

Europe's Continued Focus on Securitising African Migration Comes at a High Cost*

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Abstract

Since the 2015 migration 'crisis', Europe has increasingly applied a securitised approach to African migration: prioritising stemming flows and preventing irregular migrants from reaching Europe's external borders. This approach has slowed arrivals but comes with severe costs. Africa has resisted many securitisation and externalisation measures because they do not serve African interests. Migration is viewed mostly positively across the continent. The African Union and Member States are working towards free movement and free trade to maximise development potential. Securitisation hinders this progress. Europe's unrelenting focus on this issue is not commensurate with the actual number of African migrants who arrive irregularly in Europe. Impasses on this issue have already compromised more important agreements around trade, development, and security. Europe should carefully consider the impacts of its

migration policies and weigh them against the real and prospective costs. Collaboration will succeed most in areas where African and European priorities converge.

Keywords: Africa; Migration; European Union; African Union.

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Resumo

O Foco Contínuo da Europa na Securitização da Migração Africana Tem um Custo Elevado

Desde a 'crise' migratória de 2015, a Europa tem aplicado cada vez mais uma abordagem securitizada à migração africana: priorizando a contenção dos fluxos e evitando que os migrantes irregulares cheguem às fronteiras externas da Europa. Essa abordagem retardou as chegadas, mas vem com custos elevados. A África resistiu a muitas medidas de securitização e externalização porque não atendem aos interesses africanos. A migração é vista principalmente de forma positiva em todo o continente. A União Africana e os Estados-membros estão a trabalhar para a livre circulação e comércio livre para maximizar o potencial de desenvolvimento. A securitização atrapalha esse progresso. O foco implacável da Europa nesta questão não é compatível com o número real de migrantes africanos que chegam irregularmente na Europa. Impasses nessa questão já comprometeram acordos mais importantes em torno de comércio, desenvolvimento e segurança. A Europa

deve considerar cuidadosamente os impactos das suas políticas de migração e compará-los com os custos reais e futuros. A colaboração terá maior sucesso em áreas onde convergem as prioridades africanas e europeias.

Palavras-chave: África; Migração; União Europeia; União Africana.

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Introduction

Europe, while recognising the benefits of free movement and trade within the European Union, has increasingly applied a 'securitised' approach towards African migration.

A series of policy platforms and strategies have emerged at bilateral and multilateral levels that have prioritised limiting arrivals to Europe's external borders. These measures have included proposals to establish offshore asylum processes, strengthening borders and barriers to movement, and increasing surveillance, detention, and deportation, among others.

Africa and African states have resisted or rejected many securitisation and externalisation measures. In recent years Europe and member states have been increasing pressure on cooperation through various political instruments (Newland, 2018).

At continental, regional and state levels, Africa has divergent priorities. Africa is working towards free movement regionally and continentally (Abebe, 2018). Perspectives on migration in Africa as a whole are positive. Migration plays a major development role. Distinctions between irregular, 'illegal' and regular are less clear-cut. Strengthening measures to prevent or deter migration, or facilitating forced returns, if not managed carefully, run the risk of losing out on trade and development on the continent.

In 2020, the European Commission (EC) proposed the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (New Pact). It is aimed at rebuilding trust and developing workable compromises within the European Union's (EU) 27 states. It purports to be a "a fresh start on migration: building confidence through more effective procedures and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity" (European Commission, 2020).

While some components of the New Pact have potential to align with African priorities and foster stronger cooperation with African partners, the New Pact reinforces a securitised approach to African migration and expands the mechanisms to enforce it.

Decreasing irregular migrant arrivals and enhancing returns are among the seven thematic areas of the New Pact that aim to increase returns by implementing a common EU system that combines stronger structures with more effective cooperation with third countries. Measures include strengthening border control, signing returns agreements with third countries and allowing EU member states to choose between resettling refugees and sponsoring returns.

This paper outlines the realities of African migration and establishes that African migration is an African issue first and foremost. Europe's securitised responses towards Africa are disproportionate and have severe effects that impede the

development impacts of migration, put migrants at elevated risks, and impact more important development and trade agendas.

