interlinking political, state-building, security, economic and developmental needs. It guides EU efforts and plainly justifies the use of the Comprehensive Approach as the only way to avoid compartmentalisation and *ad hoc* short-term solutions. Some will say that in fact it could even be seen as a blueprint for the EU Comprehensive Approach.

One criticism often spread about the EU Comprehensive Approach is that contrary to NATO's similar exercise there is not a vertical chain of command responsible for its success and thus it cannot work because no one 'owns' the process. There is always the temptation to reply that the EU itself is living evidence that we can work based on a more horizontal consensus-based approach. Nevertheless, we can agree that it would be useful to have someone who should have as one of his tasks to ensure that proper co-ordination achieve its targets and instruments and their 'guardians' are speaking with each other. Fortunately, there is someone who fits the job in the EU arsenal: The European Union Special Representative for the Horn. As a constant interlocutor to the EEAS, the European Commission and the Member States he has a privileged role in ensuring that all the actors are rowing at the same speed.

On the ground, the EU Delegation to Somalia, currently in Nairobi but moving later in the year to Mogadishu, epitomizes the Comprehensive Approach. In the compound where they will be representing the EU, EEAS and DEVCO staff will share the premises with CSDP operations staff plus Member States' personnel, a symbol of the willingness to share resources and projects for a common objective.

Conclusions

It is not hard to see that the Comprehensive Approach is the only reasonable path to follow when you are facing a country with a complex set of problems, all inter-

related. A circumscribed approach of pick and choose from a menu according to circumstances has the potential to do more harm than good. What would be the purpose, say, in investing in new schools, if then the students might be victims of lack of a security environment or after graduating will be extremely frustrated because they cannot find a job?

There is a sense of local ownership, which is fundamental, in particular in a country like Somalia where the spectre of foreign intervention can trigger terrible consequences. In this case and after a large consultation process involving a number of layers in Somali society, the federal authorities are comfortable with the approach, are demanding it and expect results. Definitely, there is so much a donor can do and local authorities have to take their share of responsibility. Perhaps it is too early to be able to have an evaluation of the efforts done so far.

To a casual observer, the bombings and other terrorist attacks still prevailing give notice of the deadly persistence of those who challenge the authorities and can sustain a cynical assessment of the reality there. However, this would be a narrow view and one can argue that those who recur to asymmetric warfare are forced to so because they are now unable to mount a more classic challenge, as the territory under their control and the human resources at their disposal have considerably shrink. Moreover, internal differences and conflicts are now mostly settled by constitutional means instead of provoking new outbursts of warfare. Arguably, one should not forget that some of the initiatives taken now will only produce results in a medium to long-term timeframe. The electoral process that should take place this year, a stepping stone for universal suffrage in 2020, is on the other hand a symptom of the progress so far achieved and that has immediate impact on the population.

For sure, the Comprehensive Approach represents also a stage of evolution for the EU and its Member States. Undoubtedly, facing obstacles that go from a history of 'territorial' approaches to the need to adjust financial cycles that have their own logic, it is not easy to try things differently. If it works, like it seems to be the case on a preliminary observation, or at least contributes to build the path that Somalia will have to follow to escape its condition of fragile state, the doors are open to repeat the experience in countries with the same or even different type of problems.

The EU Engagement in Protracted Crises: Towards a Comprehensive Approach?*

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Abstract

Protracted crisis situations often last for years or decades, and derive from a complex mix of factors such as violent conflict, natural disasters, poverty, natural resources scarcity, institutional fragility, political instability, and limited economic opportunity. As they feature both emergency needs and structural vulnerabilities, protracted crises require a comprehensive approach that brings different actors and policy communities together under single political leadership, focusing on a common objective of paving the way to stability, resilience and development. This article addresses the question of whether the European Union (EU) is well positioned to respond comprehensively to such protracted crises. It explores a diversity of EU financing instruments as these are 'enablers' for the EU comprehensive approach, also taking into account the role of EU Member States. In fact, the EU has a wide array of financial instruments and mechanisms available to address protracted crises and to pursue different objectives across short – and longer-term time horizons. However, their comprehensive use is seriously constrained by the fragmentation of EU decision-making, strategic incoherence, and overlapping instrument mandates. EU institutions have made serious efforts to overcome such limitations, including through a harmonization of concepts and strategies. Furthermore, mechanisms for coordination and information exchange at the political and operational levels allow for collaborative responses. However, many of these technical solutions can only bring limited results in the absence of clear political leadership driving EU external action.

Resumo

O Empenhamento da União Europeia em Crises Estruturais: no Caminho de uma Abordagem Abrangente?

Situações de crise estrutural prolongam-se por décadas e resultam de uma combinação de fatores como conflitos violentos, desastres naturais, pobreza, escassez de recursos naturais, fragilidade institucional e limitadas oportunidades económicas. Estas crises concatenam necessidades urgentes com vulnerabilidades estruturais, requerendo uma abordagem abrangente que reúna diferentes atores e comunidades políticas sob uma única liderança, centrada num objetivo comum promotor da estabilidade, resiliência e desenvolvimento. Este artigo questiona se a União Europeia (UE) se encontra bem posicionada para responder de uma forma holística a crises estruturais, examinando de uma forma detalhada os instrumentos financeiros da UE e considerando o papel específico dos Estados-membros. Nele se observa a presença de um vasto conjunto de instrumentos e mecanismos disponíveis, que permitem à União Europeia gerir uma variedade de desafios associados às crises estruturais e prosseguir uma diversidade de objetivos, em horizontes temporais de curta e longa duração. Contudo, a sua abrangência encontra-se limitada pela fragmentação dos processos de decisão da União, pela sua incoerência estratégica e pela sobreposição de mandatos. As instituições europeias têm desenvolvido sérios esforços para ultrapassar estas limitações, incluindo a harmonização de conceitos e estratégias, de mecanismos de coordenação e a troca de informação ao nível político e operacional, permitindo o desenvolvimento de respostas colaborativas. Porém as soluções técnicas apenas geram resultados limitados, em particular na ausência de uma clara liderança política capaz de orientar a ação externa da União como um todo.

Introduction

Violent conflict, in the form of crisis and of protracted crisis[1], will continue to be a foreign and development policy challenge globally in the coming years. Because of their complicated nature and the varying length of potential intervention, protracted crises are especially challenging for the European Union (EU) and its comprehensive approach. OCHA figures have shown that the number of people relying on humanitarian aid has nearly doubled in the past ten years (OCHA, 2014), while the share of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) has doubled since 2000, from 5% then to 10% today (Maxwell, 2016). Moreover, the average length of an OCHA humanitarian appeal has now become seven years, indicating that humanitarian interventions are becoming increasingly long-term engagements. Among OECD Member States, 89 percent of total humanitarian funding is directed to protracted crises, including long-running relief programmes in countries like Sudan, Somalia or Ethiopia (Grogan, Strohmeyer, 2015).At the same time, crisis situations are often not just disruptions from the 'normal path' of development; they derive from a complex mix of factors such as violent conflict, natural disasters, poverty, natural resource scarcity, institutional fragility, political instability and limited economic opportunity, resulting in protracted crisis situations that last for years, if not decades. Most countries that are long-term recipients of humanitarian aid feature emergency needs but also structural poverty and weak state institutions that do not provide social safety nets to their citizens.[2]

Between 2000 and 2014, forced displacement has also become much longer term, on average. At the end of 2014, two-thirds of all refugees (12.9 million people) were stuck in protracted displacement situations of at least three years, and half of the refugees had been displaced for at least ten years (Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom and Walicki, 2015). Traditionally, conceptual thinking and responses to crisis situations have taken a linear approach, where responsibilities are handed over in a sequence: from relief actors, to reconstruction and rehabilitation, and eventually to long-term development. This has led to a more comprehensive understanding of crises over the recent years, recognising also their long-term nature, their multidimensional character, and a need to address needs often simultaneously. Such protracted crises require that donors address not only urgent needs e.g. through humanitarian aid or short-term stabilisation, but also the underlying political and

1   This paper defines protracted crises as 'complex (political) situations, usually comprising elements, or a mix, of (violent) conflict, natural disaster, poverty, scarce (natural) resources, institutional fragility and limited economic opportunity resulting in enduring or recurrent crisis, sometimes lasting years or decades.' (Bennett, 2015, p. 6; Scott, 2015).

2   Of the 30 countries categorised as long-term recipients of humanitarian aid during the past 15 years, 25 were in 2013 also classified as fragile states (Swithern, 2014).

development challenges through more structural engagement in recovery and reconstruction, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, disaster risk reduction, and sustainable development. Such a comprehensive approach would not only meet urgent needs, but also reduce them in the long term. Comprehensiveness, in this context, means that different actors and policy communities would act under a single political leadership so that their respective actions are adding up to a common objective of paving the way to stability, resilience and development.

Drawing on a literature review and a number of interviews conducted with key stakeholders (EU officials and NGO representatives), this article asks whether the European Union is well positioned to respond comprehensively to such protracted crises. Does it have the pertinent instruments, and how does such an EU comprehensive approach materialise? We offer a detailed look into the EU financing instruments, taking into account the specific role of EU Member States as well. This is illustrated with examples of situations of (protracted) crises where the EU has engaged. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a concise overview of the instruments that the EU has at its disposal in protracted crises, as well as their added value[3]. Section 3 offers a 'reality check' to analyse and explain the limitations and challenges that the EU is facing when putting a comprehensive approach into practice. Section 4, finally, discusses how the EU has taken technical efforts to improve comprehensiveness, despite its institutional design and political dynamics. It also points at some areas for potential improvement.

EU Instruments and Mechanisms to Engage in Protracted Crisis Situations

The EU has a variety of instruments that can be used in situations of protracted crisis. They are designed for specific policies and geographical areas, and managed by different institutional actors – notably by different Directorate--Generals in the European Commission. An overview of these instruments is given in Table 1.

Like most donors, the EU has a dedicated instrument for humanitarian aid, managed by the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). It allows the EU to provide quick and short-term support to humanitarian programmes for a maximum duration of 24 months, based on annual needs assessments, and in accordance with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality.

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3   Rather than providing a full, methodological analysis of all EU instruments, it focuses on those that are important for situations of (protracted) crisis. Our focus on EU financing instruments pays limited attention to the tools and instruments in the realm of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy, which operate according to different, more intergovernmental, governance structures.

Table 1 – Overview of EU instruments and mechanisms

Financing instrument (budget allocation for 2014-2020)	Main objective
Humanitarian Aid Instrument (EUR 7.1 billion)	Providing humanitarian aid based on annual strategies and in accordance with humanitarian principles; focuses on life-saving relief in emergencies as well in longer-lasting crises, and rehabilitation and reconstruction
Development Cooperation Instrument (EUR 19.6 billion)	Multiannual development cooperation programmes with a focus on poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (EUR 2.3 billion)	Non-programmable short- to medium-term operations in response to (emerging) crisis situations; programmed longer-term peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions.
European Neighbourhood Instrument (EUR 15.4 billion)	Long-term cooperation to advance towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness in the European Neighbourhood.
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (EUR 11.7 billion)	Provides support to (potential) candidate EU Member States in adopting the EU *acquis*, based on seven-year multiannual action programmes.
EU Trust Funds (*ad hoc* contributions from EU instruments and other donors)	Trust Funds for specific thematic priorities or crisis or post-crisis situations; function according to their own governance structures.
11th European Development Fund (EUR 30.5 billion, of which EUR 740 for the African Peace Facility	Multiannual development cooperation programmes with a focus on poverty reduction and sustainable development. Contains the Africa Peace Facility to foster peace, stability and security in Africa, providing the basis for long-term sustainable development.

For instance, it is estimated that the Syrian conflict has already left 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance inside the country alone. Recent OCHA figures indicated that 6.6 million Syrians are internally displaced, and more than 4.5 million were forced to flee to neighbouring countries or regions (OCHA, 2016). Through its humanitarian aid instrument, the EU has mobilised a total of EUR 445 million in 2016 to address needs inside Syria as well as of Syrian refugees and host communities in neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2016a).The mandate of EU humanitarian aid extends beyond the core humanitarian task of lifesaving operations in emergencies to also include relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises, short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction action, and disaster preparedness. For instance, while the bulk of EU humanitarian aid in 2014 responded to the most severe huma-

nitarian emergencies such as Syria, Iraq or South Sudan, 17 percent of ECHO's funding was directed to 'forgotten' protracted crises, such as the Sahrawi refugee crisis in Algeria or the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh (European Commission, COM, 2015).However, DG ECHO uses short-term planning and financing perspectives, and it confronts legal EU restrictions on the funding of local actors in beneficiary countries. This makes EU humanitarian aid not suited to provide longer-term capacity-building support and to take a structural approach to protracted crises. The EU has a number of development and international cooperation instruments available to address longer-term development and capacity-building, the most notable of which are the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Neighbourhood Fund (ENI), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). While the DCI and the EDF are development instruments with a focus on poverty reduction[4], the ENI is created to help foster stability, security and prosperity in the countries surrounding the EU in the East and South (Middle East and Northern Africa, Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus). The IPA, in turn, is designed to provide support to (potential) candidate EU Member States for political, institutional, administrative, social and economic reforms to comply with EU policies and standards.