It focuses on returns as a specific component of Europe's securitised approach towards African migration. It outlines the complexities of sustainable returns and why these policies work against African interests. It argues Europe's continued focus on stemming migration flows from migration at all costs reflects internal European political issues and puts African partnerships at risk.

African migration is an African Issue not a European 'crisis'

Contrary to the narrative that portrays African migration flowing principally to the EU, African migration is predominantly African and regular. Far more Africans move across land borders on the continent than across any sea. And far more do so regularly than irregularly.

According to the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Africa Migration Report: Challenging the Narrative (2020), 21 million of the world's 39.4 million African-born migrants (53.2%) live in Africa (IOM 2020: 164). Over 80 percent of Africans considering migration have no intention of leaving the continent (IOM, 2020: 20).

Migration and returns are considered African issues first and foremost as most Africans migrate within the continent. Free migration in Africa has proved to be mostly circular and to benefit all involved, including in trade, commerce and tourism (de Haas, 2017).

Strengthening measures to prevent or deter migration, or facilitating forced returns, if not managed carefully, run the risk of losing out on trade and development on the continent.

Remittances serve as the most dependable source of income to many African societies. According to IOM Africa Migration Report (2020), Africa received USD 81 billion in remittances in 2018. In contrast, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2019) reported a total USD 46 billion in foreign direct investment to Africa. The World Bank (Ratha, 2019) has established that remittances are the most important source of external financing in low- and middle-income countries; in most cases they are larger than development aid and foreign investment combined.

Europe is the most popular off-continent destination with 26% of total African migrants residing in Europe (IOM, 2020: 35). However, African migrants only comprise 12.9% of the international migrants (10.6 million people) in Europe (IOM, 2020: 14).

Of all continents, Africans are the least mobile and migrate the least. Africans comprise 14% of global migrants compared to 41% from Asia and 24% from Europe (IOM, 2020: 19). This is, however, increasing at a faster rate than other continents. Between 2000 and 2019, the number of African people moving on the continent increased at 76% (IOM, 2020: 34). Mobility and populations are increasing at the fastest pace in the world.

Irregular migration is, by definition, difficult to estimate because it is undocumented. However, the IOM estimates that as many as 85% of African migrants migrate regularly (IOM, 2020: 23).

When it comes to forced displacement, Africa hosts a quarter of the world's displaced population, despite severe resource constraints. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency – UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020) – says Africa hosts 25.7 million of the world's 79.5 million displaced people. Even when it comes to sea routes, far more Africans are using the Eastern Routes to get to the Middle East and Gulf via Yemen. In 2019 alone, 138,000 Africans used the treacherous Eastern Route; between 2006 and 2016, over 800,000 African migrants and refugees crossed to Yemen (IOM, 2020a).

Europe disproportionately focuses on Africa

Overall irregular border crossings to EU member states have dramatically decreased since Europe detected 1.82 million illegal external border crossings in 2015. According to UNHCR (2021) data, 95,031 refugees and migrants crossed the Mediterranean into the EU during 2020 and 64,394 as of August 29, 2021.

Figure 1
UNHCR Mediterranean Sea and land arrivals since 2015



According to Eurostat (2021), Africans make up a small minority of asylum claims in the EU per year. Their claims are far exceeded by those of other nationals including Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis, Turks, Iranians and more recently Venezuelans and Colombians.

Despite these low numbers, the EU directs disproportionate migration pressure towards Africa through securitised measures.

Before 2015, EU policy frameworks emphasised the need to increase safe and legal migration routes to Europe, maximise the development impacts of migration and mobility, and promote international protection as components of balanced and comprehensive migration frameworks. Expanding lawful migration channels has shown to successfully suppress unlawful migration when combined with strong enforcement measures (Center for Global Development, 2018).

Since migration was framed as a 'crisis' in 2015-16, Europe has moved away from these proposals under the pretence that it must first resolve issues related to returning migrants without legal permission to remain (Gough, 2018). They have also recognised the bargaining power of visa liberalisation schemes. Instead of using these as a migration management strategy, they are reserving them to leverage negotiations on other measures (Kipp, 2018).