In terms of decision-making and management, the DCI and the EDF are managed by the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), whereas DG NEAR (Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations) is responsible for the ENI and the IPA. EU Member States also have their say on the implementation of these instruments through the so-called 'comitology procedures', where a committee of Member State representatives is engaged before the Commission can make decisions on the financing of interventions.

The added-value of these four instruments in protracted crisis situations lies in that they provide a long-term engagement perspective with a focus on capacity-building, which allows addressing structural vulnerabilities such as weak state institutions or high youth unemployment. A recent illustration was the European Commission's decision to mobilise EUR 10 million from the IPA to strengthen response capacities of countries in the Western Balkans to cope with increased migration flows (European Commission, 2015a). In addition to the focus of the EDF and DCI

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4   The EDF provides development aid for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories. The DCI contains geographic programmes for support in developing countries in Latin America, South Asia and North and South East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and South Africa; and thematic programmes for support in all developing countries not eligible under the IPA. The DCI also has a Pan-African Programme to support the strategic partnership between the EU and Africa.

on poverty reduction, both instruments have a legal mandate to engage in conflict prevention and resolution, state-building and peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction in (post-)crisis or fragile contexts. A good practice in this regard is the "Pro-Resilience Action" (PRO-ACT), a programme funded under the DCI, focused on resilience-building through long-term crisis prevention and (post-)crisis response in countries affected by (protracted) crisis such as South Sudan and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, the use of long-term instruments for protracted crisis remains an exception rather than the norm.[5] Development instruments function on the basis of multi-annual programming documents that identify a set of agreed priorities, and are subject to long consultation and contracting procedures that aim to ensure country ownership, financial accountability and democratic control. Thus the instruments are not well-suited for quick and flexible responses in volatile situations, where the context of protracted crisis can change rapidly and trigger unexpected needs. The instruments' multi-annual financial and planning outlook can be a disincentive to engage in fragile environments, where stability cannot be guaranteed.

To remedy this, the long-term instruments have a number of provisions that aim at making them more flexible and responsive when needed. For example there is an option of emergency procedures in crisis situations that allows for quicker decision-making, e.g. by shortening the consultation process with Member States or allowing for direct contracting without calls for proposals. Similarly, a contingency fund is available for flexible responses not foreseen in the programming. Despite such arrangements, some Commission staff members remain cautious about applying them due to concerns over transparency and good financial management.[6] Moreover, the high political pressure on development policy to show results and 'to deliver' actually discourages taking any risks.

Beyond the traditional humanitarian and development instruments, the EU can provide quick and flexible responses to (emerging) crises beyond the humanitarian remit through its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The IcSP has global coverage and a broad thematic scope, ranging from peacebuilding and mediation, to support to livelihoods and economic recovery, to security sector reform and linking up with humanitarian responses. It has, for example, been used to support temporary employment programmes in the Gaza Strip, to finance security sector reform initiatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or to fund demining operations in Syria (to establish humanitarian access in conflict-affected zones). As such, the IcSP is a very flexible instrument that allows the EU to engage in a very broad range of crisis situations. While the bulk of the resources are used

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5   Interview with NGO representative, 15 April 2016.
6   Interviews with EU officials.

for short-term crisis response, nine percent of the total funding is reserved for longer-term support to peacebuilding, with a focus on civil society. The instrument is managed by the European Commission's service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). FPI adopts measures after consultation with the Political and Security Committee (where EU Member States gather at ambassadorial level), which gives the financing decisions a strong political backing.

In the domain of security, EU Member States have almost fully retained their sovereignty, and instruments housed in the European Commission face both legal and political limitations to engage in security activities that have a military or defence dimension. While the EU provides a framework for civilian and military crisis management operations (under the so-called 'Common Security and Defence Policy'), such operations require consensus among the 28 Member States, and there is limited involvement of the European Commission in their implementation. That said, the Commission manages the African Peace Facility (APF), which is funded under the EDF, and managed specifically by DG DEVCO. Upon request of the African Union or of an African Regional Economic Community, the APF can provide support to both short-term Peace Support Operations (representing 90 percent of the APF resources, most of which is used for troop stipends to the African Union-led operation AMISOM in Somalia), and institutional capacity-building to the African Peace and Security Architecture[7], following the logic of 'African solutions to African problems'. The APF can only provide funding to the AU and the AU Commission, or to African regional organisations. Through the APF, the EU cannot engage directly with armed forces at the country level. To fill this gap, the European Commission recently proposed to amend the IcSP so it could also provide support to the military of countries under certain circumstances (European Commission, 2016, COM 447 final). Yet this proposal, which is yet to be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council at the time of writing, is likely to be both politically and legally contentious, as it would extend the European Commission's influence in the security sphere, which is traditionally considered to be within Member States' remit. In addition, it raises concerns over the so-called 'securitization' of development cooperation funds.

The most recent innovation in the EU's portfolio is that the European Commission can establish – since the adoption of the 2013 EU Financial regulation (European Commission, 2013) – EU Trust Funds to address post-crisis situations. Since the

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7   The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) comprises a set of structures and decision-making processes to implement a comprehensive peace and security agenda in Africa, including through early warning and conflict prevention, peace support operations, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The main pillar of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council, which is supported by the African Union Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund.

introduction of this funding mechanism, several EU Trust Funds have been established to address the crisis in the Central African Republic (Bêkou Fund), to provide a regional response to the Syrian crisis (Madad Fund), and to address the root causes of irregular migration in Africa (Emergency Trust Fund for Africa). EU Trust Funds bring several advantages. First, they allow the Commission to pool resources from different financing instruments under a single management structure. The Madad Fund, for example, allows to provide support under one framework in Syria's neighbouring countries, where otherwise three different instruments would have to be mobilised separately.[8] Second, EU Trust Funds are open for other donors to contribute (notably Member States), which allows for donor coordination and risk-sharing. Third, because EU Trust Funds have their own decision-making and management procedures, with no consultation on financing decisions through comitology procedures with all EU Member States or involvement of the European Parliament, they allow for a quicker and more flexible response.[9]

In summary, the EU has a wide array of funding instruments and mechanisms at its disposal. This comprises the ability to provide lifesaving relief to people in urgent needs, support stability and security, reduce poverty and promote economic and human development, and prevent future crisis or conflict. Overall, it allows the EU to address a variety of challenges associated with protracted crises across different short- and longer-term time horizons.

From Theory to Practice: Fragmentation and Policy Incoherence

While the diversity of EU financing instruments and mechanisms allows to develop a comprehensive engagement in protracted crises, in practice, it faces several limitations and challenges as instruments do not always succeed in pursuing jointly-agreed objectives, or they simply fail to link up. This section will explore how the institutional and political organisation of the EU, including the dichotomy between the EU institutions and the Member States, contributes to a fragmentation of decision-making and policy incoherence.

Fragmented Political Leadership and Dispersed Governance of EU Instruments

First and foremost, EU external action is characterised by a fragmented political leadership, with different Directorates-General (DGs) in the Commission and different commissioners responsible for development cooperation, humanitarian aid,

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8   The ENI for Lebanon, the IPA for Turkey and the DCI for Iraq.
9   Comitology rules apply for the creation and extension of EU Trust Funds, as well as their liquidation through EU budget resources. Financing decisions taken under the Trust Funds are taken in accordance with the Trust Funds' own decision-making rules (D'Alfonso and Immenkamp, 2015).

and neighbourhood policy —–although all external action commissioners now regularly meet under the 'Stronger Global Actor' project team. Moreover, Member States tightly retain their political control over the security domain, which is not properly reflected in the governance of Commission-led financing instruments. With different instruments managed by separate DGs (DEVCO, NEAR, ECHO and the service FPI), coordination requirements are very high, and a coherent mobilisation of instruments in crisis situations cannot always be realised. There is institutional space for DGs to simply operate in parallel because of a dispersed system of governance without unified leadership on top. Moreover, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's diplomatic service, occupies a hybrid position: autonomous from the Commission but 'a service' and not properly an institution. The EEAS is nevertheless tasked with the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and supports and coordinates aspects of wider EU external action.

In addition, EU comprehensiveness cannot ignore the Member States. They help shape the responses under the EU instruments (e.g. through comitology consultations or Trust Fund boards) and as such may bring their own political priorities to the table. Moreover, Member States also have their own tools to address protracted crises, ranging from development funds to military engagement, and often have developed their own versions of a comprehensive approach, with various degrees of integration (Hauck and Rocca, 2014). The implementation of the IcSP is a case in point of dispersed EU governance, with implementation run in the Commission's FPI and notably counting on staff in EU Delegations (which are part of the EEAS), while also involving Member States in the process (through the Political and Security Committee). As the IcSP is designed for relatively small, short-term interventions, particular coordination efforts are already required during the design phase to ensure a sustainable follow-up by other, more long-term instruments. However, evaluations have found out that complementarities with other EU initiatives are often missing; the reasons range from the lack of long-term development funding available at the right time, to the little attention that the IcSP receives from non-FPI staff at the EU Delegations. This reduces the opportunity for coordination and linkages so the IcSP can feed into broader EU initiatives in a given country (e.g. Italtrend C&T, Office for Economic Policy and Regional Development (EPRD), Social Capital Bank, 2014). FPI cannot guarantee coherent follow-up under other instruments either, because these are beyond its control. This illustrates how the EU can fail to provide a coherent response to a protracted crisis situation because of the fragmented structures and competencies in which decisions are taken.

Strategic (in)Coherence at Regional, Country and Global Levels

In several contexts, the EU has gone to great lengths to develop a coherent strategic framework at regional, country and even global level guiding EU external

action, across instruments. Nevertheless, many of these have been important efforts 'in theory' that face difficulties to actually be put 'in practice'. The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is an example of a *regional* EU strategy that has contributed to relevant successes in applying a comprehensive approach in a region marked by recurrent conflict and state fragility. For example, the strategy contributed to comprehensiveness by creating mechanisms to coordinate between EU stakeholders in response to the Mali crisis that emerged in 2012 following the resurgence of the Touareg rebellion and the coup in March 2012 (Helly and Galeazzi, 2015). Subsequent Regional Action Plans have engaged colleagues from both the EEAS and different Commission DGs, which has helped build a comprehensive approach in the Sahel, with agreement on certain priorities and identification of instruments to fulfil them. But such a document may involve 'incoherence' beyond the EU, because 'the Sahel' as a region is composed of five countries for the EU (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania) and leaves out for example Senegal, which is considered 'Sahelian' by other international actors. Moreover, the Sahel regional strategy is not always aligned with all aspects of the EU comprehensive approach. For example, the EU also crafts policy in this region with ECOWAS as a strategic interlocutor and recipient, but Chad is not part of ECOWAS while the other four countries (together with others in West Africa) are.

The EU has not always been able to reach the successes of the Sahel strategy in other regions or countries affected by protracted crises. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is an example of insufficient strategy at *country* level. An evaluation recently found that the EU's Security Sector Reform efforts in the framework of the CSDP and later the EDF had only limited impact in the DRC, because they were designed 'from Brussels' with little knowledge of the country situation, and not embedded in a wider strategy that also took into account broader questions of governance, inclusion of civil society, human rights protection and accountability of the armed forces. The EU's efforts were also found to be insufficiently combined with political dialogue to put pressure on the Congolese government to implement its commitments (EurAc, 2016). Having a more comprehensive strategy in place, based on a good analysis of the country's political and conflict context, could have contributed to a more coherent mobilisation of EU instruments, taking into account the different interrelated challenges. The EU institutions are establishing cycles and documents of 'joint programming' and joint assessment in this regard [see section 4 below], which could serve as a more coherent basis both at broader strategic planning and field implementation.

At a *global* level, a new EU Global Strategy has been presented by the High Representative in June 2016, intended to support 'the materialisation of an EU compre-

hensive approach'[10]. This document identifies as EU priorities both the promotion of resilience and the need to address all the stages in the conflict cycle (as two out of five priorities). While the policy guidance is stated broadly, the prioritisation of resilience and a whole-of-cycle view of conflict offer a hook, and a root, for applying an EU comprehensive approach when addressing protracted crises, and as such provide backing for a more strategically coherent use of EU instruments at the country and regional levels. However, it remains to be seen which tools and mechanisms will be used to put this document into practice, notably regarding the combination of civilian and military EU action.

Different Policy Communities, Diverging Principles and Incentives

The fragmentation of decision-making and management structures is itself a reflection of the reality that the various financing instruments serve different objectives and constituents. The principles are sometimes in contradiction with each other, and with the needs in situations of protracted crisis. For instance, development aid follows the principles of local ownership and alignment with country priorities, as laid out in the Aid Effectiveness Agenda. The result is that development aid functions on the basis of slow and continuous processes of consultation and dialogue with beneficiary countries on programming and financing. This cannot be easily reconciled with the need for quick and flexible responses in volatile contexts of protracted crisis. These principles are firmly rooted within the development community's culture, including the staff at DG DEVCO managing the EU's development instruments. Given DEVCO's focus on development and poverty reduction, the adherence to the Aid Effectiveness principles creates disincentives to prioritise crisis-response concerns about quick and flexible action. As a consequence, DEVCO staff is often hesitant to use flexibility arrangements even when these are legally provided for (e.g. the EU's emergency procedures mentioned in Section 2).[11]

A related question subject to much debate is how to better link humanitarian relief with long-term development. The aid effectiveness principles recognise a central role for beneficiaries in determining how aid is being used, but this is not always easily reconcilable with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality, especially when a situation of violent conflict involves government authorities. Within the humanitarian community, there are fears that a too-close integration with the development agenda might risk an instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid for strategic or political purposes, which in the worst case could put the humanitarian worker in danger if he or she is no longer perceived as neutral. The withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from the preparation

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10 Interview with official.