The 2015 revised European Neighbourhood Policy included migration and security cooperation as key issues, namely policing, border security and counter-terrorism (Furness, 2015). It included seven African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara.

The 2015 Joint Valletta Action Plan included 35 African and European heads of state and government. Its key objectives were to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility; prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking; reinforce the protection of migrant and asylum seekers; and return, readmission and reintegration. The plan included providing vastly increased military and security cooperation to African partners including provisions for equipment, information and intelligence and surveillance (Akkerman, 2018).

EU Member states have also increased military deployments to deter migration. Ground-level military presence to prevent migration have been observed in communities. While still EU members, the United Kingdom deployed troops to Sierra Leona because "We want to do more than pull migrants out of the water, we want to stop them before they get there" (Abebe, 2019).

The presence of foreign troops in Africa to deter migration further complicates already troubled peace and security dynamics on the continent. Conflict has been the leading cause of forced displacement for the past 50 years. Increased military presence in non-conflict arenas such as migration also undermines the continent's

effort of demilitarisation through African Union (AU) initiatives such as 'silencing the guns by 2020' (Abebe, 2019).

The EC's (2016) New Partnership Framework, is a follow-up initiative to the Valletta Summit. It sets out a framework for cooperation with third party countries, including expanding the European External Action Service into third countries. 13 of the 16 priority countries are in Africa, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Frontex, established in 2004, is the European external border protection agency. Its mandate is to protect the external borders and coordinate border security efforts. Frontex's mandates have vastly expanded since inception to now include monitoring, operations, risk analysis and vulnerability assessments and returns. Frontex's budget has increased from €6.3 million in 2005 to €322 million in 2020 – more than a 5 000% increase (European Court of Auditors 2020)

Development funds as leverage

In line with increased securitisation policies, Koch et al (2018) argue that, in recent years, the EU has re-oriented development funding to include migration restrictions under the auspices of addressing the 'root causes' of migration.

The Valletta Summit led to the launch of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF), which has served as the financial and implementation arm. According to the 2020 Annual Report, as of 31 December 2020, total resources allocated to the EUTF amounted to € 5 billion (EC 2021a) for North of Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad and the Horn of Africa regions.

The EUTF has been widely criticized for calling itself aid while directing much of its spending on measures to curb migration and security measures that are not aligned with development and humanitarian objectives.

A 2020 Oxfam report found that "Official Development Assistance (ODA) is increasingly being tied to the EU's desire to stop irregular migration and reach agreements with African countries on the return of their nationals". It further found that EUTF budgets were being allocated according to which nationalities were arriving in the EU, and that many EU and government officials have gone on record expressing that the EUTF should be used to prevent arrivals and enhance returns (Raty, 2020). It warns against providing aid to countries based on their willingness to cooperate with EU demands on returns and border controls.

The New Pact states all available tools should be used to enforce more returns. These include offering an additional 10% in development assistance to countries

that cooperate and applying restrictive visa measures to those who do not. This indicates that the EU plans to continue applying a rewards approach to countries that cooperate and a punitive approach to countries that do not. The New Pact directs even more funding towards security and surveillance measures – including allocations to repressive governments – than projects with true development potential. The New Pact’s visa proposal deepens the 2019 EU revised visa system by shifting to a multilaterally binding instrument. EU development assistance is supposed to be spent on helping those in need and visa measures should remain bilateral.

Focus on returns

As part of a broader securitised approach, EU institutions and Member States have increased their focus on returning migrants.

According to the New Pact (EC, 2020), an average of 370,000 asylum applicants are rejected each year and only a third are returned home.

Pressure is high from portions of the EU and their constituents to demonstrate a system that can control migration and apply law and order. This includes returning migrants who do not have legal rights to remain, including those who do not qualify for asylum or who have overstayed their visas. Some elements within the EU feel that a well-functioning immigration system must include decisions that consistently lead to effective returns.

Within the EU, where migration is deeply divisive among Member States, enforcing returns is one of the few unifying topics. According to the New Pact (EC, 2020):

“EU migration rules can be credible only if those who do not have the right to stay in the EU are effectively returned. Currently, only about a third of people ordered to return from Member States actually leave. This erodes citizens’ trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management and acts as an incentive for irregular migration.”