11 Interview with European Commission official, 7 March 2016.

process of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, where the issue of better linking humanitarian and development aid was a prominent theme on the agenda, is a good illustration of the concerns that exist within the humanitarian community (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2016).A final illustration of contradicting principles and approaches relates to collaboration with local civil society organisations (CSOs). While there is increasing recognition at the political level of the importance of strengthening civil society in building resilient, inclusive and stable societies,[12] supporting CSOs often raises concerns, not only over issues related to sound and transparent financial management, but also over their independence and neutrality in situations of (emerging) conflict or political tensions. Such diverging positions can have an impact on the extent to which, e.g. humanitarian action can be properly linked with actions of a more political nature.

In general, the institutional fragmentation at EU-level is both a reflection of, and a contributor to thinking in silos, where different professional mandates and incentives across institutions pose serious constraints to the creation of a shared understanding and more coherent responses to protracted crises.

Overlapping Mandates and Functions Across New Instruments

A final critique relates to the positioning of the IcSP and the Trust Funds in the overall EU crisis response system, as examples of instruments that seek to cover some gaps but may have negative 'side-effects', such as overlap, reduced accountability, and blurry political lines. As the Commission has the exclusive responsibility among EU institutions for managing operational funding under the EU budget, it is the Commission, through FPI, who has financial authority over the IcSP. At the same time, FPI is physically housed within the European External Action Service (EEAS) premises, which facilitates EEAS involvement in the preparation and implementation of this essentially political instrument.

This hybrid position of the IcSP leads to different interpretations on the ultimate nature and purpose of the instrument. Some within the EU institutions view the IcSP as an auxiliary instrument available to the EEAS and the Political and Security Committee (officially, a body within the Council of the EU) to respond to urgent political requests in crisis situations, independently from what other instruments are doing. Others, however, rather stress the function of the IcSP in filling gaps where other EU (development) instruments are not (yet) mobilised and pave the way to longer-term development engagements. The broad mandate and the flexibility of this instrument can have advantages, but it risks not being optimally used

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12 See e.g. the discussion on the localisation of humanitarian aid, United Nations, 2016. *One humanity: shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit.* UNGA Seventieth session.

in the absence of a clear political priority-setting and fragmented leadership on EU external action.

Finally, the establishment of the EU Trust Funds risks creating overlaps in mandates with other instruments. This is particularly the case for the IcSP, which also has a focus on emergency response extending into the security-development nexus sphere (even if Trust Funds have a country or regional scope, whereas the IcSP can be used worldwide). While a degree of thematic overlap is not problematic per se (as it gives some flexibility in where to mobilise resources), it does raise questions on how to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity. Given that the IcSP has political backing from all Member States at ambassadorial level through the Political and Security Committee, it has a strong political basis. By contrast, the EU Trust Funds have less political foundation, and are not agreed by all EU Member States. Despite drawing significantly on EU budget resources, decisions under the EU Trust Funds are not subject to the regular Member State consultation processes (comitology) that apply to the EU financing instruments otherwise. Instead, only donors (next to the European Commission) that have directly contributed a minimum of EUR 3 million to the Trust Fund (in addition to the EU contributions) have a vote in the Trust Funds Boards and Operational Committees, and can therefore decide on the overall strategy and financing measures. This gives a say to Trust Fund-contributing countries and to the Commission, whereas EU countries not contributing to the Fund are left out. Moreover, the creation and management of EU Trust Funds are not based on a democratic debate in the European Parliament, and the role that the EEAS plays in taking decisions (beyond its representation in the Trust Fund Committees) remains rather unclear. Finally, partner country governments are involved in decision-making to varying degrees. In the case of the Bêkou Fund, the transitional government of the Central African Republic was involved in the creation of the Trust Fund, and while they have no formal voting rights in the Board, they are fully consulted for major decisions. The Madad Fund, however, does not involve partner countries' governments in decision-making and programming, with implications for ownership (Hauck, Knoll and Cangas, 2015). Nevertheless, EU Trust Funds are still relatively new, and there is limited information available on how they relate to other instruments (such as the IcSP) in practice. How they could potentially be further delineated is an area that clearly requires further attention.

To sum up, this section has revealed that, despite the wide variety of instruments, the EU faces certain limitations and challenges in establishing a comprehensive response to protracted crises. The main risks in going 'from theory to practice' remain fragmentation and incoherence in EU policy-making, which is reflected in – and also fed by – the financial instruments. In fact, the instruments are so central to EU policy-making that they sometimes *drive* policy as 'enablers' of EU action,

while they should instead be driven by political leadership. But as this section has argued, this is sometimes disperse, contradictory, or even missing.

Reaching Comprehensiveness in a Complex World

The EU has made serious efforts to establish and improve comprehensiveness in its instrument-driven approach to protracted crises and overcome the associated limitations. Nevertheless, there are clear challenges to making the EU external action more comprehensive, as we highlight in this section.

There have been attempts to improve comprehensiveness at the highest political level. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, introduced the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose mandate includes ensuring the consistency of EU external action, a task in which he or she is supported by the EEAS. The High Representative (a post currently held by Ms Federica Mogherini) also serves as Vice-President of the European Commission and, in that capacity, chairs the project team 'A Stronger Global Actor', which provides a forum to the different European commissioners that have portfolios related to EU external action to coordinate their activities. However, the project team has only recently been established (when the Juncker Commission entered office in 2014), and there is so far little evidence available as to how it successfully contributes to more political leadership and comprehensive action.

High Representative Mogherini has also taken the lead over the preparation of a 'Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy (European Union, 2016), as mentioned above. This document replaces the 2003 European Security Strategy, but takes a much wider scope by providing guidance for all dimensions of EU external action, including by formulating an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. As such, the document, which was welcomed during the European Council meeting in June 2016, provides a potentially useful framework for a more comprehensive engagement in crisis situations. It remains to be seen to what extent it will enjoy political sponsorship across the EU institutions, and whether a follow-up sectorial document on security and defence would offer more hints as to how the EU could address protracted crisis.

Within the EU system, both formal coordination and information exchange mechanisms have been set up to foster collective responses to crisis situations. This notably includes the establishment of the EEAS Crisis Response System. When activated, it allows the EEAS to convene on an *ad hoc* basis so-called Crisis Platforms to coordinate amongst a range of relevant bodies across the EU system on political and strategic matters in response to a particular crisis. However, while the Crisis Platforms aim to improve comprehensiveness, they have in some cases themselves fell victim to the fragmentation of the EU system. For instance, DG ECHO, the EU's humanitarian aid and civil protection office, manages its own Emergency Response

Coordination Centre, acting as the operational coordination hub of the EU civil protection mechanism for responses in- or outside Europe. A similar example regards the EU Trust Funds, which also have a role in coordinating EU efforts, with the Commission taking the lead. Without proper political guidance and leadership, this proliferation of parallel coordination bodies risks duplicating efforts and even creating turf wars, rather than solving them.

Despite such formal coordination mechanisms, a high degree of information exchange and coordination also happens through informal contacts. While this makes effective coordination dependent on good personal relations among staff members, it has the benefit of allowing some flexibility and swiftness, which is particularly valued in crisis situations. Indeed, while a certain systematisation of coordination and information exchange are needed, the EU must also avoid over-bureaucratising the processes to allow for meaningful dialogues across the institutions.

At country level, the EU aims to foster EU-wide strategising and programming. The concept of 'EU Joint Framework Documents' (JFD) is a case in point. JFDs are strategic documents that aim to integrate all dimensions of EU external action and outline EU interests and priorities in given countries or regions. These then provide a solid basis for better aligned programming of the various EU instruments in a country or region. However, research has found that JFDs in the past tended to focus more on short-term crisis management priorities, rather than on longer-term development objectives, and therefore failed to provide a useful basis for the programming of all EU instruments so that they would be able to address the various dimensions of (protracted) crisis in a more comprehensive way (Herrero, Knoll, Gregersen and Kokolo, 2015). Nevertheless, as Herrero *et al.* note, they may still shape a promising avenue in more coherent programming exercises in protracted crisis situations in the future, provided that the JFDs formulate a perspective beyond the short-term political, economic and security interests of the EU.

In a similar vein, the European Commission has provided guidance for the development of Joint Humanitarian-Development Frameworks (JHDFs) to guide transition processes out of crisis situations (Ramet, 2012). JHDFs have the aim of integrating different EU interventions across the crisis cycle, with involvement of ECHO, FPI, DEVCO and the EEAS, as well as Member States to jointly engage in conflict analysis and coordinate activities. JHDFs offer a light and flexible coordination tool, but there is currently no clarity on the leadership over JHDF processes, leaving the development and use of such frameworks dependent on individual initiatives.[13]

Beyond immediate crisis situations, Joint Programming has been used by EU institutions and Member States as a process to jointly determine a development response

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13 Interview with European Commission official, 11 March 2016.

for a particular partner country. This could particularly be beneficial in fragile contexts, and has already been successfully applied in volatile countries such as South Sudan, Haiti or Mali to better harmonise EU and Member States efforts at promoting development and reducing poverty and hunger in environments where state capacities are weak (Helly, Galeazzi, Parshotam, Gregersen, Kokolo and Sherriff, 2015). An important issue in protracted crises relates to ensuring that EU interventions across the crisis cycle take into account local political and conflict dynamics. Therefore, several EU bodies have established expertise hubs on conflict and crisis that are tasked with expanding the EU's understanding of conflict and that promote the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States and Situations, DG DEVCO established a Fragility and Crisis Management Unit (recently rebranded as Fragility and Resilience Unit). The institutional counterpart to this Unit in the EEAS, is the Conflict prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Division (also known as SECPOL 2), which provides expertise for engaging in conflict-affected situations. SECPOL 2 also facilitates early warning across EU institutions, allowing for regular reassessments of crisis situations to inform longer-term outlooks to (post-)crisis situations. The DEVCO Fragility Unit and SECPOL 2 (then still known as the K2 Division) have collaborated on the development of a joint conflict assessment guidance. More recently, the Fragility Unit has developed guidance on conflict-sensitivity in EU interventions and sought to ensure coherence between EU instruments and policies when engaging in fragile and crisis-hit situations. The Unit also leads training workshops on conflict- and fragility-related topics for EU staff across the system.

While such tools are valued, strong guidance and direction on how and when to use them is often missions, and the extent to which they influence implementation still depends on individual commitments of staff members and leadership in other DGs and EEAS Divisions. Consequently, this only resolves differences in mandates and biases among EU bodies to a limited extent. Other measures to boost crisis- and conflict-related expertise could involve increasing staff mobility across DGs and creating knowledge management and information-exchange tools shared by the Commission, the EEAS (including EU Delegations) and CSDP missions at Brussels level and in the field (Anthony and Lundin, 2015). The EU Delegations constitute indeed a crucial strategic asset to achieve comprehensiveness on the ground. As representations of the Union as a whole (rather than single EU institutions)[14], Delegations can act as a local coordinator between EU bodies and Member States in a given country or crisis situation, including in programming and implementation

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14 EU Delegations representing the whole Union were introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. They replaced the former European Commission Delegations, which had a less political mandate.

processes (Helly, Herrero, Knoll, Galeazzi and Sherriff, 2014). Furthermore, Delegations now also have responsibilities in the field of peace and security (Helly and Galeazzi, 2014). Especially the political sections of the Delegations can play an important role in feeding knowledge on a country's political and security situation in development instrument strategies and programming, thus promoting a more context-driven and conflict-sensitive approach. However, limited expertise and resources available to EU Delegations have limited the extent to which they can perform such tasks (European Union External Action, 2013). Much also depends on the personality of the Head of Delegation and how he or she views his or her role in promoting a culture of collaboration and comprehensiveness across the Union through regular engagement with other EU actors in the field (e.g. by inviting Heads of ECHO field offices to the weekly coordination meetings at the Delegations).

In sum, progress has been made in providing solutions to improve comprehensiveness in the complex institutional environment of the EU. Steps have been made through a harmonisation of concepts and strategies and through the creation of mechanisms for coordination and information exchange at both the political and operational levels. These efforts have often proven promising avenues towards more comprehensiveness and could be used more systematically. However, such technical solutions for coordination and comprehensiveness will continue to face limitations in the absence of clear political guidance bringing all pieces together.

Concluding Remarks

The EU is a complex environment, with many institutions and 28 Member States involved. The EU institutions have a diverse set of instruments and mechanisms available that allow it to simultaneously address the many challenges associated with protracted crises, including saving lives, ending conflict, restoring peace and security, reducing poverty and hunger and preventing future crises. However, the financing instruments designed to achieve these goals are fragmented and do not always complement each other. This is a reflection of the EU institutional environment, and of the procedures and the politics in this environment. In such a context, it has been acknowledged that a comprehensive approach was needed: much has been done to harmonize concepts and strategies, and it is already being implemented (to a certain degree). There have been serious efforts to improve comprehensiveness in EU responses to protracted crises, although these remain suboptimal or underexplored due to the absence of clear EU political leadership.