What are migrant returns?

Returns can be voluntary or forced. They occur individually and in mass numbers. Some returnees have full access to due process while others have been summarily deported in groups reaching hundreds of thousands. Enforcement methods include detention, torture, harassment, extortion and physical force (Migration Policy Institute, 2018). Many people have been returned to countries of which they are not citizens (Loprete, 2018).

From a policy perspective, the most critical distinction is between voluntary and involuntary returns.

According to the IOM (2021), voluntariness exists if two conditions apply:

1. Freedom of choice, defined as the absence of physical or psychological pressure.
2. An informed decision, which requires the availability of timely, unbiased and reliable information on which to base the decision.

Voluntary return is more cost-effective than forced returns. The European Parliament estimates voluntary returns average EUR 560 per person, including in-cash and in-kind reintegration assistance, while forced returns cost EUR 3 414 (EC, 2021b). This reflects the higher costs to detain and escort returnees before and after return.

Return rates – the number of returns ordered divided by the number of actual returns – of sub-Saharan African countries (9%) are lower than overall rates out of Europe (36%) and are trending downward (Slagter 2019). In 2019, only 9,655 returnees – six percent of total returns – were sub-Saharan African nationals (Eurostat 2020).

Removing unauthorised people from one country requires another country to accept them and both countries to cooperate and coordinate (Newland, 2018). Countries are obliged to receive their nationals back but have a sovereign right to determine nationality. It is illegal to return someone to a country that refuses to accept them.

Many countries, including in Africa, refuse to accept forced returns of their own nationals or delay issuing travel documents to people without sufficient identification. Nationality can be complicated to prove, particularly if migrants dispute their origin or are unwilling to cooperate.

Some migrants destroy their identification and claim no nationality as a means of avoiding forced return. In some cases, migrants genuinely do not possess identification because they never had it or lost it on their migration journey. Other migrants are stateless (Migration Policy Institute, 2018).

According to Frontex's (2020) Risk Analysis, 14,346 people of 'unspecified sub-Saharan nationals' arrived in Europe in 2019, up from 69 in 2018 and 0 in 2017. These statistics suggest that authorities created a new classification for undocumented migrants whom they suspected were African but could not confirm it because those individuals refused to disclose or dispute their country of origin to avoid being returned.

Returns require cooperation from various states that often have vastly different interests. Stakeholders within countries or institutions also have different priorities. Development actors consider remittances, immigration focuses on procedure, and law enforcement considers it a security issue.

The Institute for Security Studies (Mbiyozo 2019) found that, even when all parties agree to returns, reintegration schemes for failed asylum seekers or irregular migrants from the EU to Africa have been largely ineffective. They have instead resulted in hardship, violence and even re-migration. Many cases have been documented where returnees have not received the assistance they were promised. Some people have even been returned to the wrong countries.

Frontex (2019) claims that Africa's low return rate reflects a lack of cooperation from African countries, practical issues related to identifying nationalities, and administrative capacities in origin countries.

However, African negotiators have consistently and intentionally resisted forcing states to take back their returned nationals and failed asylum seekers.

At the heart of the debate is the development role of migration, particularly in high-flow countries where aspirational migration contributes substantial human and financial capital at individual and state levels. Strengthening securitised measures to prevent or deter migration are contrary to these priorities.

Cooperating on returns can be perceived as 'anti-migration' among constituents who view migration positively or rely heavily on remittances.

Irregular migration is also an outlet for a growing youth population who often face high levels of unemployment and political frustration (Herbert 2016). Politicians cannot be seen to facilitate forced returns without paying a price domestically, even if the trade-off is substantial amounts of development funding from Europe.

Cooperating with EU members on forced returns can hurt the legitimacy of governments. This resistance by African governments is driven in part by the urge to avoid being branded as facilitators of deportation of their own citizens.