Moreover, we would emphasise that coordination and coherence are not an end in themselves, but a means for the EU to address the real challenges of humanitarian and protracted crisis, and of peace and economic development in the long term.

The comprehensive approach itself is a tool at the service of the goals, to achieve more united EU external action and more impact. As an institution, the EU invests much energy and resources in coordination, yet it is important that it does not get lost in the process and continues to focus on the goals.

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Extra Dossiê

Modi's India in the Global Pecking Order

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Abstract

As it ascends the global pecking order, India collides against other aspirants. This essay evaluates the Narendra Modi government's performance against the promises contained in the election manifesto of the ruling *Bharatiya Janata* Party. It assesses the hurdles before India's ambition and the continuity and change in foreign policy, and argues that success depends more on governance than policy prescriptions.

In foreign affairs, Modi has drawn upon India's counter-narrative to the West-centric view of history, and upon the rich interventions India has offered to the world. The pillars of his foreign policy are 'soft power', economic transformation, and strategic capacity-building. Through energetic diplomacy and a willingness to assume greater international responsibility, India is intent on shifting from the role of a 'balancer' to 'leader'.

Modi demonstrates continuity in foreign policy objectives: ensuring that the neighbourhood remains peaceful, secure and stable; securing inward foreign investment, and increasing India's influence.

Modi has lent urgency to the pursuit of foreign and security policies as 'enablers' in the transformation of India. By getting tied to domestic policy, foreign policy has woven itself into the people's consciousness.

But in an unpredictable international system, can Modi see through his foreign policy initiatives into the end of his term in 2019? The challenge is not merely to augur in 'smart diplomacy', but bring all stakeholders into a governance structure for the transformation of India.

With the consolidation of national strength, India is at the centre of the international security architecture. If India were to become the world power it aspires to be, Modi needs to seize the moment.

Resumo
A Índia na Hierarquia da Ordem Global

À medida que vai ascendendo na hierarquia da ordem internacional, a Índia colide com outros competidores. Este artigo avalia o desempenho do governo de Narendra Modi tendo por base as promessas constantes no manifesto eleitoral do partido do governo, o Bharatiya Janata. Analisam-se as barreiras à ambição da Índia e a continuidade e mudança na sua política externa, defendendo--se que o sucesso depende mais da governação do que de prescrições políticas.

No campo da política externa, Modi socorreu-se de uma contra narrativa à visão ocidental da história e dos relevantes contributos que a Índia tem dado ao mundo. Os pilares da sua política externa são o soft power, a transformação económica e um capacity-building *estratégico. Através de uma diplomacia muito ativa e determinada em assumir uma maior responsabilidade internacional, a intenção da Índia é a de deixar de ser um "equilibrador" para passar a ser um "líder".*

Modi tem demonstrado uma continuidade quanto à prossecução dos objetivos de política externa, garantindo que a região permanece pacífica, segura e estável e assegurando a captação de investimento externo e incrementando a influência do país.

Modi conferiu um carácter de urgência à consecução de políticas externas e de segurança como "catalisadores" da transformação da Índia. Ao ligar a política externa à política interna, a primeira enlaçou-se na consciência da população.

Mas num sistema internacional imprevisível, poderá Modi alcançar os objetivos de política externa no final do seu mandato em 2019? O desafio não se centra apenas na smart diplomacy, mas em procurar agregar todos os agentes intervenientes numa estrutura governativa em prol da transformação da Índia.

Com a consolidação do seu poder nacional a Índia está no centro da arquitetura de segurança internacional. Se quiser ser uma potência mundial – como aspira – Modi necessita de capitalizar as oportunidades atualmente existentes.

An ascent on the global pecking order is never a smooth ride. It is like a spectacle of climbers taking different routes to the summit and occasionally bumping against each other. With the global power shifting, the field is being crowded out, as many nations knock at the door for membership of the top table at the same time. India is one such nation. Dismissed as a middle-ranking power for decades, India, it is argued, is likely to become a major world power in the foreseeable future.

Is it? Have India's political leaders been able to translate ambition into outcome? Is India finding its true voice as a first-rung world power? What are its strategic priorities and challenges? What are its natural strengths?

As an aspiring world power India is on the path of steady economic growth. With a world-class military, India has launched a charm offensive in recent years through its 'soft power approach' to win friends across the world. Yet India remains an "aspirant" and not a sure-footed world power like China. What ails India? What constrains its drive towards global status? What does India need to do to prove its credentials? Most important, what has the Narendra Modi government done to translate promise into performance?

This essay revisits the election manifesto of the ruling *Bharatiya Janata* Party, critically evaluates the performance of the government against the promises it has made, and assesses the continuity and change in foreign policy. While doing so it provides a primer on the constraints affecting India's ambitions. It provides insights into policies that need revisiting if New Delhi were to galvanize its global ambitions into matching outcomes.

A Muscular Manifesto

During the 2014 election campaign the *Bharatiya Janata* Party (BJP) produced a manifesto of lofty intent. It did not pronounce much on foreign affairs, but nevertheless threw important light on the BJP's foreign policy agenda. But while intent can be inspirational it is outcomes that are transformative. This pragmatic realization was built into the manifesto, a document promising action, with unfussy confidence.

The manifesto asked questions of the world order that had fairly failed to accommodate India. This articulated a dominant grain of thinking among the Indian elite, still smarting from historical wrongs against the nation. True to the BJP's ideological moorings, the manifesto drew upon pride in the past, and celebrated idioms that Indians have internalized through centuries. The assertion that India should lead the world, rather than merely balancing leading world players, was true to the BJP's character:

> "BJP believes a resurgent India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India's global strate-

gic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvas." (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014, p. 39).

Certainly, the Narendra Modi government has anointed the Indian dream of a better life with ambition and energy. Although many see India as a power in the making the Modi government has put into place a policy framework that radiates India's diplomatic influence beyond its neighbourhood. To this end it has the effort to show. In 2015 alone, Modi made 28 foreign visits. In a nation where good initiatives dissolve into indecision Modi was redrawing the map.

If India is to be a true great power it will need to shape outcomes of major international negotiations. At the end of the Second World War India was a mere witness to the creation of a new security architecture for the world, as decisions concerning India were made by the British. But India now is prepared to tilt outcomes in its favour, and lead in the negotiation of global covenants. Modi has understood this clearly, and has a vision of transforming India from a "balancer" to a "leader".

Together with its energetic diplomacy, Modi's India is willing to shoulder the responsibility of securing the global commons, an exercise full of pain and stumbles. This was demonstrated by humanitarian relief operations in Yemen and Nepal, and in India's continuing lead in UN peacekeeping operations. India threw itself into the frontlines in keeping the maritime commons safe and secure, and in global negotiations, such as on climate change. In the neighbourhood, India took a lead role in shaping events, such as the resolution of the land boundary dispute with Bangladesh, which had eluded solution since 1971. This was pre-emption, not reaction. For sure, previous governments had set some of these shifts in motion, but Modi has been decisive in taking the new approach forward.

Connecting Diplomacy with Development

Following the violent and debilitating Partition, India had little choice than to pursue an inward-looking foreign policy. But it was clear to the nation's founding fathers that foreign partners were needed for India's economic transformation. This has been at the centre of India's foreign policy ever since independence. India has pursued this objective with particular vigour after the economic reforms of 1991. The process has been further energized under Modi, and indeed is at the core of his diplomatic outreach.

At his election in 2014, Modi announced the goal of 8.5 per cent economic growth. In the year ending March, 2016 the Indian economy grew by 7.3 per cent, and is currently growing at 7.6 per cent. Over the next decade the government hopes to raise the share of manufacturing in the GDP from 17 to 25 per cent. How will Modi achieve these targets?

The agendas of Modi's foreign visits have carefully been orchestrated to meet economic objectives. From foreign partners he has sought pledges for billions of dol-

lars of investments in manufacturing and infrastructure, notably from the U.K., Germany, France, Japan and the UAE. The government has coupled diplomacy and development in a turn towards quantifiable outcomes. This is understandable in a democracy, because only enlarging manufacturing can provide jobs to India's ever-burgeoning number of youth. Otherwise, India will be in for social turbulence, a point Modi well understands.

Modi's frenetic visits abroad add urgency to an old objective. His diplomatic forays have focussed on the search for technology, resources and best practice. India's diplomats are tasked to shape outcomes, helping the nation's course towards prosperity, and persuade foreign partners to get involved in India's development. This includes visible symbolic actions that have a transformative effect on existing relationships[1].

Culture and Soft Power

The other pole in this multi-pronged approach is culture. Modi has brought the tenets and symbols of India's culture into the centre of India's diplomatic outreach. This is a continuation of India's charm offensive in recent years through its soft power approach to win friends across the world. It is again worth quoting from the BJP's election manifesto:

> "India has long failed to duly appreciate the full extent and gamut of its soft power potential. There is a need to integrate our soft power avenues into our external interchange, particularly, harnessing and focusing on the spiritual, cultural and philosophical dimensions of it." (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014, p. 40).

Thus, Modi was out to address a neglected area of diplomacy. There is a clear recognition here that India can gain strategic depth *vis a vis* its peers if it effectively uses its innate soft power position. India has always played a major role in international affairs, offering a range of ideas and interventions in the cultural and political domain. There is a need to integrate New Delhi's natural soft power aspects into its external interface. By harnessing such cultural resources Modi has reached out to the larger world.

But this soft power narration is also an alternate view of the world, which Modi has projected internationally. Indian civilization has had strategic thinkers like Kautilya who, in the 3rd century B.C.E., anticipated the Realist school of statecraft that the West was to take ownership of much later. Modi's India wants to offer a counter-narrative to the West-centric view of history and inter-state relations. With thou-

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1   During his visit to the U.K. in November, 2015 Modi visited the Jaguar Land Rover plant at Solihull, owned by India's Tata group. The intended message was that the relationship with the U.K., the former colonial power in India, had transformed. Now an ascendant India had become a player in the U.K.

sands of years of experience of building a civilization that is uniquely Indian, out of diverse creeds and memories, India has something lofty to offer to the world, in the creation of a peaceable society with diverse elements. This is an idea that the Modi government has seized. As the BJP manifesto states:

> "We will build a strong, self-reliant and self-confident India, regaining its rightful place in the comity of nations. In this, we will be firstly guided by our centuries old tradition of *Vasundhey Kutumbakam*." (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014, p. 40)[2].

The best example of India's harnessing of soft power to achieve diplomatic objectives is the commemoration of the first ever International Day of Yoga. With breathtaking speed the government got 177 of the 193 Member States of the United Nations to co-sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly in September, 2014 on commemorating the International Day of Yoga on June 21. The other example is the promotion of Nalanda University as an international partnership.

In Modi's India economic diplomacy and soft power objectives have been pursued in parallel to create the sense of the glorious India that is not shy of harking on its past greatness. This is pictured through Indian idioms, with a clear message that India can draw upon its ample soft power resources[3]. It is not as if indigenous traditions were not put at the disposal of India's foreign policy mandarins in the past. But what is new is the sustained focus on this.

A New Web of Relationships

If garnering support for India's development has become a strategic objective of India's foreign policy, Modi's India has also put into place a persuasive geopolitical approach. Paragraphs on security cooperation, counter-terrorism and maritime security now feature in most joint statements. India's diplomatic outreach is being recast. The BJP manifesto referred to the creation of a "web of allies" (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014, p. 40), something unthinkable for non-aligned India not so long ago. But can India succeed in gaining strategic depth by creating partnerships at the international level?

To understand India's strategic objectives we need to revisit the primary goal of promoting the development of India. For prosperity, a peaceful environment is a strategic necessity. This is at the heart of the debate about India's security. Thus, protecting the territorial integrity of India and resetting relations with the major powers become key goals of India's foreign policy. One can foresee that this will continue into the next century. Consider that India is still a state in the making.

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2   "Vasundhey Kutumbakam" can be translated to mean: "the entire world is a family".

3   During a surprise visit to Pakistan in December, 2015 to greet Prime-Minister Nawaz Sharif on his birthday, Modi touched Sharif's mother's feet, a gesture drawn straight from Indian tradition. This was a combination of diplomacy and cultural expression, all at once.

Continuity or Change?

Do Modi's moves to connect diplomacy and development and put soft power in the diplomatic arsenal mark a departure from the foreign policy of the previous United Progressive Alliance government? Within the Indian policy community opinion on Modi's foreign policy is divided. Some argue that the there has been a fundamental shift in foreign policy, whereas others argue the opposite, that the changes are cosmetic and not transformative. The truth may lie in between.

Modi's two years in office show a high degree of continuity in foreign policy objectives: ensuring that the neighbourhood remains peaceful, secure and stable; securing inward foreign investment, and increasing India's influence. In clear-headed pragmatism Modi has enhanced the primacy of the neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean, as regional stability is a prerequisite for India's development. This explains the presence of all the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and Mauritius at Modi's swearing in as Prime-Minister in May, 2014.

Another example of continuity is the abandonment of the BJP's stated positions towards the U.S. and Pakistan, bringing them in line with that of the previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government. Modi vigorously worked for the implementation of the civil nuclear agreement with the U.S. Despite vowing in the election manifesto not to talk to Pakistan until India had satisfaction on terrorism, Modi has not shied away from dialogue with Pakistan.

Amid continuity a change in India's foreign policy is also discernible. In a new style, Modi's personalized diplomacy has an unconventional touch. Modi has shown a greater willingness than his predecessors to lead on solutions to global problems. He has pursued a more assertive policy towards China and Pakistan, and a vigorous policy towards the Indian Ocean. He has shown a greater willingness to engage the U.S. in a pragmatic give and take relationship. He has pursued a more strategic approach towards Afghanistan, and decoupled India's relationship with Israel from that with the Palestinians. He has put sustained focus on India's 'Act East Policy'.

Relocating Foreign Policy

Modi's personalized interactions with foreign leaders have been marked by welcome hugs for President Barrack Obama and President François Hollande, and a selfie with Chinese Prime-Minister Li Keqiang. Modi has won "rock star status" among the Indian diaspora through energetic outreach in public spaces. But the change goes beyond the optics. In shifting towards the role of "leader" rather than "balancer" in foreign affairs, Modi's India has demonstrated a new-found willingness to assume greater regional and international responsibilities.

With two nuclear-armed neighbours in occupation of its territory, India faces the toughest neighbourhood in the world. No other nation on the planet confronts the

security challenges that India does. This is a reality underappreciated if not ignored by the world's foreign policy and strategic communities. To deal with this formidable security challenge, Modi has sharpened India's diplomatic tools.

The Asia-Pacific

In response to China's growing maritime imprint in the Asia-Pacific, Modi has pursued a strong Indian Ocean policy, as well as combating maritime terrorism. In March, 2015, after decades, India unveiled a vision framework for the Indian Ocean. Going beyond the former Manmohan Singh government's policy of being a "net security provider" to Indian Ocean island states, the Indian Navy has released a revised maritime security strategy, *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy*. This expands the areas of India's "maritime interest," speaks of three carrier battle groups, and emphasizes the importance of freedom of navigation and strengthening of international maritime legal regimes, particularly UNCLOS (Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, 2015). In the next decade the navy seeks a force of 200 ships.

The United States

In response to Chinese assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, there is a growing convergence of views between India and the U.S. on the security and diplomatic architecture of the region. A joint statement issued during President Obama's visit to India in January, 2015 states: "We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flights throughout the region, especially the South China Sea." (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015).

In further signals to China, there were direct references to the South China Sea in the India-U.S. joint statement of September, 2014, and during Modi's visits to Japan in 2014 and South Korea in 2015. The burgeoning relationship with Japan and Australia, India's new strategic partners, and the U.S. "rebalance" in Asia are complementary poles in India's Asia-Pacific strategy. There also seems to have been a breakthrough in the implementation of the civil nuclear agreement of 2008 with the U.S. A second ten-year defence framework agreement, providing for technology transfers and the co-production of arms in India, has been concluded (Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Partnership, 2015).

This clear-headed approach, ending decades of political ambivalence towards the U.S., is a departure from the previous government's policy, when the U.S. characterization of India as a "lynchpin" of its Asia-Pacific strategy was publicly refuted by New Delhi. With the resetting of relations with the U.S., Modi has created more space for manoeuvre in dealing with China.

China

Never in history did India have a great power like China on its borders. In the past India has avoided an assertive posture towards China, relying on a combination of diplomacy and strategic capacity-building to stabilize the relationship. But compared to his predecessors, Modi has demonstrated a greater firmness in dealing with China, while simultaneously seeking stronger business ties.

During the election campaign Modi made an implicit reference to China's "mindset of expansion" (Gottipati, 2014) and, in a policy departure, Tibet's Prime Minister-in-exile was invited to Modi's swearing in. Modi responded robustly to a Chinese border incursion in Chumar during President Xi Jinping's visit to India. He publicly raised the border dispute and brought up Beijing's relationship with India's neighbours with the Chinese leadership. After the Permanent Court of Arbitration pronounced on the dispute between China and the Philippines on the South China Sea, India, while not taking a stand on the dispute, nevertheless issued a statement on the need to uphold UNCLOS, implicitly recognising the court's ruling in favour of the Philippines[4].

The same confidence was evident during the negotiations on India's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in June, 2016. Modi went ahead with the push for membership without guarantee of success, amid fear that China would stymie the move. That is what happened, and China was forced to take a stand. China was seen as a spoiler, and the setback for India was turned into an opportunity to showcase India's ambition in the face of Chinese opposition[5].

India and China engage, cooperate and compete simultaneously. Even as China has become India's largest trading partner India is mindful that China will resist the rise of a peer competitor. Boundary negotiations have reached a point where political will on both sides is required for a solution. The chances of a border conflict are low, but skirmishes cannot be ruled out. Modi understands the complexities of the relationship, and has dealt with China with candour and realism.

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4   The Ministry of External Affairs statement read: "As a State Party to the UNCLOS, India urges all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans". See "Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea under Annexure VII of UNCLOS," July 12th, 2016, Ministry of External Affairs [online], available at http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement+on+Award+of+Arbitral+Tribunal+on+South+China+Sea+Under+Annexure+VII+of+UNCLOS.

5   Vikas Swarup, the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, stated: "We understand that despite procedural hurdles persistently raised by one country, a three hour long discussion took place last night on the issue of future participation in the NSG. An overwhelming number of those who took the floor supported India's membership and appraised India's application positively". See "Spokesperson's comments on NSG Plenary meeting in Seoul," June 24th, 2016, Ministry of External Affairs [online], available at http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/26950/Spokespersons_comments_on_NSG_Plenary_meeting_in_Seoul.

Pakistan

India's complex relationship with Pakistan has oscillated between dialogue and rupture. The issues bedevilling the relationship are far from solution, amid an on-off dialogue. Because the strategic balance has slowly moved in India's favour, Pakistan has resorted to sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare against India. Since the 1990s Pakistan has adopted terrorism as policy, but this has been the period when India has achieved success in building national strength. Given Pakistan's internal problems India has poor policy options towards Pakistan. Neither dialogue nor suspension of dialogue have worked, so India has had to contain and manage the relationship.

It is in this strategic advance-retreat setting that Modi has hardened India's Pakistan policy, while simultaneously engaging Pakistan. This has been criticized as being contradictory, inconsistent and as absence of policy. But it is a function of the limited options India has on Pakistan.

Following differences on the agenda and programme for the Pakistani National Security Advisor's visit, India cancelled talks between the foreign secretaries in August, 2014, and between the national security advisors in 2015. India's response to firing across the international border and line of control in Jammu and Kashmir became more forceful. Each side accused the other of cross-border terrorism, and India made talks contingent upon an end to terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.

For Modi, terrorism remains the core of the agenda for engagement with Pakistan, which pursues a partisan counter-terrorism policy. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the chief of the anti-India *Lashkar e Tayabba*, remains free, with a specious claim to heading a charitable organization. Despite suspected links to the attacks in Pathankot, *Jaish e Mohammed* chief Maulana Masood Azhar is free. Zakiur-Rehman Lakhvi, *Lashkar e Tayabba*'s Chief of Operations and the prime accused in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, was released on bail after spending six years in prison, on the ground of lack of evidence provided by India, something India contests.

Yet, in a departure from the BJP's earlier position that there can be no talks without an end to terrorism, Modi has continued to engage Pakistan. Actually, he has reversed the suspension of official-level talks in January, 2013 by Prime-Minister Manmohan Singh for ceasefire violations across the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. Modi and Prime-Minister Nawaz Sharif held talks at Modi's inauguration in New Delhi in May, 2014, and on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Ufa, Russia in July, 2015 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015a). After another policy reversal it was agreed that "talks on terror" – led by the two National Security Advisors – and talks between the two Foreign Secretaries on all other issues, including Kashmir, would be held back-to-back.

In pursuance of these decisions, official-level talks were held at Bangkok in December, 2015 after three years. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Islam-

abad in December, 2015, when the two sides decided to begin a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. In the same month Modi visited Lahore to greet Nawaz Sharif on his birthday. After being put on a pause following the Pathankot terror attack, Foreign Secretary talks were held in April, 2016. The two national security advisors have maintained contact, and the chiefs of the two border forces have met to calm border tension.

But all this is about process rather than outcome. The question is whether the centrist Modi government can find the cover of a tough public posture sufficient to deliver a pragmatic give and take, something that eluded the centre-left Congress government.

Modi has also moved the relationship with Afghanistan in a strategic direction. In January, 2016, for the first time, India has supplied offensive weaponry to the Afghan Air Force. The modest supply of three MI-25 ground attack helicopters is not a force multiplier, but marks a significant policy departure, to Pakistan's chargin (Panda, 2016). More transfers of equipment are likely, but India has not sent military instructors or troops.

Modi has also modified the calibrated policy of the previous government towards Israel and Palestine. The government changed the policy of issuing statements of support for the Palestinians over the conflict in Gaza, which resumed in July, 2014, adopting a position of neutrality, and calling for peace talks. Similarly, in a departure from support for the Palestinians in the UN, in May, 2015, India abstained from voting on an application by a Palestinian non-governmental organization for special consultative status in a UN committee (Singh, 2015). India abstained on a UN Human Rights Commission resolution that condemned Israel over a July, 2014 UN report on violence in Gaza.

In September, 2014 Modi and Israeli Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met on the margins of the UN General Assembly at New York. The first visit of an Israeli defence minister to India took place in February, 2015. While in the past India had avoided high-level visits to Israel, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Israel in October, 2015. Modi is expected to make the first ever visit by an Indian prime minister to Israel later in 2016.

A similar change is discernible in Modi's policy towards the Asia Pacific. At independence India leaned on the West for nation-building. Asia took a back seat as the West became the main source of technology and capital. With the end of the Cold War India began to search for new partnerships with a rising East, led by China. The outcome was the 'Look East Policy'. Ironically, the shift from 'Look East Policy' to 'Act East Policy' is India's response to China's actions in India's periphery.

Modi has pursued the 'Act East Policy' with vigour, and brought India's maritime past into the equation. As the BJP's manifesto states:

"India was reckoned not only as Vishwaguru but also a vibrant trading society. Our ancestors used to trade with foreign nations through the routes of sea, centuries ago. This was based on the strength of our business acumen and integrity, our products and crafts." (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014, p. 40).

Thus, Modi's approach towards foreign affairs marks a change both in substance and style. In a world transforming, as India gains a foothold on the top table, Modi's confident and forthright foreign policy can be reckoned a policy adjustment to India's growing internal strength.

Conclusion

The simultaneous rise of China and India as major world economies is one of the major geopolitical developments of the age. The fact that China is ahead of India shapes India's positions towards its northern neighbour. India sometimes has to concede to China on issues it cannot confront head on, in pragmatic side-stepping. For example, the Asia Industrial Investment Bank and the New Development Bank of BRICS are headquartered in Beijing and Shanghai, not in New Delhi or Mumbai, because China is the stronger economy. Similarly, India pursues a less involved policy than the U.S. in the South China Sea. India will not join the U.S. in countering China's assertiveness in its periphery, but will build limited partnerships to dissuade China from undermining India's core interests. The fact is that China has more stakes than the U.S. in dominating Asia.

Such a posture looks like a slippery moral path, but diplomacy has to be administered in workable doses. Modi understands the limitations of Indian power, but challenges China when he can, to force it to put its cards on the table. Yet, while China remains a challenge, it is also a partner in the transformation of India.

The fact that India's foreign and security policies are 'enablers' in the transformation of India is now well understood among thinking Indians. In that sense, by getting tied to domestic policy, which receives greater scrutiny among the people, foreign policy has woven itself into the people's consciousness. But policies can take an unpredictable course, and the question remains whether Modi can see through his foreign policy initiatives into the remaining years of his term which ends in 2019.

The related issue is that of results. India's foreign policy is leaning towards pragmatism. Its diplomats have the tools and skills of persuasion, but lack the numbers. Even if they had the numbers, governance is far from being a solo flight. Diplomats can be the harbingers of India's economic transformation but this has to be a collaborative effort between different arms of government. India's diplomats can bring the horse to the river but cannot make it drink the water. They can create the opportunity but outcomes are determined by a different set of actors. The challenge

before Modi's India is to bring all those in the field in step with international standards of governance, with the requirements of the 21ˢᵗ century.

International support for India's development may in itself be a strategic goal of India's foreign policy, but energizing the conduct of India's foreign relations cannot only be a top down effort. Bringing all stakeholders on board is easier said than done as it involves painful reforms in governance. In this sense there is a disconnection between diplomacy and development. It is better, therefore, to set modest goals and be able to attain them, rather than entertaining grandiose objectives, only to see them unfulfilled. As Modi approaches the middle of his term, the time has come to address this issue.

India is being recast internationally. In the years after independence, following the after effects of Partition, the Indian state was weak. Strategic thinking was thus security-oriented, with a singular avoidance of entanglements, to protect the borders and derive maximum benefit from the superpowers. In the twenty first century India is at the centre of the international security architecture. It is also key to the economic and technological debates of the age. By dint of its economic growth, its innovative spacefaring, and its contributions from medicine to information technology, India has become indispensable to global needs and a shaper of the world economy, not just as a market, but also as an engine of growth and of ideas.