According to VOA (Hoiye, 2016), in December 2016, Mali was offered USD 160 million to cooperate on migrant returns, but it withdrew from the deal due to a public outcry. According to the New Humanitarian (Hunt, 2020), the Gambia faced public outcry after it signed a similar informal arrangement in May 2018. Returns from Germany began accelerating and media images of deportees in handcuffs and shackles arriving in the Gambia from Germany at a time of massive youth unemployment resulted in mass protest. The government eventually stopped cooperating on returns to offset potential damage to their constitutional role as protectors of their citizens – and subsequently hurt public trust in them.

Third-country returns

Third-country returns, meaning expelling someone to a country where he or she is not a national, are particularly contentious.

Efforts to recreate an African version of the so-called 'Turkey Deal' whereby Turkey agreed to take back non-national from Greece in exchange for cash incentives and visa liberalisation for Turks, have failed (Sieff, 2017).

African states and the AU have strongly resisted third-country returns and offshore 'disembarkation' centres. Some argue that they already shoulder more than their 'fair' share are 'full', and that readmitting transit migrants who passed through would increase the burden on already restricted resources. Some have been expelling migrants and asylum seekers themselves. Human Rights Watch (2020) reports that, during 2020, Algeria has forcefully expelled thousands of migrants and asylum seekers to Niger regardless of nationality.

Expelling people to transit countries does not sustainably resolve any issues and sets a problematic precedent.

New EU Strategy on Voluntary Return and Integration

In April 2021, the EC (EC, 2021b) published the EU Strategy on Voluntary Return and Integration (New Strategy) to address these key strategic objectives of the New Pact. It aims to "promote voluntary return and reintegration as an integral part of a common EU system for returns" and "develop a more coherent and coordinated approach" among Member States.

The New Strategy lays out a series of measures to establish common procedures across the EU and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of returns, at all costs. It appears to buttress existing securitisation measures without consideration for why African partner countries have resisted them. It includes provisions to detain 'voluntary' returnees in the border environment "since people will be available and more willing to cooperate with the authorities". It expands Frontex' duties to include return and reintegration services, including enforcement, counselling, and deploying liaison officers in third countries.

The New Strategy, again, emphasises the importance of partner countries in cooperating on returns and ensuring they are sustainable, but claims that they do not always have a strong "sense of ownership of the reintegration process". It credits "shortcomings in capacity, public services as well as political, legislative and operational frameworks". This willfully ignores the many ways in which these approaches are damaging to African interests and reasons why Africa has resisted them.

The costs of securitisation – country examples

Niger

A 2019 Institute for Security Studies report (Abebe, 2019) examining the impacts of European policies in Agadez, Niger, revealed many adverse impacts. Agadez is a key transit point between West Africa and the Sahel and the Maghreb region. It is estimated that a third of all migrants travelling through Agadez end up on a boat to Europe. The EU's interventions to dismantle Agadez's 'migration industry' without putting in place alternative means of income generation for its residents have significantly diminished the local economy. Traders who provided goods and services such as food, water or phones have lost their livelihoods. Development aid promising to replace these livelihoods has not arrived fast enough and many people have been disenfranchised.

While these measures have curtailed the local smuggling industry, they have unwittingly contributed to a rise in others. Large criminal syndicates have been able to adapt and continue to provide smuggling services, while smaller Nigerien smuggling operators such as drivers or hostel operators have lost their business. Sudanese smugglers have capitalised on these shifts and offered new – and riskier – pathways through less-travelled parts of Chad and Sudan, including active conflict zones. This journey costs five times more than the one via Agadez.

The government's inability to protect local economic actors has eroded public confidence in the local government. Molenaar (2017) quotes one official who said, "the locals ask us why we work for the EU rather than them, the people who elected them".

The EUTF recognised the importance of replacing livelihoods for residents and budgeted €243 million from 2016 to 2020 for long-term socio-economic development, namely agriculture projects. However, implementation of these projects has too slow to replace with the rapidly dismantled migration industry. Disrupting local residents' livelihoods has made many people poorer and even driven some young people to banditry and made them vulnerable to radicalisation.

This report also found that Europe's increased securitisation of migration has set new precedents and had significant 'trickle down' effects within Africa. Upper-middle income countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, South Africa and Botswana have been emulating Europe's measures towards other African migrants from lower-income countries. Politicians have scapegoated migrants for under- and un-employment. Refugees are being framed as security threats. Border security measures have become increasingly militarised.