It would not thus be far-fetched to say that the future of the world will be affected by what India does. Take the example of terrorism. With swathes of humanity embittered in nihilistic rage, terrorism is at the centre of international discourse. That is why Modi talks of terrorism as a global problem. Today the world speaks of 9/11 and Mumbai's 26/11 in the same breath, and, as a major victim of terrorism, India becomes a natural partner in fighting this menace. The world cannot go it alone without India. Similarly, on the emission of greenhouse gases and climate change, what India does affects the rest of the world. This, ultimately, is the platform on which Modi has recast India's diplomatic agenda on a more ambitious scale.

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Navigating Through Unchartered Waters:
Impact of 'Brexit' on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy – Who Loses and Who Wins?

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Abstract

This paper assesses the possible consequences of 'Brexit' on the European Union's foreign, security and defence policy. This prospective exercise is focused on four major topics: the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) foreign policies; UK and United States (U.S.) relations; the future developments of Common Security and Defence Policy; and the new balance of power within the EU. At least for now, the outcome of this divorce will result in a negative sum game. Despite the consequences of the UK's departure on foreign and security domains being relatively marginal in contrast with other aspects of the UK-EU relationship, such as those of a financial and economic nature, it is crucial to anticipate the possible effects, most particularly the long-term ones produced by the new correlation of forces within the Union created by 'Brexit', which at this stage are difficult to fully assess.

Resumo
Navegando por Mares Desconhecidos: O Impacto do 'Brexit' na Política Externa e de Segurança da União Europeia – Quem Perde e Quem Ganha?

Este artigo avalia as possíveis consequências do 'Brexit' no domínio da política externa, segurança e defesa da União Europeia (UE). Este exercício prospetivo centra-se em quatro temas principais: as políticas externas do Reino Unido (RU) e da UE; as relações do RU com os Estados Unidos; os futuros desenvolvimentos na Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa; e o novo equilíbrio de poder no seio da UE. Pelo menos por agora, o resultado do divórcio será de soma negativa. Apesar das consequências da partida do RU serem no domínio dos assuntos exteriores e da segurança relativamente marginais, quando comparadas com outros domínios das relações UE-RU, nomeadamente as de natureza económica e financeira, é fundamental tentar antecipar os possíveis efeitos, em particular os de longo prazo resultantes da nova correlação de forças no seio da União criada pelo 'Brexit', os quais são neste momento difíceis de avaliar na sua plenitude.

Introduction

On 23 June 2016, United Kingdom (UK) voters chose to leave the European Union (EU). Irrespective of the agreements to be negotiated in due course between the UK and the EU in different domains, which will help us to understand the terms of the new relations, it is important to assess the repercussions of the turbulence caused by the referendum and to analyse the possible consequences of that same decision. Most of the debates about the UK's departure are centered on the economic and financial consequences and tend to disregard other important domains such as those of foreign security and defence. The impact of 'Brexit' on these realms has not attracted media headlines as have others, but this does not mean they are minor issues, especially when as pertains to long term consequences. This article is a tentative contribution to fill this gap. The exit from the Union of its second largest economy, a net contributor, most important military power (possessing nuclear armament), a G8 member and a United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Permanent member will have consequences that we will try to anticipate, based on the information available at the time this article was written (August 2016).

This prospective exercise is focused on four major topics: UK and EU foreign policies; UK and United States (U.S.) relations; future developments of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); and the new balance of power within the Union and its geopolitical repercussions.

Some analysts argue that the consequences of the UK departure on foreign and security areas might be relatively marginal in contrast with other aspects of the UK-EU relationship (Whitman, 2016a). In the short term, we would tend to agree with them. At least for now, the outcome of this divorce will result in a negative sum game: both sides have clearly lost although not dramatically or catastrophically. In the long term, however, we cannot dismiss the geopolitical effects produced by the new correlation of forces within the Union created by 'Brexit', which at this stage, might be difficult to fully grasp.

'Brexit' and UK and European Union Foreign Policy

We will first examine the impact of 'Brexit' from the UK perspective and then that of the EU. In the case of the latter, we will focus on the possible consequences it might have on the EU's ambition to become a global player. Due to its importance, UK relations with the U.S. will be treated separately in the following section. At this stage, it is important to underline the qualitative difference that characterize relations between the UK, the EU and the U.S. While in the case of the latter, the UK played, and continues to play a follower's role with a subordinate status; in the case of the former, the UK enjoyed a rather different status of *primus inter pares*. Its voice was both heard and conditioned the strategic decisions of the Union; the UK was a

power broker with a veto power, capable of thwarting decisions that could nega-
tively affect its national interests.

Many analysts tend to agree that with the withdrawal from the Union, the UK will
become a less relevant diplomatic player and the EU will become weaker, with its
defense and foreign policy seriously impaired (Bosoni, 2016; De Wall, 2016; Heis-
bourg, 2016; Howorth, 2015, Keohane, 2015; Knigge, 2016). There is a wide consen-
sus among pundits that with the exit, the UK is going to lose influence and maneu-
vering capacity in the international arena. The UK's exit will not improve its posi-
tion in the international system. The possession of nuclear weapons and its perma-
nent membership status at the U.N. Security Council are foreign policy assets which
speak for themselves and contribute to the prominent status London enjoys inter-
nationally. However, one cannot ignore the crucial contribution that the close rela-
tionship the UK has maintained and nurtured with the U.S. and Europe have given
towards its international recognition. From now on, the UK's international rele-
vance is going to be very much dependent on the interests and moods of the U.S.
and, as stated before, it will hinge on a superior-inferior relationship, which is far
from being an equal partner rapport, despite the so-called post-world war II "spe-
cial relations" established between the U.S. and the UK.

With the withdrawal from the Union, the UK has lost the possibility to use its
member state's status to enhance its international influence, and to leverage and
amplify its national foreign and security policy objectives (Whitman, 2016a). For
instance, due to 'Brexit', the decoupling of Britain from numerous EU-led peace
and development initiatives and the renegotiation of dozens of trade deals, will
leave London with a fraction of the influence it currently wields in Africa (De
Waal, 2016).

CSDP was a very convenient arrangement for the UK; it was a multilateral frame-
work that provided excellent opportunities for its foreign policy. It considerably
augmented the UK's capabilities to intervene and advance its national interests,
with fewer resources than if it had to act unilaterally. CSDP provided the UK with
the best of both worlds. On the one hand, the UK enjoyed the freedom to act inde-
pendently where it chose and to act collaboratively and leverage common resources
where it preferred (Whitman, 2016a)[1]; and, on the other hand, it facilitated the coor-
dination of its bilateral and multilateral cooperation policies.

We wonder whether the UK has the means and skills to reach out on its own to
certain regions of the globe as it used to do through the CSDP. This question is
superbly answered in the Review of the Balance of Competences (thereinafter "the
Review"), an audit carried out by the UK government on what the EU does and

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1   The wording of the original text is in the present tense.

affects (positively or negatively) the UK[2]. As "the Review" concluded, the EU's wider geographical coverage permits the UK to reach countries that it could not reach alone. Quoting from the report: "The close alignment of UK and EU development objectives, and the EU's perceived political neutrality and global influence, mean the EU can act as a multiplier for the UK's policy priorities and influence" (H.M. Government, 2013, p. 6)[3]. The report is also candid about the possible consequences if the opposite happens. As underlined in the Foreign Policy Annex of "the Review":

> "It is…in the UK's interests to work through the EU in foreign policy. The benefits come from: greater influence with non-EU powers, derived from Britain's position as a leading EU country; the international weight of the EU's single market, including its power to deliver commercially beneficial trade agreements; the reach and magnitude of EU's financial instruments, including for development and economic partnerships; the range and versatility of the EU's tools, as compared with those at the disposal of other international organizations; and the EU's perceived political neutrality, which enables it to act in some cases where other countries or international organizations might not be able to" (Whitman, 2016b).

The EU's strategies, such as the Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, the Sahel Strategy, and the Strategy for the Horn of Africa, among other frameworks of cooperation were also important forums for the UK's intervention under a multilateral hat. Some European services have expertise and presence in parts of the Islamic world, notably North Africa and the Sahel region where the prospects of a UK standalone intervention were and still are very grim. With the 'Brexit' all these opportunities will be lost.

Therefore, the withdrawal from the EU will have a direct effect on UK's international ambitions. Its willingness to be a strategic actor "with global reach and influence" as underlined in the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review* 2015 (SDSR) will be seriously affected[4]. The EU was an important instrument to achieve that goal. After the departure, the UK would probably remain a significant military power, but it would certainly become a much-diminished diplomatic player (Keohane, 2016)[5].

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2   The Review is an official unbiased document that helps us understanding the consequences of 'Brexit'. Interesting to note that many arguments put forward by the document coincide with ours.

3   This excerpt of the report was also mentioned by Whitman (2016b).

4   The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 was published by the British government on 23 November 2015. This document sets out UK's National Security Strategy for the coming five years, and explains how it will be implemented.

5   The *'Brexiteers'* called for a back to the past, as if it was possible to re-awaken its old empire from the ashes, like a phoenix. Some 'Brexit' supporters argued with the need to reinvigorate the Commonwealth, and use it as a launch pad to regain the influence in international affairs

Other obvious consequences of 'Brexit' is the UK's self-exclusion from the EU deci-
sion-making process, thereby losing its ability to influence Brussels' policies on a
wide range of issues, namely foreign policy in light of the key role that the UK
plays. The capability to shape EU strategic decisions may likely wane as well as its
ability to set the CSDP agenda. Furthermore, one ought to consider that 'Brexit' will
not mean the UK's complete departure from the security landscape of Europe.
Geography is not going to change. For economic and political reasons, the United
Kingdom and the European Union will maintain close ties after 'Brexit'. From now
on, whether the UK likes it or not it will have to continue cooperating with CSDP,
but as an external partner. This might involve the negotiation of a special status for
the UK within the European Union security project. But regardless of the status or
arrangement the UK will negotiate within the CSDP framework, it is going to be
worse than the one UK has enjoyed so far as member of the EU.

Looking at 'Brexit' from the EU's foreign, security and defence policy perspective,
with particular emphasis on its geopolitical impact and global strategy, it is obvious
that it will greatly damage the EU's already-struggling defense policy and, by
extension, its foreign policies (Keohane, 2015). The net effect is likely to be a smaller
and less ambitious Union (Renard, 2015).

It is evident that the exit of the most powerful member of the Union (militarily
speaking), with the most prepared armed forces, the biggest spender in defence
and owner of the most capable military expeditionary forces, in addition to the fact
of possessing nuclear armament and membership of the U.N. Security Council, will
reduce the EU's capacity to operate on a global scale. 'Brexit' is going to produce a
negative effect on the EU's ambition to become a relevant player in international
politics. In the years ahead only France may equal Britain's international presence;
so far, Germany has been reluctant when it comes to adopting a prominent military
role. With the 'Brexit' affair things may change.

The first immediate victim of 'Brexit' was the Global Strategy for the European
Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), presented on 28 June 2016 by Federica
Mogherini, the High Representative, to the European Council, a few days after the
referendum[6]. The plan was conceived with the UK [7]. Although the presentation to

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UK had, once boosting the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and transforming it into an
EU competitor is out of question. On this issue and the possibility of UK becoming a member
of the EFTA, see Kitwood (2016).

6   The European Council's meeting communiqué refers to the EUGS only in a very short para-
graph empty of meaning: "welcomes the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European
Union's Foreign and Security Policy by the High Representative and invites the High Repre-
sentative, the Commission and the Council to take the work forward" (European Council,
2016); nothing else was added, let alone a single remark or comment on the 'Brexit'.

7   It is important to note the dismissive behavior of UK representatives in the preparation of the
EUGS illustrates the importance given by the British political and military circles to the subject.

the Council kept the initial wording, in a business as usual posture, everyone in the room was well aware that the document was already outdated before being submitted to their consideration. Without the UK, the CSDP's level of ambition in terms of Europe's role in the world has to be reassessed and significantly downgraded.

Looking east, 'Brexit' also raised questions about the EU's future relationship with Russia. Poland and the Baltic states also saw the UK as a critical partner on issues related to Russia, since London has fought for a tough European stance against Moscow, in response to its annexation of Crimea (Bosoni, 2016). With the UK's departure, we should not exclude a more pragmatic approach of the Union towards Russia leading to the lifting of sanctions. Even before the referendum, EU members such as Hungary, Greece and Slovakia had expressed their reservations about prolonging the sanctions, which affect their economies negatively. If, as a consequence of 'Brexit', sanctions are lifted Russia will be a winner.

'Brexit' and the UK Relations with the United States

The UK's engagement with CSDP has to be understood from the perspective of the UK and U.S.' special relationship[8]. The U.S. has been an active outsider of the European debate on a European identity; it has monitored, commented and interfered in the development of ESDP/CSDP as it has done in the majority of European joint endeavours irrespective of the matters at stake (Branco, 2000). Important segments of the American political elites consider the development and strengthening of CSDP as a geopolitical threat to U.S. interests. Washington has perceived it this way since its very inception: on the one hand, as an emergent centre of power that could compete with the U.S.' hegemonic global project and a challenge to its leadership; on the other, as an instrument that could endanger U.S. influence in Europe. The EU's defence integration has been one of the most disturbing themes for the American political elites. It could compete and challenge NATO's supremacy. In an article published by the Heritage Foundation, Luke Coffey (2013) voiced what many American policymakers think but do not dare to express out loud:

> "…Developments within the CSDP threaten to undermine transatlantic security cooperation between the U.S. and its European partners. Far from improving the military capabilities of European countries, the CSDP decouples the U.S. from European secu-

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The UK showed a permanent distance from the process and did not contribute to the debate. The assertiveness that usually characterizes the participation of UK representatives in EU decisions was this time replaced by detachment and lack of interest, always keeping a low profile in the "focal points" meetings. In addition to this, the UK did not promote any outreach event.

8   With the term "special relations", we refer to the expression used by Winston Churchill in 1946 to describe the exceptionally close political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, military and historical relations between the UK and the U.S.

rity and will ultimately weaken the NATO alliance. U.S. policymakers should watch CSDP developments closely and discourage the EU from deepening defense integration. It is clear that an EU Army is the ultimate goal of the CSDP…"

These worries were very well articulated (and underlined) by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in the so-called "three-Ds" approach, establishing the limits permitted by the U.S. to European integration: against De-coupling from NATO, Duplicating NATO's mandate, and Discriminating against NATO members which are not in the EU.

Privately, British officials [were] reject[ing] the idea of those in France and Germany who would seek to manipulate the vanguard group to assert a European defense identity both decoupled from the United States and NATO and signaling an institutionalized separation between the transatlantic allies (Vinocur, 2003). Mirroring the U.S. concerns, the UK was equally fearful of the development of a European autonomous military capacity that could challenge NATO primacy.

The U.S. policy towards CSDP envisioned balancing a fine line between encouraging the EU to gain capabilities, while discouraging it from developing different foreign policy goals from the U.S. The essence of the U.S. concerns can be summed up as wanting the EU to become more self-reliant, but not wanting the EU to be able to challenge its global leadership. There was also an economic reason behind the evolution of the U.S. stand towards European defence: the so-called burden sharing. In pragmatic terms, the U.S. wanted more European involvement in defence issues without losing the political control of the events. This drives the debate into a swampy ground, because it is very difficult to strike a fair balance between level of contribution and distribution of power.

Throughout the years, the U.S. strategic goal of keeping CSDP at bay has not changed[9], only tactics have altered, shifting from a clear opposition to support, modifying its posture according to the circumstances, always safeguarding that the European integration was not going to be strong enough to challenge U.S. global supremacy. The U.S. did everything it could to retain a permanent *droit de regard* on the developments of European security policy (Van Ham, 1997). This is where the UK enters, a EU prominent member state and a faithful ally to the U.S. From within the European institutional apparatus, the UK could assure that European defence integration would not go too far, and would be kept within certain – acceptable – boundaries, without stepping over any red line.

That is why the U.S. has always staunchly advocated Britain's EU membership. The UK withdrawal will undermine the long-term U.S. strategy, pursued by both

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9 This behaviour also applies to the CSDP predecessor initiates, such as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Democrat and Republican administrations over recent decades (Whitman, 2016b). Not surprisingly, President Barack Obama and other North American high dignitaries were vocal on the advantages of having the UK in the Union on several occasions. Obama's speech in England on the 22 April 2016 is quite illustrative[10]. As Knigge (2016) stated, "it ['Brexit'] represented a historic moment in a negative sense for American foreign policy". This is the reason why the U.S. might not be happy with the outcome of the referendum. Therefore, one might conclude that the U.S. may probably be added to the list of losers, at least for the time being. This issue leads to another key topic: once the UK's mission of putting European integration on the "right track" has lost its meaning, what could the UK offer the U.S. in terms of security and defence matters? (Howorth, 2016).

In the short term, the UK cooperation with the U.S. will neither cease nor suffer perceptible changes, namely in the intelligence domain[11], but in the medium and long term, London as an independent player is likely to have to push harder to demonstrate its continuing relevance [towards U.S.] (Inkster, 2016). The special relationship between the U.S. and the UK in the field of intelligence, nuclear cooperation and cutting-edge technology (such as stealth or submarine acoustics) would be compromised by Britain reverting to its pre-1975 status in Europe (Heisbourg, 2016)[12].

Finally, it is important to understand what could UK's role be in the future relationship between CSDP and NATO. The UK will be a non-player in such a crucial debate. The necessary recalibration of that relationship will take place with Paris, Berlin and Washington as active players and the UK as an increasingly bemused onlooker (Howorth, 2016).

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10 Excerpt of President Obama's speech "…Let me be clear. Ultimately, this is something that the British voters have to decide for themselves. But as part of our special relationship, part of being friends is to be honest and to let you know what I think. And speaking honestly, the outcome of that decision is a matter of deep interest to the United States because it affects our prospects as well. The United States wants a strong United Kingdom as a partner. And the United Kingdom is at its best when it's helping to lead a strong Europe. It leverages UK power to be part of the European Union…" (White House, 2016).

11 President Barack Obama said that the U.K. vote to leave the European Union would not change the "special relationship" the country has with the United States (Reilly, 2016).

12 It is interesting to read President Obama's speech delivered in a press conference held at the Foreign Office, warning that the UK would be at the "back of the queue" in any trade deal with the U.S. if the country chose to leave the EU, as he made an emotional plea to Britons to vote for staying in. This mood helps us to extrapolate what could be the U.S. reaction in other domains, as the ones referred to above (The Guardian, 2016).

Tossing a Stick into ESDP/CSDP Spokes

In 1998 (3-4 December), Prime Minister Tony Blair met with President Jacques Chirac at Saint-Malo, in France, to discuss the future of European security and defence. The outcome of that meeting gave an enormous boost to European defence integration. Most of the issues agreed would be later politically institutionalized in what would be called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and in its successor the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), through the Lisbon Treaty.

As mentioned above, the U.S. has consistently pressured the UK to become a full and active participant in all EU policy areas, including defence and security (Howorth, 2016). That was the fundamental reason why Tony Blair went to Saint-Malo, after one decade of an attitude [towards ESDP] ranging from skeptical to hostile, and a preference for a strong NATO and a continuing engagement of the U.S. in and for Europe (Jorgensen, 2015).

With the UK at the CSDP's steering wheel, the U.S. was seated in the first row overseeing and monitoring the developments of European defence integration. In line with U.S. geopolitical objectives and acting as their *lunga manus* inside the EU institutional apparatus, the UK tried everything it could to hamper the development and further consolidation of the CSDP, obstructing any attempt to build a credible European military capacity which in the long term could challenge NATO and the U.S. role in European security. The UK mobilized all assets at hand to hinder the creation of a European autonomous military capacity. We must admit that the UK performed that task superlatively.

Despite the important role that the UK played in the foundation of the CSDP, the latter has never been a core component of the UK security and defence planning for the years to come. Britain ceased to invest politically and military in the ESDP in any substantial manner from the Iraq crisis of 2002–03 onwards (Heisbourg, 2016). This course of dissociation from the CSDP turned into a permanent feature of UK's action by favouring bilateral cooperation with European countries, namely with France and Germany, which has been strengthened and intensified in detriment of the multilateral cooperation within the CSDP framework. In 2010, UK signed the Lancaster House treaties with France, an important bilateral agreement in the field of conventional and nuclear defence[13].

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13 The document with 11 pages and 17 articles signed in London, on 2 November 2010, entered into force on the 1 July 2011, and covered vast areas of cooperation between British and French Armed Forces, such as defence and security cooperation, nuclear stockpile stewardship, operational matters and industry and armaments. The Treaty is a bilateral initiative and does not have any formal link with CSDP. It does neither use the Lisbon Treaty's Permanent Structured Cooperation facility, nor involve the European Defence Agency. On further information on the Treaty see "Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation", at

The UK was able to be at the same time in and out of the CSDP, according to its convenience. But the UK's divorce from CSDP became crystal clear in the 2015 SDSR. CSDP is mentioned only once in the document, to underline that the EU has a range of capabilities, which can be complementary to those of NATO, and stress that UK will continue to foster closer coordination and cooperation between the EU and other institutions, principally NATO. On the operational strand, the UK has given priority to its commitments with NATO in detriment of other international/regional organisations[14]. London has been a modest contributor to the CSDP military operations, preferring to participate in the EU's civilian missions, such as border observation and capacity-building, among others.

Using its veto prerogatives, the UK has blocked the concretion of strategic decisions whose implementation could deepen and widen European security integration, thus insuring that these developments were not going to undermine NATO. Along these lines, and voicing the U.S. position, the UK strongly opposed the French-German initiative to create an operational planning headquarters for the EU, separated from NATO, a project whose materialization would be a bone in the US Government's throat. That headquarters would give ESDP/CSDP the capability to exercise political control and strategic direction of the war.

One can mention many other examples of the UK's fierce opposition to further European security integration: the deepening and widening of a European defence industry, the development of permanent structured cooperation in defence (PSCD)[15], or the enhancement of intelligence cooperation.

One of UK's goals was to avoid the development of a single European defence industry that could compete with that of the U.S. and impede this project from gaining momentum. This was valid for the U.S. and on a different scale also for the UK, considering the dimension and economic importance of its defence industry. The UK defence industry is the fifth in the world and London has the sixth largest military budget. According to the SDSR 2015:

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https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238153/8174.pdf.

14 According to SDSR 2015, paragraph 5.12: "…We are making our defence policy and plans international by design…We will place more emphasis on being able to operate alongside our allies, including in the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, and NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force which the UK will lead in 2017…"

15 The Lisbon Treaty introduced the possibility for certain EU countries to strengthen their cooperation in military matters by creating permanent structured cooperation (PSCD). Thus PSCD should enable participating Member States (PMS) to increase at a quicker pace than at present their national level of ambition in terms of deployability and sustainability. In other words PMS will be able to field more capabilities for the full range of operations in all frameworks in which they engage (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010).

"…the defence and security industries manufacture make a major contribution to
UK's prosperity. In the UK, they employ over 215.000 people, predominantly highly
skilled, and support a further 150.000. In 2014, these industries had a collective turn-
over of over £30 billion, including defence and security export orders worth £11.9
billion. Half of all firms in the sector expect to grow by at least 10% over the next year.
The security sector, in particular, has grown on average five times faster than the rest
of the UK economy since 2008…" (SDSR, para. 6.49).

These reasons explain, at least partially, why the UK obstructed, for instance, the
increase of the European Defence Agency budget[16].

To be credible, CSDP needs to be backed by a strong defence industrial and techno-
logical base, a fundamental premise for the development of a competitive industry
capable of producing top quality military equipment at competitive prices. That
requires economies of scale. The UK's participation in this joint venture was indis-
pensable to provide those much needed economies of scale for the European Defence
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) weapons production. Without the UK the
plans for setting up the EDTIB needs must be reassessed and become less ambitious.

The Defence industry was a domain where losses weighed more on the European
side. 'Brexit' will have little or no impact on the UK's defence industry. However, it
will undermine the emergence of a competitive and strategically autonomous
EDTIB, which, in turn, risks undermining the future "security of supply" of defence
equipment sourced from within Europe (Utley and Wilkinson, 2016); it will [also]
increase the danger of EU states becoming irreversibly dependent on U.S. imports
to meet their future national defence and security needs in core capability areas
(Utley and Wilkinson, 2016).

Intelligence cooperation was another domain where UK obstructions were instru-
mental in blocking meaningful developments. Thanks to the UK, the Lisbon Treaty
did not consider intelligence as an area of cooperation[17] making it explicitly clear
that Europe has no competence in matters of security[18]. These issues should be kept
as national prerogatives. Naturally, the UK could keep the upper hand in intelli-
gence matters, once it enjoyed competitive advantages provided by the special rela-
tions it holds with the U.S. in this field[19].

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16 On this issue see, for instance, Maulny (2016), "…Les Britanniques, qui refusent d'augmenter
    le budget de l'Agence, sont responsables de l'atonie de cette organisation…L'incapacité des
    trois grands Etats, la France, l'Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni à s'accorder sur un rôle ambitieux
    pour cette structure a fait le reste…".

17 Article 3a, No 1: In accordance with Article 3b, competences not conferred upon the Union in
    the Treaties remain with the Member States.

18 Article 3a, No 2: National security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.

19 We mean, the UK's close cooperation with the U.S. through the National Security Agency (NSA),
    one of the most important intelligence organisations of the United States, and the Government

'Brexit' will also have financial consequences. The CSDP budget will shrink due to lack the UK contributions, and it is not foreseeable that other Member States will be able to fill that gap. This will have an immediate and adverse impact on CSDP outreach activities. In practical terms, it means, for instance, less money for development programmes and missions in Africa[20].

Despite the UK's lack of commitment to the CSDP, the EU has, ironically, lost the best military capacities it had at its disposal. Without the UK, the EU is going to have less deterrent capabilities. The CSDP's ambition in terms of defence will suffer a significant blow.

With the UK out, doors are now open for new developments in the CSDP. The "spoiler" cannot mingle any longer, and new opportunities for speeding up defence integration may occur. As we will demonstrate later, this might have already started.