Libya

Refugees and migrants face 'unacceptable and extreme' forms of violence in Libya. Migrants – mainly from East and West Africa – who pass through or are returned from failed boat crossings to Europe endure indefinite detention, extortion, torture, sexual violence, conscription and forced labour (Mbiyozo, 2020).

The IOM estimates that at least 600 000 migrants of 46 nationalities are currently in Libya. Many are trying to reach Europe. As of August 13, 2021, 20,799 refugees and migrants have been intercepted at sea and returned to Libya (UNHCR, 2021 Libya); 1051 have died (IOM, 2021a, Missing persons).

According to Nashed (2020), up to half of those taken back to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard are unaccounted for after passing through 'disembarkation' centres. Returned migrants should be sent to official disembarkation and detention centres that have some government and international oversight.

Instead, many are disappearing – believed to be taken to unofficial detention centres. These facilities are run by armed groups who use them as lucrative trafficking and smuggling hubs. Migrants are instructed to call their families in their home countries to extort money. Conditions are inhumane, including torture for ransom, illness, death by starvation and thirst.

The Guardian (Wintour, 2019) has also linked formal detention and disembarkation to smuggling, trafficking, sexual violence and torture. The Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration leadership is – with varying degrees of effort – trying to respond and provide oversight. However, multiple reports link officials to severe violations. As of June 2020, the EU Trust Fund for Africa had given Libya €435 million, including €57.2 million for border management (EC, 2020a). They provide direct funding, training and equipment to the Libyan Coast Guard, whose members are implicated in smuggling and sustaining informal detention centres.

The EU has acknowledged the abhorrent conditions in Libya and that the Libyan government isn't working towards improving conditions.

This approach has prioritised reducing the number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving on the continent, regardless of the immense humanitarian costs. Claims that the EU strategy is 'saving the lives of those making dangerous journeys by sea or land,' or 'strengthening the Libyan search and rescue capacities' and 'improving treatment of those rescued' can no longer be accepted.

Conclusion

The EU's reorientation of migration policies prioritising the stemming of migration flows has had numerous adverse effects – intended and unintended – on Africa.

These restrictive policies are incompatible with the EU's own free movement regime and are inhibiting Africa's efforts to implement its own version.

The New Pact and accompanying New Strategy reflect the EU's priorities, underscoring that stemming African migration and emphasising returns are key unifying factors among its Member States. It does so at the expense of African partnerships or true solutions to migration management from Africa.

This approach wrongly assumes that the threat of fast deportation will deter migrants and refugees from attempting any movement. Vulnerable Africans genuinely seeking protection must surpass extraordinary barriers to reach Europe. The measures taken to stem irregular migrants increase the barriers for legitimate travellers and have made these pathways even more difficult and dangerous. They undertake extraordinary risks because they have to. There is also no evidence that a country's willingness to accept forced returns will result in a high number of returns or deter future arrivals.

The AU and its Member States maintain that returns must be voluntary despite mounting pressure across bilateral and multilateral platforms. According to Slagter (2019), only Cape Verde has signed a formal readmission agreement with the EU, while Ethiopia, Guinea, the Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire have agreed to informal arrangements.

The EU's continued focus on migration will not continue to affect important non-migration agreements, as it has in past – most notably the ACP and the Africa-EU Strategy.

The AU and its Member States should remain focused on their key priority – Africa's regional integration agenda. Implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area and expanding free movement are critical to achieving Africa's objectives – sustainable and inclusive growth, good governance, and peace and security.

Effective and efficient border environments and returns are necessary component of a comprehensive migration policy platform. However, they need to be accompanied by regular and humanitarian pathways. The complexities of returns cannot be overlooked in the drive for 'quick wins'. This will backfire in many ways. The EU should carefully consider the desired impacts of its migration policies and weigh these against the real and prospective costs. They need to strongly consider the effectiveness of policies, who and what they empower and whether their impacts will be sustainable. They should also recognise that most African countries are more influenced by internal regional interests than by European incentives or pressure. Collaboration will succeed most in areas where these converge.

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