A New Balance of Power in the European Union and Its Repercussions
The New Balance of Power

As demonstrated above, 'Brexit' will change the UK and the EU status in the world and will contribute to the reshaping of European geopolitics. In fact, the UK's exit is going to unequivocally transform the existing balance of power within the Union. Complementary to the key aspects referred to earlier, the most important and dramatic consequence coming out of 'Brexit' is of a geopolitical nature: there will be a new balance of power in Europe and the EU will have to rethink its role in the world (Bosoni, 2016).

For better or for worse, the UK has played an important role in the pre-'Brexit' *status quo*. Functioning as a hinge between Germany and France, in the past the UK played a crucial role in the EU's internal balance of power. On the one hand, Germany relied on Britain's backing when it came to promoting free trade in the face of France's protectionist tendencies; on the other hand, France saw Britain not only as a key defense partner but also a potential counterweight to German influence (Bosoni, 2016). With the exit of the UK, one cannot discard the likelihood of an initiative led by the most powerful Member States, who will feel tempted to fill the power *vacuum* left by the UK and use it as an opportunity to grab control and take over positions in the EU establishment.

Seminatore (2016) proposes three post-'Brexit' possible forms of governance in the EU, all conceived around the emergence of a core group of Member States: an "hard executive" group originating in an imperfect duopoly, asymmetric and elastic,

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Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the most important British Intelligence organisation that works side by side with the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).

20　On the impact of the 'Brexit' in Africa, see, for instance, De Waal (2016).

comprising a two-member power center – a director and a legitimizer –, with different resources and capabilities, coordinating their actions and dividing influence (Germany and France); a "soft executive" encompassing a flexible unipolar center, predominantly German, acting on a permanent logic of compromise; and a "flexible executive" with a weak decision power or a power weakened by internal coalition games of flexible formats (Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Spain). From the political legitimacy perspective, the first form will be an oligarchy, the second an autocracy and the third a polyarchy.

On 25 June 2016, two days after the referendum was held, two meetings took place in Berlin. The first, gathering the six founding members of the EU, and the second between the foreign affairs ministers of France and Germany, with the purpose of examining the results of the British polls and to discuss the way ahead, excluding the other Member States of the Union from such a crucial debate.

The communiqué that came out of the German-French meeting underlines the responsibility that Germany and France reserve themselves to reinforce the solidarity and cohesion within the EU (bilateral meetings might not be the most appropriate way to reach that goal) [21]. It is clear in the Communiqué the enhanced role those two countries are determined to play from now on in the Union.

France and Germany emphasized the fact that Member States differ in their levels of ambition when it comes to the project of European integration: "While not stepping back from what we [Member States of the EU] have achieved, we have to find better ways of dealing with different levels of ambition so as to ensure that Europe delivers better on the expectations of all European citizens"[22]. The repetition throughout the text of terms like "flexibility" and "different levels of ambition" denounces the veiled willingness of those two Member States to reorganize the Union around a "core Europe".

This would mean a different European Union comprising two groups of Member Sstates with different levels of ambition participating at different speeds, an idea already voiced on several occasions in the past. In other words, it would mean a small group, led by Germany, dictating the rules to other Member States.

If Europe is inclined to follow the course suggested above, bearing in mind the visible signs already displayed by the strategic positioning of certain Member States – the creation of an informal core group with additional prerogatives in the decision-making process, sidelining the remaining countries – then Germany and France will have their positions enhanced. The small member states who do not

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21 Ayrault and Steinmeier (2016). Thereinafter the Communiqué, page 1: "…France and Germany recognise their responsibility to reinforce solidarity and cohesion within the European Union…".

22 Communiqué, page 1.

have the possibility to join that core group/directorate will augment the list of losers. At this stage we cannot assess the dimension of the loss. This will depend on how far their exclusion from strategic decisions will go, especially those affecting – either directly or indirectly – their vital interests.

In this new centripetal development, regardless of the formality/informality it may assume, the EU as a whole will also be a loser. It will be difficult for the heads of State and Government of certain Member States to explain to their constituencies why they remain in an association where their voices will not be heard (or heard in a quieter tone) and their national interests not duly taken into account. If the situation becomes harsher to the smaller countries, the temptation to follow the UK's example may increase, thus leading to the possible disintegration of the EU or, alternatively, to a cooperative formula considerably different from the one that exists today.

The weakening of the EU will open up space for the affirmation of sub-regional arrangements, such as the Weimar[23] and the Visegrad[24] groups. In a very short period of time several meetings of these groups have taken place. The first took place in July, when the Visegrad Group Member States met to assess the referendum's impact on the four countries that comprise that association and to discuss proposals for EU restructuring[25]. Rather than further integration, those countries supported a more intergovernmental European Union and are wary of further integration. One still has to understand if that concern includes the foreign and defence and security domains.

It is also important to note the meaning of the intense diplomatic activity carried out by German Chancellor Angela Merkel holding successive meetings with the heads of many EU Members States[26], to coordinate ahead of the EU summit to be held in Bratislava (16 September) – the first since the British referendum –, in order to make it a display of European unity. That activity suggests a practice of "soft executive" form of governance.

The events that took place after 'Brexit' are strong indicators of the disruption occurring at the EU's power base, suggesting that the formation of a Directorate of nations is on the way and in full swing. Using Seminatore's taxonomy, one could

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23 France, Germany and Poland.

24 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

25 In a similar vein, the Greek Prime Minister Alexi Tsipras invited six Southern European countries for a meeting in early September, just days before the meetings of the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU to be held in Bratislava, also with the purpose of evaluating the impact of 'Brexit' on these countries.

26 Since 21 August, Chancellor Angela Merkel has met with the leaders of France, Italy, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

say that power re-alignments in the EU suggest a movement towards either the first
or the second form of governance, with an inclination to the second.

The Consequences of the New Balance of Power on EU Defence and Security

With a clarification on the re-alignment of forces in the EU, one is in a better condition to anticipate the consequences it may have on the European security and defence domains. Germany and France proposed in the two peers meeting – a rehearsal of a "new informal setting" framework? – held on 25 June 2016, a "European Security Compact", i.e. a pack of proposals encompassing all aspects of security and defence, many of them obstructed in the past by the UK. We will analyse the ones that merit a closer look. It is crucial to grasp what the implications of that "course of action" could be on EU security and defence.

Those two Member States proposed that the EU start conducting regular reviews of its strategic environment, supported by an independent situation assessment capability, with production of strategic and intelligence analysis approved at European level[27], and, in the medium term, to work towards a more integrated approach for EU internal security, based on the creation of a European platform for intelligence cooperation, fully respecting national prerogatives and using the current frameworks[28].

The Communiqué also proposed the setting up of a permanent civil-military chain of command with the justification that the EU needs to plan and conduct civil and military operations more effectively[29]. In addition to this, the document also: included a proposal to use a common fund for the employment of EU high-readiness forces; opened the door to willing states to establish permanent structured cooperation in defence initiatives or to push ahead to launch operations in a flexible manner; considered, if needed, the possibility of establishing standing maritime forces or acquiring EU-owned capabilities in other key areas[30]. The Communiqué also dedicated considerable attention to the security of the Union's external border, stating that it is no longer exclusively a national task but a common responsibility, proposing the creation of a multinational border and coast guard[31].

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27 Communiqué, page 4.

28 Communiqué, page 5.

29 Communiqué, page 4.

30 Compact, page 4. There are other proposals whose full reach we cannot at this stage grasp, such as the establishment of a European semester on defence capabilities. Through this process, the EU will support efforts by Member States by ensuring the coherence of defence and capability-building processes and encourage Member States to discuss the priorities of their respective military spending plans.

31 Communiqué, page 6. Those proposals, namely the increase of intelligence sharing, the creation of a multinational border and coast guard, and the joint research and investment in com-

The Communiqué also highlights the EU's ambition to become an independent and global actor, based upon its ability to leverage a unique array of expertise and tools, both civilian and military; security is also considered an element of the global ambition of the European project[32]. The document adds that the European Union Global Strategy is a first step in that direction, without making any reference to the new conditions arising from the UK retreat, i.e. a weaker EU with less resources and means to implement such an ambitious strategy. Last but by no means least, the document forgets to mention NATO and the transatlantic relation.

The mere enunciation by Germany and France of the willingness to implement the above set of proposals is a clear evidence of U.S.'s reduced influence and leverage on EU security and defence matters in the post-'Brexit' era. The "European Security Compact" unmistakably indicates Berlin and Paris' intention to deepen and accelerate European security and defence integration. These ventures would be impossible with the UK in the Union.

How the new relation of force is going to work is a question mark, particularly in light of France's willingness to coexist and accommodate itself with German leadership. It is still too soon to say how Germany will assert itself in the future, in the international affairs arena and in the security and defence realm. Germany's interventions in the post-Cold War period have been very selective, acting in a decisive manner when their national interests were at stake, such as its conduct during the Yugoslav crisis has shown. Berlin's pressure on other EU Member States imposing the premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia's independence led to a civil war with well-known results and illustrates Germany's determination.

One still does not have a clear picture of Germany's intentions. For instance, it is crucial to understand the extent of Germany's willingness to build an EU Army, regardless of the impact it can have on transatlantic relations. The upcoming publication of a Defense White Paper, a strategy document setting out guidelines for German defense policy, will certainly provide important elements to respond to this question. It is decisive to understand to what extent German political and economic elites believe that Berlin has already paid for its past errors and it is now time to claim an international status and role more in line and compatible with its economic relevance.

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mon defense projects were also agreed by the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi during a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, on 22 August.

32 "…Providing security for Europe as well as contributing to peace and stability globally is at the heart of the European project…we see the EU as a key power in its neighbourhood but also as an actor for peace and stability with global reach…"

The evolution of the German defence budget in the near future will certainly also
provide indications of its intentions and elements to figure out what could be a pos-
sible answer to our present questions. Important to include in this reflection are
the various statements of the German president and foreign and defense ministers
saying that Germany should assume more responsibilities for international secu-
rity, implying that Berlin should contribute more militarily, as well as in other ways
(Keohane, 2016).

It is interesting to note in the German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen's
speech at the Munich Security Conference, in 2015, where she expands on the con-
cept of "Leadership from the Centre", a glimpse of an elegant construct on how
Germany should lead and shoulder greater responsibility in Europe and in interna-
tional politics, very much in line with the "soft executive" form of governance
enunciated by Seminatore. She argues that a stronger German military contribution
to European defense will remain constrained by domestic politics and should there-
fore not unduly raise the hopes or fears of allies. However, we have to wait and see
what the German elites are going to do in order to persuade their constituencies of
the need of a greater military role for Germany[33].

Conclusion

Based on the arguments extensively discussed throughout this paper, one can con-
clude that the impact of 'Brexit' on Foreign and Security Policy of the Union was
responsible for the emergence, in the short term, of one potential winner (Ger-
many), eventually two (Germany and France), and one winner in the long term
(Germany). For the remaining players (the UK, the EU, the U.S. and smaller EU
Member States) 'Brexit' represented a negative-sum game.

'Brexit' is not going to improve UK´s position in the international system and the
UK will most likely become a less relevant diplomatic player; it is going to lose
influence and maneuvering space in the international arena; it will lose the possibil-
ity to use its member state's status to enhance its international influence; it can no
longer use CSDP to promote its national interests; and the goal of becoming a stra-
tegic actor with global reach and influence will be seriously affected. Moreover, the
departure of the UK is not going to improve its relations with the U.S. The leverage
and influence exerted by the UK in the EU decision-making is gone, thereby reduc-

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33 On this issue, it is important to read the speech of the Defence Minister Ursula Leyen to the 2015
    Munich Security Conference where this problem is identified: "…Thus, *we need to tirelessly com-
    municate and explain* throughout Germany that the commitment to unity, justice and freedom
    today is no longer a purely domestic, national affair. And *we need to explain* that the grueling,
    often painful and hard struggle in defense of human rights, democracy and freedom worldwide
    is not a duty for others to fulfil, but equally concerns us Germans…" Author's italics.

ing U.S. capability to influence the evolution of CSDP. From this perspective, one could argue that the U.S. is also a potential loser.

'Brexit' is not going to improve EU's internal and external situation either. The Union will most probably evolve into a smaller and less ambitious organisation. 'Brexit' is going to produce a negative effect on the EU's aspirations to become a relevant player in international politics. The EU will likely become a weaker actor in the international arena; the first immediate victim of 'Brexit' was the EUGS. Without the UK, CSDP will suffer a significant blow and its level of ambition in terms of Europe's role in the world has to be reassessed and significantly downgraded; the EU is going to have less deterrent capabilities. In the domain of the defence industry and technology, the EU seems to lose considerably more than the UK.

When it comes to developments in the EU's power base and a new internal realignment of positions, the possible creation of an informal core group of states with additional prerogatives in the decision-making process, sidelining the remaining countries, may represent an enhancement of German and French positions, making them the winners. German assertiveness may transform the current "soft executive" into a "hard executive" form of governance, making it also a winner in the long term. A visible consequence of this centripetal movement created by the new balance and correlation of forces within the Union is the indication of Berlin and Paris' intention to deepen and accelerate European security and defence integration, something impossible to occur with the UK in the Union.

The smaller nations who do not have the possibility of joining that core group/ directorate group will increase the list of losers. The EU project as a whole might also be a loser, if challenged by sub-regional arrangements inspired by Brexit, regardless of the formality/informality they may assume.

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